P. Chandra Reddy, C.J.
1. The question that poses itself here is whether parched rice (atukulu) is comprised in the word 'rice' in S-95 entry 6 of Schedule III of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act 1957.
2. The petitioner is a dealer in paddy and parched rice at Warangal. He claimed exemption on the sale of parched rice manufactured out of the paddy which he purchased, by reason of the Explanation read with Schedule III, items 5 and 6. That Explanation reads :
Where a tax has been levied in respect of purchase of paddy under item 5 any subsequent purchase of rice converted from such paddy is not liable to tax under item 6.
3. The contention of the petitioner which he unsuccessfully urged before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal and repeated before us is that as he paid purchase tax on the paddy, the parched rice prepared out of the same paddy could not be subjected to tax once again.
4. In support of this argument, reliance is placed by Sri Veerabhadrayya, learned counsel for the petitioner, on Kapildeoram v. J. K. Das A.I.R. 1954 Assam 170 which contains the proposition that 'chira' and 'muri' which are 'forms of rice' are included in the expression 'all cereals' occurring in the relevant statute. Our attention was also drawn to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Tttngabhadra Industries v. Commercial Tax Officer A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 412 which decided that hydrogenated groundnut oil continued to be groundnut oil for purposes of Rules 5(1) (k) and 18(2) of the Madras General Sales Tax (Turnover and Assessment) Rules, 1939, notwithstanding that such oil did not possess the characteristic colour, taste or odour etc. of the raw groundnut oil.
5. We do not think that the petitioner can derive much assistance from either of the two cases. In the first of the cases, the point for determination before the Assam High Court was whether the word 'cereal' comprehended 'chira' and 'muri''. The view taken by the learned Judges in that case was that notwithstanding the transformation which the rice had undergone, since the word 'cereal' was used in a broad and comprehensive sense in which it would include readily edible food which had been prepared by merely conditioning a cereal in its original state, both 'chira' and 'muri' would be covered by the word 'cereal' as they retained the quality of the cereal whose original state had ceased to exist. But we are not concerned with the interpretation of the word 'cereal' here. One of the meanings of the word 'cereal' as given in the Chambers's (Twentieth Century) Dictionary is 'a food prepared from such grain, especially a breakfast food easily got ready.' The word 'rice' cannot have such a wide connotation as 'cereal'. The Legislature here has advisedly used the expression 'paddy and rice'. It has not said 'paddy and/or all products of paddy'. Therefore, it is unnecessary for us to consider whether the principle embodied in the cited case is correct, since this ruling does not furnish any analogy here.
6. The pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court also is not helpful to the petitioner, since their Lordships have laid down that hydrogenated groundnut oil and groundnut oil could be put to the same uses and that the hydrogenated groundnut oil continues to be groundnut oil in spite of the processing employed for the purpose of rendering the oil more stable to improve its keeping qualities for those who desire to consume groundnut oil.
7. The position is different here. It cannot be postulated that rice (biyyamu) and parched rice (atukulu) are put to the same use. Rice (biyyamu) is consumed only after cooking, whereas parched rice (atukulu) is edible and it can be consumed without its being cooked. The characteristics of both are also different. Rice and parched rice mean two different things. In common parlance, the expression 'parched rice' is not used to mean rice (biyyamu). As pointed out by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ramavatar Budhaiprasad v. Assistant Sales Tax, Officer  12 S.T.C. 286 such words should be construed as understood in common parlance. These expressions being in use everyday, they must be interpreted in popular sense, meaning 'that sense which people conversant with the subject-matter with which the statute is dealing would attribute to it'. If a person goes to market and asks for rice, he would not be supplied with parched rice. These expressions are used to denote two different things. Their uses are also different. There is abundant authority for this opinion of ours.
8. In Kayani & Co. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax A.I.R. 1953 Hyd. 252, it was inter alia held by the erstwhile Hyderabad High Court that rice in item No. 1 of the exempted articles in Schedule I of the Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act (XIV of 1950) dealing with cereals could not be interpreted as meaning cooked rice. To a similar effect is the ruling of the same Court in Ganapathy Iyer and Anr. v. Hyderabad State A.I.R. 1954 Hyd. 94. In Kosuri Subba Raju v. State of Andhra  7 S.T.C. 479 a Divisional Bench of the Andhra High Court consisting of Subba Rao, C.J., and Viswanatha Sastry, J., decided that nawar tape (material woven in bands and used as mat for. cots) could not be regarded as cloth within the definition of 'cloth' under Section 5(iii) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939. The decision in Pithapuram. Taluk Tobacco, Cigars and Soda Merchants' Union v. State of Andhra Pradesh  9 S.T.C. 723 accords with the doctrine of the above cases. The principle embodied in the last cited case is that country tobacco which was subject to levy of sales tax at a single purchase point did not include cigars and cheroots made out of it.
9. In our judgment, parched rice is not the same thing as rice and, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to invoke the Explanation read with Schedule III, item 6, annexed to the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957.
10. In the result, the order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal is confirmed and the revision case is dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee is fixed at Rs. 75.