B.J. Divan, C.J.
1. The principal question in each of these four writ petitions is whether seat covers are accessories or not. It is clear in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in A.C. Industries v. State of Andhra Pradesh A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1418, that the term 'accessories' in the schedule to the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act is used to describe goods which may have been manufactured for use as an aid or addition. 'Accessories' are not necessarily confined to particular machines for which they may serve as aids. The same item may be an accessory of more than one kind of instrument. The deciding factor is the predominant or ordinary purpose or use. It is not enough to show that the article can be put to other uses also. It is its general or predominant user which determines the category in which an article will fall. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court it is clear that seat covers will also be 'accessories' and since powers of revision have been utilised to bring the turnover in respect of these seat covers to tax, it cannot be said that revisional powers have been wrongly utilised by the Commissioner.
2. This conclusion would ordinarily dispose of each of these writ petitions. However, in Writ Petitions Nos. 4570 and 4659 of 1975, it is contended by the learned Advocate for the petitioner in each of these petitions that over and above powers exercisable under Section 20, being revisional powers, the officer concerned has utilised powers under Section 14(4) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act. He contends that under Section 14(4), inter alia, if the dealer has been assessed at a rate lower than the correct rate, then under Clause (c), the officer concerned can assess at the correct rate the turnover that has been assessed at a lower rate. He contended that, in the instant case, the powers that have been exercised are powers under Section 14(4)(c) and not the power under Section 20. It is obvious that if the case falls under Section 14(4), the orders would be time-barred because under Section 14(4-A) assessment under Section 14(4) has to be made within a period of four years from the expiry of the year of assessment. The year under consideration was the assessment year 1969-70 and the notice for reopening the case was issued on 9th June, 1975. In Writ Petition No. 4659 of 1975, the assessment year is 1970-71 and the notice was issued in June, 1975. It is contended that since the period of 4 years in each of these two cases had expired after the end of the year of assessment under consideration, that is, after the expiry of 1st April, 1974, in Writ Petition No. 4570 of 1975 and 1st April, 1975, so far as Writ Petition No. 4659 of 1975 is concerned, bar of limitation under Section 14(4-A) would apply and, at any rate, orders passed increasing the tax after this notice in these Writ Petitions Nos. 4570 and 4659 of 1975 should be held to be time-barred.
3. In view of the decision in State of A.P. v. Sri Rama L.S. Rice Mill  35 S.T.C. 601, it is obvious that, in the instant case, the reopening would fall under Section 14(4) because at the time when the matter was originally before the Sales Tax Officer, he had not considered whether the seat covers were accessories or not and that question was not agitated before him. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the decision of the Sales Tax Officer was wrong which needed revision or which can be revised under Section 20 of the A.P. General Sales Tax Act. The cases would therefore fairly and squarely fall under Section 14(4) and, therefore, the bar of limitation under Section 14(4-A) would clearly apply to Writ Petitions Nos. 4570 and 4659 of 1975 and they are, therefore, allowed with costs in each of the two cases. The other two matters, Writ Petitions Nos. 4689 and 4693 of 1975, are dismissed with costs.