Chandra Reddy, C.J.
1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, to quash the order of the Board of Revenue, D/- 6-1-61 reviewing its earlier order D/- 18-4-60.
2. The proceedings giving rise to this petition were initiated by the second respondent in the shape of an appeal against the Order of the Jagir Administrator. The question that was agitated before the Board of Revenue was whether the hissedars were entitled to their sharai share only from the date of the decision of the Atiyat Appeals Committee or from the date of the Abolition of the Jagirs. It was held by the Jagir Administrator that between the two dates the hissedars were entitled only to guzaras of maintenance, i. e., from the date of the abolition of the Jagirs to the date of the determination of the Atiyat Appeals Committee. On 18-4-1960 the Board of Revenue though that the sharai share of the hissedars in the commutation amount between the dates mentioned above was a debt to be determined by the Jagirdars' Debt Settlement Board. The Tribunal thought that this conclusion, namely, that the sharai share of the commutation amount was a debt, was sustained by the judgment of this Court in Sartaj Baig Khan v. Muzaffarunnisa Begum, (1958) 2 Andh WR 519. Later on, when it was brought to the notice of the Board that it misunderstood the scope of the ruling relied on, it reviewed its own order and held that the hissedars were entitled to their share of the commutation amount and that they should be paid their share as fixed by the Atiyat Appeal Committee from the date of the abolition of the Jagirs. It is this order that is sought to be removed on certiorari.
3. In support of this writ petition, it is argued by Sri Ali Adil that the Board of Revenue is not competent to review its own order, as there is no provision of law which has vested the Board with such a power.
4. Incontestably, the Hyderabad (Abolition of Jagirs) Regulation 1358 Fasli (LXIX of 1358 Fasli) does not contain, any provision conferring jurisdiction on the Board of Revenue to review its own orders. Our attention was drawn to Rule 9 of the rules made by the Government in exerciseof its powers under Section 24 of the aforesaid Act which runs as follows:
'The procedure laid down in the Hyderabad Revenue Act for the presentation of appeals and revision petition and the exercise of the appellate and revisional powers shall in ho far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of the regulation be adopted for the purposes of Section 20 of the Regulation.'
5. The question that poses itself before us is whether this enables the Board of Revenue to apply Section 166 of the Hyderabad Land Revenue Act (VIII of 1317 Fasli), which clothes every Revenue Officer with authority to review his own orders. Section 166 (omitting the unnecessary portions) runs as follows:
'166 (1) Every Revenue Authority may, either himself or on the application of any party accompanied by the original order of decision or an authenticated copy thereof against which review is intended, revise the order or decision which he or his predecessor may have passed and made such order as may seem fit to him; provided that a petition for review may be presented on the following grounds only.'
6. There can be little doubt that if this section is attracted to the hearing of appeals and revisions by the Board of Revenue, it is competent for the Board of Revenue to review its own orders. We have, therefore, to consider whether Rule 9 empowers the Board to invoke Section 166 of the Hyderabad Land Revenue Act. This depends upon the connotation of this Rule. In our opinion this rule does not enable the Board to have recourse to the provisions of the Hyderabad Land Revenue Act, among which is Section 166, other than those dealing with the procedure relating to the presentation of appeals and revision petitions and the exercise of such jurisdiction.
7. The pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Martin Burn Ltd. v. R.N. Banerjee, : (1958)ILLJ247SC does not govern the instant case. That case dealt with Ss. 9 and 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. Section 9 of that Act, which bore on the powers and procedure of the Appellate Tribunal, postulates:
'The Appellate Tribunal shall have the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court when hearing an appeal, under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Aet V of 1908).'
Section 10 reads:
'The appellate Tribunal shall follow such procedure as may be prescribed, and subject thereto, it may, by order, regulate its practice and procedure and the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908), shall so far as they are not inconsistent with this Act, or the rules or orders made thereunder, apply to all proceedings 'before the Appellate Tribunal.'
8. It is manifest from Section 10 of that Act that it was open to the Tribunal to apply all the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code by making ar. order to that effect. Quite apart from that, the language of Section 9 makes it abundantly clear that it conferred on the Appellate Tribunal all the powers which were vested in a Civil Court under the Civil Procedure Code. Obviously 'when bearing an appeal' is a parenthesis. These wordswere used between the words 'civil Court' and 'under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908', It is for this reason that their Lordships held that the Appellate Tribunal possessed all the powers of a civil Court while exercising its jurisdiction, whether original or appellate. In this context, it is pertinent to extract the following passage from that judgment.
'The very juxtaposition of the words 'when hearing an appeal' with the words 'a civil Court' is sufficient in our opinion to invest the Labour Appellate Tribunal while exercising its jurisdiction -- whether original or appellate -- with the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure when it is exercising its appellate jurisdiction, and hearing appeals.'
9. It is plain that the ratio decidendi of that case is based upon the wording of Section 9. So, that decision is easily distinguishable from the present case and the instant case does not fall within the doctrine of : (1958)ILLJ247SC .
10. It is well settled that the powers of a Tribunal, which is creature of a statute, must be found within the four corners of the statute, and, in the absence of any provision investing the Tribunal with authority to hear either appeals or revisions or reviews, it is not competent for it to do it. As already observed, there is no specific provision in the Act or in the rules which gives such a power to the Board of Revenue. It follows that the Board has acted without jurisdiction, in reviewing its earlier order and the impugned order has to be set aside.
11. Even its prior order also cannot be allowed to stand for the reason that the sharai share of a hissedar is not a debt within the terms of the Hyderabad Jagirdars Debt Settlement Act (XII of 1952). It was, therefore, not competent for the Board of Revenue to remit the matter to the Debt Settlement Board to adjudicate upon the share of the commutation amount of the respondent.
12. In the result, the original order nf the Board of Revenue also, is set aside and the Board is directed to take the appeal filed by the second respondent before it, on file and dispose it of according to law. Parties will bear their own costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 100/- (Rupees hundred).