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In Re: Kafula Srinivasa Rao - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCriminal
CourtAndhra Pradesh High Court
Decided On
Judge
Reported in1957CriLJ1223
AppellantIn Re: Kafula Srinivasa Rao
Excerpt:
.....under article 134(1)(c) the high court should certify a case as a fit one where exceptional and special circumstances exist. cases that arose under section 109(c) of the code of civil procedure, the learned judges laid down that the certificate should be granted not only where special and exceptional circumstances exist but also where injustice of a serious and substantial character has occurred. generally speaking, this court will not grant special leave, unless it is shown that exceptional and special circumstances exist, that substantial and grave injustice has been done and that the case in question presents features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the decision appealed against. unless it is shown that exceptional and special circumstances exist that substantial and..........under article 134(1)(c) the high court should certify a case as a fit one where exceptional and special circumstances exist.2. we shall next refer to the decisions of the madras high court bearing on the interpretation of article 134(1)(c) of the constitution. the first decision is that reported in mandalapu paddayya, in re, : air1951mad329 (e). after discussing the. cases that arose under section 109(c) of the code of civil procedure, the learned judges laid down that the certificate should be granted not only where special and exceptional circumstances exist but also where injustice of a serious and substantial character has occurred. this decision was followed in narayana v. kesappa : air1951mad721 (f). the learned judges observed that the principles followed by the supreme court.....
Judgment:

Umamaheswaram, J.

1. This is an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution. Article 134(1)(c) provides that an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, final order or sentence in a criminal proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India, if the High Court certifies that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. The terms of Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution and Section 109(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure are in identical terms. Bose, J., in delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court in Nar Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh : [1955]1SCR238 (A), observed as to the scope of Article 134(1)(c) as follows:

In the case of Clause (c) both of Article 133(1) and Article 134(1), the only condition is the discretion of the High Court but the discretion is a judicial one and must be judicially exercised along the well-established lines which govern these matters (see Benarsi Pershad v. Kashi Krishna ILR 23 All 227 at p. 231 (PC) (B).); also the certificate must show on the face of it that the discretion conferred was invoked and exercised; Radhakrishna Ayyar v. Swaminatha Ayyar ILR 44 Mad 293 at p. 295 : AIR 1921 PC 25 at p. 26 (C) and Radha Krishn Das v. Krishn Chand ILR 23 All 415 (D).

In the Privy Council decision referred to by Bose, J., viz., in ILR 23 All 227 at p. 231 (PC) (B), Lord Hobhouse stated that the High Court should grant a certificate only in special cases. His observations are as follows:

That is clearly intended to meet special cases; such for example, as those in which the point in dispute is not measurable by money, though it may be of great public or private importance. To certify that a case is of that kind, though it is left entirely in the discretion of the Court is a judicial process which could not be performed without special exercise of that discretion, evidenced by the fitting certificate.

This decision was followed by the Privy Council in ILR 23 All 415 (D). In ILR 44 Mad 293 at p. 295 : AIR 1921 PC 25 at p. 26 (C), Lord Buckmaster reiterated that the conditions that regulate the granting of a certificate for leave to appeal have been clearly stated in the Privy Council decisions referred to supra. Referring to the scope of Section 109(c) he observed as follows:

This does not cover the whole ground of appeal, because it is plain that there may be certain cases in which it is impossible to define in money value the exact character of the dispute; there are questions, as for example those relating to religious rights and ceremonies, to caste and family rights, or such matters as the reduction of the capital of companies as well as questions of wide public importance in which the subject-matter in dispute cannot be reduced into actual terms of money. Sub-section (c) of Section 109 of the Civil Procedure Code contemplates that such a state of things exists, Rule 3 of Order 45 regulates the procedure.

It is therefore clear from an examination of the decisions referred to supra that under Article 134(1)(c) the High Court should certify a case as a fit one where exceptional and special circumstances exist.

2. We shall next refer to the decisions of the Madras High Court bearing on the interpretation of Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution. The first decision is that reported in Mandalapu Paddayya, In re, : AIR1951Mad329 (E). After discussing the. cases that arose under Section 109(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the learned Judges laid down that the certificate should be granted not only where special and exceptional circumstances exist but also where injustice of a serious and substantial character has occurred. This decision was followed in Narayana v. Kesappa : AIR1951Mad721 (F). The learned Judges observed that the principles followed by the Supreme Court in granting special leave under Article 136 should be adopted by the High Courts in deciding in what cases, certificate should be granted under Article 134(1)(c).

3. In dealing with the question when special leave might be granted under Article 136, the Supreme Court held in Pritam Singh v. The State : 1950CriLJ1270 (G), as. follows:

Generally speaking, this Court will not grant special leave, unless it is shown that exceptional and special circumstances exist, that substantial and grave injustice has been done and that the case in question presents features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the decision appealed against.

The same view was reiterated by Mahajan C. J., in Hem Raj v. State of Ajmer : 1954CriLJ1313 (H), in the following terms:

Unless it is shown that exceptional and special circumstances exist that substantial and grave in-justice has been done and the case in question presents features of sufficient gravity to warrant a re-view of the decision appealed against, this Court does not exercise its overriding powers trader Article 136(1) of the Constitution and the circumstance that because the appeal has been admitted by special leave does not entitle the appellant to open out the whole case and contest all the findings of fact and raise every point which could be raised in the High Court.

In Dhakeswari Cotton Mills v. Income-tax Commissioner, West Bengal 1955 SCJ 122 : AIR 1955 SC 65 (I), decided recently Mahajan C. J., stated that it was not possible to define with any precision the limitations on the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Supreme Court by the constitutional provision made in Article 136 of the Constitution. At page 127 (of SCJ) : (at p. 69 of AIR), he observed as follows:

The limitations, whatever they be, are implicit in the nature and character of the power itself. It being an exceptional and overriding power, naturally it has to be exercised sparingly and with caution and only in special and extraordinary situations. Beyond that it is not possible to fetter the exercise, of this power by any set formula or rule. All that can be said is that the Constitution having trusted the wisdom and good sense of the Judges of this Court in this matter, that itself is a sufficient safeguard and guarantee that the power will only be used to advance the cause of justice, and that its exercise will be governed by well-established principles which govern the exercise of overriding constitutional powers. It is, however, plain that when the Court reaches the conclusion that a person has been dealt with arbitrarily or that a Court or Tribunal within the territory of India has not given a fair deal to a litigant, then no technical hurdles of any kind like the finality of finding of facts or otherwise can stand in the way of the exercise of this power because the whole intent and purpose of this Article is that it is the duty of this Court to see that injustice is not perpetuated or perpetrated by decisions of Courts and tribunals because certain laws have made the decisions of these Courts or Tribunals final and conclusive.

The view taken in : AIR1951Mad329 (E) and : AIR1951Mad721 (F), was dissented from in Sheriff v. Govindan : AIR1951Mad1060 (J) & Public Prosecutor v. A. K. Gopalan : AIR1953Mad66 (K). It was held in the latter decisions that the powers of the High Court under Article 134(1)(c) and tile Supreme Court under Article 136 are not identical. It was pointed out that 'the only common consideration with the High Court under Article 134(1)(c) and the Supreme Court under Article 136 may well take into account as a ground for granting leave is that 'exceptional' and special circumstances exist'', which is the first of the three requirements indicated by the Supreme Court in : 1950CriLJ1270 (G). It is not necessary for us on the facts of the present case to refer the matter to a Full Bench to solve the conflict that exists between the two sets of Madras decisions referred to supra. As the matter has not been fully argued before us, we do not wish to express our ' opinion as to which view is correct, though our prima facie inclination is that the powers of the High Court under Article 134(1)(c) are not as wide as the powers of the Supreme Court under Article 136, the terms of the two Articles not being ad idem.

4. Even applying the wider interpretation placed upon Article 134(1)(c) by Govinda Menon and Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, JJ., in : AIR1951Mad721 (F), to the facts of the present case, we see no reason to grant a certificate that the case-is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. In the judgment we have discussed how the offence of murder is made out on the testimony of the eye witnesses. The question involved is one of fact depending upon the evidence in record. There is no substantial question of law involved in the case. We followed the decision of the Madras High Court in Choragudi Venkatadri v. Emperor ILR 33 Mad 502 (L), and held that there was no misjoinder of charges. On the facts we came to the conclusion that the offences of murder and attempt to commit suicide formed part of the same transaction and that the provisions of Section 235(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure were satisfied. There are no exceptional and special circumstances so as to warrant the grant of a certificate under Article 134(1)(c). As our decision is based on the oral testimony of the eye witnesses and the several circumstances referred to in our judgment, we do not feel that any substantial and grave injustice had been done or that there are any features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of our decision. We do not agree with the learned advocate for the petitioner that there is any great difficulty in the interpretation of Section 235 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the circumstances, the application is dismissed.


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