The petitioner was assessed to income-tax for the assessment year 1956-57 on the profits accruing on the sale of two patlas of gold. Against the assessment order the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that the gold had been treated by the petitioner as stock-in-trade and consequently the profits accruing from the sale of the gold must be regarded as revenue income liable to tax. In this connection he referred to the income-tax assessment for the earlier assessment year 1947-48, which had been upheld by the Income-tax Appellate tribunal by its order dated April 3, 1957. The petitioner then applied in revision under section 33A(2) to the Commissioner of Income-tax against the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The revision application was dismissed on July 12, 1960. By this petition for certiorari the petitioner challenges that order.
The first contention of the petitioner is that the proceeding before the Commissioner being quasi-judicial he should have been afforded an opportunity of being heard before the revision application was disposed of. There is no doubt that when the Commissioner considers a revision application and makes an order thereon he exercises quasi-judicial jurisdiction. But, in my opinion, there is no substance in the grievance of the petitioner that he was not heard by the Commissioner. It was the petitioner who field the revision application, and it was open to him to file along with the revision application, all the material upon which he relied. It may have been open to him to file further material before the Commissioner at any stage before the revision application was disposed of. But it was not incumbent upon the Commissioner in case he found that the material produced by the petitioner was inadequate for making out the case of the petitioner that he should inform the petitioner and give him an opportunity to produce further material in support of his case. Where the Commissioner intend to rely upon material which was detrimental to the case of the petitioner he was bound to put that material to the petitioner. But there is nothing in the instant case to show that such material was relied upon by the Commissioner. The Commissioner relied upon the order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, but that order had also been considered by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the petitioner had a perfectly good opportunity of criticising that order in the revision application filed by him. There was no new material before the Commissioner adverse to the case set up by the petitioner upon which reliance was placed by the Commissioner. The petitioner says that the circumstance that the order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was the subject of a reference application in this court and that this court had on that application called for a statement of the case from the Tribunal was material which he should have been allowed to produce before the Commissioner. It was open to the petitioner to produce that material before the Commissioner, but it was not necessary for the Commissioner to appoint any date for that purpose. The petitioner has also been unable to refer me to any authority in support of the proposition that in a quasi-judicial proceeding there is a right in the parties to be heard orally. On the contrary, this court has laid down in V. C. Maheshwari v. State of U. P. that no right of personal hearing can be claimed by a party in a quasi-judicial proceeding. The first contention of the petitioner must, therefore, be rejected.
The second contention of the petitioner is that the Commissioner should have held that the taxable income must be determined by reference to the market value of the gold patlas on the date of the partial partition of the Hindu undivided family and it is said that this aspect of the case has been disregarded. Consequently, the petitioner urges, the order suffers from manifest illegality. There is nothing to show that this contention was specifically raised before the Commissioner. Unless the Contention has been pressed before the Commissioner, it cannot be said that he has committed a manifest error of law. In paragraph 20 of the affidavit accompanying the petition a complaint has been made by the petitioner that this aspect of the case has not been considered by the Commissioner but there is no averment that the contention was specifically raised before the Commissioner.
In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed. There is, however, no order as to costs.