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K. Veeraswamy Deceased by L.R.K.B. Narasappa, Receiver to the Estate of Late K. Veeraswamy, Kurnool Vs. Commissioner of Income-tax, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectDirect Taxation
CourtAndhra Pradesh High Court
Decided On
Case NumberIncome Tax Civil Misc. Petn. No. 5934 of 1959
Judge
Reported inAIR1960AP422
ActsIncome-tax Act, 1922 - Sections 66; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908 - Order 3, Rule 4
AppellantK. Veeraswamy Deceased by L.R.K.B. Narasappa, Receiver to the Estate of Late K. Veeraswamy, Kurnool
RespondentCommissioner of Income-tax, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad
Appellant AdvocateAlladi Kuppuswamy, Adv.
Respondent AdvocateC. Kondaiah, Standing Counsel for Income-tax Department
Excerpt:
.....- application not signed by assesse - defect pointed out by tribunal - subsequent application filed - tribunal dismissed application as being time barred - petition before high court - held, it is not necessary that application should be signed by assesse and advocate simultaneously - law requires the signature of either of them - tribunal to treat application as being made within time and to dispose it according to law. - all india services act, 1951.sections 8 & 11 & a.p. buildings (lease, rent and eviction) control rules, 1961, rule 5: [v.v.s. rao, g. yethirajulu & g. bhavani prasad, jj] refusal by landlord to receive rent - deposit of rent in court - held, a tenant has the option to take recourse to section 8 in case of refusal or evasion by landlord to receive rent and if..........of the order.this abdication was not signed by the asses-see but was signed by the advocate who filed vakalat on behalf of the assessee in the rectification droceedins. the tribunal drew the attention of the assessee to the alleged defect, in the application not being signed by an advocate properly authorised, and finally the assessee presented another anolication on 6th may 1958 duly signed by him. the tribunal held that the latter application was filed 37 days beyond the period of 60 davs provided by section 66(1) of the act.it was contended before the tribunal that as the advocate had filed the vakalat in the rectlfication proceeding, it should be taken that he had an authority to sign the application for reference also. the tribunal negatived this contention holding that the.....
Judgment:

Satyanarayana Raju, J.

1. This is an application by the assessee under Section 66'3) of the Income Tax Act questioning the correctness of the order of the Appellate Tribunal rejecting an application under Section 66(11 of the Act, on the ground that it was barred by limitation.

2. The order of the Tribunal is the appeal is dated 11th January 1958 and it was received by the assessee on the 31st January 1958. An Advocate of this Court filed an application before the Tribunal for rectification of the order on the ground that it contained some mistake. He sought the rectification in his favour but eventually on the llth March 1958 a rectification was made by the Tribunal which was in fact against the assessee. Thereafter on the 31st March 1958 an application was presented on behalf of the assessee requiring the Tribunal to refer to the High Court certain questions of law as arising out of the order.

This abdication was not signed by the asses-see but was signed by the Advocate who filed Vakalat on behalf of the assessee in the rectification Droceedins. The Tribunal drew the attention of the assessee to the alleged defect, in the application not being signed by an Advocate properly authorised, and finally the assessee presented another anolication on 6th May 1958 duly signed by him. The Tribunal held that the latter application was filed 37 days beyond the period of 60 davs provided by Section 66(1) of the Act.

It was contended before the Tribunal that as the Advocate had filed the vakalat in the rectlfication proceeding, it should be taken that he had an authority to sign the application for reference also. The Tribunal negatived this contention holding that the vakalat filed by the Advocate did not contain the necessary authority to sign the application,

3. It has been held by a Division Bench ot the Madras High Court consisting of Satyanara-yana Rao and Rajagopalan JJ. in Subramanian Chettiar v. Commr. of Income Tax, : [1953]24ITR89(Mad) that it was not necessary that an appication under Section 66(1) should be signed both v the assessee as well as the Advocate and that all that the law requires is that there must be the signature of either of the assessee or his authorised representative.

4. The principle of this decision' was followed by a Division Bench of this High Court consisting of Subba Rao C.J. and Jaganmohan Reddy, J. in Satyanarayana Murthi v. Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, AIR 1958 Andh Pra 143.

5. This view has not been accepted by some of the other High Courts, but we are bound by the decision of the Madras High Court and the decision of this Court. So far as this point is concerned, therefore, there is no difficulty.

6. The question, however, raised by the counsel for the Department is that the vakalat filed by the Advocate was not in the original appeal but in the rectification proceeding and that this would not therefore enable the Advocate to sign the application under Section 66(1) of the Act. The material part of the vakalat fifed by the Advocate, in the proceeding for rectification reads:

'I, petitioner in the above petition, do hereby appoint and retain ..... Advocate of the High Court to appear for me in the above petition, and to conduct and prosecute (or defend) the same and all proceedings that may be taken in respect of any application connected with the same or any decree or order passed therein.' The contents of the vakalat-Form are very comprehensive, The asses see gave authority there-under to the Advocate to appear not only in the rectification proceeding but 'in all proceedings connected with the same or any order passed therein.' The application for reference under Section 66(1) cannot be said to. be unconnected with the application for rectification. Both arise out of the same proceedings and on the language of the vakalat form, we must hold that it would comprehend the application, under Section 66(1) also.

7. Having regard to the construction whichwe have placed on the terms of the Vakalat, wehold that the order of the Appellate Tribunal isunsustainable. The Appellate Tribunal will treatsthe application as made within time as requiredunder Section 66(1) and dispose it of in accordancewith law. We make no order as to the costs.


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