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Kommisetty Nammalwar and Co. Rep. by Its Proprietor Kommisetty Nammalwar S/O. Panakalu Vs. the Agricultural Market Committee Rep. by Its Secretary, - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCommercial
CourtAndhra Pradesh High Court
Decided On
Case NumberWrit Petition No. 24818 of 2008
Judge
Reported in2009(4)ALT431:AIR2009NOC2482(A.P)(F.B).
ActsAndhra Pradesh (Agricultural Produce and Livestock) Markets Act, 1966 - Sections 2, 3, 3(1) to 3(3), 3(4), 4, 4(1) to 4(4), 4(5), 5, 5A, 6, 6A, 6B, 7, 7(1), 8 to 11, 12, 12(1), 12A to 12G, 14 to 16, 16(2), 17 to 21, 22, 23 to 26, 31, 36, 37, 39, 40 and 43; Andhra Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1891 - Sections 13 and 15; Uttar Pradesh Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam Act, 1964 - Sections 2 and 17; Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Market Act, 1961 - Sections 40; Bihar Agricultural Products Markets Act, 1960 - Sections 2(1), 3, 4, 4(1), 4(2), 4(3), 4(5), 4A, 4A(1), 4A(2), 4B, 5, 15, 27 and 39; Uttar Pradesh Sales tax Act; Maritime Zones of India (Regulation of Fishing by Foreign Vessels) Act; Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 - Sections 7, 13(3) and 16(1); Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947
AppellantKommisetty Nammalwar and Co. Rep. by Its Proprietor Kommisetty Nammalwar S/O. Panakalu
RespondentThe Agricultural Market Committee Rep. by Its Secretary, ;The Director of Marketing and ;The Governm
Appellant AdvocateRama Rao Ghanta, Adv.
Respondent AdvocateGP for Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 and ;K. Madhava Reddy, Adv. for Respondent No. 1
DispositionPetition allowed
Excerpt:
- maximssections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [v.v.s. rao, n.v. ramana & p.s. narayana, jj] ghee as a live stock product held, [per v.v.s. rao & n.v. ramana, jj - majority] since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. the first of such resultant products developed is curd or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by product. the shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. by simmering unsalted butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions. ghee at least as of now is most synthesized, ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. so to say, milk is converted to dahi, then butter......v.v.s. rao, j.introduction*1. whether 'ghee' is a 'product of livestock', under the provisions of andhra pradesh (agricultural produce & livestock) markets act, 1966 (the act, for brevity) and whether government notification vide g.o.ms. no. 286, agriculture 8b cooperation (mktg-1) department, dated 05.07.1994 notifying among others, 'ghee' as one of the products of livestock for the purpose of regulation of purchase and sale in all notified market areas is not valid? these are the two questions before this full bench. the consideration of these two questions involves interpretation of sections 3 and 4 of the act. this case, or at least, one question involved in this case, was once decided by a division bench of this court in gurram polisetti v. government of andhra pradesh 200 (4) ald.....
Judgment:

V.V.S. Rao, J.

Introduction*

1. Whether 'ghee' is a 'product of livestock', under the provisions of Andhra Pradesh (Agricultural Produce & Livestock) Markets Act, 1966 (the Act, for brevity) and whether Government Notification vide G.O.Ms. No. 286, Agriculture 8B Cooperation (Mktg-1) Department, dated 05.07.1994 notifying among others, 'ghee' as one of the products of livestock for the purpose of regulation of purchase and sale in all notified market areas is not valid? These are the two questions before this Full Bench. The consideration of these two questions involves interpretation of Sections 3 and 4 of the Act. This case, or at least, one question involved in this case, was once decided by a Division Bench of this Court in Gurram Polisetti v. Government of Andhra Pradesh 200 (4) ALD 253 (DB). The Division Bench judgment was assailed before the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 4484 of 2000 (Guntur District Produ. M.A. Co-op Un. Ltd. v. Agricultural Market Committee). The apex Court set aside the Judgment of this Court and remitted for fresh hearing. Thereafter, petitioners in remanded matters, withdrew those writ petitions with liberty to file fresh writ petition. This writ petition came to be filed thereafter. A learned single Judge, before whom initially matter was listed, referred writ petition to Division Bench. But, learned Chief Justice directed that the matter be heard by a Full Bench.

Brief fact of the Matter

2. The factual background is not disputed by the parties. In exercise of powers under Section 3(3) of the Act, Government issued Notification vide their order in G.O.Ms. No. 2095, dated 29.10.1968 (hereafter called, declaration order), notifying twenty (20) areas for the purpose of the Act in respect of agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock (hereafter cumulatively referred to as 'market products') specified in Schedule II thereto. Enumerated under seven (7) groups, like agricultural group, fruit group, vegetable group, fish group, livestock group, poultry group etc, livestock product group was shown as group VI, which includes 'ghee' besides raw hides, raw skins, bones, horn and hoof, and hair and wool. In Guntur District, four notified areas were declared. These are (i) Guntur, Sattenapalli Taluks; (ii) Tenali, Repalli Taluks; (iii) Ongole, Bapatla Taluks; and (iv) Narasaraopet, Vinukonda and Palnad Taluks.

3. Three years after declaration order, Government of Andhra Pradesh issued G.O.Ms. No. 1066, dated 30.07.1971 (published in A.P. Gazette, 14.10.1971) (hereafter called, market area order), notifying the market area for Guntur and notifying market products, which can be regulated by market committee concerned. Among various items, in this notification, 'ghee' was mentioned at Serial No. 9. Similar notification was also issued in respect of Ongole Market Area vide G.O.Ms. No. 976, dated 16.07.1971. It appears, Andhra Pradesh Agmark Ghee Packers' Association, made a representation to delete 'ghee' from market area order. This was considered favourably and Government issued order being G.O.Ms. No. 448, dated 29.03.1972 (hereafter called, deletion order) deleting 'ghee' from respective market area orders. By reason of deletion order, 'ghee' ceased to be a product of livestock in relation to Guntur and Ongole market areas, which means that market committees of these areas, could no more regulate sale or purchase of ghee nor levy market fee. It may be mentioned that when once an agricultural produce or products of livestock is/are notified, no person shall purchase, sale, store without obtaining a licence granted by the market committee (Section 7) and it shall be competent market committee to levy fees on such product (Section 12). Be that as it may, Government of Andhra Pradesh issued Notification vide their order in G.O.Ms. No. 286, Agriculture 85 Cooperation (Mktg-I) Department, dated 05.07.1994 (hereinafter 'impugned order' or 'revised order'), for the purpose of regulation of market products under Section 4(4) of the Act, by all Agricultural Market Committees (AMCs) in the State. The said notification reads as under.

Notification

In exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (4) of Section 4 of the Andhra Pradesh (Agricultural Produce and Livestock) Markets Act, 1966 (Act 16 of 1966) and in supercession of all the G.Os., issued on the subject of Agricultural Produce, Livestock and products of Livestock and flowers, the Governor of Andhra Pradesh hereby directs that all the notified markets shall regulate the purchase and sale of all the notified agricultural produce, livestock and products of Livestock issued in Schedule-II to the G.O.Ms. No. 2095, Food and Agriculture (Agrl.,) Department, dated 29.10.1968 and flowers issued in Schedule to G.O.Ms. No. 610, Food and Agriculture Department, dated 21.10.1978 respectively as amended from time to time.

4. As noticed supra, from the date of deletion order till the issue of impugned order, market fee was not levied on 'ghee' nor traders in ghee were required to obtain licence. After earlier writ petitions were dismissed as withdrawn, Guntur Agricultural Market Committee (GMC), first respondent herein, issued notice, dated 12.02.2007, under Section 7(1) of the Act to petitioner-proprietary concern engaged in ghee business, directing him to obtain licence for doing business in notified area, failure of which would entail in criminal prosecution under Sections 7(1), 12(1) read with Section 23(1) of the Act.

Grounds of Challenge

5. Sri Ghanta Rama Rao, learned Counsel for petitioner made the following submissions. A reading of definition of 'livestock'2 and 'products of livestock'3 in Sections 2(v) and 2(xv) respectively would show that 'ghee' is not a product of livestock as it is not directly extracted from livestock but it is extracted from product of a livestock i.e., butter or cream. Though cows, buffaloes, goats and sheep are defined as livestock, unless and until a product is directly derived from the livestock, it cannot be treated as a product of livestock. There ought to be direct link between the livestock and product of livestock and a further extraction from the product of livestock cannot be treated as a product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Insofar as the second question is concerned, learned Counsel submits that the impugned order, which is of general nature was issued without application of mind and a general notification without therebeing separate notification with respect to each notified market area under Section 4(4) for the purpose of the Act does not enable a market committee to regulate a market product or to levy market fees. Such notification for each AMC can only be issued after complying with the conditions precedent contemplated under Sections 3(2), 4(1) and 4(3) of the Act. Every one of these steps or conditions are indispensable and no notification under Section 4(4) of the Act in respect of AMC can be issued without first establishing market within the notified area and providing facilities in such market for carrying business in a market product. Alternatively, at all times unless and until facilities are provided for marketing ghee, GMC cannot regulate sale, purchase or storage of 'ghee'. Learned Counsel relied on decisions of this Court as well as Supreme Court to which a reference is made at appropriate place.

Respondents' Contentions

6. Learned Government Pleader for Cooperation, Agriculture and Marketing and learned standing Counsel for Guntur Agricultural Market Committee submit that there is no bar for the Government to issue general notification under Section 4(4) of the Act superseding all earlier marketwise notifications in respect of existing notified areas. When such power is exercised, all market committees can only regulate the sale and purchase of those notified market products and every time such market products are deleted or included for the purpose of regulation, there is no necessity to issue separate marketwise notification. Pointing out the scheme of Sections 3 and 4 of the Act, they would urge that inviting objections at the stage of Sections 4(1), 4(3) and 4(4) of the Act, compatible with principles of natural justice is not warranted nor called for within the scope of the provisions of the Act. According to them, Sections 3(3) and 4(4) of the Act would operate in different spheres and serve different purposes. They submit that Notification issued under these provisions is a one-time exercise of declaring notified areas or notified market area and every time market products are varied, there is no necessity to invite objections. They submit that when legislature specifically does not contemplate procedure as envisaged under Section 3(2) of the Act with reference to exercise of power under Sections 4(1), 4(3) and 4(4) of the Act, the Court cannot read any such procedure into the Act. They point out that though in respect of Ongole and Guntur Market Committees, deletion order was issued in respect of other market areas, 1968 declaration order issued remained intact and 'ghee' was never deleted from its Schedule II. Deriving assistance from Section 13 of Andhra Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1891, they contend that the power conferred under Section 4(4) of the Act includes power to include or exclude from list of products for the purpose of regulation without resorting to procedure contemplated under Section 4(3) of the Act. Lastly, they would urge that levy of market fee on a notified market product is not subject to quid pro quo and therefore, the petitioner cannot press the same for invalidating the impugned Government Order. They also relied on various authorities. A reference is made to these at appropriate place.

In re Point No. 1

7. 'Ghee' is not defined in the Act. It can be regulated under the Act if it can fall within the definition of 'notified agricultural produce or livestock or products of 'livestock'4 or within the definition of 'products of livestock' as defined in Section 2(x) and Section 2(xv) of the Act. The word or phrase used in the enactment is ordinarily defined by the Act itself. In case the legislature does not define, the Court has to look to General Clauses Act. If it is silent, meaning of the word as explained by decisions of Court of Record is the best guide. In case all these are not available, there is no bar to refer to dictionaries and understand meaning of word or phrase as generally understood by persons dealing with such a thing.

8. As per Section 2(v) 'livestock' means, 'cows, buffalos, bullocks, bulls, goats and sheep and includes poultry, fish and such other animals as may be declared by the Government by notification to be livestock for the purpose of the Act'. As per Section 2(xv) 'products of livestock' means 'such products of livestock as may be declared by the Government by notification to be products of livestock for the purpose of this Act'. Thus, though the legislature used the word 'means' while defining livestock' and 'products of livestock', the phrase 'such other...as may be declared by Government by notification' appearing in both these definitions would show that the legislature conferred the power of defining words on Government. Not only the animals mentioned in Section 2(v) and not only the products of livestock defined in Section 2(xv), but all such animals and all such products of livestock as may be declared by notification are to be treated as livestock and/or products of livestock, as the case may be.

9. If cows and buffalos are livestock, what are the products of 'cows and buffalos', whether only raw hides, raw skins, bones, horns and hoof, hair and wool of cows, buffaloes, goat, sheep etc., are products of livestock? Learned Counsel for petitioner vehemently contends that 'ghee' cannot be treated as a product of cow or buffalo. Therefore, it is necessary to explain as to what are milk (buffalo or cow) or dairy products as understood by general public and those who engage in business of milk products. 'Milk', 'curd', 'butter', 'butter milk' and 'ghee' are traditional milk products in India. In modern times, other products like icecream, kulfi, kalakand, kova, srikand, gulab jamoon and a large varieties of sweets, chhana products (used for preparation of Rasgulla) became popular as modern products of milk. India is the largest producer of milk. As much as 46% of milk produced in India is consumed as liquid milk. Be that as it is, cow or buffalo milk when pasteurized has shelf life from 12 to 24 years. Therefore, since ages, milk is preserved by souring with aid of lactic cultures. The first of such resultant products developed is curds or yogurt (dahi) obtained by fermenting milk. It is an important item in Indian food. Dahi when subjected to churning yields butter (makkhan) and buttermilk as by-product buttermilk. The shelf life of dahi is two days whereas that of butter is a week. By simmering unsalted butter in a pot until all water is boiled, ghee is obtained which has shelf life of more than a year in controlled conditions5. 'Ghee' at least as of now is not synthesized. Ghee is a natural product derived ultimately from milk. So to say, milk is converted to dahi, then butter and then ghee is obtained by boiling butter. Scientifically or common sense point of view, even though ghee is not directly obtained from milk (which is certainly a product of cow/buffalo), it is certainly a product of a product of livestock i.e., cow or buffalo. It would be rather illogical or irrational to say that ghee is not a milk/dairy product or to say that it is not a product of livestock. Ghee is certainly a product of livestock. It is, therefore, to be seen whether ghee comes within the definition of product of livestock or within the meaning of notified product of livestock. Section 2(x) and 2(xv) of the Act used the plural 'products of livestock'. The legislative intention is very clear that not only a product of livestock like milk (when notified by the Government), butter etc., are products of livestock but even derivative items (derived from a product of livestock) are intended to be product of livestock for the purpose of the Act. We are convinced that the term 'ghee' has to be interpreted on the basis of expression 'products of livestock' as defined in Section 2(xv) of the Act. Whatever products are declared as such by the Government by notification, they become products of livestock for purposes of the Act.

10. In Park Leather Industry (P) Limited v. State of U.P. : (2001) 3 SCC 135 : AIR 2001 SC 931, Supreme Court considered the question whether the term 'hides and skins' includes 'tanned leather' which can be subjected to market fee under U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 (U.P. Act). It was contended that hides and skins in 'raw' condition are different from 'tanned' condition. Reliance was placed on various decisions arising under Sales Tax laws, which made distinction among various products derived or produced from the similar raw product. The Supreme Court rejected such argument and held that the meaning of a market product has to be understood on the basis of the expression of agricultural produce as defined in Section 2(a) of the U.P. Act.

A perusal of Section 2(a) of the said Act makes it clear that an agricultural product would be a product which is specified in the Schedule or one which is admixture of two or more items and would also include any such item in a processed form. In our view it makes no difference, for the purposes of the said Act, that the item concerned is a different commodity from the one which is included in the Schedule. It is possible that by virtue of an admixture of two or more items or by virtue of processing a different commodity or item may come into existence. Even though a different commodity may come into existence, it would still be an 'agricultural produce'. This is best illustrated by sugarcane which is in Schedule A Item VIII at Serial No. 14. From sugarcane, 'rab' and 'gur' are manufactured. They are already different commodities or items. Yet they are all included. The specific inclusion of items like 'gur, rab, shakkar, khandsari and jaggery' is to make it clear that merely because it becomes a different item or commodity it is not excluded.

(emphasis supplied)

11. In Kishan Lal v. State of Rajasthan : 1990 (Supp) SCC 742 : AIR 1990 SC 2269, Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Market Act, 1961, was challenged on various grounds inter alia on the ground that Section 40 thereof confers excess power on State Government to amcnd or include any item of agriculture produce in the Schedule to the Act. Rejecting the plea that Section 40 is excessive delegation of legislative power, the apex Court observed.

Fallacy of the submission is apparent as it was in complete disregard of definition of the word 'agricultural produce' in the Act which includes all produce whether agricultural, horticultural, animal husbandry or otherwise as specified in the Schedule. The legislative power to add or include and define a word even artificially, apart, the definition which is not exhaustive but inclusive neither excludes any item produced in mill or factories nor it confines its width to produce from soil. If that be the construction then all items of animal husbandry shall stand excluded. It further overlooks expanse of the expression 'or otherwise as specified in the Schedule'. Nor switch over from indigenous method of producing anything to scientific or mechanical method changes its character.... Even in Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn. vol. 1, para 1414, the word agricultural produce for purposes of agricultural marketing schemes is understood as, including 'any product of agriculture or horticulture and any article of food or drink wholly or partly manufactured or derived from any such product and fleeces (including all kinds of wool) and the skins of animals.

(emphasis supplied)

12. As already noticed, the terms 'livestock' and products of livestock', are not defined in restrictive sense. Not only those animals defined as livestock, but all such other animals as may be declared by the Government by notification to be such are to be treated as livestock. Similarly, all such 'products of livestock' as may be declared by the government by notification are to be treated as products of livestock for the purpose of the Act. By reason of Section 2(x) when once a notification is issued under Section 3(3) of the Act, declaring market products, by reason of Section 2(v) and 2(xv), all products of cows, buffalo, bullocks, bulls, goats etc., shall have to be treated as products of livestock for the purpose of the Act. Here we may refer to Ram Chandra Kailash Kumar v. State of U.P. : AIR 1980 SC 1124, Dineshchandra Jamnadas Gandhi v. State of Gujarat : AIR 1989 SC 1011, Sita Devi v. State of Bihar : 1995 Supp (1) SCC 670 and I.T.C. Limited v. Person Incharge, Agriculture Market Committee, Kakinada : AIR 2004 SC 1796 : 2004 AIR SCW 792.

13. In Ram Chandra Kailash (supra), traders in U.P., challenged levy of market fee under U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam Act, 1964. Writ petitions were dismissed by Allahabad High Court. On appeal, before Supreme Court, questions were whether market fee could be levied both on paddy and rice, whether market fee is payable on 'ghee' by the producer/trader or purchaser, and whether the market fee could be levied on hides and skins, timber or Catechu (katha), paper, kirana goods, tobacco, vegetables etc. Dealing with question as to who is liable to pay the market fee in respect of paddy and rice, hides and skins, ghee or khoya, Constitution Bench held:

As for example, under Group D 'Animal Husbandry Products', milk has been omitted although it is to be found in the schedule appended to the Act. From milk can be prepared ghee or khoya and Items 1 and 2 in Group D are the said articles.... In relation to the transactions of ghee we had two types of dealers before us--(1) a dealer who purchases milk or cream from the villagers and others and manufactures ghee in his plant and (2) a dealer who purchases such ghee from the manufacturer of ghee and sells it to another trader in the same market area. The first dealer will be liable to pay market fee because he is the producer of ghee within the meaning of the Act and at the same time a trader in ghee also. When he sells ghee to another dealer in ghee who is simply a dealer then under Sub-clause (3) of Section 17(iii)(b) the manufacturing dealer will be liable to pay market fee to the market committee on the transaction of ghee. But he will be entitled to pass on the burden to his purchaser. Apropos the market committee, however, the liability will be of the manufacturing dealer. If milk, butter or cream would have been included in the notification then the charging of fee in relation to the first transaction of sale and purchase of such commodities would have been attracted in the light of the principle of law we have enunciated above with reference to paddy and rice.

(emphasis supplied)

14. The above observations of Supreme Court would support our conclusion that all animal husbandry products are products of livestock, if they are so declared under Section 3(3) read with Section 2(xv) of the Act. Merely because, ghee is a derivative product from another dairy product, its inclusion in Schedule II of declaration order cannot be faulted. When legislature has endowed power of defining and declaring products of livestock to them, Court cannot find fault if Government in their wisdom choose to declare a product as a 'product of livestock'.

15. In Sita Devi (supra), Supreme Court considered the scope of Section 2(1)(a) of Bihar Agricultural Products Market Act, 1960, which defined 'agricultural produce' as to include all produce whether processed or non-processed of agriculture, horticulture, animal husbandry, specified in Schedule to the enactment. The question was whether market committee can levy market fee on buffalos, bullocks and cows bought and sold in weekly market. The High Court of Patna held that cattle is an agricultural produce for the purpose of levy. It was argued before the Supreme Court that cattle is not an agricultural produce. Rejecting the contention, it was held that:

In view of the fact that the legislature itself, on identifying the cattle to be an agricultural produce, laid its policy to subject cattle for levy of market fee, it is not open to the court to scan its wisdom. Though in the normal connotation cattle may appear to be not an agricultural produce, it needs to be given effect unless the legislature lacks competence which is not the case of the appellant. The policy and the wisdom of the legislature cannot be tested by taking aid of the preamble of the Act particularly when the language of Section 2(1)(a) is inclusive, unambiguous, specific and explicit. Preamble of the Act is the key to open the mind of the legislature when the language of the statute is ambiguous. Absurdity or irrationality of bringing the enumerated items of agricultural produce within the sweep of the legislature is not a principle of interpretation of the statute and the court cannot strike down the Act on its basis.

(emphasis supplied)

16. Yet again referring to Ram Chandra Kailash (supra), it was held that:

If an agricultural produce has been bought or sold in the notified area and subject to levy and collection of market fee and if the same notified market area, certainly the market committee has no power to levy market fee more than once. But that is not the case here. Imposing of multiple tax is the accepted legislative policy in Sales tax Acts. Paddy and rice, wheat and wheat flour, when separated, identified as agricultural produce and each is exigible to levy of market fee. Hides and skins when identified as agricultural produce, merely because they are treated from carcass, they are not exempt from levy of market fee as the cattle was already subjected to levy of market fee. Ghee and butter are by-products from milk but when milk, ghee and butter are notified as agricultural produce, each is exigible to levy of market value.

(emphasis supplied)

17. In ITC Limited (supra), the question before the apex Court was whether prawns can be treated as livestock for the purpose of the Act. Having regard to the power conferred on the Government under Section 3 to declare market products under the Act, Supreme Court held that it is competent to the State Government to issue notification regarding prawns. The relevant observations read thus:

Normally, in common parlance animal is understood as a quadruped creature but fish is also an animal but of a different kind. Prawn is included in the definition of fish as given in the Maritime Zones of India (Regulation of Fishing by Foreign Vessels) Act and has all the essential attributes of an animal viz. life, sensation and voluntary motion. It is therefore not possible to accept the contention that prawn is not a livestock. The State Government is thus fully competent to issue a notification regarding prawns under Section 3 of the Act.

18. For above reasons, on point No. 1, we hold that 'ghee' is the product of livestock and by reason of power conferred under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Act on them it is competent for the Government to declare ghee as 'product of livestock' for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale, in any notified market area.

In re Point 2

19. This is essentially enquiry into the procedural irregularity, if any. To be more precise, question as to whether the impugned notification is valid essentially involves consideration of the point as to whether the Government followed the procedure contemplated under the provisions of the Act before issuing the notification. Incidentally it requires to be considered whether any procedural non-compliance by itself vitiates impugned notification rendering it invalid and unenforceable.

Procedural irregularity

20. The Act is seamless. It is not divided into Chapters, but for sake of convenience, provisions of the Act can be grouped. Sections 3, 5, 5A, 6, 6A, 6B, 8 to 11 form one group of establishment or machinery provisions. These deal with (i) identification of notified areas; (ii) constitution of market committee; (iii) establishment of markets; (iv) provision of facilities for purchase and sale of market products; and (v) declaration of market areas. This group of provisions also provide for disciplinary action against chairman of the market committee and withdrawal of powers.

21. Section 312 contains four sub-sections. Sub-sections (1) to (3) thereof deal with the foremost step of government publishing a notification declaring the notified areas for the purpose of regulating purchase and sale of market products. Such notification must not only contain delineable geographical boundaries of a notified area and also description of various items of regulated market products. Before issuing any notification, Government have to notify, receive objections, if any, and consider same. This is mandatory. Section 3(4) of the Act operates and is applicable after the initial notification under Section 3(3) of the Act and empowers the Government to merge or de-merge notified areas. A careful reading of Section 3(4) would show that when notified area is merged with another notified area or when a notified area is demerged by separation into two or more parts, the notification need not again enumerate various items of regulated market products.

22. Section 413 contains five sub-sections. Sub-sections (1), (3) and (4) contemplate various steps one after the other before a market committee starts regulating purchase and sale of market products in a notified market area as stipulated under Section 4(2) of the Act. These are as follows. First, under Section 4(1) of the Act, Government shall constitute market committee for every area notified under Section 3(3). This has to be in accordance with Section 5, which deals with composition of market committees. Under Section 4(3)(a) of the Act market committee shall establish one or more markets for such notified area in accordance with the directions of Government and provide facilities as specified by Government by general or special order. Under Section 4(3)(b), Government can direct a market committee to provide special facilities in the market for purchase and sale of only vegetables or fruits by general order or special order. Be that as it is, then comes the last step under Section 4(4), whereunder the Government shall declare market area and such other adjoining area to be 'notified market area' for regulating market products. Like in the case of Section 3(4), Section 4(5) exclusively deals with merger or demerger of notified market areas subject to the provisions of Sub-sections (1) to (4) of Section 4.

23. We may refer to following elucidation of five steps by Full Bench of this Court in Mamidi Satyanarayana Murthy v. State : AIR 1977 AP 147 (FB).

Thus, to clarify the concepts and the different terminologies used in the Act, it may be pointed out that the notified area is the largest geographical and physical unit. There may be a single market or more than one market for each notified area. There is to be a market committee which is a body corporate and it operates over the entire notified area. The market committee has to set up one or more markets within the area of its operation as may be directed by the Government. After the directions have been issued by the Government, the market committee has to establish a market or markets in accordance with the directions of the Government and for each market it has to fix, under Section 4(3)(c), the limits of the market and the limits of the market area referred to as the 'market area'. Under Section 4(4), the market area and such other area adjoining thereto as may be specified by the Government in the notification issued under that Section becomes the notified market area. Thus, the largest physical unit is the notified area and within that notified area is the notified market area pertaining to each market established by the market committee. Within the notified area is the market area which defines the limits of every market and within the market area are the actual markets where the notified agricultural produce is bought or sold and where facilities have to be provided by the market committee for buying and selling these notified commodities. It is obvious that all these different five steps have to be completed before the machinery set up under the Act starts functioning.

24. Continuing with the scheme of the Act, we may mention that Sections 7, 12, 12A to 12G form one group requiring a trader to take licence and empowering the market committee to levy fees on any notified market products. Sections 14 to 16 deal with market committee fund and Sections 17 to 21 deal with administration of the market committee. Sections 23 to 26 deal with imposition of penalties and other provisions deal with redressal mechanism. In none of these provisions, Act contemplates issuing a preliminary/draft notification inviting objections or suggestions from public before taking a particular action thereunder. It is only under Section 3 that Government are required to publish draft notification inviting objections and Section 3(3) mandates to consider objections and suggestions before issuing declaration order. It is very conspicuous that Section 4 does not contemplate any draft notification inviting objections and suggestions before either constituting market committee, establishing notified market area or declaring notified market area for the purpose of levy of market fees.

25. Thus, except ordaining Government to issue preliminary/draft notification inviting objections at the time of issuing declaration order under Section 3(3), the Act nowhere much less under Section 4 contemplates issuing a notification inviting objections. When the legislature has chosen to exclude principles of natural justice, the Court cannot introduce rule of audi alteram partem and render - of course some times; statutory provisions unworkable. In such a case, maxim expressum facit cessare taciturn (when there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded) applies. It was so held by Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel : (1985) 3 SCC 398 : AIR 1985 SC 1416 and Satyavir Singh v. Union of India : AIR 1986 SC 555. In the latter authority, summarizing conclusions reached in former, inter alia it was held (Paras 28 and 29):

It is well established both in England and in India that the principles of natural justice yield to and change with the exigencies of different situations and do not apply-in the same manner to situations which are not alike. They are neither cast in a rigid mould nor can they be put in a legal strait jacket. They are not immutable but flexible and can be adopted, modified or excluded by statute and statutory rules as also by the constitution of the tribunal which has to decide a particular matter and the rules by which such tribunal is governed. Instances of cases in which it has been so held are Norwest Holst Ltd. v. Secretary of State for Trade (1978) 1 Ch. 201, 227, Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala : (1969) 1 SCR 317, 322 : AIR 1969 SC 198 at p.201, A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India : (1970) 1 SCR 457, 469 : AIR 1970 SC 150 at p. 157, Union of India v. Col. J.N. Sinha : (1971) 1 SCR 7191 (794-95) : (AIR 1971 SC 40 at p. 42, Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India : (1981) 2 SCR 533, 591 : AIR 1981 SC 818 at p. 846, J. Mohapatra. and Co. v. State of Orissa : (1985) 1 SCR 322, 334-5 : AIR 1984 SC 1572 at Pp. 1576-77 and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India : (1978) 2 SCR 621, 681 : AIR 1978 SC 597 at p. 629.... If legislation and the necessities of a situation can exclude the principles of natural justice including the audi alteram partem rule, a fortiori so can a provision of the Constitution such as the second proviso to Article 311(2).

26. Therefore, the impugned revised order cannot be invalidated on the ground that its issue is not preceded by a notification inviting objections. The fact that earlier deletion order was issued excluding the ghee from declaration order in respect of GMC does not have any effect on legal position as discussed supra.

Interpretation of statutes

27. To understand the spirit of a statute, one has to understand its script. Literal or strict rule of interpretation is norm. It is golden rule, employed which helps to get at the intention from the language of the provision. If language of the phraseology employed by the legislation is precise and plain, and thus by itself proclaims legislative intent in unequivocal terms, the same must be given effect, regardless of its effect or hardship that may result. This is well settled See Chief Justice of A.P. v. L.V.A. Dikshitulu : (1979) 2 SCC 34 : AIR 1979 SC 193 and Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Administration) : AIR 1988 SC 1883. It is also well settled that if literal or golden rule of interpretation yields vaguely absurd meaning, rule can be ignored. Then statute has to undergo purposive interpretation, if necessary, using rules of harmonious construction and contextual interpretation. While so doing, the true or legal meaning of enactment is arrived at by reading a statute in the light of any discernible purpose or object, for which it is enacted. See District Mining Officer v. Tata Iron & Steel Co. : (2001) 7 SCC 358, Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India : (2002) 3 SCC 722 : AIR 2002 SC 1351, Union of India v. Hansoli Devi : (2002) 7 SCC 273 : AIR 2002 SC 3240, Easland Combines, Coinbatore v. Collector of Central Excise : (2003) 3 SCC 410 : AIR 2003 SC 843, Prakash Nath Khanna v. Commissioner of Income Tax : (2004) 9 SCC 686, Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta : (2005) 2 SCC 271 : AIR 2005 SC 648, Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co. Limited v. Bombay Environmental Action Group : (2006) 3 SCC 434 : AIR 2006 SC 1489 and Promoters & Builders Association of Pune v. Pune Municipal Corporation : (2007) 6 SCC 143.

28. It is - more often than not; the legislative practice to provide for machinery for enforcing a police law (regulating law) or taxing law. In interpreting such 'machinery provisions', Court should always interpret in a manner so as to make provisions workable, by applying the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat (liberal construction should be put so as to make statute workable). If any interpretation renders an Act or any of its core provisions unworkable, such interpretation should be avoided unless the legislative intention is clear and unambiguous. In Saurabh Chaudri v. Union of India : (2003) 11 SCC 146, Commissioner of Income Tax v. Lakshmi Machine Works (2007) 11 SCC 126 and K.P. Mohammed Salim v. Commissioner of Income Tax : (2008) 11 SCC 573, Supreme Court held that a statute or any enacting provision therein must be so construed as to make it effective and operative on principle expressed in the said maxim.

29. In Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Limited v. State of Assam : (1989) 3 SCC 709 : AIR 1990 SC 123, a Constitution Bench of Supreme Court held, (para 49 of AIR)

The Courts strongly lean against any construction which tends to reduce a Statute to a futility. The provision of a Statute must be so construed as to make it effective and operative, on the principle 'but res majis valeat quam periat'. It is, no doubt, true that if a Statute is absolutely vague and its language wholly intractable and absolutely meaningless, the Statute could be declared void for vagueness. This is not in judicial-review by testing the law for arbitrariness or unreasonableness under Article 14; but what a Court of construction, dealing with the language of a Statute, does in order to ascertain from, and accord to, the Statute the meaning and purpose which the legislature intended for it. In Manchester Ship Canal Co. v. Manchester Racecourse Co. (1900) 2 Ch 352, Farwell, J. said:

Unless the words were so absolutely senseless that I could do nothing at all with them, I should be bound to find some meaning and not to declare them void for uncertainty. (See pages 360 and 361).

In Fawcett Properties v. Buckingham County Council (1960) 3 All ER 503, Lord Denning approving the dictum of Farwell, J. said

But when a Statute has some meaning, even though it is obscure, or several meanings, even though it is little to choose between them, the Courts have to say what meaning the Statute has to bear rather than reject it as a nullity. (Vide page 516).

It is, therefore, the Court's duty to make what it can of the Statute, knowing that the Statutes are meant to be operative and not inept and that nothing short of impossibility should allow a Court to declare a Statute unworkable. In Whitney v. Inland Revenue Commissioners 1926 AC 37, Lord Dunedin said

A Statute is designed to be workable, and the interpretation thereof by a Court should be to secure that object, unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable. (vide page 52).

30. In Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement : (2005) 4 SCC 530 : AIR 2005 SC 2622, another Constitution Bench of Supreme Court considered the question whether a company or a corporation, being a juristic person, can be prosecuted for an offence for which mandatory punishment prescribed is imprisonment and fine. The leading opinion was given by Hon'ble Justice K.G. Balakrishnan (as his Lordship then was) holding that a company has no immunity from prosecution, and that fine can be imposed for violating a penal provision. The majority also held that law should be interpreted so as to make it workable. However, in their dissenting opinion B.N. Srikrishna and N. Santosh Hegde, JJ, dealing with the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat, observed as under, (para 72 of SCC)

The maxim 'ut res magis valeat quam pereat' is pressed into service to contend that the duty of the court is to construe the enactment in such a way so as to implement rather than defeat the legislative purpose. In our view, this maxim can be pressed into service only if it is permissible to extract another reasonable meaning from the plain words used in the statute. There is a further difficulty in accepting this principle as applicable to the case on hand. This principle might enable the court to resolve the difficulty in construing a statute so that an interpretation is put on the statute which will carry forward the intention of the statute. However, it is to be remembered that the interpretation put on the statute must be of determinative import in all cases. This maxim cannot enable the court to put a variant construction on the statute, which would vary with the circumstances of different cases.

(emphasis supplied)

Interpretation of Sections 3 and 4

31. The petitioner contends that impugned revised order without following essential steps contemplated under Sections 4(1) and 4(3) of the Act is illegal. According to him, unless and until market committee constituted under Section 4(1) provides all facilities for sale and purchase of ghee in GMC, impugned notification ought not to have been issued. This contention of the petitioner does not commend itself to this Court for reasons more than one. At the outset, it may be reiterated that by impugned notification issued under Section 4(4) of the Act, Government directed that all the notified markets shall regulate all market products as already notified in declaration order of 1968. It does not operate with reference to only GMC. The declaration order vide G.O.Ms. No. 2095, dated 29.10.1968 remained in force and exercise by Government under Section 3(3) of the Act stood undisturbed. Further, ghee as 'product of livestock', which was included as item six (6) under Group VI (Livestock Product Group) in Schedule II to declaration order was never amended and it continued to be a market product for the purpose of Section 3(3) as well as for all other purposes. Therefore, effect of the impugned order admittedly is to restore 'ghee' as one of the market products with reference to GMC, which was initially included vide G.O.Ms. No. 1066, dated 30.07.1971 and deleted subsequently vide G.O.Ms. No. 448, dated 29.03.1972. When all market products notified under Section 3(3) in 1968 were directed to be regulated by all notified markets in Andhra Pradesh, whether such notification which restores ghee as one of the market products that can be regulated by GMC would be rendered illegal? On true construction of Sections 3 and 4, we are of the considered opinion that the impugned order does not suffer from any vice on that ground. We may mention that though 'ghee' as market product which stood deleted by virtue of deletion order, in respect of GMC, ghee - there is no doubt - continued to be regulated market product in other market areas or markets.

32. Sections 3(4) and 4(5) of the Act, as noticed supra, deal with merger and/or de-merger of notified areas and notified market areas respectively. A notified area may be pruned by excluding a part of area from it or may be enlarged by including another geographical area. These can be done, however, only after following provisions of Sub-sections (1), (2), (3) of Section 3 of the Act. A similar power is conferred under Section 4(5) of the Act on the Government. Under Section 4(5) the Government may exclude from a notified market area any area comprised therein or include in any notified market area any area specified in such notification. Here again, when they choose to exclude or include from or in a notified market area, Government have to follow procedure contemplated under Sub-sections (1) to (4) of Section 4 of the Act. It is thus very clear that legislature intended procedural compliance under Sections 3(1) to 3(3), and/or under Section 4(1) to 4(4) only when merger/de-merger of a notified area or notified market area is proposed. When a notification is issued under Section 4(4) notifying market products to be regulated by AMCs, there is no requirement of complying with or following the procedure contemplated under Sub-sections (1) to (4) of Section 4 of the Act. This interpretation makes the provision workable. For instance, if the Government decides to increase the number of market products to be regulated by AMC in a notified market area, there is no necessity to follow steps contemplated under Sections 4(1) to 4(3). Every time, the Government decides to increase number of regulated market products, if a market committee is constituted and such committee is required to provide facilities, it would render the entire Act unworkable. Section 4(4) of the Act stipulates issue of notification declaring market area and declaring market products to be regulated in market area. It does, not mean that they should always be one separate notification in respect of every notified market area. By one single notification, the Government can as well complete exercise contemplated under Section 4(4) to have uniform regulation pattern.

33. In Coramandal Traders v. Agricultural Market Committee, Guntur : 2004 (3) ALD 285 (DB), decided by Division Bench, question was whether G.O.Ms. No. 286, dated 05.07.1994 (challenged in this writ petition) was issued without following procedure under Section 3 of the Act. The factual background in the said case is somewhat similar to the facts on hand. In respect of Guntur market area, onion was notified as agricultural produce. Subsequently, item of onions was de-notified vide G.O.Rt.No.997, dated 04.04.1979. By impugned G.O., onion was again notified as one of the regulated market products. The question, therefore, was whether onions as one of the market products could be restored by impugned notification. Repelling the contention that every time a product is introduced in the notified list of market products, the Government should follow the procedure contemplated under Sections 3 and 4, following Full Bench decision in Mamidi Satyanarayana Murthy (supra) held as under.

Admittedly, Section 3 notification was issued after draft had been published and thereafter onions were notified and in terms of Sub-section (4) of Section 4, but subsequendy by G.O.Rt. No. 997, dated 04.04.1979 onions were de-notified. Therefore the exercise of issuing a draft notification and a final notification under Section 3 is a one time exercise. For the purposes of declaring a notified area, Sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 4 make it clear that notification for a specified notified market area with respect to a produce can be issued and revoked without any draft notification under Section 3.

(emphasis supplied)

34. By the same logic, whenever the market products are deleted or re-introduced under Section 4(4), the Government need not follow the procedure contemplated under Sections 4(1) and 4(3) of the Act. It is also not necessary for the market committee constituted under Section 4(1), every time to take steps as contemplated under Sub-section (3)(a) and (3)(b) of Section 4 of the Act to provide facilities whenever products are added to the list of notified regulated market products.

35. In Sasa Musa Sugar Works v. State of Bihar : (1996) 9 SCC 681, facts are as follows. Sugar was included in the Schedule of Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960, upto 1977. By notification, sugar was deleted as one of the market products with effect from 02.05.1977. Again by another notification, dated 21.05.1977, earlier notification was rescinded. This rescinding notification was challenged. In Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Limited v. Agricultural Produce Market Committee : AIR 1993 Pat 43 : (1992) 2 Pat LJR 253, Patna High Court invalidated rescinding order, for non-compliance with procedure contemplated under Sections 3 and 4 of Bihar Act35. Subsequently, Bihar legislature inserted Sections 4-A and 4-B to the effect that Sections 3 and 4 shall not apply to the exercise of power by the Government under Section 39 to amend schedule and that market fee levied and collected pursuant to rescinding notification, dated 21.05.1977 shall be deemed to be valid and no legal proceedings shall be maintained. These two provisions were inter alia challenged as ultra vires by several sugar mills of Bihar. By Judgment, dated 20.01.1994, Patna High Court allowed the writ petitions in part. It was held rescinding notification of 21.05.1977 though cancelled earlier deletion notification, did not tantamount to an automatic revival of sugar being a regulated item and that for including sugar in schedule of the Market Act positive action of issuing separate notification adding sugar, in schedule was necessary. The question before the Supreme Court was whether decision in DCM (supra) and impugned decision of High Court was correct. Whether procedure contemplated under Sections 3 and 4 are to be followed for introducing sugar as one of the items in the schedule. The Supreme Court answered question in the negative, and held that since deletion of sugar from the schedule was made in exercise of power under Section 39 and such deletion was not a decision under Section 4(1) of the Act, the procedure prescribed therein was not required to be followed. While holding that it is always a matter of decision of the State Government according to their perception to the felt need of inclusion of an item as the regulated market product, apex Court observed as under.

In the judgment in DCM case, such notification dated 21-5-1977 rescinding earlier notification has been held invalid by the High Court on the ground that once control has been effected in respect of a scheduled goods by following provision under Sections 3 and 4, reintroduction of an item in the Schedule is not permissible without following the provisions of Sections 3 and 4. In our view, such decision cannot be sustained for the reasons indicated hereafter. Inclusion or deletion of an item in selecting the field of control is to be made in exercise of power under Section 39 of the Markets Act and State Government is clothed with such power which can be exercised without any aid of the provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of the Act. It should also be noted that since deletion of sugar from the Schedule was made in exercise of power under Section 39, and such deletion was not a deletion under Section 4(1) of the Act, the procedure prescribed in Sections 3 and 4 of the Act, was not required to be followed. Section 4(3) does not contemplate inclusion or exclusion of produce under Section 39 of the Act but is applicable only to the inclusion or exclusion of any area from the area of market or any produce specified therein as have been notified for control in a specified market already by notification issued under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act.

(emphasis supplied)

36. It was also held that Section 4(3)36 thereof does not contemplate inclusion or exclusion of products under Section 39 of the Act, but is applicable only to inclusion or exclusion of any area from the notified market area. We may observe that though the scheme of Bihar Act and Andhra Pradesh Act are slightly different, the purport of Sections 3 and 4 of A.P. Act is similar to the purport of Sections 3 and 4 of Bihar Act. The reasoning which weighed with Supreme Court in Sasa Musa Sugar Works (supra), therefore, can be respectfully followed to reject the contention of petitioner.

37. We may also reiterate our view with a little more elaboration. After issue of declaration order vide G.O.Ms. No. 2095, dated 29.10.1968, the Government of A.P., issued market area order for G.M.C. vide G.O.Ms. No. 1066, dated 30.07.1971. This is under Section 4(4) of the Act showing the name of the market, boundaries of notified market area and notified regulated market products including ghee. This was followed by deletion order vide G.O.Ms. No. 448, dated 29.03.1972. This is also under Section 4(4) of the Act. About two decades thereafter came to be issued, the impugned revised order vide G.O.Ms. No. 286, dated 05.07.1994, which is again under Section 4(4) of the Act. Thus all orders, namely, market area order, deletion order and impugned revised order are issued under Section 4(4) of the Act and therefore, there is no requirement to follow procedure contemplated under Section 4(1) and (3) of the Act. There cannot be any objection if the Government decides to issue a general order under Section 4(4) applicable to all market areas. There is nothing in Section 4(4) read with other cognate provisions to indicate that every time Government decides to add or delete certain items of regulated market products, they should follow the procedure under Sections 4(1) and 4(3) of the Act. That would render the entire Section unworkable and the provision being a machinery provision cannot be interpreted like that. For instance, if at a given point of time, the Government issued a notification under Section 4(4) of the Act declaring the market area and market products and subsequently decides to delete some of items of market products, if it is insisted upon to follow all steps, it would certainly render the entire provision nugatory. Take another instance. If at a given point of time, Government issued as many notifications under Section 4(4) as there are market areas, notifying different items of market products and subsequently with a view to bring uniformity decides to issue one notification under Section 4(4) of the Act only with reference to different items and varieties of market products, one cannot expect the Government to abolish all the existing market committees and re-start exercise under Section 4(1) and then requiring such newly constituted market committees to establish markets, provide facilities and then request the Government to issue notification under Section 4(4). Further more, any exercise under Section 4(4) can be in two stages. The Government can first issue notification declaring market area and then issue another notifying regulated market products market areas notified simultaneously or earlier. Every time the items of market products are changed, there is no necessity for the Government to follow entire cumbersome procedure.

38. Above view derives strength from Section 4(5) of the Act which, as noticed earlier, enables Government to exclude from a notified market area any area comprised therein and/or to include any notified market area in an area specified in such notification. As ordained by the provision, Government are required to follow entire procedure contemplated under Sections 4(1), (2), (3) and (4) which only means constituting market committee, such market committee establishing markets, providing facilities and then Government issuing notification declaring the market area. So to say, whenever an area is excluded from the notified market area or whenever an area is included in the notified market area, Government have to follow four steps other than step contemplated under Section 3(3) of the Act because the declaration order under Section 3(3) of the Act37 is ordinarily one time exercise (unless Section 3(4) is put to use), whereas exercise under Section 4(4) especially with regard to all or any notified market products, can be from time to time based on exigencies.

39. We may, though not directly relevant to the point, refer to Taylor Principle. This principle postulates that when power is conferred indicating the manner of exercising such power, the same shall be exercised only in the manner prescribed or not at all. In Taylor v. Taylor 1875 (1) Ch.D 426 it was held:

When a statutory power is conferred for the first time upon a Court and the mode of exercising it is pointed out, it means that no other mode is to be adopted on a great varieties of Acts where application has been directed to be by petition, and it has been laid down that being the mode appointed by the Act which conferred the jurisdiction, it must exercise the jurisdiction according to the provisions of the Act. In the same way, when the Statute says who is the person to petition, it means that the person or persons so described, and no others, shall be entitled to petition, otherwise any one interested might petition under the general principle that when powers are to be exercised by a Court of law any person interested in calling those powers into execution is entitled to come before the Court, and the only reason for putting in such a Section is to shew that that is not the meaning of the Legislature, but that the right of calling for the exercise of the powers shall be confined to the persons so described.

40. The principle was quoted with approval by Supreme Court in G.E. Board v. Girdharlal : AIR 1969 SC 267, State of Gujarat v. Shantilal : AIR 1969 SC 634, Ramchandra v. Govind : AIR 1975 SC 915, and Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Muncipal Corporation of Delhi : (1993) 3 SCC 161. It is not necessary to refer to all the decisions. Suffice it to extract relevant passage from Ramchandra v. Govind.

A century ago, in Taylor v. Taylor (1875) 1 Ch D 426 Jessel M.R. adopted the rule that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all and that other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden. This rule has stood the test of time. It was applied by the Privy Council, in Nazir Ahmed v. Emperor : 63 Ind App 372 : AIR 1936 PC 253 (2), and later by this Court in several cases, Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of U.P. : (1954) SCR 1098 : AIR 1954 SC 332 : 1954 Crl LJ 910 : Deep Chand v. State of Rajsthan : (1962) SCR 662 : AIR 1961 SC 1527 : 1961 (2) Crl. LJ 705 to a Magistrate making a record under Sections 164 and 364 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. This rule squarely applies 'where indeed, the whole aim and object of the legislature would be plainly defeated if the command to do the thing in a particular manner did not imply a prohibition to do it in any other'. (Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edn., pp. 362-363).

(emphasis supplied)

41. In a given case if Government excludes from a notified market area or includes in any notified market area without following procedure envisaged under Sections 4(1), (2), (3) and (4), it would certainly suffer from procedural irregularities of noncompliance with mandatory procedure therein. The same is not the case when the Government issues a notification under Section 4(4) modifying, amending, including or excluding any item or items from notified market products. It may be mentioned that generally and ordinarily declaration of notified areas and declaration of notified market areas by the very nature are permanent or quasi-permanent and if often Government tinkers with notified area or notified market area, the Act cannot be enforced with promptitude and may not succeed in its object of regulating purchase and sale of agricultural products, intended to safeguard mainly producers (farmers) of market products. Any interpretation which is contrary to the object of legislation should not be preferred to interpretation, which make the Act especially its machinery provisions workable and furthers object of the Act. On point No. 2, we hold that impugned order does not suffer from any illegality or invalidity.

Incidental Questions

42. Yet another subsidiary and incidental point raised by the learned Counsel for petitioner insofar as GMC is concerned is that impugned notification does not restore status quo ante as on the date of issue of declaration order and market area order vide G.O.Ms. No. 2095, dated 29.10.1968 and G.O.Ms. No. 1066, dated 30.07.1971 respectively. The submission is wholly unsustainable. No material is placed before this Court to show that Government issued order under Section 4(4) of the Act deleting 'ghee' (item 6 of group VI of Schedule II of declaration order) from declaration order. What was done was to delete 'ghee' from market area order of GMC vide G.O.Ms. No. 448, dated 28.03.1972. Even after issue of deletion order, 'ghee' continued to be regulated market product as per Schedule II of declaration order, and therefore, it is always permissible for the Government to issue the impugned G.O. Be it noted that impugned order under Section 4(4) was issued in supersession of all the Government orders on the subject of market products which obviously means the deletion order as well.

43. That a notification issued in supersession of earlier notifications would not wipe out the liability to pay the levy - be it fees or tax; is well settled. In Calcutta Municipal Corporation v. Pawan Kumar Saraf : (1999) 2 SCC 400 : AIR 1999 SC 738, respondent was indicted for an offence under Section 16(1)(a)(i) read with Section 7 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (PFA Act, for brevity), on a charge of adulteration of asafoetida, based on the report of Public Analyst, Calcutta. After entering appearance in Criminal Court, he made an application to send samples to Director of Central Food Laboratory (Director). The Director sent certificate favouring the accused to the effect that the sample conforms to the standard prescribed for asafetida. The accused then moved the criminal Court for discharging him from prosecution. Trial Magistrate declined, whereupon he moved the High Court, which quashed the prosecution proceedings. Before Supreme Court, Calcutta Municipal Corporation projected that certificate of Director does not supersede report of the Public Analyst. The accused relied on Section 13(3) of the PFA Act which provides that certificate issued by Director shall supersede report of the Public Analyst. Dealing with this aspect, Supreme Court referring to Black's Law Dictionary (5th edn.,) observed that the word 'supersede' in law means, 'obliterate, set aside, annul, replace, make void or inefficacious or useless, repeal' and held that when statute says the certificate shall supersede report, it means that report stand annulled or obliterated and same stands displaced.

44. In State of Orissa v. Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Limited : AIR 1985 SC 1293 : 1985 Supp SCC 280, the factual background is as follows. Government of Orissa issued two notifications in exercise of powers under Sections 3B and 5(1) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947 (Orissa Act, for brevity), making severed bamboos and standing trees liable to tax on turnover. Subsequently, two other notifications were issued in supersession of all previous notifications, pursuant to amendment to Orissa Act. These two notifications were challenged before High Court inter alia on the ground that since the notifications were issued in supersession of all earlier notifications on the subject, the liability, if any, under earlier notifications is wiped out. A Division Bench of Orissa High Court rejected the said contention, but allowed and quashed the impugned notifications. Whether the notification issued in supersession of all previous notifications had the effect of wipe out all liability, which had accrued under earlier notifications? Supreme Court answered this question in the negative and held:

In the notifications dated December 29, 1977, the word 'suppression' is used in the same sense as the word 'repeal' or rather the words 'repeal and replacement'. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, third edition, at p. 2084, defines the word 'suppression' as meaning 'The action of superseding or condition of being superseded'. Some of the meanings given to the word 'supersede' on the same page in that dictionary which are relevant for our purpose are 'to put a stop to; to render superfluous or unnecessary; to make of no effect; to annul; to take the place of (something set aside or abandoned); to succeed to the place occupied by; to supply the place of a thing'. Webster's Third New International Dictionary at p. 2296 defines the word 'suppression' as 'the state of being superseded: removal and replacement'. Thus, by using in the notifications dated December 29, 1977, the expression 'in supersession of all previous notifications' all that was done was to repeal and replace the previous notifications by new notifications. By repealing and replacing the previous notifications by other notifications, the result was not to wipe out any liability accrued under the previous notifications. If this contention of the respondents were to be accepted, the result would be startling. It would mean, for example, that when a notification has been issued under Section 5(1) prescribing a rate of tax, and that notification is later superseded by another notification further enhancing the rate of tax, all tax liability under the earlier notification is wiped out and no tax can be collected by the State Government in respect of any transactions effected during the period when the earlier notification was in force.

45. When all Government orders on the subject of market products issued from time to time in respect of all notified market areas stood superseded and the impugned order comes into effect, the ghee shall stand included in all market areas including GMC. Learned Counsel for petitioner has not brought to our notice any authority to support his contention that impugned order does not revive 'ghee' as one of the regulated products in GMC. As noticed supra in Sasa Musa Sugar Works (supra), Supreme Court held that when rescinding notification is issued earlier excluded item attracts market levy.

46. Another related question raised by learned Counsel for petitioner is that in the absence facilities for purchase, sale and storage of ghee in Guntur market area, or its Market, notice issued to the petitioner requiring him to obtain licence under Section 7(1) of the Act is unsustainable. The allegation in ground (f) in affidavit accompanying the writ petition is that GMC did not provide any market for purchase and sale of ghee and that no facilities are provided by them for the purpose of regulating trade in ghee. This has been denied by GMC as well as Government of Andhra Pradesh stating that they have provided facilities having established markets in Guntur and Prathipadu and keep on extending facilities with available funds. Though not specifically averred in the counter affidavit, their Counsel in written submissions states that GMC established ghee laboratory in collaboration with the Department of Marketing and that the market committee would plough back its funds to provide facilities under Section 15 of the Act and that it is for the petitioner to avail the facilities. It is also averred that no special benefit would be extended to individual fee payers. This is not specifically denied by filing any reply affidavit. The submission of learned Counsel for petitioner requires addressing following questions, (i) Whether Act requires GMC to provide any special facilities for purchase and sale of ghee; (ii) whether GMC has provided any facilities as contemplated in Act in its notified market area; and (iii) whether GMC cannot compel a ghee merchant to take licence and pay market fee without conferring any benefit or ignoring principle of quid pro quo. We may consider these one after other.

47. Section 4(3)(a) of the Act requires market committee to establish such number of markets in the notified market area as directed by the Government, and 'shall provide such facilities in the market as may be specified by the Government from time to time'. For this purpose, the Government of Andhra Pradesh issued order in G.O.Ms. No. 719, dated 27.12.1979, directing market committees to provide basic amenities like drinking water for users of the market, drinking water for users of the market, drinking water for the cattle shed, shed for the use of the users of yard etc. Referring to this G.O., in Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of Andhra Pradesh : AIR 1983 SC 1246, Supreme Court observed that if any of the facilities are not provided by the market committee, it is open to the payers to have the remedy to take up the matter with State Government which has ample power under Section 22 of the Act to direct supersession of market committee. The relevant observations are as below.

It will be noticed that these facilities are to be provided by the market committees in course of time 'as and when funds permit'. It is needless to stress that the question of providing these facilities would depend on the financial capacity of each market committee. That would depend on whether there are sufficient funds available at its disposal with the Market Committee. We are not impressed by the submission that if a market committee does not have sufficient funds to provide the special amenities it should borrow loans from the State Government under Sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Act or the State Government should provide grant-in-aid to such market committee under Sub-section (2)(iii) of Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Act. If any particular market committee persistently makes default in not performing the duties imposed on it by or under the Act, or neglects or refuses to carry out any general or special direction issued by the State Government under Sub-section (3) of Section 4 as regards providing of facilities or abuses its powers, the petitioners have the remedy to take up the matter with the State Government. The State Government has ample power under Section 22 of the Act to direct the supersession of such a market committee.

(emphasis supplied)

48. Section 4(3)(b) of the Act is to the effect that every market committee shall also establish in the notified area, such number of markets (as Government may direct) for the purchase and sale, solely of vegetables or fruits and shall provide such facilities in the market as may be specified. The legislative intention is very clear that there could be special markets for vegetables and fruits or such other items but it is never intention of the legislature to establish a special market for ghee or provide special facilities for storage etc. The petitioner has not brought to our notice any special or general order of Government directing market committees to provide special facilities or establish special markets for ghee. Ghee is one of regulated market products and insofar as the operation of Section 7(1) and Section 12(1) is concerned, ghee stands on same footing as others. It is nobody's case that the GMC has not provided any facilities in its jurisdiction as directed by the Government in G.O.Ms. No. 719, dated 27.12.1979. It is altogether different question as to whether levy of fees on the purchase and sale of ghee is commensurate with service given by the GMC and in case laxity, what are remedies available to a market fee payer. For this reason, we are not able to countenance submission of learned Counsel for petitioner.

49. It is not the case of the petitioner that no facilities at all are provided in the entire Guntur notified market area. There is not even a whisper nor an allegation that GMC failed to discharge its duty in providing facilities as contemplated under Section 4(3)(a) or Government Order referred to hereinabove. In their counter affidavit, GMC stated that it has provided established markets at Guntur and Prathipadu and provided facilities and also continue to provide facilities subject to availability of funds. As noticed supra, no reply affidavit is filed denying allegations. At this stage, we may refer to Sections 14 and 15 of the Act. Section 14 mandates that all monies received by market committee shall be paid into market committee funds (MCF). Section 15 stipulates and enumerates purposes for which such MCF may be expended. The purposes for which MCF may be used are acquisition of site for market; establishment, maintenance and improvement of market; construction of buildings for market; maintenance of standard weights and measures; collection and dissemination of information regarding all matters relating to crop statistics and marketing in respect of market products; schemes for extension or cultural improvement of notified market products; propaganda for improvement of market products; promotion of grading services; measures for preservation of food grains and meet staff and establishment charges. GMC was notified by market area order vide G.O.Ms. No. 1066, dated 30.07.1971. It is also averment in counter affidavit of GMC that they have already established markets and provided facilities. Therefore, we have no manner of doubt that GMC has already provided facilities and they can always collect the market fee and also compel a ghee trader to obtain licence under Section 7(1) of the Act.

50. The third question posed supra need not detain us any longer. It is well settled that levying fees and tax are two forms of exercise of State's taxing power. There is no quid pro quo between tax payer and public authority as tax is a part of common burden. It is also well settled that fee is charge for special service or a benefit given to a class of individuals fee-payers and fee collected need not have correlation with actual service in exactitude but if it is shown substantial portion of the fee is expended for the purpose for which it is levied, it would be justified. The decisions of the Supreme Court on this aspect are galore. We feel appropriate to refer only to Krishi Upaj Mandi Samithi v. Orient Paper & Industries Limited : (1995) 1 SCC 655.

51. After referring to almost all authorities, namely, Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments v. S.L.T.S.S.S. Mutt : AIR 1954 SC 282, Jagannath Ramanuj Das v. State of Orissa AIR 1954 SC 40, Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay : AIR 1954 SC 388, Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. Ltd v. State of Orissa : AIR 1961 SC 459, H.H. Sadhundra Thirtha Swamiar v. Commissioner for Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments : AIR 1963 SC 966, Corporation of Calcutta v. Liberty Cinema : AIR 1965 SC 1107, Kewal Krishna Puri v. State of Punjab : (1980) 1SCC 416, Southern Pharmaceuticals & Chemicals v. State of Kerala : (1981) 4 SCC 391, Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of A.P. : (1983) 4 SCC 353, Om Parkash Agarwal v. Giri Raj Kishori : (1986) 1 SCC 722 : AIR 1986 SC 726 and Kishan Lal Lakshmi Chand v. State of Haryana : 1993 Supp (4) SCC 461, Supreme Court summarized law under nine principles. Paragraph 21 (7) is relevant and reads as under.

21(7). It is not a postulate of a fee that it must have relation to the actual service rendered. However, the rendering of service has to be established. The service, further, cannot be remote. The test of quid pro quo is not to be satisfied with close or proximate relationship in all kinds of fees. A good and substantial portion of the fee must, however, be shown to be expended for the purpose for which the fee is levied. It is not necessary to confer the whole of the benefit on the payers of the fee but some special benefit must be conferred on them which has a direct and reasonable corelation to the fee. While conferring some special benefits on the payers of the fees, it is permissible to render service in the general interest of all concerned. The element of quid pro quo is not possible or even necessary to be established with arithmetical exactitude. But it must be established broadly and reasonably that the amount is being spent for rendering services to those on whom the burden of the fee falls. There is no postulate of a fee that it must have a direct relation to the actual services rendered by the authorities to each individual to obtain the benefit of the service. The element of quid pro quo in the strict sense is not always a sine qua non for a fee. The element of quid pro quo is not necessarily absent in every tax. It is enough if there is a broad, reasonable and general corelationship between the levy and the resultant benefit to the class of people on which the fee is levied though no single payer of the fee receives direct or personal benefit from those services. It is immaterial that the general public may also be benefited from some of the services if the primary service intended is for the payers of the fees.

(emphasis supplied)

52. Thus, the element of quid pro quo in strict sense is not always sine qua non for a fee. GMC was established about four decades ago and it would be improper and incorrect to infer that they have not provided any facilities nor spent MCF for the purposes as mentioned in Section 15 of the Act. The petitioner also does not point out any special paraphernalia required for ghee trade. Here, we may clarify about the position of daily farmer (not a trader), who makes ghee for his own consumption and/or for selling in Guntur notified market area. As per Section 2(xvi) of the Act, trader means, 'the person licensed under Sub-section (1) of Section 7 and includes the person in whose management the collection of fees is placed whether he is called a commission agent, ginner, presser, warehouseman, importer, exporter and/or stockists. Rule 2(xxiii) of the Andhra Pradesh (Agricultural Produce and Livestock) Markets Rules, 1969 (the Rules, for brevity) defines trader means, 'a person ordinarily engaged in the business of buying and selling of notified agricultural produce, livestock or products of livestock as a principal or as a duly authorized agent of one or more principals and includes a person ordinarily engaged in the business of processing notified market products'. Section 7(1) of the Act prohibits a person to set up any place for purchase, sale and storage of regulated market product, without obtaining a licence granted to him by market committee. Section 12(1) is a charging provision and empowers a market committee to levy fees on any notified regulated market product at such rate not exceeding Rs. 2 as may be specified in the byelaws of market committee. Under Rule 48 of the Rules, it is only the trader who is required to obtain licence and a daily farmer or a smalltime agriculturist, who keeps cows and buffaloes need not apply for a licence to sell his ghee in market area or market though he may be liable to pay market fee to trader whenever there is a sale subject to any exemption order. The petitioner is admittedly wholesale dealer and therefore, it is incumbent on him to obtain a licence under Section 7(1) of the Act.

Conclusion:

53. On the above analysis and for the reasons as above, we hold that ghee is a product of livestock and subject to the observations made in the above paragraph with regard to daily farmer or small time agriculturist, every trader in Ghee (other than daily farmer or small time agriculturist, who keeps cows and buffaloes) is required to obtain licence under Section 7(1) of the Act. We also hold that the impugned notification vide G.O.Ms. No. 286, dated 05.07.1994, does not suffer from any illegality and infirmity and the same is valid. The writ petition is therefore dismissed. Having regard to facts and circumstances, we make no order as to costs.

ORDER

P.S. Narayana, J

54. Kommisetty Nammalwar & Co., Quntur, represented by its Proprietor, filed the present Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for issuance of a writ of mandamus declaring the action of the respondents in issuing G.O.Ms. No. 286, Agriculture and Co-operative Marketing-1 Department dated 5-7-1994 directing all the notified markets to regulate the purchase and sale of notified agricultural produce, livestock and product of livestock issued in Schedule II of G.O.Ms. No. 2095 dated 20-9-1968 in supersession of all the G.Os. issued earlier including the G.O. under which thee product of 'ghee' is deleted from the notified products without mentioning any reasons whatsoever and the action of the respondents in treating the 'ghee' as the notified product straight away which was already deleted by virtue of the earlier G.O. without following the due procedure preliminary decree under the provisions of the A.P. (Agricultural Produce and Livestock) Markets Act 1966 (hereinafter in short referred to as 'Act' for the purpose of convenience) and without considering that the 'ghee' is not the product of livestock and insisting upon the petitioner for taking the licence and payment of fee as illegal, arbitrary, ultra vires of the powers of the respondents and contrary to the provisions of the Act and to pass such other suitable orders.

55. Sri Ghanta Rama Rao, the learned Counsel representing the writ petitioner, the learned Government Pleader for Agriculture and Sri K. Madhava Reddy, the learned Standing Counsel of the Agricultural Market Committee, Tenali, made submissions in elaboration in the light of the respective stands taken by these parties in the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition and the respective counter affidavits as well.

56. Sri Ghanta Rama Rao, the learned Counsel representing the writ petitioner would maintain that 'ghee' does not fall within the definition of 'livestock' under the Act. The learned Counsel also pointed out to the relevant paras of the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition and also the respective stands taken by the respondents in their respective counter affidavits. The learned Counsel also further explained the notified area and the denotification and the procedure to be followed under Section 3 of the Act. The Counsel also had drawn the attention of this Court to the preamble of the Act and made elaborate submissions on the scope, object and ambit of the Act. The Counsel also had drawn the attention of this Court to the relevant definitions under Section 2 of the Act and further explained the definition of 'livestock'. The learned Counsel also further explained how the commodity - 'ghee', had been introduced and how the same had been deleted and how the same had been notified. The Counsel also would contend that on both the grounds that 'ghee' would not fall within the meaning of the livestock under the Act and also on the ground that the procedure or steps which led to the issuance of the notification being mandatory since had not been followed, the writ petitioner is bound to succeed. The Counsel also explained how the interim order was operative for sufficiently a long time even when the matter was pending before the Apex Court and how the matters again came back to this Court and under what circumstances the present Writ Petition had been filed. While making elaborate submissions, the learned Counsel had drawn the attention of this Court to Section 3(3) and Section 3(4) and Section 4(3) and Section 4(4) in particular. The Counsel also had pointed out to the relevant G.Os., the relevant portions of the G.Os., and further relied on several decisions to substantiate his submissions.

57. On the contrary, the learned Government Pleader for Agriculture and Marketing would maintain that in the prior batch of Writ Petitions, the G.O. as such had not been challenged. The learned Government Pleader had drawn the attention of this Court to the language of Section 4(4) of the Act and would maintain that the issuance of general notification would be sufficient. These provisions may have to be construed in favour of the Market Committee keeping in view the object of the Act. The learned Counsel also would contend that it is true that certain steps are to be followed but however if substantial compliance is there, that would be sufficient and even if there is some lapse or gap, at the best this can be said to be a curable irregularity and definitely not an illegality. The learned Counsel also while making elaborate submissions pointed out that the Government has discretion to notify a particular commodity or to delete a particular commodity and this discretion cannot be lightly interfered with by the Courts. While making further submissions the learned Counsel also had taken this Court through the relevant G.O.s., the relevant portions of the counter affidavits and further made certain submissions in the context of Sections 7 and 12 of the Act as well. The learned Counsel ultimately would conclude that inasmuch as the present notification had been issued for the benefit of the Market Committee, the same to be upheld. The learned Government Pleader relied on several decisions to substantiate his submissions.

58. Sri K. Madhava Reddy, the learned standing Counsel representing 1st respondent made elaborate submissions tracing the historical background of the litigation and also submitted written arguments. The learned Counsel strongly relied on Sections 13 and 15 of the A.P. General Clauses Act and would maintain that in the light of the views expressed by the Apex Court in Sasa Musa Sugar Works v. State of Bihar : 1996 (9) SCC 681, Rameshchandra Kachardas Porwal v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. : 1981 (2) SCC 722, Rameshchandra Kailashkumar v. State of U.P. : AIR 1980 S.C. 1124, Union of India v. Cynamide India Limited : 1987(2) SCC 720; Belsund Sugar Co. Limited v. State of Bihar : 1999 (9) SCC 620, Srinivasa General Traders v. State of A.P. : 1983(4) SCC 353, it cannot be said that the impugned action suffers from any illegality whatsoever. While further elaborating his submissions the learned Counsel also pointed out to the views expressed by the Division Benches of this Court and would maintain that the said views being well-considered views, the same to be upheld by negativing the reliefs prayed for by the writ petitioner. The learned standing Counsel also had pointed out to the relevant columns of the relevant G.Os., in seriatim and further relied on Sections 3, 4, 7 and 12 of the Act and further would maintain that the constitutionality of the G.O. had not been challenged as being violative of any of the fundamental rights. The learned standing Counsel also would maintain that the constitutionality of an action normally should be upheld since there is a presumption in favour of the constitutionality and when the petitioner is unable to establish contra, the petitioner is bound to fail and hence the Writ Petition to be dismissed. The learned standing Counsel also relied on several decisions in this regard.

59. The learned Counsel representing the parties also relied upon several decisions and further made certain submissions relating to the correctness or otherwise of the prior decisions made by this Court and pointed out certain of the distinguishing features in relation thereto.

60. The Act is enacted for the purpose of regulation of purchase and sale of agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock and for establishment of markets in connection therewith. The various provisions of the Act enable the Government to notify various products, livestock and products of livestock as specified in the draft notification. A detailed procedure is prescribed under Section 3 of the Act for the purpose of notifying the products in respect of which the purchase and sale can be regulated within the notified area. It contemplates issuance of draft notification under Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act intending to regulate the purchases and sale of such product and products in such area as specified in such a notification and call for the objections relating to the same. The Government issued final notification after considering such objections which may be raised by such persons in pursuance of such draft notification. The change in such a notified area with respect to the notified products can be done under Sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the Act only after following the due procedure as contemplated by Sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 3 the Act. Section 4 of the Act enables the Government to constitute Market Committee or each notified area by following the procedure as prescribed therein. Such Market Committee to be constituted by the Government shall be in the notified area and the Government may from time to time direct establishment of markets in the notified areas for the purchase and sale of any notified agricultural produce livestock or products of livestock and shall provide such facilities in the market as may be specified by the Government from time to time by general or special order. The Government can also issue notification under Sub-section (4) of Section 4 of the Act declaring the market area and such other area adjoining thereto as may be specified in such notification in the notified market for the purpose of sale of agricultural produce, livestock and produce of livestock.

61. The Government in exercise of power under Section 3(3) of the Act had issued G.O.Ms. No. 2095, Food and Agriculture (Agrl.IV) dt.29-10-68 and declared notified areas in respect of the several Agricultural Market Committees so also specified agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock in Schedule-I and Schedule II respectively. In pursuance whereof, notified area of the 1st respondent -Market Committee had been declared and serialized at item No. 6 of Schedule-I. Out of the said notified area of the 1st respondent-Market Committee, new notified area of respective Agricultural Market Committees stood declared and consequent upon the same bifurcation was effected to the notified area of the 1st respondent-Market Committee. Article 'ghee' was shown at serial No. 6 under the caption of 'products of livestock'.

62. The Government had issued G.O.Ms. No. 1066, Food and r Agricultural (Agrl.IV) dt.30-7-1971 declaring notified Market Committee area of 1st respondent-Market Committee under column 5 of the said G.O. In the notified commodities under column No. 4 'ghee' was shown at serial No. 9.

63. G.O.Ms. No. 448 dt.29-3-72 was issued in exercise of power under Section 4(4) of the Act and 'ghee' was deleted in respect of Ongole and Guntur Market Committees by having carried out an amendment to G.O.Ms. No. 976 dt. 16-7-1971 and G.O.Ms. No. 1066 dt.30-7-1971 respectively.

64. G.O.Ms. No. 286 dt.5-7-94 was issued under Section 4(4) of the Act and all the Market Committees had been directed to regulate purchase and sale of all the commodities specified in the said notification as remained notified in Schedule II of the Act. Accordingly, the 1st respondent-Market Committee had initiated action to levy market fee on 'ghee' and how the traders who were bent upon challenging the same began the litigations and the series of litigations up to the Apex Court and how again the present Writ Petition had been filed in the light of the liberty granted by the learned Division Bench of this Court, had been well narrated in the respective stands taken by the parties in the affidavits filed in support of the Writ Petition and also in the respective counter affidavits.

65. This Court on 28-11-2008 while issuing rule nisi in W.P.M.P. No. 32404/2008 made the following order:

As the notice issued by Agricultural Market Committee requiring the petitioner to obtain necessary licence, we do not consider it fit to pass interim Order. However coercive steps shall not be taken against the petitioner.

The W.P.M.P. is ordered accordingly.

66. The petitioner has been dealing with 'ghee' which will be derived from butter and the butter is a bye-product of milk. 'Ghee' which is a product of butter cannot be termed as either livestock or product of livestock. Further it is the case of the petitioner that at the most milk may be specified as livestock product but certainly 'ghee' prepared by certain process of manufacturing from cream or butter cannot be considered as livestock product. Though initially 'ghee' was included in notified items as a product of livestock, realizing the nature of this product, the Government of Andhra Pradesh on a representation made by the 'ghee' traders that 'ghee' is not a livestock product, by G.O.Ms. No. 448, Food & Agriculture Department, dated 29-3-1992, deleted 'ghee' from the notified products. Inasmuch as 'ghee' is not a livestock product, the petitioner is not obliged to obtain licence or to pay the market fee or to submit records to the 1st respondent-Market Committee under the provisions of the Act. It is also averred that the 1st respondent had not established any market or market building in the notified area providing facilities to store or sell 'ghee' and no infrastructure had been created by it to facilitate trading in 'ghee'. The Market Committees concerned are empowered to implement the provisions of the Act for the benefit of the agriculturists in the area. This Enactment is not intended to be a measure of taxation. Section 12 of the Act provides for levy only for the marketing and other facilities and the Market Committee provides elimination of middlemen. It is also the case of the petitioner that the Government issued G.O.Ms. No. 286, Agriculture & Cooperation dated 5-7-1994 empowering the notified markets to regulate the purchase and sale of the notified agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock, issued in Schedule 11 of G.O.Ms. No. 2095 dated 27-10-1968 as amended from time to time. As on the date of issuance of G.O.Ms. No. 286, dated 5-7-1994, 'ghee' was not a notified product in respect of the Agricultural Market Committee for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale in view of the fact that the same had been deleted by G.O.Ms. No. 448, Food & Agriculture (Agriculture-IV) Department dated 29-3-1972. It is also the case of the petitioner that unless a particular product is notified for the purpose of regulating its purchase and sale in the specified area for marketing, the concerned Market Committee will not have any power or Authority to regulate the purchase and sale of the said product in the said notified area. If any area is to be notified or the existing area of any market is to be notified under Sub-section (4) of Section 3, the procedure under Sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) to be followed. It is also the case of the petitioner that the Government had not issued any draft notification calling for objections for the purpose of including 'ghee' as a product in an area of specified market to be regulated under the provisions of the Act. Unless and until the procedure contemplated under Section 3(1), (2) and (3) of the Act are followed, no notification can be issued modifying the specified area in respect of the notified products. Hence the action of the respondents in issuing the impugned G.O.Ms. No. 286 dated 5-7-1994 enabling the Market Committee to regulate the purchase and sale of 'ghee' treating it as a product of livestock by virtue of G.O.Ms. No. 2095 dated 27-10-1968 is contrary to the provisions of the Act and is in violation of principles of natural justice as well. It is also the case of the petitioner that after issuance of the said G.O., the Market Committee in question issued notice dated 18-6-1998 requiring the petitioner to take licence under Section 7 of the Act, to pay the fee at the rate of 1% on the sales of 'ghee'. Then the petitioner filed W.P. No. 28418/96 on the file of this Court and this Court was inclined to admit the said Writ Petition and granted interim Order. Ultimately the Writ Petition was dismissed along with similar Writ Petitions by a Common Order dated 8-9-1999. The concerned organization approached the Apex Court by filing C.A. No. 16256-16257/2000 and the Apex Court was pleased to post the said Appeal along with C.A. No. 4484/2000 and initially the Apex Court granted interim direction, but finally disposed of the said C.A. No. 4484/2000 remanding the said batch of cases to this Court for hearing afresh. Then the above batch of cases came up before a learned Division Bench of this Court and the learned Division Bench pointed out that in the said batch of Writ Petitions, the validity of G.O.Ms. No. 286 had not been challenged and in the light of the same, the said Writ Petitions were withdrawn with liberty to file Writ Petitions afresh challenging the said G.O. In such circumstances, the present Writ Petition had been filed.

67. On 14-11-2008, a learned Judge of this Court made the following order:

The question whether market fee can be levied on 'ghee' under the provisions of Andhra Pradesh (Agricultural Produce and Live Stock) Markets Act, 1966 was considered by this Court in the earlier round of litigation and the entire batch of writ petitions was dismissed by a Division Bench. When the matter was carried to the Supreme Court, by order dated 28-3-2006, the Supreme Court remanded the matter for fresh consideration while making it clear that the interim Order granted shall continue till the disposal of the matters by this Court afresh. However on a request made by the petitioners, the said writ petitions were withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh writ petition. Thus, the present writ petition came to be filed.

Sri K. Madhava Reddy, advocate, who accepted notice for the 1st respondent Market Committee, while bringing to the notice of this Court that an identical issue was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in 2004(3) A.L.D. 285 and 1997(3) A.L.D. 720 and the contentions of the petitioners therein were rejected, submitted that this writ petition is liable to be dismissed as covered by those decisions.

Be that as it may, as mentioned above, since the very same question relating to the payment of market fee or 'ghee' was once considered and negatived by the Division Bench, in my considered opinion, it would be appropriate to post this writ petition before a Division Bench for consideration.

Accordingly, the Registry of directed to place the papers before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for appropriate orders.

Since the learned Counsel for the petitioner states that there is urgency for interim orders, the papers may be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice today itself.

67. By virtue of an order made by the learned Chief Justice, especially in the light of the decisions Coromandal Traders v. Agricultural Market Committee, Guntur and Anr. : 2004(3) ALD 285 (D.B.) and Vijayawada Skin Merchants Association and Ors. v. State of A.P. 1997(3) ALD 720 (D.B.), the matter had been placed before this Court.

68. Several grounds also had been specified in the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition by the writ petitioner.

69. Counter affidavits were filed by respondents 1 and 3 and both these counter affidavits take almost similar stand. Since the 1st respondent is the Agricultural Market Committee and in view of the fact that the validity of the G.O. had been challenged as specified supra and in the light of the fact as already referred to above that the counter affidavit of the 1st respondent and the counter affidavit of the 3rd respondent run on similar lines, to avoid repetition, it may be appropriate to refer to the counter affidavit filed by the 3rd respondent in detail. As already aforesaid, the counter affidavit of the 1st respondent also runs on similar lines and the undernoted decisions had been referred to: Sita Devi (Smt.) (Dead) By L.Rs. v. State of Bihar and Ors. : 1995 Supp.(1) SCC 670, Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of Andhra Pradesh : AIR 1983 S.C. 1246, Coromandal Traders v. Agricultural Market Committee, Guntur and Anr. (referred (7) supra), Gurram Polisetti and Ors. v. Government of A.P. and Ors. : 2000(4) ALD 253 (D.B.) and Vijayawada Skin Merchants Association and Ors. v. State of A.P. (referred (8) supra).

70. In the counter affidavit of the 3rd respondent, it was averred that the Government by exercising power vested in it under Section 3(3) of the Act had issued G.O.Ms. No. 2095 dated 29-10-1968 declaring notified areas of respective market committee and notified agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock as set out in Schedules I and II appended to the Act respectively. Pursuant to issuance of the said G.O., the 1st respondent-Market Committee has come into existence and limits of notified area stood declared under Section 3(3) of the Act by having meticulously adhered to the procedure mandated by Section 3 of the Act. The Government in exercise of power conferred on it under Section 4(4) of the Act, preceded by fulfillment of legal requirements under Section 4(3)(a)(b) & (c), had issued G.O.Ms. No. 1066, Food & Agriculture (Agrl. IV) Department dated 30-7-1991 and declared limits of notified market area with respect to regulation and control of notified commodities specified under the said G.O. wherein 'ghee' - found its place and serialized at item No. 9 by virtue of Section 4(2) of the Act and the petitioner-Market Committee stands obligated to enforce the provisions of the Act and Rules made thereunder under the approved bye-laws. It was also stated that Section 3 of the Act deals with creation of notified area in strict compliance with the procedure prescribed under Section 3(1), (2) & (3) of the Act in respect of any agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock. Further it is stated that embodiment of Section 4(1) of the Act contemplates constitution of Market Committee for the notified area and endows it with status and entity as body corporate. Section 4(1) of the Act casts an obligation on the Government to declare notified market area for the purposes of the Act in respect of any notified agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock after the establishment of markets under Section 4(3) of the Act. It is apposite to state that consequent upon declaration of notified market area and notified articles the Market Committees would be teethed to regulate the purchase and sale of the notified agricultural produce for the reason that all other provisions of the Act would spring into operation binding the traders to be amenable to the provisions of the Act. It was also stated that enjoined by any statutory requirements under Section 4(4) of the Act, more so, buttressed by the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in catena of cases holding that rules of natural justice would not run in the spheres of legislative character in the sense that both primary or delegated, the question of inviting objections or suggestions with respect to change of notified market area or inclusion or deletion of notified commodities specified in the notification under Section 4(4) of the Act may not be visualized and countenanced. Significant to state that given the language employed under Section 4(4) of the Act, besides legal sustenance drawn, taking recourse to Sections 13 and 15 of General Clauses Act, 1891 and the legal basis formed beyond vulnerability, it may have to be asserted on the lines that absolute discretion, wisdom and power circumscribed by parameters of Section 4(4) of the Act would lie vested in the hands of the Government to alter or rescind and issue fresh notification touching notified agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock without aid and report to the procedure under Section 3(3) of the Act and hence the impugned G.O.Ms. No. 286 dated 5-7-1994 may not be called in question on the ground that the procedure contemplated under Section 3 of the Act had not been followed. It was further averred that the 1st respondent-Market Committee is justified in treating 'ghee' as the product of livestock and demanding payment of market fee besides insisting on getting the licence be obtained under Section 7(1) of the Act by the petitioner inasmuch as the Government had issued G.O.Ms. No. 286 dated 5-7-1994 and superseded all the G.Os. amended from time to time, whereby the notified commodity 'ghee' had been re-notified in respect of the 1st respondent-Market Committee and stands enumerated and serialized at item No. 6 under group (iv) captioned as livestock product and in consequence G.O.Ms. No. 448 dated 29-3-19782 remained superseded. The 1st respondent-Market Committee had provided facilities by having established markets at Guntur and Pathipadu, more so, keeps on extending facilities subject to availability of funds. It is pertinent to state that the procedure envisaged under Section 3(3) of the Act would require to be followed as one time exercise intending to declare notified area and by reason thereof the procedure under Section 3 of the Act certainly seems to be uncalled for at the time the notification is issued under Section 4(4) of the Act declaring notified market area in respect of any notified produce. The action of the 1st respondent in initiating steps to get the petitioner to act in accordance with the provisions of the Act, levy and collect market fee on 'ghee' pursuant to issuance of G.O.Ms. No. 286 cannot be said to be arbitrary, illegal and unconstitutional. It was also stated that the Government in exercise of powers vested under Section 3(1) of the Act would issue draft notification declaring their intention to regulate purchase and sale of such agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock in such area as may be specified in such notification and sees it be published in such manner as may be prescribed. The Government after considering the suggestion or objection if any received within the period specified in the draft notification pursuant to the preliminary notification under Section 3(1) of the Act would issue final notification declaring the area specified in the draft notification and any portion thereof to be a notified area for the purpose of the Act in respect of any agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock. On issuance of the notification under Section 3(3) of the Act, the notified area would stand declared in respect of agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock for the purpose of regulating purchase and sale of agricultural produce. Declaration of any notified area by way of bifurcation or amalgamation requires adherence to the procedure contemplated under Section 3(1), (2) & (3) of the Act. Further it was stated that Section 4 of the Act confers power on the Government to constitute Market Committee for every notified area. Section 4(3)(a) & (b) of the Act enjoins a duty on the Market Committee to establish markets as the Government may direct for the purchase and sale of any agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock and provide such facilities in the market as may be specified by the Government. The Market Committee, under Section 4(3)(c) of the Act declares limits of every market established by it. On issuance of notification under Section 4(4) of the Act, declaring the market area and such other area adjoining there as may be specified to be notified market area for the purpose of the Act in respect of agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock would empower the Market Committee to collect the market fee. By virtue of Section 4(4) of the Act, the Government would declare notified market area for the purpose of regulating the purchase and sale of agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock. It is apposite to state that invested with absolute discretion and wisdom and clothed with power, the Government gets enabled to choose areas of control and select the notified agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock out of the notified commodities specified under Schedule II appended to the Act. It was further stated in para-9 of the counter affidavit that the petitioner had been carrying on business in purchase and sale of 'ghee' whereby rendered himself liable to obtain licence under Section 7(1) of the Act and incurred liability of payment of market fee on the said transactions taken place under Section 12(1) of the Act irrespective of the polemics whether 'ghee' would fall within the meaning of the term 'products of livestock' defined under Section 2(xv) of the Act, given the fact that 'ghee' finds its place in Schedule II appended to the Act and specified as notified commodity under Section 4(4) of the Act in respect of the respondent-Market Committee. The Apex Court in Sita Devi (Smt.) (Dead) By L.Rs. v. State of Bihar and Ors. (referred (9) supra) while dealing with issue of levy and collection of market fee on cattle notified as agricultural produce and specified under animal husbandry products under the provisions of Bihar Agricultural produce Markets Act 1960, held that though in the normal connotation cattle may appear to be not an agricultural produce it needs to be given effect unless the Legislature lacks competence and once agricultural produce had been identified in the Schedule they are liable or levy and collection of market fee and it seems on the lines of analogy it was also held that 'ghee' and butter are by-products of milk and when milk, 'ghee' and butter are notified agricultural produce, each is exigible to levy. It was further stated that the definition assigned to the term 'agricultural produce', 'livestock' and 'products of livestock' under Section 2(x) of the Act would comprehend in its fold all the agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock specified under the notification under Section 3 of the Act. Section 2(xv) of the Act defines 'products of livestock' to mean such products of livestock as may be declared by the Government by notification to be products of livestock for the purpose of the Act. The contention of the petitioner that 'ghee' cannot be considered as product of livestock may not be countenanced for the reason that 'ghee' is specified as notified article/product under group (vi) of products of livestock in Schedule II appended to the Act. The contention of the petitioner that the Government issued G.O.Ms. No. 448, Food & Agriculture Department dated 29-3-1972 and deleted 'ghee' from the notified products on the ground that it is not livestock product is incorrect and misconceived for the reason that at no point of time the Government had deleted 'ghee' beyond the purview of regulation of notified agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock specified under Schedule II of the Act. It is significant to state that the Government deleted 'ghee' by issuing G.O.Ms. No. 448 dated 29-3-1972 effecting an amendment to G.O.Ms. No. 1066, Food & Agriculture dated 30-7-1971 in respect of regulation of notified commodities within the notified market areas of Ongole and Guntur Market Committee respectively. On issuance of G.O.Ms. No. 286, dated 5-7-1994, exercising powers conferred on the Government under Section 4(4) of the Act, the G.O.Ms. No. 448 stood superseded. It is further stated that the Government issued G.O.Ms. No. 1066, Food & Agriculture (Agrl.IV) Department dated 30-7-1971 under Section 4(4) of the Act and declared the notified market area of Agricultural Market Committee, Guntur in respect of notified agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock of which 'ghee' had been specified at serial No. 9 under column 4 of the annexure of the said G.O. It is further stated that that the respondent-Market Committee had established markets in Guntur and Pathipadu and provided amenities besides allowed the Department to set up 'ghee' laboratory within the premises of Guntur Market Yard and keeps on extending the facilities ring fencing its funds keeping in view the general interests of all the concerned and the test of quid pro quo may be expected to satisfy with close and proximate relationship of all transactions. The respondent-Market Committee provides facilities to the payers of fee in general so also ploughs back its income for the purposes delineated in Section 15 of the Act. The Apex Court in Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of Andhra Pradesh (referred (10) supra) dissecting the provisions of Act had an occasion to deal with the meaning and amplitude of the term 'fee' and held that correlation between fee and the services rendered expected is one of general character and not of mathematical exactitude and further held that it is not the postulate of a fee that it must have a direct relation to the actual service rendered by the authorities to each individual to obtain the benefit of service and hence the theory of quid pro quo is well settled. The petitioner is obliged to obtain licence under Section 7(1) of the Act and pay market fee under Section 12(1) of the Act on the transactions of 'ghee' inasmuch as 'ghee' remains to be notified one for the purpose of regulating purchase and sale. It is also further stated that the Government in exercise of powers bestowed on it under Section 3(3) of the Act declared the areas specified in Schedule I to be notified areas in respect of agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock specified in Schedule II of the Act. Exercising powers under Section 4(4) of the Act the Government issued G.O.Ms. No. 286 dated 5-7-1994 in supersession of all the G.Os. issued on the subject of agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock and flowers issued in Schedule II to G.O.Ms. No. 2095 dated 29-10-1968 and G.O.Ms. No. 610 dated 21-10-1978 as amended from time to time and declared the agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock to be regulated by all the Market Committees in the State in respect of the notified commodities specified in the said G.O.Ms. No. 286 dated 5-7-1994. G.O.Ms. No. 448 dated 29-3-1972 was issued under Section 4(4) of the Act to govern the regulation of notified commodities in respect of Ongole and Guntur Market Committees. It is further stated that the notified area of the respondent-Market Committee was declared by G.O.Ms. No. 2095 dated 29-10-1968. In view of the reason that notified area under Section 3(3) of the Act was declared in relation to respondent-Market Committee and notified market area of respondent-Market Committee stood declared under Section 4(4) of the Act in respect of agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock for the purpose of regulation, the respondent-Market Committee is empowered to levy and collect market fee under Section 12(1) of the Act on the transactions of agricultural produce and product of livestock purchased or sold within the notified market area. Pursuant to issuance of G.O.Ms. No. 286 dated 5-7-1994 whereby all the notified commodities enumerated under different groups in the Schedule II appended to the Act have become specified for the purpose of regulation by all the market committees, the respondent-Market Committee had called upon the petitioner to obtain licence under Section 7(1) of the Act to pay the market fee. It was also stated that G.O.Ms. No. 448 dated 29-3-1972 stood superseded on issuance of G.O.Ms. No. 286 dated 5-7-1994. It is apposite to state that the contention of the petitioner that the procedure contemplated under Section 3(3) of the Act is not followed calling for objections for including 'ghee' as notified product and issuance of G.O.Ms. No. 286 dated 5-7-1994 would do violence and is contrary to the provisions of the Act and is in clear violation of principles of natural justice does not stand to legal scrutiny for the reason that notification under Section 3(3) of the Act declaring notified area in respect of particular agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock would be issued as one time exercise and requirement. The procedure envisaged under Section 3 of the Act would be adhered to at the time of bifurcation of the notified area of any Market Committee and the purposes embodied under Sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the Act. Further, the Government invested with powers under Section 4(4) of the Act is competent enough to include and exclude any agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock to be regulated within the notified market area specified in respect of such agricultural produce. G.O.Ms. No. 286 dated 5-7-1994 was issued under Section 4(4) of the Act including all notified commodities specified in Schedule II of the Act for the purpose of regulation and by the issuance of notification under Section 4(4) of the Act, the procedure under Section 3 of the Act would remain unwarranted. It is further stated that a learned Division Bench of this Court had an occasion to explicate the true ambit and purport of Sections 3(3) and 4(4) of the Act in Coromandal Traders v. A.M.C., Guntur and Anr. (referred (4) supra) wherein it was held that fresh notification under Section 3 of the Act is not necessary every time the notification was issued under Section 4 of the Act either notifying or denotifying agricultural produce. Further it is stated that another Division Bench of this Court had an occasion in Vijayawada Skin Merchants Association and Ors. v. State of A.P. (referred (8) supra) to examine analytically the meaning of expressions 'agricultural produce', 'livestock' and 'products of livestock' defined under Clause (x) of Section 2 of the Act and upheld the correctness of G.O.Ms. No. 286 dated 5-7-1994. Further it was stated that W.P.No.20121/94 filed by the petitioner was dismissed along with the batch of Writ Petitions by common order dated 8-9-1999 and this Court negatived the contentions of the petitioners therein and held that the petitioners have to obtain licence under Section 7(1) of the Act for trading in 'ghee' and pay market fee as long as 'ghee' remains as a notified product in the statute book. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner approached the Apex Court by filing C.A.No.4484/2000 and the Apex Court disposed of the said Civil Appeal and remanded the said batch of cases to this Court for hearing the same afresh. The said W.P. stood dismissed for default, but however it was restored by order dated 12-9-2008 and gave liberty to the petitioner to file a fresh Writ Petition. It was also stated that G.O.Ms. No. 286 issued in exercise of powers under Section 4(4) of the Act without following the procedure contemplated under Section 3(3) of the Act may not lay open to impeachment inasmuch as declaration of notified area under Section 3(3) of the Act would be exercised as one time requirement and the Government under Section 4 derives power with respect to inclusion and deletion of agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock to be regulated within the notified market area of the Market Committee. This Court in Vijayawada Skin Merchants Association and Ors. v. State of A.P. (referred (8) supra) dissecting the import and implications under Section 3 and 4(4) of the Act delivered the Judgment holding that the notification under Section 3 of the Act is not necessary every time the notification was issued under Section 4 of the Act either notifying or denotifying the agricultural produce and hence inclusion of 'ghee' as notified product by having issued G.O.Ms. No. 286 dated 5-7-1994 would remain beyond challenge. It was further stated that 'ghee' which falls under the group 'product of livestock' would remain subjected to levy and collection of market fee. This Court in Vijayawada Skin Merchants Association and Ors. v. State of A.P. (referred (8) supra) dealing with legality of G.O.Ms. No. 286 dated 5-7-1994 in so far as its application to the items raw hides, raw skin, horns and hoofs held that it is immaterial whether each of the items under Section 2(x) of the Act would answer the definition of the terms 'agricultural produce' 'livestock' or 'products of livestock'. It was also stated that in the absence of express statutory duty cast under Section 4(4) of the Act to invite objections or suggestions for declaration of notified market area in respect of any notified agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock and more so given the rational discretion, wisdom and power as to declaration of notified market area and the goods to be regulated therein, would lie vested in the hands of the Government in the light of the well settled law that the rules of natural justice would not be required to be followed in the spheres of Legislative character and the question of calling for objections for any purpose will be untenable. It was further stated that the respondent-Market Committee had provided facilities by having established markets in Guntur and Pathipadu and keeps on extending the facilities as pert funds available at its reach and command. It was also further stated that at no point of time the notified commodity 'ghee' remained deleted from the Schedule II of the Act but the 'ghee' in question was deleted by virtue of G.O.Ms. No. 448 dated 29-3-1972 under Section 4(4) of the Act from the regulation in respect of the 1st respondent-Market Committee whereby deletion of 'ghee' may not be construed to have become denotified or erased from the Schedule and hence reintroducing 'ghee' by having issued G.O.Ms. No. 286 dated 5-7-1994 under Section 4(4) of the Act cannot be assailed.

71. As already specified supra, since the counter affidavit filed by the 1st respondent also runs substantially on similar lines, the details of the same need not be repeated again, the stand taken by both these respondents being the same in their respective counter affidavits.

72. In the written arguments submitted by the 1st respondent, several of the provisions under the Act and also A.P. General Clauses Act also had been relied upon.

73. Section 13 and 15 of the A.P. General Clauses Act read as hereunder:

Section 13: When powers and duties to be exercised and performed: Where an Act confers a power or imposes a duty then the power may be exercised and the duty shall be performed from time to time as occasion requires.

Section 15: Revocation and alteration of rules, bye laws and orders: Where an Act confers a power to make any rules or bye laws, or to issue orders, the power shall be construed as including a power exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like consent and conditions, if any, to rescind, revoke, amend or vary the rules, bye laws or orders.

74. The respective stands taken by the parties already had been referred to supra. The non-following of the procedure or the non- following of the steps expected to be followed and the absence of issuance of specific notification and the power to issue general notification had been argued in elaboration in the context of Sections 3 and 4 of the Act in particular and to substantiate their submissions several decisions had been relied upon. In the light of the same, the following Points may have to be decided in the present Writ Petition:

1. Whether 'ghee' cannot be treated as livestock product?

2. Whether there is no valid notification issued by the Government notifying 'ghee' as livestock product under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act by the notified Market Committee?

3. Whether after the deletion of 'ghee' in terms of G.O.Ms. No. 448 dated 20-3-1972, G.O.Ms. No. 286 dated 15-7-1994 would have the effect of restoring position so far as the levy of market fee on 'ghee' is concerned?

75. In Gurram Polisetti and Ors. v. Government of A.P. (referred (11) supra) at paras 13 and 14 the learned Division Bench observed:

In the instant writ petitions, the grievance of the petitioners is that no service is rendered by the respondents to the traders of 'ghee'. No amenities are provided to the petitioners for conducting their trade in the market yard. As no amenities are provided by the respondents, it is contended that the petitioners need not pay any fees to the market committees. This question whether the facilities are at all provided by the respondents or not is purely a question of fact. If no facilities are provided by the respondents for conducting of the business by the petitioners, it is open for the petitioners to complaint about the same to the authorities concerned and if such complaint is made, the authorities are bound to consider the same and pass appropriate orders thereon. But as long as the commodity is notified and continues in the statute book, one cannot escape from its liability, on the other hand he has to answer to the dictates of the statute.

In our considered view inclusion of the item 'ghee' as notified commodity is well within the purview of the statute. There is no arbitrariness or illegality as such in the decision of the State. If one has to conduct trade in 'ghee' he has to necessarily obtain a licence from the market committee under Section 7(1) of the Act and has to pay the required market fee to the market committee concerned.

76. In C.A. No. 4484/2000 dated 28-3-2006, the Apex Court observed:.The dispute related to the question whether after deletion of 'ghee' in terms of G.O.Ms. No. 448 dated 29-3-1972, the Notification No. 286 dated 5.7.1994 had the effect of restoring position so far as the levy of market fee on 'ghee' is concerned. The High Court committed further mistakes in proceeding as to what type of commodities could be dealt as with livestock and products of livestock. Since the High Court has not dealt with the basic issue which was raised before it in the writ petitions, it would be appropriate for the High Court to rehear the writ petitions. If the State of Andhra Pradesh has not in reality filed a counter affidavit, it shall be permitted to do so within eight weeks. The impugned common judgment of the High Court is set-aside and the matter is remitted to it for hearing the writ petitions afresh. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case. Since the matter is pending since long, we request the High Court to dispose of the matters as early as practicable preferably within six months from the date of receipt of our order. The interim order passed in the matter shall continue till the disposal of the matters by the High Court afresh. By granting this protection, it shall not be construed as if we have expressed any order on the merits of the case. The appeals are disposed of accordingly.

77. When the batch of cases came up before the learned Division Bench, it was found that the validity of G.O.Ms. No. 286 aforesaid had not been challenged and thus the writ petitions were withdrawn with liberty to file fresh writ petitions. Likewise, the present Writ Petition had been filed. The specific stand taken by the writ petitioner is that G.O.Ms. No. 286 dated 5-7-1994 to the extent of enabling the Market Committee to regulate 'ghee' by virtue of the earlier G.O. pursuant to G.O.Ms. No. 448 dated 19-3-1978 without following the procedure as contemplated by Section 3 of the Act is illegal.

78. Section 3 of the Act dealing with Declaration of notified area reads as hereunder:

(1) The Government may publish in such manner as may be prescribed a draft notification declaring their intention of regulating the purchase and sale of such agricultural produce, livestock or products of livestock in such area as may be specified in such notification.

(2) Such notification shall state that any objections or suggestions which may be received by the Government from any person within a period to be specified therein will be considered by them.

(3) After the expiration of the period specified in the draft notification and after considering such objections and suggestions as may be received before such expiration, the Government may publish in such manner as may be prescribed a final notification declaring the area specified in the draft notification or any portion thereof, to be a notified area for the purposes of this Act in respect of any agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock specified in the draft notification.

(4) Subject to the provisions of Sub-sections (1), (2) and (3), the Government, may, by notification-

(a) exclude from a notified area, any area comprised therein, or

(b) include in any notified area, any area specified in such notification; or

(c) declare a new notified area by separation of area from any notified area or by uniting two or more notified areas or parts thereof or by uniting any area to a part of any notified area:

Provided that where, as a result of declaration of a new notified area under this clause, the entire area comprised in an existing notified area is united to one or more notified areas, the said existing notified area shall stand abolished.

Further it is stated that the action of the respondents in not treating 'ghee' as produce of livestock is illegal unsustainable for the reason that 'ghee' may be manufactured by following mechanical process from butter and butter is a derivative of milk. Further specific stand had been taken that the procedure of giving opportunity as contemplated by Section 3(1), (2) and (3) had not been followed. The discretion conferred on the Government to be exercised in a reasonable manner and when deletion is made also when once deletion is made and subsequent thereto, the same had been reintroduced, the representations if any of the organizations to be considered after affording reasonable opportunity. Incidentally, the contents of G.O.Ms. No. 286 dated 5-7-1994, Schedule-II of G.O.Ms. No. 2095 dated 29-10-1968 and Schedule-II of G.O.Ms. No. 610 dated 21-10-1978 as amended from time to time and G.O.Ms. No. 448 dated 29-3-1972 also had been referred to.

79. The Government in exercise of power under Section 3(3) of the Act had issued G.O.Ms. No. 2095, Food and Agriculture (Agrl.IV) dt.29-10-68 and declared notified areas in respect of the several Agricultural Market Committees so also specified agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock in Schedule-I and Schedule II respectively. In pursuance whereof, notified area of the 1st respondent -Market Committee had been declared and serialized at item No. 6 of Schedule-I. Out of the said notified area of the 1st respondent - Market Committee, new notified area of respective Agricultural Market Committees stood declared, consequent upon the same bifurcation was effected to the notified area of the 1st respondent - Market Committee. Article - 'ghee' was shown at serial No. 6 under the caption of 'products of livestock'.

80. The Government had issued G.O.Ms. No. 1066, Food and Agricultural (Agrl.IV) dt.30-7-71 declaring notified Market Committee area of 1st respondent - Market Committee under column 5 of the said G.O. In notified commodities under column No. 4 'ghee' was shown at serial No. 9 for the purpose of liberation.

81. G.O.Ms. No. 448 dt.29-3-72 was issued in exercise of power under Section 4(4) of the Act and 'ghee' was deleted in respect of the Ongole and Guntur Market Committees by having carried out an amendment to G.O.Ms. No. 976 dt. 16-7-1971 and G.O.Ms. No. 1066 dt.3 0-7-1971 respectively.

82. G.O.Ms. No. 286 dt.5-7-1994 was issued under Section 4(4) of the Act and all the Market Committees had been directed to regulate purchase and sale of all the commodities specified in the said notification as remained notified in Schedule II of the Act and thus the 1st respondent - Market Committee had initiated action to levy market fee on 'ghee' and the Traders who were bent upon in challenging the same began the litigations and the series of the litigations went up to the Apex Court and again the present Writ Petition had been filed in the light of the liberty granted by the learned Division Bench of this Court. These aspects had been well narrated in the respective stands taken by the parties in the affidavits filed in support of the Writ Petition and also in the respective counter affidavits.

83. Section 4 of the Act dealing with Continuation of Market Committee and declaration of notified market area reads as hereunder:

(1) The Government shall constitute by notification a market committee for every notified area from such date as may be specified in the notification and the market committee so constituted shall be a body corporate by such name as the Government may specify in the said notification, having perpetual succession, and a common seal with power to acquire, hold and dispose of property and may, by its corporate name, sue and be sued:

Provided that any market committee functioning immediately before such constitution in respect of a notified area abolished under the proviso to Clause (c) of Sub-section (4) of Section 3 shall stand abolished.

(1-A) Any notification made under Sub-section (1) for the constitution of a new market committee in respect of any new notified area declared under Clause (c) of Sub-section (4) of Section 3, may contain such supplemental, incidental and consequential provisions, including provisions as to the composition of the new market committee or new and existing market committees and the apportionment of the assets and liabilities between the market committees affected thereby.

(2) It shall be the duty of the market committee to enforce the provisions of this Act and the rules and bye-laws made thereunder in the notified area.

(3)(a) Every market committee shall establish in the notified area excluding the scheduled areas such number of markets as the Government may, from time to time, direct for the purchase and sale of any notified agricultural produce, livestock or products of livestock and shall provide such facilities in the market as maybe specified by the Government from time to time, by a general or special order.

(b) Every market committee shall also establish in the notified area such number of markets as the Government may, from time to time, direct for the purchase and sale, solely of vegetables or fruits and shall provide such facilities in the market as may be specified by the Government from time to time by general or special order.

(c) The market committee shall declare, by notification, the limits of every market established by it under Clauses (a) and (b) (hereinafter referred to as the market area).

4. As soon as may be after the establishment of a market under Sub-section (3), the Government shall declare by notification the market area and such other area adjoining thereto as may be specified in the notification, to be a notified market area for the purposes of this Act in respect of any notified agricultural produce, livestock or products of livestock.

5. Subject to the provisions of Sub-sections (1), (2), (3) and (4), the Government may, by notification,-

(a) exclude from a notified market area, any area comprised therein; or

(b) include in any notified market area, any area specified in such notification.

Certain submissions were made relating to Sub-section (4) of Section 4 of the Act in elaboration by the Counsel representing the respective parties.

84. In Agricultural Market Committee, Rajahmundry v. Venkata Bulimamba Rice Mill : 2002(5) A.L.D. 87, one of us (P.S. Narayana, J.) observed at para-10 as hereunder:

Points (a) and (b), being inter linked, can be discussed together. PW1, one of the partners of the plaintiff firm, was examined and to show that it is a registered partnership firm, Ex. AI was marked and this witness deposed that the plaintiff is doing business at Kadium in rice and paddy and no doubt, he further deposed that he is not aware whether rice and paddy are notified products and whether the defendant is authorised to levy market fee. This witness also further deposed that he does not know the defendant passing bye-laws and rules and publication of the same. PW1 further deposed that there is no market yard during the said period and hence, no services were rendered by the defendant warranting levy of market fee and even basic amenities were not provided for as required by the Government Orders. He further deposed that under Ex. A2 receipt, the defendant illegally collected Rs. 3,071. 20 ps., from the plaintiff. The two demand notices, dated 1-3-1980 and 20-9-1980 were marked as Exs. A3 and A4. Ex. A5 is the certified copy of the judgment in AS No. 192 of 1980 on the file of I-Addl. District Judge, Rajahmundry. One Sreeramulu, the then Secretary, was examined as DW1. DW1 deposed that the defendant-Market Committee published the necessary notifications in the Gazette as contemplated by the Act and the notifications are marked as Exs. Bl to B4. This witness further deposed that the Market Committee purchased an extent of Acs. 11-00 and odd for the purpose of establishing the market yard at Rajahmundry and Exs. B5 and B6 speak of purchase of the said land. This witness further deposed that the site was purchased, the office building was constructed and the roads were laid and weighing platforms were built and water facilities were provided and godowns were also constructed and the Photostat copy of the cash book entry to show money was spent for such construction was filed and it was marked as Ex. B7. The bye-laws of the Agricultural Market Committee are marked as Ex. B8. The Government issued G.Os. under No. 2261, dated 7-12-1970 and No. 790, dated 27-12-1979, directing the appellant-defendant Market Committee to provide basic amenities under Section 43 of the Act. No doubt, this witness was questioned about certain suits like OS No. 28 of 1977 and OS No. 182 of 1977 filed by some persons questioning the legality of levying the market fee and no doubt, he denied about the same. DW1 further deposed that the bye-laws were published, but, however, he did not file the Gazette publications into Court. On the strength of this evidence available on record, both parties are advanced elaborate arguments. The appellant-Market Committee taking a stand that when once a notification is made and some formalities relating to amenities had been complied with, it is sufficient to make a demand and had placed strong reliance on the very language of the Act. Whereas, the learned Counsel representing the respondent-plaintiff had taken a specific stand that the mere construction of building or laying road by itself may not be sufficient unless special services are rendered for the purpose of levying the market fee. However, both the Counsel were unable to explain where exactly to draw a line of distinction relating to the providing of amenities. In this regard, strong reliance was placed by both the Counsel on Sreenivasa General Trader's case (supra) and R.K. Porwal's case (supra). In Sreenivasa General Trader's case (supra) at page No. 1261, the Apex Court had observed:

The traditional view that there must be actual quid pro quo for a fee has undergone a sea change in the subsequent decisions. The distinction between a tax and a fee lies primarily in the fact that a tax is levied as part of a common burden, while a fee is for payment of a specific benefit or privilege although the special advantage is secondary to the primary motive of regulation in public interest. If the element of revenue for general purpose of the State predominates, the levy becomes a tax. In regard to fees there is, and must, always be, correlation between the fee collected and the service intended to be rendered. In determining, whether a levy is a fee, the true test must be whether its primary and essential purpose is to render specific services to a specified area or class; it may be of no consequence that the State may ultimately and indirectly be benefited by it. The power of any Legislature to levy a fee is conditioned by the fact that it must be 'by and large' a quid pro quo for the services rendered. However, correlationship between the levy and the services rendered expected is one of general character and not of mathematical exactitude. All that is necessary is that there should be a 'reasonable relationship' between the levy of the fee and the services rendered. If authority is needed for this proposition, it is to be found in the several decisions of this Court drawing a distinction between a tax and a 'fee'. See: The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt : AIR 1954 SC 282 (supra); H.H. Sudhindra Thirtha Swamiar v. Commr, for Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Mysore : 1963 Suppl (2) SCR 302 : AIR 1963 SC 966; Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. Ltd v. State of Orissa : (1961) 2 SCR 537 : AIR 1961 SC 459; H.H. Shri Swamiji of Shri Admar Mutt v. The Commrr. Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Dept. : (1980) 1 SCR 368 : AIR 1980 SC 1; Southern Pharmaceutical and Chemicals, Trichur v. State of Kerala : (1982) 1 SCR 519 : AIR 1981 SC 1863 and Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Mohd. Yasin : AIR 1983 SC 617.

In R.K. Porwal's. case (supra) while dealing with the establishment of market area and facilities and conveniences not available on the date of notification under the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1964, the Apex Court observed at paragraph No. 15 as follows;

It was also said that neither the Gultekdi Market nor the Turbhe Market had any convenience or facility or was ready for use on the date on which it was notified as the Principal Market for the concerned market area. On the material placed before us we are satisfied that all reasonable conveniences and facilities are now available in both the markets, whatever might have been the situation on the respective dates of notification. We refrain from embarking into an enquiry as to the situation obtaining on the dates of notification. We do say that a place ought not to be notified as a market unless it is ready for use as a market with all reasonable facilities and conveniences but we do not conceive it to be our duty to pursue the matter to the extreme limit of quashing the notification when we find that all reasonable facilities and conveniences are now available. While a notification may be quashed if nothing has been done beyond publishing the notification, in cases where some facilities and conveniences have been provided but not some others which are necessary the Court may instead of quashing the notification give appropriate time-bound directions for providing necessary facilities and conveniences. On the facts of the present case, we are satisfied that all reasonable facilities and conveniences are now provided. We are also satisfied that the traders have been making one desperate attempt after another to avoid moving into the new markets and they have been successful in stalling the notifications from becoming effective for quite a number of years.

No doubt, the learned Counsel for the appellant had pointed out that this decision was considered in the subsequent decisions and hence, the ratio in this decision may not be applicable to the facts of the present case. In. Kewal Krisharis case (supra) the principles of satisfying the tests for a valid levy of market fee on agricultural produce had been dealt with as follows:

From a conspectus of the various authorities of this Court we deduce the following principles for satisfying the tests for a valid levy of market fees on the agricultural produce bought or sold by licensees in a notified market area: (1) That the amount of fee realised must be earmarked for rendering services to the licensees in the notified market area and a good and substantial portion of it must be shown to be expended for this purpose. (2) That the services rendered to the licensees must be in relation to the transaction of purchase or sale of the agricultural produce. (3) That while rendering services in the market area for the purpose of facilitating the transactions of purchase and sale with a view to achieve the objects of the marketing legislation it is not necessary to confer the whole of the benefit on the licensees but some special benefits must be conferred on them which have a direct, close and reasonable correlation between the licensees and the transactions. (4) That while conferring some special benefits on the licensee, it is permissible to render such service in the market which may be in the general interest of all concerned with transactions taking place in the market. (5) That spending the amount of market fees for the purpose of augmenting the agricultural produce, its facility of transport in villages and to provide other transport in villages and to provide other facilities meant mainly or exclusively for the benefit of the agriculturists is not permissible on the ground that such services in the long run go to increase the volume of transactions in the market ultimately benefiting the traders also. Such an indirect and remote benefit to the traders is in no sense a special benefit to them. (6) That the element of quid pro quo may not be possible, or even necessary, to be established with arithmetical exactitude but even broadly and reasonably it must be established by the authorities who charge the fees that the amount is being spent for rendering services to those on whom falls the burden of the fee. (7) At least a good and substantial portion of the amount collected on account of fees, may be in the neighbourhood of two-thirds or three-fourths must be shown with reasonable certainty as being spent for rendering services of the kind mentioned above.

In the Agricultural Market Committee, Bapatla Rep., by its Secretary v. Tatavarti Malakondarayudu Atchuta Venkata Subbaiah and Co. 1984 (2) An. WR 417, it was held that in the present case, what is collected is only a fee not a tax and there is correlation between the fee collected and the services rendered and the market is at an initial stage and is being developed from time to time and it is unreasonable to compel the committee to provide all the facilities at a stretch and then collect the market fee and it is not necessary that every payer of the fee should be a recipient of the services rendered and general service to the body of traders and growers is sufficient and it is the object of the Act and it is being rendered.

85. In Agriculature Market Committee, Rajam v. Rajam Jute and Oil Millers Association Rajam 2003(2) Supreme 232 the Apex Court held at para-23 as hereunder:

In the case in hand, the levy of market fee by the market Committee was challenged only on the ground that no basic amenities or services were provided in the notified market area and therefore the Market Committee had no right to levy, demand and collect the market fee. We have noted from the evidence on record that the market Committee had made provision for certain services and facilities in the notified market area and efforts were being made for extending the services. The market committee had recently come into existence and completion of all the intended services and facilities takes time. It has clearly emerged from the evidence of DW 1 that steps were being taken for extending the services and facilities in the market area. The plaintiff has led no evidence to contradict the defendant's evidence. Whether particular services and amenities are available at a given place and the extent thereof are questions of fact which require to be proved or demolished on basis of evidence to be led by the parties concerned. Since the plaintiff has not led any evidence whether oral or documentary in support of its case, the' Court is left with no option but to accept the evidence of defendant which shows that some services and facilities in the notified market area were already available while arrangements were being made for various other facilities and services. The foundation for the case set up by the plaintiff is not available on record. The law is well settled that though quid pro quo is required in relation to a fee which is charged and collected by a market committee, the quid pro quo cannot be in exact proportion to the fee levied. Mathematical proportions are not possible in such matters. We have accepted that some services and amenities were already provided for in the notified market area which fully justified the levy of market fee. We are thus unable to agree with the finding of the High Court that the market committee had failed to provide any services or amenities in the notified market area. The findings of the High Court are accordingly set aside. The appeal is allowed. As a result of this, the suit filed by the plaintiff, respondent herein, shall stand dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

86. In the light of the decisions specified supra, if certain facilities are provided, they being sufficient, this question though argued in elaboration may not help the writ petitioner.

87. A learned Division Bench of this Court in Vijayawada Skin Merchants Association v. State of Andhra Pradesh, Agriculture and Co-Operation Maktg-I Department Hyderabad (referred (8) supra) at para-14 held:

Now reverting to the arguments of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the 'products of livestock' as defined in Clause (xv) of Section 2 of the Act means such products of livestock as may be declared by the Government by notification to be products of livestock, which could only be products of living animals, but cannot be the products of dead animals and as obviously 'raw hides', 'raw skins', 'bones' and 'horns and hoofs' could not be secured without killing the animals, the notification, which includes these items, is beyond the scope of the definition. We regret we are unable to accept the contention of the learned Counsel. It may be noted that the expression 'notified market (sic. agricultural) produce, livestock or the products of livestock' is an independent expression; it is not a compendium of terms 'agricultural produce', 'livestock' and 'product of livestock' defined in Clauses (i), (v) and (xv) respectively of Section 2 of the Act and for that reason it is defined separately. While extracting the definition of that expression we have already indicated that the expression means such agricultural produce, livestock or products of livestock as is specified in the notification. Once articles like 'dry fish', 'raw hides', 'raw skin', 'bones', 'horns and hoofs' are included in the notification and they satisfy the requirement of that expression as defined in Clause (x) of Section 2 of the Act it would not only be unnecessary but also be misleading to test whether each of the items therein would answer the definition of terms 'agricultural produce' or 'livestock' or 'product of livestock'. A given article may or may not fall within the meaning of the one or the other of the above said terms 'agricultural produce', 'livestock' or 'product of livestock' but if that article is included in the omnibus expression 'notified market produce, livestock or product of livestock as defined in Section 2(x) of the Act, the notification cannot be said to be illegal on the ground that an article cannot be fit in any one of the above terms. We feel that grouping of various items in the impugned notification leaves much to be desired. Much of the controversy could have been avoided by proper and consistent grouping of items. Be that as it may, for the aforementioned reasons we are of the view that the impugned notification insofar as it includes the items 'dry fish', 'raw hides', 'raw skin', 'bones' and 'horns and hoofs' being among the notified agricultural produce, livestock or product of livestock, is legal and valid and the petitioners are liable to pay market fees under Section 12 of the Act on their sale or purchase in the market area.

Certain submissions were made commenting certain of the observations to be unsustainable. On a careful reading of the whole Judgment, it may be true that certain of the observations are not happily worded. However, in Coramandal Traders v. Agricultural Market Committee, Guntur (referred (7) supra) the learned Division Bench at para-5 observed:

Perusal of this Section would show that it lays the methodology which has to be adopted before a declaration of 'notified area' is made. Under Sub-section (xi) of Section 2 also it is stated that notified area would mean an area notified under Section 3. Even if an area is notified in terms of Section 3 in respect of any agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock specified in the notification, even then, it does not constitute any rights or liabilities. Rights or liabilities are constituted under Section 4, which is a second step. There is a pre-requisite for issuing a notification in terms of Sub-sections (i) and (ii) of Section 3 for declaring an area to be notified area. Once that is done, the next step would be to proceed in terms of Section 4, which does not prescribe a notification prior to exercising of power under that Section. For the purposes of this case, Sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 4 would be relevant, which read:

(4) As soon as may be after the establishment of a market under Sub-section (3), the Government shall declare by notification the market area and such other area adjoining thereto as may be specified in the notification, to be a notified market area for the purposes of this Act in respect of any notified agricultural produce, livestock or products of livestock.

(5) Subject to the provisions of Sub-sections (1), (2), (3) and (4), the Government may, by notification (a) exclude from a notified market area, any area comprised therein; or (b) include in any notified market area, any area specified in such notification.

Admittedly Section 3 notification was issued after draft had been published and thereafter onions were notified and in terms of Sub-section (4) of Section 4, but subsequently by G.O. Rt. No. 997 dated 4.4.1979, onions were de-notified. Therefore the exercise of issuing a draft notification and a final notification under Section 3 is a one time exercise. For the purposes of declaring a notified area, Sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 4 make it clear that notification for a specified notified market area with respect to a produce can be issued and revoked without any draft notification under Section 3. We are fortified in our view by a Full Bench judgment of this Court reported in Mamidi Satyanarayana Murty and Ors. v. The state of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. : AIR 1977 AP 147 (FB). While analyzing the Act in para 5, the Full Bench held:

In order to understand the controversy in this case, it is necessary to point out that there are five distinct concepts mentioned in the Act. Under Section 2(vi) 'market' means a market established under Sub-section (3) of Section 4 and includes market yard and any building therein. Section 2 (viii) defines 'market committee' to mean a committee constituted or reconstituted under the provisions of the Act. Section 2(xi) defines 'notified area' to mean any area notified under Section 3. Section 2(xii) defines 'notified market area' to mean any area declared to be a market area by notification under Section 4. The confusion is likely to arise because similar terminology was also used in the repealed Acts viz., 'notified area', 'market' and 'market yard'. Under Sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the Act of 1966 after the preliminaries set out in Sub-sections (1) and (2) have been gone through, the Government has to publish a final notification declaring the area specified in the draft notification or any portion thereof, to be a notified area for the purpose of the act in respect of any agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock specified in the draft notification published under Sub-section (1) of Section 3. We are not concerned, in the course of this judgment, with the rest of the provisions of Section 3. Thus it is clear that the notified area in the instant case, so far as Anakapalli notified area was concerned consisted of five taluks of Anakapalli, Yellamanchili, chodavaram, Narsipatnam and Chintapalle. The area of these five taluks was thus a single notified area for purposes of the Act. Section 4 deals with the constitution of a market committee and declaration of notified market area. Sub-section (1) makes it clear that the setting up of a market committee by the Government is second step in the process of setting up the entire machinery under Act of 1966.

88. The learned Standing Counsel and the learned Government Pleader placing strong reliance on these decisions would maintain that the ratio laid down in these decisions to be followed and they require no reconsideration at the hands of this Court. However, contra submissions were made by the learned Counsel representing the writ petitioner that these decisions do not lay down the correct law and these decisions require reconsideration at the hands of this Court and in fact for this reason only the learned Chief Justice had constituted the present Full Bench.

89. In Mamidi Satyanarayana Murty v. State of Andhra Pradesh : AIR 1977 A.P. 147 the Apex Court held at paras 6 and 8 as hereunder:

Thus, to clarify the concepts and the different terminologies used in the Act, it may be pointed out that the notified area is the largest geographical and physical unit. There may be a single market or more than one market for each notified area. There is to be a market Committee which is a body corporate and it operates over the entire notified area. The market Committee has to set up one or more markets within the area of its operation as may be directed by the Government. After the directions have been issued by the Government, the market Committee has to establish a market or markets in accordance with the directions of the Government and for each market it has to fix, under Section 4(3)(c), the limits of the market and the limits of the market area referred to as the 'market area'. Under Section 4(4) the Market area and such other area adjoining thereto as may be specified by the Government in the notification issued under that Section becomes the notified market area. Thus, the largest physical unit is the notified area and within that notified area is the notified market area pertaining to each market established by the market Committee. Within the notified area is the market area which defines the limits of every market and within the market area are the actual markets where the notified agricultural produce is brought or sold and where facilities have to be provided by the market Committee for buying and selling these notified commodities. It is obvious that all these different five steps have to be completed before the machinery set up under the Act starts functioning.

After the enactment of the Act of 1966, when the notification was issued by the Government on 29th October 1968 declaring notified area and constituting market Committees for the notified area under the Act a batch of writ petitions came to be filed against the formation of market Committees and in those writ petitions, this High Court held that notification of areas involving a change in the jurisdiction of existing Committee was illegal as it contravened the provisions of Section 36 of the Act which required notification of the areas already notified under the repealed Acts and that inclusion of new areas in, or exclusion of any area from, such notified areas should have been notified separately under Section 3(4). As the notification of areas afresh as directed by the High Court would have entailed a lot of time and administrative inconvenience, it was proposed to empower the Government specifically to declare a new notified area by separation of area from any notified are or by uniting two or more notified areas or parts thereof or by uniting any area to a part of any notified area and also to validate the notification issued in G.O.Ms. No. 2095 Food and Agricultural Department dated the 29th October 1968.

90. Apart from Sections 3 and 4 of the Act, Sections 7 and 12 of the Act also had been relied upon and it may be appropriate to have a glance at this provisions also.

91. Section 7 of the Act dealing with Trading etc., in notified agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock in the notified area, reads:

(1) No person shall, within a notified area, set up, establish or use, or continue or allow to be continued, any place for the purchase, sale, storage, weighment, curing, dressing or processing of any notified agricultural produce or products of livestock or for the purchase or sale of livestock except under and in accordance with the conditions of a licence granted to him by the market committee:

Provided that the market committee may exempt from the provisions of this Sub-section any person who carries on the business of purchasing or settling any notified agricultural produce, livestock or products of livestock not exceeding such value as may be prescribed;

Provided further that a person selling notified agricultural produce, livestock or products of livestock grown, reared or produced by him, shall be exempt from the provisions of this sub-section, but the Government may for special reasons to be recorded in writing, withdraw such exemption in respect of any such person;

Provided also that the market committee shall not renew the licence granted under this section, unless the licencee pays all the arrears of amounts due to it under provisions of this Act.

Explanation: Nothing in the second proviso to this Sub-section shall be construed as exempting a co-operative marketing society registered or deemed to be registered under the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1964, selling notified agricultural produce, livestock or products of livestock grown, reared or produced by any of its members.

(2) Nothing in Sub-section (1) shall apply to a person purchasing notified agricultural produce, livestock or products of livestock for his own domestic consumption.

(3) A licence granted under Sub-section (1) shall be in such form and subject to the payment of such fees, as may be prescribed:

Provided that no fees shall be charged for the grant of a licence-

(i) to the Khadi and Village Industries Commission;

(ii) to a co-operative marketing society referred to in explanation to Sub-section (1);

(iii) to a person merely for curing, pressing or processing any notified agricultural produce or products of livestock.

(4)(a) A licence under Sub-section (1) may be refused to a person-

(i) whose licence was cancelled and one year has not elapsed since the date of cancellation;

(ii) who has been convicted of an offence or been guilty of misconduct which, in the opinion of the market committee, affects the said person's integrity as man of business;

(iii) in regard to whom the market committee is satisfied, after such enquiry as it considers adequate that he is a benamidar for, or a partner with, any other person to whom a licence may be refused under Sub-clause (i) or Sub-clause (ii);

(iv) if, in the opinion of the market committee, the grant of a licence is likely to affect the transaction of purchase or sale in the market or the levy of market fees therefore;

(b) The Market Committee may, in accordance with such rules as may be made by the Government and after such inquiry as it deems fit, cancel or suspend any licence granted under Sub-section (1):

Provided that in the case of refusal to grant a licence or of suspension or cancellation of a licence, the applicant or licensee, as the case may be, shall be entitled to appeal to such officer and in such manner as may be prescribed.

(5) A person to whom a licence is granted under Sub-section (1) shall comply with the provisions of this Act, the rules and the bye-laws made thereunder and the conditions specified in the licence.

(6) Notwithstanding anything in Sub-section (1), no person shall purchase or sell any notified agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock in a notified market area, outside the market in that area.

92. Section 12 of the Act dealing with Levy of fees by the market committee reads:

(1) The market committee shall levy fees on any notified agricultural produce, livestock or products of livestock purchased or sold in the notified market area at such rate, not exceeding two rupees as may be specified in the bye-laws for every hundred rupees of the aggregate amount for which the notified agricultural produce, livestock or products of livestock is purchased or sold, which for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration.

Explanation I: For the purposes of this section, all notified agricultural produce, livestock or products of livestock taken out of a notified market area shall, unless the contrary is proved, be presumed to have been purchased or sold within such area.

Expression II: In the determination of the amount of fees payable under this Act, fractions of ten paise equal to or exceeding five paise shall be counted as ten paise and other fractions often paise shall be disregarded.

93. In Sri Lashmi Dry Fish Traders v. State : AIR 1986 A.P. 330 (D.B.) the learned Division Bench held at paras 4, 5 and 7 observed as hereunder:

In the impugned notification dt. 7-11-1978 in the group-V the livestock 'fish' is not included. What are included in that group are : 1) Bull, 2) Bullock, 3) Cow, 4) Beifer, 5) Buffalo (Bull), 6) He Buffalo, 7) She Buffalo, 8) Young Stock of Buffalo, 9) Sheep and 10) Goats. In group VI of the Livestock Products what are included are : 1) Raw Hides, 2) Raw skins, 3) Bones, 4) Horn and Hoof, 5) Hair and wool and 6) Ghee, 'Fish' group is separated from 'livestock' group and in this group what are included are: 1) Live Fish including fish with or without life in any form (inserted by G.O.Ms. No. 406 F and A, dt.21-7-1980), 2) Dry fish and 3) Live Prawn including Prawn with or without life in any form. Again under the group of 'poultry' (group VII) only Hens, Ducks, and Cocks are included.

A close look at the definition of 'livestock' would at once make it clear that the definition takes within its scope and ambit only animals with life. The meaning of the 'livestock' given in the Concise Oxford Dictionary also is, animals kept or dealt in for use of profit. In the Chambers 20th Century Dictionary the meaning given for 'livestock' is 'domestic animals, esp., horses, cattle, sheep and pigs.' The definition of 'livestock' is widened under the Act to include 'poultry' 'fish' and such other animals as may be declared by the Government by its notification as 'livestock' for the purpose of the Act. Even if 'fish' is considered to be an 'animal' the 'dry fish' in our opinion, cannot fall within the sweep of the definition of 'livestock' is also made clear by the impugned notification itself (extracted above) where 'dry fish' is not included in the 'livestock' group. It is now well settled that, in construing the word in a taxing or penal statute, it should be understood as in common parlance and not in any technical sense nor from any botanical point of view. We cannot read into the definition words which are not found in it. The definition of 'livestock' includes 'fish' and such other animals as may be declared by the Government by its notification as livestock. The Supreme Court in Ramavatar Budhaiprasad v. A.S.T.O. Akola (1962) 1 AWR 27, while construing the word 'vegetables' observed after referring to several decided cases, that 'the word 'vegetables' in taxing statutes is to be understood as in common parlance, i. e. denoting class of vegetables which are grown in a kitchen garden or in a farm and are used for the table. 'We find it difficult to hold that in common parlance when a customer asks for 'fish' he means dry fish also, 'fish' is understood in common parlance only as 'wet fish' with or without life.

In the result the writ appeals are allowed and the impugned notification in so far as the inclusion of the 'dry fish' in Schedule II to the said notification is concerned is quashed. No costs. Advocates' fee Rs. 150/- in each.

However, the Apex Court in I.T.C. Limited v. Person Incharge Agricultural Market Committee, Kakinada 2004 AIR SCW 792 held at para-4 as hereunder:

The State Government has issued notifications declaring their intention of regul ating the purchase and sale of different kinds of agricultural produce, live stock and products of live Stock which have been broadly classified as agricultural group, fruit group, vegetable group, fish group, live stock group, poultry group etc. The notification regarding the Fish group includes the following items:

1. Live fish including fish with or without life in any form.

2. Dry Fish.

3. Live prawn including prawn with or without life in any form.

4. Dry Prawn.

Section 3 of the Act confers power upon the Government to issue notification declaring their intention of regulating the purchase and sale of such agricultural produce, livestock or products of livestock in such area as may be specified in such notification. The Andhra pradesh Government has issued notification, whereunder live prawns including prawns with or without life in any form has been notified. The commodity which the appellant purchases namely dead prawns, which after processing is exported to various countries are clearly included in the notification issued by the State government. In view of Section 12 of the Act which is the charging Section and empowers the Market Committee to levy fee on any notified agricultural produce, livestock or products of livestock purchased or sold in the notified market area, the appellant is liable to pay market fee.

94. In the light of the decision of the Apex Court referred to above, it is clear that the view expressed by the learned Division Bench in Sri Lashmi Dry Fish Traders v. State (referred (15) supra) is no longer good law. By virtue of remand made by the Apex Court the observations made by the learned Division Bench in Gurram Polisetti and Ors. v. Government of A.P. and Ors. (referred (11) supra) also may not be of much help in deciding the question in controversy.

95. In Sita Devi (Smt.) (Dead) By L.Rs. v. State of Bihar and Ors. (referred (9) supra) it was held at paras 2 and 3 as hereunder:

As stated earlier, in Classification 8 of the Schedule, Item 3 identifies cattle to be an agricultural produce. It is true that in the common parlance of animal husbandry cattle may not be considered to be an agricultural produce. But the definition is an inclusive definition and is of wide import. The legislature itself has specified diverse items in the Schedule which is part of the Act which are amenable to levy and collection of the market fee when the specified item is bought or sold in the notified market yard or sub-market yard or yard or in the notified area. In view of the fact that the legislature itself, on identifying the cattle to be an agricultural produce, laid its policy to subject cattle for levy of market fee, it is not open to the court to scan its wisdom. Though in the normal connotation cattle may appear to be not an agricultural produce, it needs to be given effect unless the legislature lacks competence which is not the case of the appellant. The policy and the wisdom of the legislature cannot be tested by taking aid of the preamble of the Act particularly when the language of Section 2(1)(a) is inclusive, unambiguous, specific and explicit. Preamble of the Act is the key to open the mind of the legislature when the language of the statute is ambiguous. Absurdity or irrationality of bringing the enumerated items of agricultural produce within the sweep of the legislature is not a principle of interpretation of the statute and the court cannot strike down the Act on its basis.

The inclusive definition in Section 2(1)(a) under the caption animal husbandry products, cattle has been specified as one of the items of agricultural produce for the purpose of Section 27. We find that the market committee, therefore, is well within its power to levy and collect market fee when the cattle was bought or sold in the notified market or notified market area. It is a common knowledge that in rural areas weekly cattle fairs are conducted in which cattle will be brought for sale and are sold. Its regulation is the purpose of the Act. The learned Counsel, Shri Sanyal, sought to seek support from the observations made by this court in Ram Chandra Kailash Kumar and Co. v. State of U.P. The observations therein would be construed in the context in which the argument was addressed. It is not the case where the cattle has not been identified as one of the items of the agricultural produce under the caption 'animal husbandry products'. As held earlier that once agricultural produce has been identified by the legislature in the Schedule, so long as they are bought or sold within the same notified market area, they are liable for levy and collection of the market fee. It is not the case that the same produce, namely, cattle has been subjected to levy of multiple fee in the same notified market area. It may be that there may be more than one market in the same notified market area. If an agricultural produce has been bought or sold in the notified area and subject to levy and collection of market fee and if the same notified market area, certainly the market committee has no power to levy market fee more than once. But that is not the case here. Imposing of multiple tax is the accepted legislative policy in sales tax Acts. Paddy and rice, wheat and wheat flour, when separated, identified as agricultural produce and each is exigible to levy of market fee. Hides and skins when identified as agricultural produce, merely because they are treated from carcass, they are not exempt from levy of market fee as the cattle was already subjected to levy of market fee. Ghee and butter are by products from milk but when milk, 'ghee' and butter are notified as agricultural produce, each is exigible to levy of market value.

96. A Five Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Rameshchandra Kailashkumar v. State of U.P. (referred (3) supra) at paras 19 to 22 held as hereunder.-

Point No. 9: We have already alluded to this aspect of that matter earlier in our judgment and taken the view that market fee could be levied on transactions of good not produced within the limits of a particular market area by the Market Committee of that area even though the goods are produced outside the State of Uttar Pradesh or outside the market area of that particular Market Committee provided the transactions take place within the limits of that Market area. On the other hand we find no provision in the Act or the Rules to limit the operation of the law in a particular market area only in respect of the agricultural produce produced in that area.

Point No. 10: Apropos this point attention is first to be focussed on the definition of the word 'producer' in Clause (p) and 'trader' in Clause (y) of Section 2 of the Act which have already been quoted. A producer who produces agricultural produce generally does not indulge in trading activities so as to become a trader within the meaning of Clause (y). He is covered by Clause (p) only. If a person is simply a trader indulging in trading activities he is covered by the definition in Clause (v). We have coined the expression producer-trader for a person who is both a producer of agricultural produce and himself trades in it. For the purposes of the Act he ceases to be a producer and becomes a trader only as the definition indicates. While discussing the question of levy of market fee on paddy and rice this aspect of the matter is important and therefore we thought it appropriate to highlight it at this stage. By and large in the notification dated 11/04/1978 there is hardly any duplication of any item of agricultural produce. As for example, under Group D Animal Husbandry Products, milk has been omitted although it is to be found in the Schedule appended to the Act. From milk can be prepared Ghee or Khoya and Items 1 and 2 in Group D are the said articles. Hides and Skins can be had from the animal, so wool is obtained from the sheep. But in case of paddy and rice mentioned as Items 3 and 4 in Group A-I 'cereals', there is a duplication as rice is obtained from paddy. We would, therefore, like to clarify the position of law in this regard. If paddy is purchased in a particular market area by a rice miller and the same paddy is converted into rice and sold then the rice miller will be liable to pay market fee on his purchase of paddy from the agriculturist-producer under Sub-clause (2) of Section 17(iii)(b). He cannot be asked to pay market fee over again under Sub-clause (3) in relation to the transaction of rice. Nor will it be open to the Market Committee to choose between either of the two in the example just given. Market fee has to be levied and collected in relation to the transaction of paddy alone. Otherwise, there will be a risk of violation of Article 14 if it is left to the sweet-will of the Market Committee in the case of some rice millers to charge market fee on the transaction of paddy and in case of others to charge it when the sale of rice takes place. If, however, paddy is brought by the rice-miller from another market area, then the Market Committee of the area where paddy is converted in to rice and sold will be entitled to charge market fee on the transaction of sale in accordance with Sub-clause (3). We now take the example of a producer-trader who is an agriculturist and produces paddy in his own field but owns a rice mill also in the same market area. He mills the paddy grown by him into rice and sells it as such. It is plain that in his case no market fee can be charged on paddy because there is no transaction of sale and purchase of paddy and market fee can be charged only on the sale of rice by him in accordance with Sub-clause (3) and he will be entitled to pass on the burden to his purchaser. Disputes of facts were raised before us as to whether paddy had been subjected to the charge of market fee or not and whether the same paddy has been milled into rice. We did not enter into this disputed question of fact, and as observed above, after clarifying the law we direct the Market Committees to levy market fee in the light of this judgment. It will be open to any trader to go to the High Court again, if necessary, for the redress of his grievance in connection with a disputed question which may arise even after our judgment.

In relation to the transactions of Ghee we had two types of dealers before us - (1) a dealer who purchases milk or cream from the villagers and others and manufactures Ghee in his plant and (2) a dealer who purchases such Ghee from the manufacturer of Ghee and sells it to another trader in the same market area. The first dealer will be liable to pay market fee because he is the producer of Ghee within the meaning of the Act and at the same time a trader in Ghee also. When he sells Ghee to another dealer in Ghee who is simply a dealer then under Sub-clause (3) of Section 17(iii)(b) the manufacturing dealer will be liable to pay market fee to the Market Committee on the transaction of Ghee. But he will be entitled to pass on the burden to his purchaser. Apropos the Market Committee, however, the liability will be of the manufacturing dealer. If milk, butter or cream would have been included in the notification then the charging of fee in relation to the first transaction of sale and purchase of such commodities would have been attracted in the light of the principle of law we have enunciated above with reference to paddy and rice. But in the case of Group D such commodities are not mentioned in the notification.

Point No. 11: An attempt was made on behalf of the Hides and Skins dealers to show that hides and skins cannot be an agricultural produce within the meaning of the Act. They are obtained from the carcass of an animal and not from a living animal. Argument stressed was that under group C in the Schedule appended to the Act Animal Husbandry Products only can come. Item 11 Hides and Skins, item 12 bones, item 13 meat etc. are not products of Animal Husbandry. Some authoritative books were cited before us on 'words and phrases' to show the meaning of 'Animal' 'Husbandry' and 'Animal Husbandry'. Animal Husbandry means that branch of agricultural which is concerned with farm animals especially as regards breeding, care and production. We are not impressed by this argument. The definition Clause (a) of Section 2 uses to expression 'animal husbandry' by way of a descriptive one without strictly confining to the products of animal husbandry as the addition of the words 'specified in the schedule' indicates. In the schedule under the group 'husbandry products' are mentioned all these items. We may also add that one may breed and rear animals in a farm for the purpose of obtaining hides and skins after they are butchered. Market fee is, therefore, leviable on the transactions of hides and skins as no market fee can be charged on transactions of sale and purchase of animals, in a market area in the State of Uttar Pradesh, the same having not been included in the notification. Had it been included in the notification, then no market fee could be charged in the same market area on hides and skins. It could only be charged in relation to the transaction of purchase and sale of animals.

97. In Sasa Musa Sugar Works v. State of Bihar (referred (1) supra) the Apex Court at paras 24 and 36 observed as hereunder:

The arguments advanced by the respective Counsel appearing for various sugar mills may be summarised as follows:

(I) The title to the Markets Act itself delineates its scope, which is to provide for better regulation of buying and selling of agricultural produce and the establishment of markets for agricultural produce in the State and for matters connected therewith. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Markets Act, it has been indicated that the Act is aimed to constitute regulated markets so as to secure to the cultivator better prices, fair weighment and freedom from illegal deductions, a fair deal for the agriculturists provides good incentive for the agriculturists to adopt improved agricultural programme etc. The main objects of the Markets Act are to create market area and markets with a view to ensuring constitution of market committees fully representatives of growers, traders, local authorities and government for supervising the working of regulated markets and regulation of market charges and prohibition of realisation charges etc.

(II) (a) When the State government decides to exercise its control over the purchase, sale, storage or processing of any agricultural produce in a specified area, it can do so only by issuing a notification declaring its intention to that effect and by inviting objections or suggestions within a period of not less than two months. The State government is required to consider such objections or suggestions.

(b) Any inclusion of an item in the Schedule to the Markets Act under Section 39 does not bring about any control or regulation of sale, purchase, storage or processing of such produce. In order to regulate and bring the produce under control, it is necessary that intention to regulate a produce is to be notified. When is it finally decided after hearing objections to the notification under Section 4(1) is to be issued declaring the area specified in the notification issued under Section 3 or any portion thereof to be market area for the purpose of the Markets Act in respect of any of the agricultural produce. Sub-section (2) of Section 4 provides that after the date of publication of notification under Sub-section (1) of Section 4 or such later date as may be specified therein, no municipality, local authority or other person shall within the area notified in the Official Gazette set up, establish or continue any place for the purpose of sale, purchase, storage or processing of any agricultural produce so notified, except in accordance with the provisions of Markets Act, the Rules and bye-laws. Sub-section (5) of Section 4 provides that subject to the provisions of Section 3, the State government may, at any time, by notification, exclude from a market area or any area or any agricultural produce specified therein or include in any market area or any area or agricultural produce.

(c) It is thus clear that the scheme of the Act is that after it is determined legislatively as to what are the agricultural produces within the meaning of the Act and which are provided in the Schedule to the Act, the second stage of contemplated exercise of control of regulation can be undertaken by following the procedure laid down under Sections 3 and 4 read together. It is quite apparent that until declaration under Section 4 is notified by the State government, the question of any regulation and control of sale, purchase, storage or processing of any agricultural produce mentioned in the Schedule to the Act does not arise at all.

(III) The Markets Act presents an integrated scheme and Section 39 of the Act cannot be read in isolation of other provisions of the Act. It is a settled rule of construction that the provisions of the Act should be read as a whole so as to determine the scope and effect of each of them. The provisions of the Act should be harmoniously construed so as to allow each of the provisions to have full effect. No particular provision should be so construed as would render other provisions ineffective or redundant. Moreover, the provisions are to be so construed as would subserve the basic scheme and object of the legislation.

(IV) The amending/validation Act introducing Section 4-A and Section 4-B fails to revive control of any agricultural produce, even if it is included in the Schedule under Section 39 of the Act, until and unless the provision of Sections 3 and 4 of the Act read with Section 15 are complied with. Section 4-A and Section 4-B are invalid. Section 4-A contains two sub-sections. Sub-section (1) of Section 4-A, insofar as it dispenses with the requirement of complying with the provisions of Sections 3 and 4 before market fee can be validly levied on an agricultural produce, is bad and void for being repugnant to the scheme of the Act. It is also bad and void for truncating valuable rights given to citizens and others under Sections 3 and 4. Sub-section (1) of Section 4-A also obliterates the concept of market area which is the sole basis of operating the Act and for imposing the levy. As a result of Sub-section (1) of Section 4-A, the basis of the Act gets transmuted from an Act levying a fee to an Act imposing tax. Sub-section (2) of Section 4-A is also bad because it renders invalid the notifications for deletion of items issued by the State government, which have been acted upon by the citizens and all concerned. The introduction of Sub-section (2) of Section 4-A retrospectively with effect from 6/8/1960 would lead to invalidation of notifications by which items have been deleted and enable the market committee to impose a fee and to collect the fee in respect of items which have been deleted, the same is bad inasmuch as it undoes the certainty with which citizens had acted upon issuance of notification under Section 39 of the Act deleting items from the Schedule.

Section 4-A(2) is also bad inasmuch as the legislature has provided an opportunity for hearing at the stage of deletion of the items from the Schedule and not at the stage of addition of the items. Since the process of addition and deletion are both legislative acts, unless a rational basis exists to differentiate the circumstance when an item is being deleted from the Schedule, non-affording of opportunity to the members of the general public when an item is being added to the Schedule, is per se discriminatory and as such void.

Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 4-A cannot co-exist with Sections 3 and 4 of the statute. The continuance of Sections 3 and 4 after the Amending Act is entirely futile and these Sections have been reduced to a dead letter. Such cannot be the scheme of the Act. Particularly, when Sections 3 and 4 have always been adverted to by this Hon'ble court while analysing the scheme of the provisions of the Act both in relation to the declaration of a market area and also the declaration of a principal market/sub-market yard and while adjudging the validity of imposition of fee.

Section 4-A by obliterating the right to object conferred under Section 3 introduces an unnecessary hardship and exposes the entire scheme of the Act to a charge of unreasonableness. The substantial nature of the objections of the appellant as depicted in the objections filed would indicate that they had a right at least to set forth the grievances for consideration by the State government.

Section 4-B of the Act is a consequential provision. Section 4-B is a validating provision proceeding on the basis of curing the defects pointed out by the Division Bench of the High court in the DCM case through the medium of Section 4-A and consequently validating all collections as if the same was authorised by the Amending Act and also removing the impediments of any judgment by a court to the contrary. It is, therefore, submitted that Section 4-B containing the words: 'as if such levy and collection was made under the provisions of this Act as amended by this Act...indicate that Section 4-B cannot have any existence independent of its own. The effect of the judgment of the division bench in striking down Section 4-A entirely and upholding the fiction contained in Section 4-B would lead to an anomalous result that without curing the defects, a judgment can be overruled by the legislature by a simple process of amendment. It is well settled that a mere attempt to overrule the decision of the courts by amending the law is not sufficient and would itself be an encroachment on the judicial power of the State. It is only upon the defects pointed out by the judgment being cured in a proper manner that validation enactments can be upheld.

The legal fiction in Section 4-B must stand the test of reasonableness. The fiction occurring in Section 4-B is consequential to the removal of defects pointed out by the division bench in the judgment dated 30/3/1992 and cannot be divorced from the same. Section 4-B is inseverable for the purpose of either interpreting the provisions or for the purpose of considering its validity.

The Notification of 31/8/1992 is bad and illegal because the objections raised by the appellants have not been considered. On the basis of the pleadings submitted by the parties, the High court ought to have answered the questions relating to the validity of the Notification dated 31/8/1992 in the affirmative. It is also contended that no satisfactory material has been placed by the Marketing Board before the court to suggest that the objections were considered in a serious manner as is expected of statutory authority under Section 3 of the Act.

(V) It is well settled that the provisions of an Act have to be read as a whole in order to give effect to a purposive interpretation of the Act. Viewed from this cardinal principle of construction, it is evident that the purpose of the Act to regulate activities in relation to specified agricultural produce in a market area is being defeated by the Amending Act. Viewed from this principle of statutory interpretation. Section 4-A and 4-B of the Amending Act are bad, as being contrary to the scheme of the Act. In this connection, reference has been made to the decision of this court in Commr. of Commercial Taxes v. R.S. Jhaver.

(VI) Legislation relating to imposition of a restriction under the provisions of the various Marketing Regulation Acts have always been viewed in an integrated manner by this court. In support of such contention, reference has been made to the decision in M.C.V.S. Arunachala Nadar v. State of Madras. Considering the scheme of the Madras Commercial Crops Act, 1953, which is in pari materia with the provisions of the Markets Act, it was observed by this court in Nadar case that 'under Section 3, the State government issues a notification declaring their intention to exercise control over the purchase and sale of such commercial crop in a particular area and calls for objections and suggestions to be made within a prescribed time. After the objections are received, the State government considers them and declares the areas to be specified in the notification or any portion thereof to be a notified area for the purpose of the Act in respect of commercial crop or crops specified in the notification.'

(VII) In this connection reference has also been made to the decision of this court in Lakhan Lal v. State of Bihar. In Lakhan Lal case, this court had noted that power under Section 4(1) should be exercised reasonably. It is contended that the intention of the judgment is that the reasonableness of the exercise of the power under Section 4(1) is amenable to judicial review. By dispensing with Section 3 and 4, the Markets Act has become plainly vulnerable.

(VIII) Referring to Kewal Krishan Puri case, it is contended that for a fee to be valid, levy must be imposed on the agricultural produce bought or sold by licensees in a notified market area and must also be earmarked for rendering services to the licensees in the notified market area and a good and substantial portion of it must be shown to be expended for that purpose. If the requirement of regulatory control as envisaged in Sections 3 and 4 are sought to be dispensed with by the aid of Sections 4-A and 4-B, the imposition of levy of market fee loses its character as fee and it essentially partakes the character of tax. Such imposition of tax suffers from legislative incompetence.

(IX) A valid law must cure the defects pointed out in the judgment of a court and unless it does so effectively, the validation statute would be liable to be struck down. Mere amendment to overrule or annul a decision of courts is not permissible inasmuch as the same amounts to encroachment on the judicial power of the State. In this connection, reliance has been made on the decision of this court in Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality, Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. New Shrock Spg. and Wvg. Co. Ltd., Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India and Cauvery Water Disputes tribunal case.

(X) A validating law must also be reasonable. The validating law must satisfy the requirement of the Constitution after taking into account the accrued and acquired rights of the parties today. In this connection, reference has been made to the decision in State of Gujarat v. Roman Lal Keshav Lal Soni (para 52 at pp. 61-63)

(XI) Whilst it is true that Sections 3 and 4 do not influence the exercise of power under Section 39 of the Markets Act and are not therefore, condition precedent, yet once an item is added to the Schedule, it would be operative in a market area through the process of Sections 3 and 4. Section 39 contemplates a positive act of addition or alteration. While amendment to the Schedule may be effected by deletion of an item in the Schedule, yet addition can be effected only by a positive act of insertion. Rescission of a notification deleting the items will not lead to or tantamount to addition of the item in the Schedule.

The Notifications of 2/5/1977 and 21/5/1977 are referable to Section 39. The Notification dated 21/5/1977 expressly rescinds notification issued under Section 39 on 2/5/1977. Hence, this notification is referable to Section 39 and not Section 4(3). For exercise of power under Section 4(3) the procedure under Section 3 is to be followed.

It may be noted here that the invalidity of the deletion of sugar on the basis of the said Notification dated 2/5/1977 is not alleged by the sugar mills. As a matter of fact, they accept that by the said notification sugar stood deleted from the Schedule. But when such deletion is sought to be negatived by issuing Notification dated 21/5/1977 rescinding the earlier Notification dated 2/5/1977, challenge as to the validity of the later notification was made by filing writ petitions before the High court. In the judgment in DCM case such notification dated 21/5/1977 rescinding earlier notification has been held invalid by the High court on the ground that once control has been effected in respect of a scheduled goods by following provision under Sections 3 and 4, reintroduction of an item in the Schedule is not permissible without following the provisions of Section 3 and 4. In our view, such decision cannot be sustained for the reasons indicated hereafter. Inclusion or deletion of an item in selecting the field of control is to be made in exercise of power under Section 39 of the Markets Act and State government is clothed with such power which can be exercised without any aid of the provisions of Section 3 and 4 of the Act. It should also be noted that since deletion of sugar from the Schedule was made in exercise of power under Section 39, and such deletion was not a deletion under Section 4(1) of the Act, the procedure prescribed in Sections 3 and 4 of the Act, was not required to be followed. Section 4(3) does not contemplate inclusion or exclusion of produce under Section 39 of the Act but is applicable only to the inclusion or exclusion of any area from the area of market or any produce specified therein as have been notified for control in a specified market already by notification issued under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act.

98. In Rameshchandra Kachardas Porwal v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (referred (2) supra) the Apex Court observed at paras 6 and 17 as hereunder:

We have seen that Section 5 authorises the establishment of a principal market and one or more subsidiary markets. Quite obviously the power to establish a principal market or a subsidiary market carries with it the power to disestablish (if such an expression may be used) such market. Quite obviously again, the power given by Section 5 to establish a principal or subsidiary market may be exercised from time to time. These follow from Sections 14 and 21 of the Maharashtra General Clauses Act. So, Section 5 of the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1963, read with Sections 14 and 21 of the Maharashtra General Clauses Act vest enough power in the Director to close an existing market and establish it elsewhere. Section 4A(2) of the Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939, (the Act which preceded the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing Regulation Act), empowered the State Government to declare any enclosure, building or locality in any market area to be a principal market yard for the area and other enclosures, buildings or localities to be one or more sub-market yards for the area. There was a proviso to Section 4a(2) which provided that out of the enclosures, buildings or localities declared to be market yards before the commencement of the Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets (Amendment) Act 1954, one shall be declared to be the principal market yard for the market area and others, if any, to be one or more sub-market yards for the area. Before the 1954 amendment Act Vakhar Bagh was the market yard for a certain market area. In October 1954, (after the 1954 amendment came into force) Vakhar Bagh was declared as the principal market yard for the market area under the proviso to Section 4a(2) of the Act. A few days later another notification was issued declaring some other place as the principal market yard for the market area. Vakhar Bagh was not even declared as a sub-market yard. The effect was that Vakhar Bagh Market Yard ceased to be a market yard. This was questioned in Bapubhai Ratanchand Shah v. State of Bombay : (1955) 57 Bom LR 892 at Pp. 903, 904. The argument was that Vakhar Bagh had necessarily to be declared as a Principal Market Yard since there was no sub-market yard under the proviso to Section 4a(2) and that once having been so declared another market yard could not be substituted in its place. This argument was repelled by Chagla, C.J., and Tendolkar, J. It was observed:

Now, Section 4A(2) confers upon the Government the power to declare any enclosure, building or locality in any market area to be a principal market yard for the area and other enclosures, buildings or localities to be one or more sub-market yards for the area. It is clear that by reason of Section 14 of the General Clauses Act any power that is conferred on Government can be exercised from time to time as occasion requires. Therefore, it would be clearly competent to the State Government to declare from time to time which should be the principal market yard and which should be sub-market yards. It is also clear under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act that when a power to issue notifications, orders, rules, or by-laws is conferred, then that power includes a power to exercise in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions, if any, to add to, amend, vary or rescind any notifications, orders, rules or by-laws so issued... Under Section 4A(2) Government can by issuing notifications from time to time alter the principal market yards which have been set up and which did not exist before the passing of the Amending Act.

We agree. Any other construction may frustrate the very object of the legislation. Nothing may be expected to remain static in this changing world of ours. A market which is suitably and conveniently located today may be found to be unsuitable and inconvenient tomorrow on account of the development of the area in another direction or the congestion which may have reduced the market into an impossible, squalid place or for a variety of other reasons. To so interpret the provisions of the Agricultural Produce Marketing Regulation Act as prohibiting the abolition of a market once established and bar the transfer of the market to another place would, as we said, be to defeat the very object of the Act. Neither the text nor the context of the relevant provisions of the Act warrant such a prohibition and bar and there is no reason to imply any such. On the other hand Sections 14 and 21 of the Maharashtra General Clauses Act warrant our reading into Section 5a. power to close a market and establish it elsewhere.

We may now turn to the Bihar cases. The Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960, follows roughly the same pattern as the other Acts. A market area has to be first declared within which the marketing of specified agricultural produce is proposed to be regulated. For every market area there is to be a principal market yard and one or more sub-market yards. In between the market area and the market yard there is to be a market but market does not seem to play any part in the scheme of the Act as it now stands after the 1974 amendments. However it should be mentioned here that Rule 80, which it still on the Statute Book, provides that a market shall be established for a market area and that after the establishment of a market, a notification under Section 5 (declaring market yards) shall be issued. Section 15 of the Act provides that no specified agricultural produce shall be bought or sold at any place within the market area other than the principal market yard or sub-market yard established therein except such quantity as may be prescribed for retail sale or personal consumption. The arguments advanced in the Maharashtra and Karnataka cases were advanced in the Bihar cases also. For the reasons already mentioned we reject the submissions in one of the Bihar cases it was further submitted that when a market yard was disestablished at one place and established at another place, it was the duty of the concerned authority to invite and hear objections. Failure to do so was a violation of the principles of natural justice and the notification disestablishing the market yard at one place and establishing it elsewhere was therefore, bad. It was said that even as there was express provision for inviting and hearing objections before a 'market area' was declared under the Act, so should objections be invited and heard before a 'market yard' was established at any particular place. The principles of natural justice demanded it. We are unable to agree. We are here not concerned with the exercise of a judicial or quasi-judicial function where the very nature of the function involves the application of the rules of natural justice, or of an administrative function affecting the rights of persons, wherefore, a duty to act fairly. We are concerned with legislative activity; we are concerned with the making of a legislative instrument, the declaration by notification of the Government that a certain place shall be a principal market yard for a market area, upon which declaration certain statutory provisions at once spring into action and certain consequences prescribed by statute follow forthwith. The making of the declaration, in the context, is certainly an act legislative in character and does not oblige the observance of the rules of natural justice. In Bates v. Lord Hailsham (1972) 1 WLR 1373, Megarry, J., pointed out that the rules of natural justice do not run in the sphere of legislation, primary or delegated, and in Tulsipur Sugar Co. v. Notified Area Committee : (1980) 2 SCR 1111 : AIR 1980 SC 882, our brothers Desai and Venkataramaiah, JJ., approved what was said by Megarry, J., and applied it to the field of conditional legislation too. In Paul Jackson's Natural Justice (Second Edn.), it has been pointed out:

There is no doubt that a Minister, or any other body, in making legislation, for example, by statutory instrument or by-law, is not subject to the rules of natural justice-Bates v. Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone (1972) 1 WLR 1373 - any more than is Parliament itself, Edinburgh and Dalkeith Ry Co. v. Wauchope (1842) 8 CI and Fin 710, 720 per Lord Brougham, British Railways Board v. Pickin 1974 AC 765.

Prof. H.W.R. Wades has similarly pointed out in his Administrative Law (4th Edn.): 'There is no right to be heard before the making of legislation, whether primary or delegated, unless it is provided by statutes.'

There is, therefore, no substance in the invocation of the rules of natural justice.

99. Strong reliance was placed on the decision of the Apex Court in Tulsipur Sugar Co. Limited v. Notified Area Committee, Tulsipur : 1980(2) SCC 295 wherein the Apex Court observed at paras and 6 as hereunder:

The solution to the question raised before us principally depends upon the nature of the function that is performed by the State Government under Section 3 of the Act. If that function is judicial or quasi-judicial involving adjudication of the rights of any person resulting in civil consequences, it no doubt becomes necessary to follow the maxim audi alteram partem (hear the other side) before taking a decision. It is also true that in order to establish that a duty to act judicially applies to the performance of a particular function, it is no longer necessary to show that the function is analytically of a judicial character or involves the determination of a lis inter partes; though a presumption that natural justice must be observed will arise more readily where there is an express duty to decide only after conducting a hearing or inquiry or where the decision is one entailing the determination of disputed questions of law and fact. Prima facie, moreover, a duty to act judicially will arise in the exercise of a power to deprive a person of his livelihood or of his legal status where the statue is not merely terminable at pleasure, or to deprive a person of liberty or property rights or another legitimate interest or expectation, or to impose a penalty on him; though the conferment of a wide discretionary power exercisable in the public interest may be indicative of the absence of an obligation to act judicially. Where a discretionary power to encroach upon individual rights is exercised the factors pointing to whether it must be exercised judicially include the nature of the interests to be affected, the circumstances in which the power falls to be exercised and the nature of the sanctions, if any, involved. Exceptionally, a duty to act judicially may arise in the course of exercising a function not culminating in a binding decision, if the wording of the grant of powers or the context indicates that a fair hearing ought to be extended to persons likely to be prejudicially affected by an investigation or recommendation. (Halsbury's Law of England, Vol. I, Fourth Edition, Para 65 at p. 77).

A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India : (1970) 1 SCR 457, Mohinder Singh Gill v. The Chief Election Commr. New Delhi : (1978) 2 SCR 272 and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India : (1978) 2 SCR 621 which were decided in the light of the ever widening and expanding horizons of natural justice also lay down that it is only where an administrative decision affects the rights of persons, it becomes the duty of the authority concerned to give notice of the proposed action to the person to be affected and to take a decision after giving a fair opportunity to the person concerned to make his representation in that regard. The decision in Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs (1969) 2 Ch D 149 which was followed by this Court in Maneka was followed by this Court in Maneka Gandhi's case (supra) summarises the above principle as follows: 'where a public officer has power to deprive a person of his liberty or his property, the general principle is that it has not to be done without his being given an opportunity of being heard and of making representations on his own behalf. In all these cases one significant common factor is that the administrative action is directed against a person. None of them, however, is a case where the question whether in the absence of an express provision requiring it to do so, an authority which has to exercise a legislative function should follow the principles of natural justice before discharging such function arose for consideration.

100. In Raunaq Ram Tara Chand v. State of Punjab 1957(2) SCC 354 it was held at paras 13 and 14 as hereunder:

Now under Section 23 'a Committee may, subject to such rules as may be made by the State Government in this behalf, levy on ad valorem basis fees on the agricultural produce bought or sold by licensees in the notified market area at rate not exceeding rupee one fifty paise for every one hundred rupees, provided....' Section 43 provides for rulemaking power. Rule 24 is referable to Section 43(2)(v), but we are not concerned with this rule in this case, Rule 29 provides that under Section 23 a Committee shall levy fees on the agricultural produce bought or sold by licensees in the notified market area at the rates fixed by the Board from time to time. Reading Section 23 and Rule 29 together it is not possible to escape from the conclusion that the Act authorises levy of fee on agricultural produce bought or sold in the notified market area by licensees only. The appellants have licence only in respect of the business of kacha arhtiya and commission agent. While we express no opinion on the point whether the absence of reference to buying and selling of agricultural produce in Form 'A' and Form 'B' disables the Committee to issue licences for that purpose, we are of opinion that the present appeals can be disposed of on the sole ground that the appellants have not as a matter of fact been issued such licences and no fees can, therefore be levied on them in respect of purchases and sales of agricultural produce by them. The appellants are, therefore, not liable to payment of fee under the Act as demanded.

The appellants also contend that since gur and shakkar are manufactured products they cannot come under the definition of agricultural produce within the meaning of Section 2(a) of the Act. Section 2(a) defines agricultural produce to mean 'all produce whether processed or not, of agriculture, horticulture, animal husbandry or forest as specified in the Schedule to this Act' which mentions 85 items of commodities. These are statutorily agricultural produce under Section 2(a). It is not possible to entertain the argument that the Court will undertake a judicial scrutiny of these items in order to come to a conclusion whether these are agricultural produce or not. In view of the definition in Section 2(a) such an enquiry is out of place. In this context we may note that under Section 38 the State Government may by notification add to the schedule any other item of agricultural produce or amend or omit any such specified item. It is because of this power to add to the schedule items of agricultural produce that the first part of the definition under Section 2(a) gives guidance as to what agricultural produce means. The submissions are, therefore, devoid of substance.

101. In Park Leather Industry (P) Ltd. and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Ors. 2001(3) SC 135 the Apex Court at paras 19, 20, 21 and 23 observed:

We have considered the arguments of both the parties. In our view it is clear that the interpretation has to be on the basis of the expression 'agricultural produce' as set out in Section 2(a) of the said Act. In so determining decisions based on different statutes such as Sales Tax Laws can be of no assistance. All the cases relied upon by Mr. Sudhir Chandra are cases under the taxing statutes where the interpretation has been given on the basis of the terms as defined in those statutes.

A perusal of Section 2(a) of the said Act makes it clear that an agricultural product would be a product which is specified in the Schedule or one which is admixture of two or more items and would also include any such item in a processed form. In our view it makes no difference, for the purposes of the said Act, that the concerned item is a different commodity from the one which is included in the Schedule. It is possible that by virtue of an admixture of two or more items or by virtue of processing a different commodity or item may come into existence. Even though a different commodity may come into existence, it would still be an 'agricultural produce'. This is best illustrated by Sugarcane which is in Schedule A, Item VIII at Serial No. 14. From Sugarcane, 'rab' and 'gur' are manufactured. They are already different commodities or items. Yet they are all included. The specific inclusion of items like 'gur, rab, shakkar, khandsari and jaggery' is to make it clear that merely because it becomes a different item or commodity it is not excluded.

We see no reason to go into the difference between 'manufacturing' and 'processing'. In the strict sense of the terms there may be a difference. However, we are not required to go into these differences as, in our view, it is very clear, from what has been set out by the appellants themselves in their affidavit that for hide and skin to be converted into leather or tanned leather all that is required is a process. It is a process of cleaning, curing and adding preservatives. That it is a process has been held by this Court in the case of State of Tamil Nadu v. Mahi Traders : AIR 1989 SC 1167 (supra). We are also of the view that the finished product i.e. 'tanned leather' even though it may have changed in physical appearance or chemical combination and even though it may commercially be a different item still remains a 'hide' or a 'skin'.

In this view of the matter the appeal stands dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.

102. In Kishan Lal v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. 1990 Supp. S.C.C. 742 the Apex Court observed at paras 4, 5 and 6 as hereunder:

Sugar is one of the items which was included in the Schedule to the Act, statutorily, right from its inception. Such inclusion is found in Maharashtra, Gujarat, West Bengal, Bihar etc. Whether it was subsequently deleted or re-included or regrouped or it was added later was immaterial as Section 40 of the Act empowered State Government to amid or include any item in the Schedule of agricultural produce. Existence of such delegated power is usual feature of the statutes. No illegality or infirmity could be pointed out in it. Any challenge, therefore, founded on excessive delegation of legislative power was misconceived.

Inclusion of sugar in the Schedule was urged to be arbitrary as it was not produced out of soil the basic ingredient of agricultural produce. Fallacy of the submission is apparent as it was in complete disregard of definition of the word 'agricultural' produce in the Act which includes all produce whether agricultural, horticultural, animal husbandry or otherwise as specified in the Schedule. The legislative power to add or include and define a word even artificially, apart, the definition which is not exhaustive but inclusive neither excludes any item produced in mill or factories nor it confines its width to produce from soil. If that be the construction then all items of animal husbandry shall stand excluded. It further overlooks expanse of the expression 'or otherwise as specified in the Schedule'. Nor switch over from indigenous method of producing anything to scientific or mechanical method changes its character. Khandsari sugar, which is produced by open pan process and is not different from sugar produced by vacuum pan process except in composition, filterability and conductivity as held in Rathi Khandsari Udyog : AIR 1985 SC 679 (Supra) was held to be agricultural produce in some decisions. No distinction was made on method of production, namely, by modern plant and machinery. To say, therefore, that sugar being produced in mill or factories could not be deemed to be agricultural produce is both against the statutory language and judicial interpretation of similar provisions of the Act in statutes of other States. Rice or dal produced in mills have been held to be agricultural produce in Ramesh Chandra v. U.P. State : (1980) 3 SCR 104 : AIR 1980 SC 1124 and State of U.P. v. Ganga Das Mill 1985 SCR 87. Even in Halsbury Laws of England, Vol. I the word agricultural produce for purposes of agricultural marketing schemes is understood as, 'including any product of agriculture or horticulture and any article of food or drink wholly or partly manufactured or derived from any such product and fleeces (including all kinds of wool) and the skins of animals'. In the same volume products covered by the provisions of EEC Treaty as to agriculture (classified according to the Brussels Nomenclature of 1965) are mentioned in paragraph 1845. Sugar is one of them.

Another legalistic challenge regarding inhibition of State to legislate on sugar or oft repeated argument of occupied field was more attractive than of any substance. Reliance on Article 246 of the Constitution was academic only. As far back as 1956 Constitution Bench of this Court in Choudhary Tika Ram v. State of U.P. : 1956 SCR 393 : AIR 1956 SC 676 examined the matter in detail and held sugar legislations to be within the scope of Entry 33 of concurrent list. It was observed that all 'acts and the notifications issued thereunder by the Centre in regard to sugar and sugarcane were enacted in exercise of concurrent jurisdiction'. Effect of it was described thus, 'the Provincial Legislation as well as the Central Legislation would be competent to enact such pieces of legislation and no question of legislative competence would arise'. Any further discussion on clash between Entry 52 of List I of VII Schedule with Entry 28 of List II in the circumstances is unnecessary. As regards the submission of occupied field suffice it to say that there is no repugnancy in the Central and State legislation. At least none was made out. Even if there would have been any the Act having received assent of the President it is fully protected by Article 254(2).

103. In Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti v. Orient Paper and Industries Limited : 1995(1) SCC 655 the Apex Court held at paras 24, 28, 31 and 32 as hereunder:

On behalf of the appellant-Committees, their income and expenditure account for the five years, viz., 1985-86 to 1989-90 has been annexed to the appeal memo. As is stated in the memo itself, these details were not filed before the High court since the appellants' averments in that behalf in the counter filed in the High court, were not denied by the respondent-Mills. As per these details, the income from market fee recovered and the expenditure incurred for the five year period 1985-86 to 1989-90 in the case of both the appellant-Committees, was as follows:

Years Income (in Rs.) Expenditure (in Rs.)------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Appellant 1 Appellant 2 Appellant 1 Appellant 2------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1985-86 226518.69 1711094.71 166447.15 851178.731986-87 247248.47 1856387.98 254291.20 1356002.441987-88 244506.43 3311000.70 424512.70 3008839.531988-89 293449.10 3915838.67 323202.35 2715734.741989-90 209403.61 3731315.34 322041.70 3442650.67-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------The expenses are excluding those incurred on capital assets like roads and buildings. These figures will show that there is a reasonable nexus between the market fees levied and the expenses incurred on the services rendered to the buyers and sellers of the agricultural produce.

It will be obvious from the above purposes for which the market fee is to be utilised that the said purposes are in furtherance of the object of the Act, viz., to regulate the buying and selling of agricultural produce and the establishment and proper administration of markets for agricultural produce for the benefit of the agriculturists who are the primary producers of the said produce. The machinery and the facilities for which the market fees are being expended are all necessary to provide the necessary infrastructure to further the object of the Act. But for such infrastructure, the objects of the Act cannot be properly and adequately implemented. The fact that the respondent-Mills may not be the direct beneficiary of anyone or some of the said facilities or does not make use of them does not absolve it from payment of the market fees. The said machinery and the facilities are meant for the benefit of all the buyers and sellers of all the agricultural produce within the market area and it cannot be denied that they are so. It is further difficult to appreciate the contention that in the circumstances, the respondent-Mills is not either directly or indirectly a beneficiary of the said machinery and the facilities as a buyer of the bamboos when the purchase is admittedly made in the market area as pointed out above. In the circumstances, the High court was in error in holding that there was no evidence of the services rendered by the Committees.

We are afraid that on both these counts, the High court has committed errors. As regards the first ground on which the High court has set aside the market fee, viz., that the transaction of sale and purchase of the bamboos at the forest depots is not a transaction in the market proper or market yard and hence it is not prohibited by the Act, the High court has failed to notice the relevant provisions of Section 6(b) of the Act to which a reference has already been made earlier. The provision in terms states that no person shall, except in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the rules and the bye-laws made thereunder, use any place in the market area for the marketing of the notified agricultural produce or operate in the market area as a market functionary. The exceptions to this provision are mentioned in Section 6(b) itself and the sale of the bamboos at the forest depots which are admittedly in the market areas of one or the other committee, are not covered by any of the exceptions. The prohibition for sale or purchase of the agricultural produce is not only in the market proper or market yard area but in the market area as a whole. So also Section 31, as already pointed out, further provides that no person shall, in respect of any notified agricultural produce, operate in the market area as commission agent, trader, broker, weighman, hammal, surveyor, warehouseman, owner or occupier of processing or pressing factories or such other market functionary except in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the rules and bye-laws made thereunder. Section 37 requires that every person who buys notified agricultural produce in the market area, shall execute an agreement in favour of the seller in triplicate in such forms as may be prescribed. One copy of such agreement is to be kept in the record of the market committee.

As regards the reliance placed by the High court on the second proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 19 of the Act which provides that in case of a commercial transaction between traders in the market area, the market fee shall be collected and paid by the seller, we are unable to understand as to how the said provision can be pressed into service to negative the levy of the market fee, even assuming that the Forest Department is for the purposes of the said provision, a trader when it sells the bamboos. The Forest Department is required by that provision to collect the fees from the buyers in the present case, from the respondent-Mills. The market fee has, therefore, in any case, to be paid by the respondent-Mills if not to the Market Committee directly, at least to the Forest Department, and it is to be paid at the time of the purchase of the bamboos. It is immaterial for this purpose whether the bamboos are purchased by the respondent-Mills for selling them or for using them as their raw material in the manufacture of paper. The liability of the respondent-Mills to pay the market fees is in no way negated on that account. The provision requiring the seller to collect the market fees in such cases is made for the convenience of collection of the fees, as is the similar provision made in the first proviso of the said Ss. where buyers cannot be identified. The collection made by the seller, i.e., the forest depots in the present case is for and on behalf of the Committee and is eventually to be handed over to the Committee. The provision is enabling and does not prevent the Committee itself from collecting the fee, if it so proposes.

104. In Belsund Sugar Co. Limited v. State of Bihar (referred (5) supra 1999(9) SCC 620 it was observed at para-139 as hereunder:

Placing reliance on these ingredients, it was submitted that per 100 milligrams of Lactodex milk fat content is 0.9 gm and that other minerals and vitamins may also include milk powder. Similarly, Raptakos (special infant food) also contains proteins and fats. He also contended that even milk which is a complete food may contain vitamins, therefore, it cannot be said that these two products are not milk products or products containing some ingredients of milk. It is difficult to accept this contention for the simple reason that the aforesaid Schedule at sub-item 20 captioned under the title 'Animal Husbandry Products' refers to milk except liquid milk. By no stretch of imagination, tinned baby food containing various ingredients which may include some milk fats or proteins though in powder form can be said to be milk powder simpliciter or whole milk not in liquid form. It is also pertinent to note that there is no item of milk products in the Schedule to the Act under the caption 'Animal Husbandry Products'. In this connection, it is profitable to contradistinguish this entry in the Schedule with Items 14, 15 and 16 under the caption 'Cereals' in the very same Schedule. In the listed items under the caption 'Cereals', we find 'Wheat' separately mentioned at Item 3 as compared to wheat atta, suji and maida separately mentioned at Items 14, 15 and 16. This shows that the basic agricultural produce - 'wheat' is treated as a separate agricultural produce as compared to its own products manufactured out of wheat, namely, atta, suji and maida. Those mentioned as 'agricultural produce' in the Schedule so far as 'cereals' are concerned. But similar is not the scheme in connection with milk. Milk products like baby foods are not separately mentioned. Under the very caption 'Animal Husbandry Products', butter and ghee are separately mentioned as Items 7 and 8 which are wholly manufactured out of milk. It, therefore, becomes clear that save and except butter and ghee no other milk product is sought to be covered by the sweep of the Act as 'Animal Husbandry Products' and the basic animal husbandry produce like 'milk' only in sold form is sought to be covered by a separate solitary Item 20 as one of the 'Animal Husbandry Products'. Therefore, any other manufactured product like the present ones, utilizing the same ingredients of milk powder as one of the ingredients but which are processed by addition of all other extra items with the result that finished products like baby foods emerge as manufactured items for serving as substitute for milk to be fed to infants who cannot digest liquid milk or solidified milk as such, cannot be treated to be 'agricultural produce' as part and parcel of the listed 'Animal Husbandry Products' mentioned in the Schedule to the Act. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant in support of his contentions tried to rely upon specimen copies of printed material affixed to the sealed tins of these manufactured commodities 'Lactodex' and 'Raptakos', which, according to him, are substitutes for mother's milk and are to be used to feed infant babies who cannot take milk in its natural form. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondents tried to repel this submission by contending that this type of printed material was not produced before the High Court. Be that as it may, the undisputed fact remains that these two special infant foods are meant for infant babies who are to be fed by mixing this baby food powder with water to make it a paste as a substitute for mother's milk.

105. Further reliance also was placed on Govindlal Chhaganlal Patel v. Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Godhra : AIR 1976 S.C. 263, Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of Andhra Pradesh (referred (10) supra) and Union of India v. Cynamide India Limited (referred (4) supra) as well.

106. Elaborate submissions were made relating to the settled principles of interpretation of statutes and submissions were made by the Counsel representing the writ petitioner that when procedure and all steps in relation to the issuance of notifications had not been followed, the whole exercise is vitiated and liable to be quashed and on the contrary even if it is to be taken that every step had not been followed this may have to be taken as a curable irregularity and in the light of the decided cases of the Apex Court since no longer this issue whether 'ghee' would fall within the meaning of livestock or not being no longer available to the writ petitioner, it would be a futile exercise to quash the proceedings with a further direction to follow every step while issuing the notifications. Hence, it was contended by the learned Government Pleader and the learned Standing Counsel representing the respondents that the Writ Petition to be dismissed.

107. In Swedish Match Ab v. Securities & Exchange Board of India : 2004(11) SCC 641 at para 52 the Apex Court observed:

It is a well-settled principle of law that where wordings of a statute are absolutely clear and unambiguous, recourse to different principles of interpretation may not be resorted to but where the words of a statute are not so clear and unambiguous, the other principles of interpretation should be resorted to.

108. In B.S. Council of Ayurvedic and Unani Medicine v. State of Bihar : AIR 2008 S.C. 595 the Apex Court at para-24 held:

In our opinion, where the legislature has used words in an Act which if generally construed, must lead to palpable injustice and consequences revolting to the mind of any reasonable man, the court will always endeavour to place on such words a reasonable limitation, on the ground that the legislature could not have intended such consequence to ensue, unless the express language in the Act or binding authority prevents such limitation being interpolated into the Act. In construing an Act, a construction ought not be put that would work injustice, or even hardship or inconvenience. Unless it is clear that such was the intention of the legislature. It is also settled that where the language of the legislature admits of two constructions and if constructions in one way would lead to obvious injustice, the courts act upon the view that such a result could not have been intended, unless the intention had been manifested in express words. Out of the two interpretations, that language of the statute should be preferred to that interpretation which would frustrate it. It is a cardinal rule governing the interpretation of the statutes that when the language of the legislature admits of two constructions, the court should not adopt the construction which would lead to an absurdity or obvious injustice. It is equally well settled that within two constructions that alternative is to be chosen which would be consistent with the smooth working of the system which the statute purported to be regulating and that alternative is to be rejected which will introduce uncertainty, friction or confusion with the working of the system. See Collector of Customs v. Digvijaysinhji Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. : (1962(1) SCR 896, at page 899 and His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala : AIR 1973 S.C. 1461.

109. In B.K. Srinivasan v. State of Karnataka : AIR 1987 S.C. 1059 the Apt Court observed at para-18 as hereunder:

The High Court was of the view that such defect as there was in regard to publication of the Plan was cured by Section 76-J, the Omnibus Curative Clause to which we earlier made a reference as the 'Ganga' clause. Provisions similar to Section 76-J are found in several modern Acts and their object is to put beyond challenge defects of constitution of statutory bodies and defects of procedure which have not led to any substantial prejudice. We are inclined to agree with the High Court that a defective publication which has otherwise served its purpose is not sufficient to render illegal what is published and that such defect is cured by Section 76-J. The High Court relied on the two decisions of this Court - Bangalore Woollen, Cotton & Silk Mills, Bangalore case : (1961) 3 S.C.R. 707 : AIR 1962 S.C. 562 and Municipal Board, Sitapur v. Prayag Narain Saigal : (1969)3 S.C.R. 387 : AIR 1970 S.C. 58. In the first case objection was raised to the imposition of octrai duty on the ground that there was failure to notify the final resolution of the imposition of the tax in the Government Gazette as required by Section 98(2) of the City of Bangalore Municipal Corporation Act. A Constitution Bench of the Court held that the failure to publish the final resolution in the Official Gazette was cured by Section 38(1)(b) of the Act which provided that no act done or proceeding taken under the Act shall be questioned merely on the ground of any defect or irregularity in such act or proceeding, not affecting the merits of the case. The Court said that the resolution had been published in the newspapers and was communicated to those affected and failure to publish the resolution did not affect the merits of its imposition and failure to notify the resolution in the Gazette was not fatal to the legality of the imposition. In the second case it was held that the non-publication of a special resolution imposing a tax was a mere irregularity, since the inhabitants had no right to object to special resolutions and had otherwise clear notice of the imposition of the tax. It is true that both these cases relate to non-publication of a resolution regarding imposition of a tax where the imposition of a tax was otherwise well known to the public. In the present case the situation may not be the same but there certainly was an effort to bring the Plan and regulations to the notice of the public by giving notice of the Plan in the Official Gazette. Non-publication of the Plan in the Official Gazette was therefore a curable defect capable of being cured by Section 76J. It is here that the failure of the appellants to plead want of publication or want of knowledge in the first instance assumes importance. In the answer to the writ petitions, the appellant took up the substantial plea that they had complied with the requirements of the Outline Development Plan and the Regulations but not that they had no knowledge of any such requirement. It can safely be said that the defect or irregularity did not affect the merits of the case.

110. If the language employed in Sub-sections of Sections 3 and 4 if carefully analyzed, in certain Sub-sections the word or expression 'may' has been employed and in certain Sub-sections the word or expression 'shall' had been employed. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 specifies 'such notification shall state that any objections or suggestions which may be received by the Government from any person within a period to be specified therein will be considered by them. In Sub-section (3) of Section 3 it is specified '...the Government may publish in such manner as may be prescribed a final notification....' In Sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act it is specified that 'The Government shall constitute by notification a market committee....' Further, in Sub-section (1) of Section 4 it is specified that '...the market committee so constituted shall be a body corporate by such name as the Government may specify in the said notification....' Sub-section (3)(a), (3)(b), (3)(c) of Section 4 would commence with words 'Every market committee shall', 'The market committee shall'. Sub-section (4) of Section 4 of the Act specifies 'As soon as may be after the establishment of a market under Sub-section (3) the Government shall declare by notification the market area and such other area adjoining thereto as may be specified in the notification, to be a notified market area for the purposes of this Act in respect of the any notified agricultural produce, livestock or products of livestock'. It is pertinent to note that Sub-section (5) of Section 4 specifies that 'Subject to the provisions of Sub-section (1), (2), (3) and (4), the Government may, by notification - (a) exclude from a notified market area, any area comprised therein; or (b) include in any notified market area, any area specified in such notification'.

111. It is no doubt true that the Apex Court in the decisionss specified supra had adopted a relaxed or liberal approach in construing or interpreting the expression 'livestock' or the expression 'agricultural produce'. Section 2(xv) of the Act defines 'product of livestock' as hereunder:

products of livestock means such products of livestock as may be declared by the Government by notification, to be products of livestock for the purposes of this Act.

Section 2(v) of Act defines 'livestock' as hereunder:

Livestock means cows, buffaloes, bullocks, bulls, goats and sheep, and includes poultry, fish and such other animals as may be declared by the Government by notification to be livestock for the purposes of this Act.

112. In the light of the liberal or relaxed interpretation adopted by the Apex Court in certain decisions no doubt in the light of the specific provisions of the said Enactments elaborate submissions were made that 'ghee' also would fall within the meaning of 'livestock'. Even if the principles in Sita Devi's case (referred (9) supra) to be applied while deciding the question whether 'ghee' would fall within the meaning of livestock or not, since the said decision was decided in a given set of circumstances, in the light of the provisions of the Enactment referred to in the said decision, the said decision may not be applicable to the present case. If 'livestock' or 'agricultural produce' and the categories thereof had been specified in the statute itself by appending in the schedule or otherwise, that would stand on a different footing from the present provisions of the Act which contemplate the issuance of notifications in accordance with the procedure ordained by the provisions specified supra. In view of the clear definition of the 'livestock' and 'products of livestock', the 'ghee' being derivative of butter or cream, if the language employed in the definitions to be taken as they stand, the only conclusion at which this Court can arrive at is that the 'ghee' would not fall within the ambit of the definitions aforesaid.

113. The validity of G.O.Ms. No. 286, dt.5-7-1994 had been challenged on several grounds especially in the context of the provisions of Section 4 of the Act. The relevant G.Os. - G.O.Ms. No. 1066, G.O.Ms. No. 448, G.O.Ms. No. 2095, G.O.Ms. No. 286 already had been referred to above. The principal submission made by the Counsel representing the writ petitioner is that the different steps to be followed under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act since had not been followed, the impugned G.O. aforesaid is liable to be quashed. Certain portions of Sections 3 and 4 of the Act and how in Sub-sections the expression 'may' and 'shall' had been employed already had been referred to supra.

114. In Sainik Motors v. State of Rajasthan : AIR 1961 S.C. 1480 it was held that the word 'shall' is ordinarily mandatory but it is sometimes not so interpreted if the context or the intention otherwise demands. In State of U.P. v. Babu Ram : AIR 1961 S.C. 751 it was held that when a statute uses the word ' 'shall', prima facie It is mandatory, but the Court may ascertain the real intention of the Legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute. In Jaywant S. Kulkarni v. Minochar Dosabhai Shross : AIR 1988 S.C. 1817 it was held that if the word 'shall' has been substituted for the word 'may' by an amendment, it will be a very strong indication that use of 'shall' makes the provision imperative. In Chairman, Canara Bank, Bangalore v. M.S. Jasra : AIR 1992 S.C. 1341 it was held that the use of word 'may' at one place and 'shall' at another place in the same Section may strengthen the inference that these words have been used in their primary sense and that 'shall' should be construed as mandatory. It is no doubt true that strong reliance was placed on the decision of the Apex Court in B.K. Srinivasan v. State of Karnataka (referred (25) supra). But however in the light of the relevant portions of the provisions of both Sections 3 and 4 specified above and in the light of the fact that in subsections, the expressions 'shall' and 'may' have been employed, this Court is of the considered opinion that the steps contemplated in issuance of the notifications being mandatory or imperative, it cannot be said that these are only directory and hence this is only a curable irregularity. It is needless to say that inasmuch as there is no serious controversy between the parties that all the steps as ordained by the provisions aforesaid had not been followed in issuing the impugned G.O.Ms. No. 286, dt.5-7-1994, the said G.O. cannot be sustained and the same is liable to be quashed and accordingly, it is hereby quashed. It is needless to say that on both the grounds that 'ghee' would not fall within the definition of the livestock product and also on the ground that the very G.O. under challenge had not been issued in accordance with law, the provisions of the statute, the writ petitioner is bound to succeed and accordingly the Writ Petition is hereby allowed. No order as to costs.

Foot Note

* 'Ghee' is 'clarified butter' obtained through heating process and used as cooking medium or taken as food.

2 2(v): 'Livestock' means cows, buffaloes, bullocks, bulls, goats and sheep, and includes poultry, fish and such other animals as may be declared by the Government by notification to be livestock for the purposes of this Act.

3 2(xv): 'Products of livestock' means such products of livestock as may be declared by the government by notification, to be products of livestock for the purposes of this Act.

4 2(x): 'Notified agricultural produce, livestock or products of livestock' means agricultural produce, livestock or products of livestock specified in the notification under Section 3.

5 http:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ghee

12 3. Declaration of notified area: (1) The Government may publish in such manner as may be prescribed a draft notification declaring their intention of regulating the purchase and sale of such agricultural produce, livestock or products of livestock in such area as may be specified in such notification.

(2) Such notification shall state that any objections or suggestions which may be received by the Government from any person within a period to be specified therein will be considered by them.

(3) After the expiration of the period specified in the draft notification and after considering such objections and suggestions as may be received before such expiration, the Government may publish in such manner as may be prescribed a final notification declaring the area specified in the draft notification or any portion thereof, to be a notified area for the purposes of this Act in respect of any agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock specified in the draft notification.

(4) Subject to the provisions of Sub-sections (1), (2) and (3), the Government may, by notification-

(a) exclude from a notified area, any area comprised therein; or

(b) include in any notified area, any area specified in such notification; (or)

(c) declare a new notified area by separation of area from any notified area or by uniting two or more notified areas or parts thereof or by uniting any area to a part of any notified area:

Provided that where, as a result of declaration of a new notified area under this clause, the entire area comprised in an existing notified area is united to one or more notified areas, the said existing notified area shall stand abolished.

13 4. Constitution of Market Committee and declaration of notified market area: (1) The Government shall constitute by notification a market committee for every notified area from such date as may be specified in the notification and the market committee as constituted shall be a body corporate by such name as the Government may specify in the said notification, having perpetual succession, and a common seal with power to acquire, hold and dispose of property and may, by its corporate name, sue and be sued:

Provided that any market committee functioning immediately before such constitution in respect of a notified area abolished under the proviso to Clause (c) of Sub-section (4) of Section 3 shall stand abolished.

(1-A) Any notification made under Sub-section (1) for the constitution of a new market committee in respect of any new notified area declared under Clause (c) of Sub-section (4) of Section 3, may contain such supplemental, incidental and consequential provisions, including provisions as to the composition of the new market committee or new and existing market committees and the apportionment of the assets and liabilities between the market committees affected thereby.

(1-B) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 3 and in Sub-sections (1) and (1-A) of Section 4 of the Act, the Government, may, by notification, also constitute a separate market committee to a special market in a notified area.

(2) It shall be the duty of the market committee to enforce the provisions of this Act and the rules and bye-laws made thereunder in the notified area.

(3)(a) Every market committee shall establish in the notified area excluding the scheduled areas such number of markets as the Government may, from time to time, direct for the purchase and sale of any notified agricultural produce, livestock or products of livestock and shall provide such facilities in the market as may be specified by the Government from time to time, by a general or special order.

(b) Every market committee shall also establish in the notified area such number of markets as the Government may, from time to time, direct for the purchase and sale, solely of vegetables or fruits and shall provide such facilities in the market as may be specified by the Government from time to time by general or special order.

(bb) Every market committee may also establish in the notified area such number of special markets as the Government may from time to time direct for the purchase and sale of any notified agricultural produce, livestock or products of livestock or fruits and vegetables and may provide such facilities in the special market as may be specified by the Government from time to time, by a general or special order.

(c) The market committee shall declare, by notification, the limits of every market established by it under Clauses (a), (b) and (bb) (hereinafter referred to as the market area).

(4) As soon as may be after the establishment of a market under Sub-section (3), the Government shall declare by notification the market area and such other area adjoining thereto as may be specified in the notification, to be a notified market area for the purposes of this Act in respect of any notified agricultural produce, livestock or products of livestock.

(5) Subject to the provisions of Sub-sections (1), (2), (3) and (4), the Government may, by notification,-

(a) exclude from a notified market area, any area comprised thereon; or

(b) include in any notified market area, any area specified in such notification.

35 Sections 3 and 4 of Bihar Act are intended to achieve the same purpose as Section 3 of AP Act and contemplate issue of preliminary notification before an area is notified and declared.

36 Section 4(3) of the Bihar Act is similar to Section 4(5) of the A.P. Act.

37 The five steps that are to be followed have already indicated by the Full Bench of this Court in Mamidi Satyanarayana Murthy (supra).


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