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Government of Andhra Pradesh and anr. Vs. Bactchala Balaiah - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
Overruled ByUnion of India and Ors. v. Manager, M/s. Jain and Associates (2001)3SCC277
SubjectArbitration;Limitation
CourtAndhra Pradesh High Court
Decided On
Case NumberCivil Rev. Petn. No. 2415 of 1983 and C.M.A. No. 764 of 1984
Judge
Reported inAIR1985AP52
ActsLimitation Act, 1963 - Sections 5; Arbitration Act, 1940 - Sections 17; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908 - Order 9, Rule 13
AppellantGovernment of Andhra Pradesh and anr.
RespondentBactchala Balaiah
Advocates:V. Lakshmi Devi, Govt. Pleader
Excerpt:
limitation - notice - section 5 of limitation act, 1963, section 17 of arbitration act, 1940 and order 9 rule 13 of code of civil procedure, 1908 - recovery suit filed by respondents against appellant - subordinate judge decreed suit in favour of respondents ex parte - appellant filed appeal before high court for setting aside ex parte decree and for condonation of delay - court observed impugned decree did not suffer from any infirmity - notice of filing of award given to appellants - government pleader put in appearance on their behalf and took several adjournments for filing written statement - provisions of order 9 rule 13 not applicable to decree passed under section 17 - revision dismissed accordingly. - maximssections 2(xv) & 3(1) & (3): [v.v.s. rao, n.v. ramana & p.s. narayana,.....punnayya, j. 1. the revision and the c.m.a. arise out of the proceedings of original suit no. 124 of 1982. the brief facts leading to the revision and the c.m.a. are as follows: the plaintiff in the suit was a contractor. he entered into an agreement with defendants 1 and 2 who represent the state of andhra pradesh to do earth work over the embankment of godavari south canal beyond lower manair dam. his tender was accepted and he completed the work as per the agreement. however, disputes arose between him and the defendants regarding the payment of the amounts for the work done by him. both parties appointed defendants 3 to 5 as arbitrators to resolve the dispute. after due enquiry, defendants 3 to 5 passed an award on 15-8-1982 in favour of the contractor-plaintiff. copies of the award.....
Judgment:
Punnayya, J.

1. The Revision and the C.M.A. arise out of the proceedings of Original Suit No. 124 of 1982. The brief facts leading to the revision and the C.M.A. are as follows: The plaintiff in the suit was a contractor. He entered into an agreement with defendants 1 and 2 who represent the State of Andhra Pradesh to do earth work over the embankment of Godavari South canal beyond lower Manair Dam. His tender was accepted and he completed the work as per the agreement. However, disputes arose between him and the defendants regarding the payment of the amounts for the work done by him. Both parties appointed defendants 3 to 5 as arbitrators to resolve the dispute. After due enquiry, defendants 3 to 5 passed an award on 15-8-1982 in favour of the contractor-plaintiff. Copies of the award were communicated to defendants 1 and 2 . But the Government did not pay the amount as per the award and hence the contract filed the suit in the Subordinate Judge's Court, Ongole, to make the award a rule of Court. Defendants 1 and 2 did not file any petition to set aside the award in the Court under S. 30, Arbitration Act. R.P.Notices were taken on the defendants 1 to 5 on 29-10-1982. Notices were served personally on defendants 1 to 5 . The Government Pleader filed his memo of appearance on 29-10-1982. Notices were served personally on defendants 1 to 5 . The Government Pleader filed his memo of appearance on 29-10-1982. The suit was adjourned to 27-11-1982 for written statement. From that day it was adjourned from time to time for written statement till 27-1-1983. Though several adjournments were granted in between 27-11-1982 and 27-1-1983, written statement was not filed by the defendants. On 27-1-1983 the Government pleader requested the Court for further time for filing written statement. But the learned Subordinate Judge refused to grant further adjournment and set the defendants ex parte. The suit was adjourned to 28-1-1983 for the plaintiff's evidence. On 28-1-1983 the plaintiff gave evidence as P.W.1 and the award was marked as Ex.A-1. The learned Subordinate Judge on the basis of the evidence of P.W.1 and Ex.A-1 decreed the suit in the terms of the award. No petition was filed for setting aside the award under S. 30. Arbitration Act. Hence the learned Subordinate Judge decreed the suit in terms of the award with costs as prayed for making the award the rule of the Court. The learned Subordinate Judge also passed orders stating that there shall be no order for the payment of subsequent interest.

2. Defendants 1 and 2 in the suit filed I.A. No. 539 of 1983 under O.9 R.13.C.P.C. for setting aside the ex parte decree passed in O.S.No.214 of 1982 with a petition. I.A.No.538 of 1983 for condonation of delay of 9 days in presenting I.A.539 of 1983. As to why the delay in filing I.A.No.539 of 1983 was caused, the petitioners in I.A.No.538 of 1983 explained that they were informed of the ex parte decree dated 28-1-1983 by the Government Pleader, Ongole, as per his letter dated 31-1-1983 and hence they could not get instructions from the Government of Andhra Pradesh even up to 28-2-1983 and they could not file the petition I.A.No.539 of 1983 under O.9.R.13.C.P.C., within the prescribed time of 30 days and left with no other remedy they filed the petition I.A.No.538 of 1983 under S. 5. Limitation Act, seeking for the condonation of delay, which according to them, was due to purely administrative reasons. This petition was opposed by the plaintiff.

3. The plaintiff contends that the Government pleader was aware of the proceedings in the suit, O.S.No.214 of 1982 and he took several adjournments for filing written statement ever since 27-11-1982 till 28-1-1983 when finally the suit was decreed in the absence of the defendants. He also contends that the Government can have no better privilege than any other party and they did not explain every day's delay for these 9 days and their contention that they could not file the petition in time for want of instructions from the Government does not constitute a sufficient cause warranting condonation of delay. He also contends that the defendants also did not file O.P.under S. 30, Arbitration Act, as it would be futile. The plaintiff, therefore, contends that it is for this reason that the defendants remained ex parte in the suit and hence the petition. I.A.No. 538 of 1983 was intended only to avoid payments due under the award now made a rule of the Court.

4. The learned Subordinate Judge did not accept the defendant's explanation as to why the delay has been caused as the letter of the Government Pleader was not placed before the Court and it is not known whether the defendants or the Chief Engineer addressed the Government for necessary instructions. In support of his conclusion the learned Subordinate Judge relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Ramlal v. Rewa Coal Fields Ltd., : [1962]2SCR762 and also the two decisions of this Court in R.D.O.v. T. Laxminarayanayar, : AIR1975AP109 and Spl.Dy Collector v.Nawath T Yar Jung. : AIR1973AP43 . The learned Subordinate Judge also took into consideration the ultimate result of the suit, which will be decreed against the defendants, as no petition was filed for setting aside the award within the period of limitation as provided under S. 30 Arbitration Act, and the award would be ultimately made as a rule of Court under S. 17. Arbitration Act, even if the delay is condoned and the ex parte decree is set aside and if the defendants are given an opportunity to contest the suit and the learned Subordinate Judge, therefore, took the view that no useful purpose would be served even if the delay is condoned. So holding he dismissed the petition I.A.No.538 of 1983 and consequently he dismissed I.A.No.539 of 1983 which was filed for setting aside the ex parte decree under O.9 R.13.C.P.C. The learned Subordinate Judge also decreed the suit making the award rule of Court. Aggrieved with the orders in I.A.No.538 of 1982 and I.A.No.539/1983. C.R.P.No.2415 of 1983 and C.M.A.No.764 of 1983 respectively are filed. Even against the decree in O.S.No.214 of 1982 a revision is filed but it is unnumbered.

5. Kum V. Lakshmi Devi, the learned Government Pleader, contends that the learned Subordinate Judge did not appreciate the explanation offered by the Government for the condonation of the delay of nine days in its proper perspective.

6. As against this contention Sri N.V.B.Shankara Rao, the learned counsel for the respondent plaintiff submits that the learned Subordinate Judge has rightly dismissed I.A.No.538 of 1983 as the explanation offered by the defendants is unsatisfactory and consequently has rightly dismissed I.A.No.539 of 1983 which filed for setting aside the ex parte decree.

7. This Court took the view that the inter-departmental correspondence or consultation or administrative reasons will not constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay. The explanation offered by the Government comes under inter-departmental correspondence. Hence, it does not constitute sufficient ground or cause for the condonation of delay. Vide Sol. Dy. Collector v. Nawab T. Yar Jung. : AIR1973AP43 . Revenue Divisional Officer v T. Lakshminarayana, : AIR1975AP109 . S.M.Hadi Jaffery v. Spl. Dy.Collector.(1975)2 Andh WR 28 and R. Janakirama Raju v. State of A.P., (1978) 2 Andh WR (HC)7 The learned Subordinate Judge, therefore, was justified in not accepting the explanation offered by the Government for condonation of delay.

8. The learned Government Pleader contends that the lower Court has committed illegality in dismissing the I.A.No.539 of 1983 holding that no useful purpose would be served even if the delay is condoned, as ultimately the suit has to be decreed since no petition is filed under S. 30. Arbitration Act, within 30 days from the date of notice the learned Subordinate Judge has no jurisdiction to consider the ultimate result of the suit, while disposing of these two petitions.

9. As against this contention Sri Shankaras Rao the learned counsel for the respondent plaintiff contends that the provisions of O.9,R.13.C.P.C., are not applicable to the proceedings under Arbitration Act much less to an ex parte decree passed by the learned Subordinate Judge.

10. In this case, the defendants have deliberately chosen to be absent and have chosen not to file written statement even after receiving notice of filing of the award, though several adjournments were taken by the learned Government Pleader for filing the same.

11. We think the contention of Sri. Shankararao that the provisions of O.9, R.13, C.P.C., are not applicable to the ex parte decree passed by the learned Subordinate Judge in terms of the award filed by the arbitrators, when the defendants did not choose to file written statements in spite of sufficient time being given, is well founded.

12. It admits of no doubt that if the petition under S. 5, Limitation Act, is allowed, then the petition, I.A.No.539 of 1983 will have to be disposed of no merits and in such a case, the Court has to examine the question whether decree passed on an award filed by the arbitrators (sic).

13. When an award is passed in the Court, what the aggrieved party has to do is enunciated by S. 30 gives an opportunity to the aggrieved party to file an application under S. 30 for setting aside the award within 30 days from the date of service of the notice of filing of the award in the Court on the grounds mentioned therein and no appeal against such an order lies under S. 30 of the Act. If such a petition is not filed under S. 30, the Court has to pass a decree under S. 17 of the Act making the award the rule of the Court, irrespective of the fact whether the defendants do appear or do not appear and contest. S. 17 makes it mandatory on the part of the Court to pass judgment and decree in terms of the award as such a decree can be pronounced even if the parties, cannot be treated as ex parte, especially when a petition under S. 30 of the Act for setting aside the award was not filed within 30 days from the date of service of the notice of filing of the award in the Court. It is not an ex parte decree, the question of setting aside such a decree under O.9, R.13 does not arise. Hence the petition filed under O.9, R.13, C.P.C., for setting aside the ex parte decree which was passed under S. 17, Arbitration Act, is not maintainable. This legal position is made clear by the several High Courts and the Supreme Court.

In Ganeshmal v. S. Kesoram Cotton Mills, : AIR1952Cal10 this question was examined by Bachawat, J. thoroughly with reference to the case law on this aspect. In that case there is no service of notice of filing of the award in the Court on the defendants in the manner prescribed by law. The limitation for applying to set aside the award, therefore, never started to run and the decree was passed before the expiry of the time for applying to set aside the award and without complying with the mandatory provisions of S. 17, Arbitration Act. Under those circumstances the learned Judge observed:

In my judgment in spite of S. 43 of the Arbitration Act and S. 141 of the Code strictly the provision of O.9, R.13 does not apply to proceedings for setting aside of an ex parte decree passed under S. 17. In a suit there is plaintiff and defendant and O.9, R.13 deals with them differently; strictly neither party to an award is a plaintiff or defendant and both parties are entitled to ask the Court to pronounce judgment according to the award. In a suit if the plaintiff does not appear no decree can be passed and if the defendant does not appear the plaintiff must prove his case. Under S. 17 a judgment must be pronounced and a decree must follow, if the conditions of Ss. 14 and 17 are complied with. Such a decree even if pronounced in the absence of the parties cannot be said to be passed as ex parte so as to attract O.9, R.13.......O.9, R.13 enables the Court to set aside an ex parte decree in case where the summons was not duly served but it does not provided or a case where the decree under S. 17, Arbitration Act, is passed without complying with its mandatory provisions and before the expiry of the time for applying to set aside the award. The provisions of O.9, R.13 of the Code cannot be made applicable to the proceedings for setting aside a judgment pronounced under S. 17 of the Arbitration Act. In spite of S. 43, Arbitration Act, such provisions of the Code as are not consistent with the provisions of the Arbitration Act will not apply to the proceedings under the latter Act.

14. For taking this view the learned Judge relied upon the decision in Raghunath Raj Dilsuk Rai v. Bridhi Chan Sri Lal, ILR 3 Pat 839:(AIR 1924 Patna 603) and also Subramaniam v. Vasudevan, : AIR1950Mad488 . After enunciating the proposition of law as above, the learned Judge ultimately held in view of the infirmities from which the decree in that case has suffered as follows:-

I have no doubt, however, that the principles of O.9, R.13 should be followed and the judgment and the decree passed under S. 17 should be set aside where such decree was passed without duly giving the notice of the filing of the award or without allowing the time for applying to set aside the award to expire. In both cases the decree is irregularly passed and this Court sitting in revision will set aside such decree if passed by the Muffassil Court. In my judgment, if these are good grounds for revision they are equally good grounds for setting aside the ex parte decree on a summary application. It is settled law that the Court has the inherent power and duty to correct injustice and to set aside a judgment and order passed ex parte without notice to the party................................. To obtain a judgment irregularly is a wrongful act and the party applying is entitled ex debito justitiae to set is aside. The Court has also inherent power to recall the previous order or decree if it is without jurisdiction. The Court has therefore power to set aside such judgment and decree.'

15. Ad careful reading of the above ruling makes it clear that Bachawat, J. held in unambiguous terms that the principles of O.9, R.13 will not be applicable to a proceeding for setting aside the judgment pronounced under S. 17, Arbitration Act, in spite of S. 43, Arbitration Act, and S. 141, C.P.C. The learned Judge gave cogent reasons in support of his view. They are that in a civil suit there is plaintiff and defendant. According to the provisions of C.P.C., if the plaintiff does not appear, the suit will be dismissed and no decree can be passed and if the defendant does not appear then the plaintiff will prove his case and an ex parte decree will be passed. Such an ex parte decree can be set aside under O.9R.13 if the defendant satisfies the Court that the summons was not duly served or that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing. But in a suit, which was filed for making the award a rule of the Court, neither party to the award is plaintiff or defendant and both parties are entitled to ask the Court to pronounce judgment according to the award. Under S. 17 of the Act judgment must be pronounced and a decree must follow if the conditions of Ss. 14 and 17 are complied with. Such a decree even if pronounced in the absence of the parties cannot be said to be passed ex parte. When the decree cannot be said to be ex parte the question of applying the provisions of O.9. R.13 for setting aside the ex parte decree does not arise.

16. But the learned Judge had taken into consideration the fact that the Court passed the decree under S. 17, Arbitration Act. Without duly giving the notice of the filing of the award or without allowing the time for applying to set aside the award to expire. The learned Judge, therefore, felt that the decree was irregularly passed and the Court has no power or jurisdiction to pass such a decree contrary to the mandatory provisions of S. 17. Hence the learned Judge felt that the principles of O.9, R.13 should be applied for setting aside the decree in exercised of the Court's revisional jurisdiction.

17. When the learned Judge declares that the principle of O.9 R.13 should be followed for setting aside the decree passed under S. 17. Arbitration Act. If such a decree was passed without giving notice of the filing of the award or without allowing time prescribed under Art. 119(b). Limitation Act. For setting aside the award to expire, it should not be understood that the learned Judge has stated that the provisions of O.9.R.13. are applicable to the proceedings for setting aside the ex parte decree passed under S. 17. Arbitration Act. There is a marked difference between the two expressions, namely, the principles of O.9.R.13. and the provisions of O.9 R.13. The principles for the application of the provisions of O.9.R.13 are (1) non-service of summons that disabled the defendant and (2) sufficient cause that prevented the defendant from appearing in the Court is bound to apply the provisions of O.9.R.13 for setting aside the ex parte decree. The same principles namely the non-service of notice of the filing of the award in the Court will be applicable for setting aside the decree passed under S. 17 of the Act. It is, therefore, clear that the Court can set aside the decree was passed before the expiry of the time allowed by Art.119(b) for setting aside the award and this the Court can do in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction invoking the inherent powers conferred by S. 151. C.P.C. though the provision of O.9.R.13 cannot be invoked for setting aside such a decree.

18. In Soorajmull v. Golden Fibre & Products. : AIR1969Cal381 S.C. Ghose, J., followed the decision in Ganeshmal v. Kesoram Cotton Mills : AIR1952Cal10 (supra) and held unequivocally that the provisions of O.9.R.13. C.P.C., do not apply to the ex parte decree passed under S. 17, Arbitration Act. The learned Judge observed that O.9 deals with suits and R.13 deals with setting aside of ex parte decree passed in a suit. In an award case, both the plaintiff and the defendant are entitled to ask the Court to pronounce judgment in terms of the award. S. 17 makes it mandatory on the part of the Court to pass a judgment and decree in terms of the award in the circumstances specified in the said section. Under S. 17 a decree may be pronounced in the absence of parties even then it cannot be said that the decree has been passed ex parte.

19. The Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Alvel Sales v. Dujadwala Industires. : AIR1978Mad295 held that the decree passed by the Court under S. 17, Arbitration Act. In the absence of defendant is not an ex parte decree at all and it is a decree which the Court is bound to pass under S. 17, Arbitration Act. Which appears to be rather mandatory in scope. The Bench observed that 'It, therefore, appears to us that there is no scope for the contention that this is a case in which an ex parte decree ought to be set aside. Even otherwise, the respondent had lost its rights to seek for the setting aside the award, as under the Limitation Act, the period had expired.

20. In Rajeswar Pd.v. Ambika Pd. : AIR1956Pat28 the Division Bench of the Patna High Court took the same view by holding that where an award is given by the arbitrators on a reference under S. 21. Arbitration Act. By all the parties concerned including the minor through his natural guardian, the Court under S. 17. Arbitration Act. Must pass a decree in terms of that award and no appeal lies from such a decree except on ground stated in that Section. Where a minor has any grievance against such a decree he can file an objection under S. 30. Arbitration Act. Or he may take other proper steps. Where, However, the father of the minor filed an objection under S. 30 only on his own behalf, although he represented the minor also the contention that the minor's application should be considered to be one under S. 30 so as to give him a right of appeal under S. 30 was not acceptable. Nor could it be said that the decree passed on award was an ex parte decree within the meaning of O.9.R.13. Civil P.C. against the minor. Therefore, an appeal would not lie against an order rejecting the application made on behalf of the minor to set aside the decree under O.9.R.13. because there could be no appeal against the decree passed in terms of the award under S. 17. Arbitration Act.

21. In S.S. Gruhanirman Sanstha v. Sree Ram Construction Co. : AIR1981Bom260 the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held that it is incumbent on the person challenging the award filed by the arbitrators in the Court to make an application under S. 30. Arbitration Act. For setting aside the award within a period of 30 days from the date of the service of the notice of the award as prescribed by Art. 119(b), Limitation Act. In that case it was urged by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants that the arbitrator had exceeded his jurisdiction in awarding the amount in excess of the claim of the respondents in their suit and that the arbitrator had failed to publish the award within the time prescribed by the terms of reference and as such the award is invalid and the application filed under S. 30. Arbitration Act. For setting aside such an invalid award should be allowed even if it was filed beyond the period of limitation as prescribed by S.119(b). Limitation Act. The Bench held that:

'Assuming therefore, that the award in the present case which was made by the arbitrator is invalid on the ground that it was made in excess of the terms of reference and that the arbitrator failed to publish the award within the time fixed by the terms of reference, such a ground would be clearly covered by the words'or is otherwise invalid' in cl.(c).S. 30. Further, the ground being covered by the said clause, the remedy of the party lies in making an application for setting aside the award within the limitation prescribed under Art.119 Limitation Act. There is, therefore, no scope for the argument that the Court can act suo motu and set aside the award on the ground of invalidity.'

22. From this decision it is clear that the relevant Article under the Limitation Act is Art.119(b) which prescribed a period of limitation 30 days for an application to be filed under S. 30 to set aside an award or to get an award remitted for consideration and the starting point of the limitation was the date of service of the notice of filing of the award. It is, therefore, clear that the parties have to apply within 30 days from the date of service of notice of filing of the award for setting aside the award or for getting the award remitted for reconsideration.

23. The learned Judges took the view that notice was served on the appellants. But the petition for setting aside the award being filed on June 14, 1978 it was clearly barred by limitation. Then the appellants raised the contention that it was a case for condonation of delay as the administrator, who was in charge of the affairs of the society had no knowledge of the receipt of the notice of the filing of award.

Since Kanekar was not examined the appellants' contention was not accepted by the leaned Judges. The learned Judges, therefore, came to the conclusion that the appellants were negligent and were not interested in getting the award set aside.

24. The Supreme Court in Madan Lal v. Sunder Lal, : [1967]3SCR147 held that if a party wants an award to be set aside on any of the grounds mentioned in S. 30 it must apply within 30 days of the date of service of notice of filing of the award as provided in Art. 158, Limitation Act (old). If no such application is made the award cannot be set aside on any of the grounds specified in S. 30 of the Act. It may be conceded that there is no special form prescribed for making such an application and in an appropriate case an objection to an award in the nature of a written statement may be treated as such an application, if it is filed within the period of limitation. But if an objection like this has been filed after the period of limitation it cannot be treated as an application to set aside the award, for it is so treated it will be barred by limitation.

25. The Supreme Court of course did not deal with the question whether the provisions of O.9 R.13 C.P.C. apply to the decree passed under S. 17 of the Act. But the Supreme Court clearly laid down that the decree of the Court making the award a rule of the Court becomes final when an application is not made on any of the grounds mentioned in S. 30. Arbitration Act. Within 30 days of the date of service of notice of filing of the award as provided in Art. 119(b),Limitation Act. And the above decisions of the Madras High Court as well as the Calcutta and Patna High Courts clearly laid down that the provisions of O.9R.13 C.P.C., are not applicable to the decree passed under S. 17, Arbitration Act.

26. But the learned Government Pleader relied upon a judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court inRam Chander v. Jamna Shankar, . The learned Judge held in para 17:

'.................I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed in : AIR1952Cal10 that the principles of O.9 R.13 should be followed and the judgment and the decree passed under S. 17 should be set aside on a summary application where such decree was passed without duly giving the notice of the filing of the award or without allowing the time for applying to set aside the award to expire. The Court has inherent power and duty to correct injustice and to set aside a judgment and order passed ex parte without notice to the interested parties.'

27. In the case before the learned Judge, there was no notice of filing of the award. Hence the defendant had no opportunity of filing objections. Hence the learned Judge felt that the decree is illegal and contrary to the mandatory provisions of Ss. 14 and 17 of the Act and set aside the ex parte decree passed under S. 17 of the Act in exercise of revisional jurisdiction following the above cited decision of the Calcutta High Court. The learned Judge of the Rajasthan High Court did not say that the provisions of O.9 R.13 apply to the proceedings for setting aside an ex parte decree passed under S. 17. he merely stated 'however the principles of O.9 R.13. Civil P.C., should be followed in such cases and the judgment and the decree passed under S. 17 should be set aside on a summary application where such decree was passed without duly giving the notice of the filing of the award or without allowing the time for applying to set aside the award to expire. This decision, therefore, does not render any assistance to the contention of the learned Government Pleader.

28. The learned Judge based his view on the fact that the notice of the filing of the award was not given. But in the case on hand the impugned decree had not suffered from any infirmity since the notice of the filing of the award was given to the defendants and the learned Government Pleader put in appearance on their behalf and took several adjournments for filing written statement. Hence the case before us is not the one where it can be said that notice of the filing of award was not served on the parties or the defendants. We, therefore, hold that the decisions of the Rajasthan High Court will not apply to the case on hand.

29. Having regard to the reasons given above, we have no hesitation to hold that the provisions of O.9 R.13 C.P.C. will not apply to the decree passed under S. 17, Arbitration Act, in terms of the award filed in the Court by the arbitrators. We are not inclined to express any view in these proceedings whether the decree passed under S. 17, Arbitration Act, is invalid and should be set aside, as that is the subject-matter of an unnumbered revision.

30. In result, the revision as well as the C.M.A. are dismissed but without costs.

31. The learned Government Pleader made an oral application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. We do not consider that the case involves any substantial question of law of general importance to be decided by the Supreme Court. Oral application is accordingly refused.

32. Revision dismissed.


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