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Mrs. R.D. Chand and anr. Vs. the State of Andhra Pradesh and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectProperty
CourtAndhra Pradesh High Court
Decided On
Case NumberWrit Petn. Nos. 1223 of 1961 and 411 and 663 of 1962
Judge
Reported inAIR1963AP383
ActsLand Acquisition Act, 1894 - Sections 6, 6(1), 17(4), 40, 40(1), 41 and 41(5); Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1962
AppellantMrs. R.D. Chand and anr.
RespondentThe State of Andhra Pradesh and ors.
Appellant AdvocateY. Shivram Sastry and ;G. Bala Parameswari Rao, Advs.
Respondent AdvocateAdv. General, ;O. Audinarayana Reddy, Adv. for ;Govt. Pleader, ;K.B. Krishna Murthy and ;M.S.R. Subramanyam, Advs.
DispositionPetitions dismissed
Excerpt:
property - acquisition of land for public purposes - sections 4, 5-a, 6 and 17 (4) of land acquisition act, 1894 and sections 40 and 41 of land acquisition act, 1894 as amended by act of 1962 - land of petitioner acquired under two notifications issued under section 4 - under notification no. 84-a land acquired for public purpose under section 17 (4) without giving regard to section 5-a - under notification no. 84-b land acquired under section 17 (4) for public purpose - writ petition filed before high court - high court observed section 5-a not applicable in view of urgency to acquisition of arable lands - whether or not urgency exists is not matter for judicial review - power to acquire land for company engaged in work for public purpose is given under section 40 (1) (aa) - company for.....orderchandrasekhara sastry, j.1. the petitioners in these writ petitions are two of the owners of certain lands in the village of balanagar and kazigadda, hyderabad west taluk, hyderabad district.2. the petitioner in w. p. no. 411/62 is the owner of the property bearing s. nos. 25 to 30 of the total extent of ac. 97.30 guntas. the petitioner in the other two writ petitions is the owner of serial nos. 3 to 9, 10/1, 10/2, 11, 12/1 and 12/2 of the extent of ac. 143-30 guntas. the rst respondent in the writ petitions is the state of andhra pradesh represented by the secretary to the government, industries department. the 2nd respondent is the special deputy collector, land acquisition, hyderabad. the 3rd respondent is m/s. jay engineering works limited. the ist respondent issued g. o. rt. no......
Judgment:
ORDER

Chandrasekhara Sastry, J.

1. The petitioners in these writ petitions are two of the owners of certain lands in the village of Balanagar and Kazigadda, Hyderabad West Taluk, Hyderabad District.

2. The petitioner in W. P. No. 411/62 is the owner of the property bearing S. Nos. 25 to 30 of the total extent of Ac. 97.30 guntas. The petitioner in the other two writ petitions is the owner of Serial Nos. 3 to 9, 10/1, 10/2, 11, 12/1 and 12/2 of the extent of Ac. 143-30 guntas. The rst respondent in the writ petitions is the State of Andhra Pradesh represented by the Secretary to the Government, Industries Department. The 2nd respondent is the Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition, Hyderabad. The 3rd respondent is M/s. Jay Engineering Works Limited. The ist respondent issued G. O. Rt. No. 124 Industries, dated 19-5-1961 and published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette dated 22-5-1961 under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act I of 1894 notifying that it appears to the Government of Andhra Pradesh that the lands specified in the said notification are needed for a public purpose, to wit, for establishment of Jay Engineering Factories. The said notification authorised the Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition) to exercise the powers conferred by Section 4(1) of the Act. The notification further stated that under Sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act, the Governor of Andhra Pradesh directs that in view of the urgency of the case, the provisions of Section 5-A of the Act shall not apply to the acquisition of the arable lands specified in the notification. This notification is numbered as 84-A.

On the same date, another notification No. 84-B was issued with respect to six guntas in Dry S. No. 26 (One house) belonging to Abdul Khader Razvi along with one house, who is the petitioner in W. P. No. 411/62. Since this property is not arable land, the Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition), Hyderabad is appointed to perform the functions of Collector under Section 5-A of the Act. This was followed up by the notification, G. O. Rt. No. 178, Industries, D/_- 1st July, 1961 under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act declaring that the lands described in the said notification measuring about Ac. 219-00 are needed for a public purpose to wit, for establishment of Jay Engineering Factories for manufacturing sewing machines and other engineering products. The Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition) Hyderabad District was appointed to perform the functions of a Collector under the Act and was directed to take order for the acquisition of the said lands and under Subsection (i) of Section 17 of the Act, the Governor of Andhra Pradesh further directed that the possession of the said lands may be taken on the expiry of fifteen days from the date of the publication of the notification of the notice mentioned in Section 9(1) of the Act. The validity of these two notifications is in question in these writ petitions.

3. It is first contended by Mr. Balaparames-wari Rao, the learned counsel; who argued the writ petitions for the petitioners that dispensing with the notice under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act is not warranted on the facts of this case. The acquisition of the immoveable property in this case is for a Company i.e. Jay Engineering Works Limited. The notification, though it states that, in view of the urgency of the case, the provisions of Section 5A of the Act shall not apply to the acquisition of the arable lands specified therein, it does not indicate the reasons for the urgency. Hence, the said notification issued under Section 4(1) read with Section 17 of the Act is illegal and has to be quashed. Under the Act, the preliminary notification has to be published under Section 4(1). Section 5A Sub-section (i) provided that:

'Any person interested in any land which has been notified under Section 4, Sub-section (i) as being needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose or for a company may within thirty days after the issue of the notification, object to the acquisition of the land or of any land in the locality, as the case may be'.

And Sub-section (2) of Section 5A is as follows:

'Every objection under Sub-section (1) shall be made to the Collector in writing and the Collector shall give the objector an opportunity of beingheard either in person or by pleader' and shall, after hearing all such objections and after making such further inquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary, submit the case for the decision of the Provincial Government together with the record of the proceedings held by him and a report containing his recommendations on the objections. The decision of the Provincial Government on the objections shall be final.'

Sub-section (1) of Section 17 states that:

'In cases of urgency, whenever the ProvincialGovernment so directs, the Collector, though nosuch award has been made, may, on the expirationof fifteen days from the publication of the noticementioned in Section 9, Sub-section (i) take possessionof any waste or arable land needed for public purposes or for a Company. Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Crown free from all encumbrances'.

4. It is not necessary to refer to Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 17 for the purpose of deciding these writ petitions. But Sub-section (4) of Section 17 provided that :

'In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the Provincial Government, the provisions of Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) are applicable the Provincial Government may direct that the provisions of Section 5A shall not apply, and if it does so direct, a declaration may be made under Section 6 in respect of the land at any time after the publication of the notification under Section 4(1), Sub-section (1)'.

It is by virtue of the power conferred by Sub-section (4) of Section 17 that the Government in the present case directed that in view of the urgency of the case, the provisions of Section 5A of the Act shall not apply to the acquisition of the arable lands mentioned in the notification. It is not disputed before me that the direction that the provisions of Section 5A shall not apply can form part of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. It is also not contended before me that the notification under Section 4(1) itself shall state the reasons for the urgency. The Government filed a counter-affidavit only in W. P. No. 1223/61 and since the three writ petitions are heard together by consent, the same counter is used in the three writ petitions.

5. On behalf of the Jay Engineering Works Limited, the 3rd respondent in the writ petitions, a counter-affidavit is filed by Mr. K. Section Vaidyana-than, its Deputy General Manager. From his counter-affidavit the following facts appear: In pursuance of the policy of the Government for the Industrial expansion of the Country and to encourage manufacture of articles for export for earning foreign exchange and for creating favourable trade balances, the Government of India granted a licence on 21-3-1961 to the Company to establish a new, Industrial undertaking in Andhra Pra-desh within a period of 12 months. The following conditions were imposed by the said licence :

(1) Effective steps shall be taken for the establishment of this new industrial undertaking within a period of six months from the date of issue of the licence;

(2) The new industrial undertaking shall be established within a period of 12 months from the date of issue of the licence;

(3) It shall be located in Andhra Pradesh;

(4) 50,000 straight stich domestic sewing machines should be produced 2/3rd of which should be exported and 50,000 fully automatic and semiautomatic zig-zag sewing machines should be manufactured per annum 50 per cent of which should be exported.

(5) The undertaking should be under the control of the Central Government and regulated by the general policy of the Government from time to time having regard to the foreign exchange position and other exigencies.

There was an extent of Ac. 257-33 guntas of land outside the city of Hyderabad which was intended to be acquired by the Government of Andhra Pradesh for the purpose of establishing the Institute of Preventive Medicine and Notification No. 435 dated 6-9-60 was published in Andhra Pradesh Gazette, dated 22-9-60 under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. The Government of Andhra Pradesh agreed to provide the land thus notified to the 3rd respondent Company. Accordingly on 24-6-61, an agreement was entered into between the Government of Andhra Pradesh and the Company declaring that the acquisition was needed for industrial purposes and that the work was likely to prove useful to the public. Therefore a notification of withdrawal from acquisition of the land for the purpose of the Institute of Preventive Medicine was Issued on 17-4-1961 and the notification under Section 4(1) dated 19-5-61 bearing Nos. 84-A and 84-6 in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette dated 22-5-61 notifying the acquisition of Ac. 219-6 guntas of land out o the above mentioned Ac. 257-32 guntas were issued, and they were followed up by the notification in question under Section 6 of the Act. on 1-7-61. In view of the fact that the factory had to be set up immediately and had to go into production within one year from the date of the grant of the licence i.e., before aist March, 1962, 'there was urgency within the meaning of Sub-section (i) read with Sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act.

6. The facts stated above are not seriously in dispute and in view of these facts, it is quite clear that there was leal urgency in the present case which justified the Government's action in directing under Sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act that the provisions of Section 5A of the Act shall not apply to the acquisition of arable lands specified in the notification 84-A dated 19-5-1961.

7. Further it has been held by a Bench of the Madras High Court in Natesa Asari v. The State of Madras, : AIR1954Mad481 that,

'What all is required under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act is that the Government must be satisfied that there is such urgency as is contemplated by Section 17. If they are so satisfied, they are entitled to pass an order under Section 17 suspending the application of Section 5A. Whether an urgency exists or not is a matter solely for the determination of the Government and it is not a matter for judicial review'.

8. But Mr. Balapanneswari Rao also contended that in the lands covered by notification No. 84-A, there are several structures and buildings which take the case out of the category of arable lands and that therefore the Government is not justified in dispensing with the application of provisions of Section 5A of the Act. But a perusal of the said notification shows that it refers only to the arable lands and also that there are no buildings on that land. The notification relating to that part of the property which is not arable land but which consists of buildings in notification No. 84-B with reference to which the provisions of Section 5A of the Act are applicable. There is no sufficient material on record to show that the lands mentioned in notification No. 84-A are not arable lands. The allegations in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition No. 411/62 suggesting that the lands mentioned in notification No. 84-A are not arable lands are not at all substantiated. Hence I hold that the notification dated 19-5-61 under which the Governor of Andhra Pradesh directed that in view of the urgency of the case, the provisions of Section 5A shall not apply to the acquisition of the arable lands specified in the taid notification No. 84-A is valid and cannot be successfully attacked.

9. It is next strenuously contended by Mr. Bala-parrneswari Rao that conditions prescribed by part VII of the Land Acquisition Act for the acquisition in the present case which is for a Company are not satisfied and hence the acquisition is ultra vires of the powers of the Government and is illegal. The acquisition of land for companies is governed by Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act 1 of 1894. Section 40 of the Act provided that the Govern-ment shall not consent to acquire property for a company unless it is satisfied either on the report of the Collector under Section 5A or by an enquiry:

(a) that the purpose of the acquisition is to obtain land for the erection or dwelling houses for work-men employed by the company or for the provision of amenities directly connected therewith, or

(b) that such acquisition is needed for the construction of some work, and that such work is likely to prove useful to the public. Section 39 of the Act also provided that Sections 6 - 37 shall not be put in force in order to acquire land for any company, unless with the previous consent of the Provincial Government nor unless the Company shall have executed the agreement thereinafter mentioned.

The terms of the agreement referred to in Section 39 are specified in Section 41 which is as follows:

'41. If the Provincial Government is satisfied after consideration of the report if any, of the Collector under Section 5A Sub-section (2) or on the report of the Officer making an enquiry under Section 40 that the purpose of the proposed acquisition is to obtain land for the erection of dwelling houses for workmen . employed by the Company or for the provision of amenities directly connected therewith, or that the proposed acquisition is needed for the construction of a work, and that such work is likely to prove useful to the public, it shall require the Company to enter into an agreement with the Provincial Government providing to the satisfaction of the Provincial Government for the following matters, namely :

(1) the payment to the Provincial Government of the cost of the acquisition;

(2) the transfer, on such payment, of the land to the Company;

(3) the terms on which the land shall be held by the Company :

(4) where the acquisition is for the purpose of erecting dwelling houses or the provision of amenities connected therewith, the time within which, the conditions on which and the manner in which the dwelling houses or amenities shall be erected or provided; and

(5) where the acquisition is for the construction of any other work, the time within which and the conditions on which the work shall be executed and maintained and the terms on which the public shall be entitled to use the work'.

10. The agreement was entered into between the Government and the Company as G. O. Et. No. 171, Industries, dated 28th June, 1961, Notification No. 107-A and published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette dated 28-6-61. The 3rd paragraph of the preamble to the agreement stated that :

'Whereas th'e Government after making and holding an enquiry under Section 40 of the said Act, are satisfied that the acquisition of the said land is needed for industrial purposes in connection with expansion oi the Company and that such work is likely to prove useful to the public'.

Clause 4 of the preamble to the agreement further stated that:

'Whereas under Section 41 of the said Act, the Company is required to enter into an agreement with the Government in respect of matter specified in the said section'.

Clause (i) of the agreement is as follows:

'(i) That the Company will pay to the Government or such person or persons as the Government may appoint in this behalf all such sums of money as shall be awarded under the provisions of the said Act, as compensation to any person or persons who may be found on enquiry held under the provisions thereof, to be interested in the said land'; Clause (iii) (a) of the agreement stated:

'that the company will use the said land for the aforesaid purpose of putting up a factory or factories, housing colonies for staff and works or any other such building as may be required in connection therewith and for purpose of expanded activities of the Company and for no other purposes'.

11. It is not necessary to refer to the other clauses in the agreement. Section 40, Clause (i)(b) enables the Government to acquire land for a company provided that such acquisition is needed for the construction of some work and that such work is likely to prove useful to the public. But Section 41 prescribed under Sub-clause (5) that the agreement shall provide for among other matters where the acquisition is for the construction of any work other than erecting dwelling houses for the workmen employed by the Company or for provision of amenities directly connected therewith, the time within which and the conditions on which the work shall be executed and maintained and the terms on which the public shall be entitled to use the work. Section 41 itself prescribed that the Provincial Government must be satisfied that the purpose of the proposed acquisition is to obtain land for the dwelling houses for workmen employed by the company or for the provision of amenities directly connected therewith or the proposed acquisition is needed for the construction of a work and that such work is likely to prove useful to the public. In R. L. Arora v. State of Uttar Pradesh, : AIR1962SC764 the Supreme Court had to consider the scope of Sections 40 and 41 of the Land Acquisition Act and to defluii the limits oi the power of the Government to acquire land lor a company under Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. After referring to Sections 40 and 41 Wanclioo, J. who delivered the judgment of the majority in that case stated that it is clear that the fifth term in the agreement referred to in Section 41 is directly related to Section 40 and that, no doubt, in finding out what is meant by Section 40, the fifth term in Section 41 must be taken into account and that it is only by reading the two together that it will be possible to find out the intention of the legislature when it provided for acquisition of land tor a company through the machinery of the Act. Finally it was held by the majority that:

'What the provisions of Sections 40 and 41 require is that the work should be directly useful to the public and the agreement shall contain a term how the public shall have the right to use the work directly themselves. It seems that under the relevant words in Sections 40 and 41 it is works like a hospital, a public reading room or a library or an educational institution open to the public or such other work as the public may directly use that are contemplated' and it is only for such works, which are useful to the public in this way and can be directly used by it, that laud can be acquired for a company under the Act'.

Relying on this decision of the Supreme Court, Mr. Balaparmeswari Rao, the learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the acquisition in the present case is not for the construction of any work which is directly useful to the public and as the agreement does not contain a term as to how the public shall use the work directly themselves, the acquisition is illegal and beyond the power of the Government. On a perusal of relevant terms of the agreement above referred to there can be no doubt that they do not Satisfy the requirements oi Section 40 read with Section 41 Clause (5) of the Land Acquisition Act, because the acquisition is rot for the construction of a work which should be directly useful to the public and the agreement does not contain a term as to how the public shall have the right to use the work directly themselves.

12. If the matter rested there, these writ petitions will have to be allowed and the notifications quashed.

13. But ia view of the difficulty caused by the said decision of the Supreme Court in : AIR1962SC764 the President issued the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Ordinance, 1962, (No. 3 of 1962) amending Sections 40 and 41 of the Land Acquisition Act. This was followed up by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1962, (Act No. 31 of 1962) by which amendments were introduced in Sections 40 and 41 of the Land Acquisition Act. By Section 3 of the Amendment Act, the following Clause (aa) is introduced in Sub-section (i) of Section 40 of the principal Act after Clause (a);

'(aa) that such acquisition is needed for the construction of some building or work for a Company which is engaged or is taking steps for engaging itself in any industry or work which is for a public purpose; or',

Section 4(1) of the Amendment Act is as follows; 'In Section 41 of the Principal Act,

(a) for the words 'the purpose of the proposed acquisition is to obtain land for the erection of dwelling houses for workmen employed by the Company or for the provision of amenities directly connected therewith, or that the proposed acquisition is needed for the construction of a work, and that such work is likely to prove useful to the public the wprds, brackets, letters and figures the proposed acquisition is for any of the purposes referred to in Clause (a) or Clause (aa) or Clause (b) of Subsection (i) of Section 40 shall be substituted;

(b) In Clause (4), the word 'and' occurring at the end shall be omitted, and after that clause, the following clausa shall be inserted, namely;

(4-A) Whore the acquisition is for the construction of any building or work for a company which is engaged or is taking steps for engaging itself in any industry or work which is for a public purpose, the time within which, and the conditions on which, the building or work shall be constructed or executed; and'

14. These amendments came into force on 12-9-1962. Under the new Clause (aa) of Section 40 the Government is vested with the power to acquire land for a company for the construction of some building or work, provided the Company is engaged or is taking steps for engaging itself in any industry or work which is for a public purpose. Further, Sub-clause (4-A) introduced in Section 41 refers to an acquisition for the construction of any building or work for a company which is engaged or is taking steps for engaging itself in any industry or work which is for a public purpose. So that after the amendments introduced by the Amendment Act, 1962, the Government has the power to acquire land for the construction of any work for a company which is engaged or is taking steps for engaging itself in any industry or work which is for a public purpose. These amendments introduced in Sections 40 and 41 of the Act are made retrospectively by Section 7 of the Amendment Act (31 of 1962) which is as follows :

'7. Validation of certain acquisitions :

Notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court, every acquisition of land for a company made or purporting to have been made under Part VII of the principal Act before the 20th day of July 1962, shall, in so far as such acquisition is not for any of the purposes mentioned in Clause (a) or Clause (b) of Sub-section (i) of Section 40 of the Principal Act, be deemed to have been made for the purpose mentioned in Clause (aa) of the said sub-section, and accordingly every such acquisition and any proceeding, order, agreement or action in connection with such acquisition shall be; and shall be deemed always to have been, as valid as if the provisions of Sections 40 and 41 of the Principal Act, as amended by tbis Act, were in force at all material times when such acquisition was made or proceeding was held or order was made or agreement was entered into or action was taken.

Explanation:- Tn this section 'company' has the same meaning as in Clause (e) of Section 3 of the Principal Act, as amended by this Act.

Therefore, the only question that arises for deci-sion now after the Amendment Act 1962 came into force is whether in the present case the acquisition is for the construction of some building or work for a Company which is engaged or is taking steps for engaging itself in any industry or work which is for the public purpose. In Babu Barkya Thakur v. State of Bombay, : [1961]1SCR128 , Sinha, Chief Justice stated that the expression 'public purpose' has been used in its generic sense of including any purpose in which even a fraction of the community may be interested or by which it may be benefited. Again in Smt. Somawanti v. State of Punjab, in Petition Nos. : [1963]2SCR774 the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the meaning and scope of the expression 'public purpose'. In that case, the acquisition was made by the Government for a company engaged in constructing a factory for the manufacture of compressors and the components of big and small airconditioners, refrigerators, water coolers and cold storage cabinets, and the question was whether such a purpose is public purpose within the meaning of Section 6 of the Act. The Supreme Court referred to the decision in : [1961]1SCR128 and pointed put that the expression 'public purpose' means a purpose which is buneficial to the community and that whether a particular purpose is beneficial or is likely to be beneficial to the community or cot is a matter primarily for the satisfaction o the State Government. It was further stated as follows :

'On the face of it, therefore, bringing into existence of factory of this kind would be a purpose beneficial to the public even though that is a private venture. As has already beta pointed out, facilities for providing refrigeration are regarded in modern times as public utilities. All the greater reason, therefore, that a factory which manufactures essential equipment for establishing public utilities must be regarded as an undertaking carrying out a public purpose. It is well established in the United States of America that the power of eminent domain can be exercised for establishing public utilities. Such a power could, therefore, be exercised for establishing a factory for manufacturing equipment upon which a public utility depends. It is, therefore, clear, that quite apart from the provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 6 the notification of the State Government under Section 6 cannot be successfully challenged on the ground that the object of the acquisition is not to. carry out a public purpose'.

In the present case, the notifications themselves 'under Sections 4 and 6 stated that the lands are needed for a public purpose, viz., for the establishment of Jay Engineering Works Limited. The facts stated in the counter affidavit of Mr. K. Section Vaidyanathan in Writ Petition No. 411/62 make it clear that the land is acquired for the construction of a factory for the company, which is the 3rd respondent which is engaging itself in the industry which is for a public purpose. The machines which this company undertook to manufacture are in short supply in this country and they have to be exported from foreign countries. By manufacturing these machines in this country, the public will be greatly benefited. Further, it will save foreign exchange and at the same time earn foreign exchange. About 2,500 workmen will get employment and part of the land acquired will be used for constructing dwelling houses and other amenities to the workmen thus employed. By acquiring land for con-struction of the factory in question, the Government will be implementing its policy of industrialising the country in accord with the five year plan. In view of these facts, it is impossible to contend that the purpose is not a public purpose.

15. Mr. Balaparmeswari Rao next contended that the acquisition in this case is not bona fide and that the exercise of the power is a colourable one. I do not find Anything in the record to warrant such a suggestion.

16. The learned Advocate General attempted to validate the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 also on the ground that it is for a public purpose apart from the question whether it is a valid acquisition under Part VII of the Act for the Company. As 1 held above, the purpose for which the land is acquired is undoubtedly a public purpose. But if the acquisition is not for Company, no declaration under Section 6 can be made unless the compensation to be awarded is to be paid wholly or partly out of the public revenues or some fund controlled or-managed by a local authority. It is clear from the terms of the agreement referred to earlier in this judgment that the entire compensation to be awarded for the acquisition is stipulated to be paid by the Company itself and the Government would not pay any part of it. But the Government issued a notification G. O. Rt. No. 183. Industries, dated 17-7-62 declaring its intention to contribute Rs. 100/-being a part of compensation payable in respect of the land acquisition from out of the public revenues. This is obviously done in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court dated 2-5-62 in Petn. Nos. 246 to 248 of 1961 : : [1963]2SCR774 . It is not suggested in the counter affidavit filed in the writ petitions or during the course of the arguments before me that the Government intended at any time before issuing the notifications under Sections4 and 6 or at any time before 17-7-62, to contribute any part of the compensation payable for the land which is acquired.

It is clear from a perusal of the proviso to Subsection (i) of Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act that no such declaration under the said section shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded is to be paid wholly or partly out of the public revenues. It means that the Government must decide even before issuing the notification under Section 6 to pay the compensation wholly or in part out of the public revenues. This is also clear from the decision of Chandra Reddy, J.. (as he then was) in Venkatapathi Raju v. The State, AIR 1957 Andh Pra 686. Therefore, I am unable to accept this contention of the learned Advocate General.

17. It is also argued by the learned Advocate General that since the agreement published in G. O. Rt. No. 171, Industries, dated 28-6-6r mentioned that the Company will use the said land also for the purpose of housing colonies for the staff and workers, the requirements of Section 40 of the Act are satisfied and that the acquisition comes undef the said clause I am unable to agree with' this contention-for the reason that the entire extent of Ac. 219-6 gurttas are not acquired for the purpose of constructing housing colonies for the staff and workers arid it is not known what part of the land will be used for that purpose. Further, the notification is a single one and cannot be divided into two parts one relating to part of the land for the purpose of constructing houses for the staff and workers and the other for the construction of the factory and other buildings. The validity of the notification cannot be upheld on this ground.

18. It is further argued by the learned Advocate General relying on the decision of this High Court in Mirza Nowsherwan Khan v. State of Andhra Pradesh, : AIR1959AP444 that since, the petitioners acquiesced in the acquisition proceedings by submitting their claims to compensation, they are estopped from questioning the legality of the notifications. The petitioners appear to have filed their claims for compensation before the Officer, and it is also stated on behalf of the Government that, with regard to the acquisition of 6 guntas covered by the Notification No. 84-B no objections were filed to the acquisition of that property. If the acquisition itself is wholly without jurisdiction, a question may arise wheher the principle of estoppel applies. Further, the petitioners in the present case might be ignorant of their rights. It is not necessary to pursue the matter further in the view I have taken that the writ petitions will have to be dismissed on another ground.

19. In the view I took of the power of the Government with regard to the acquisition of the land for the company under Part VII of the Act as amended by the Land Acquisition Amendment Act, 1962, the notifications issued in the present case are valid.

20. The writ petitions, therefore, fail and aredismissed with costs. Advocate's fee Hs. 100/- ineach petition.


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