Jagnmohan Reddi, J.
1. This petition is for the restitution of the amount of pension paid to the respondents as a consequence of the order of stay made by the High Court of Madras in C.M.P. No. 5539 of 1953, dated 23 June 1953.
2. The facts of the case may briefly be stated. The respondents were in receipt of pension of Rs. 100 each under the Pensions Act from out of the amount of pension payable to the petitioner who was the pension-holder. It was represented to the Government that the respondents were in impecunious circumstances and consequently out of the amount of pension payable to the applicant, they were entitled to certain sums which contention was accepted by the Government and the aforesaid sums were ordered to be paid as per orders of the Government dated 30 January 1951. Subsequently, the applicant brought it to the notice of the Government that the respondents were in affluent circumstances, had landed property and therefore were not entitled to any payment of pension. An enquiry was conducted and there were appeals from the orders of the Collector and finally the Government by its order dated 6 May 1953 directed that the respondents are not entitled to the payment of pension and in this view they cancelled their prior order dated 30 January 1951. The respondents thereafter filed writ petitions challenging the jurisdiction of the Government to cancel the previous order on the ground that it was a functus officio. This contention was negatived and when the writ petition came before me, I held that the order dated 6 May 1953 cannot be set aside and was operative. In this view the writ petition was dismissed. Against that decision a writ appeal was preferred and my lord the Chief Justice and Ansari, J., who have heard the appeal, dismissed it confirming my orders.
3. Now this petition, as already stated, is for restitution of the pension amount paid to the respondents together with interest. Learned advocate for the respondents contends inter alia that the payment of the amounts to the respondents was not as a result of the order by this Court, but it was a consequence of suspension of the orders dated 6 May 1953 which enabled him to receive payment under orders dated 30 January 1951 and therefore this Court cannot direct repayment of the amounts. He contends further that the payment of interest cannot be ordered for this reason. I fail to appreciate this argument, because it is immaterial whether as a result of the stay of the operation of the order stopping payment of pension under a previous order, the pension was paid to the respondent, or as a result of an unequivocal order of the Court that pension be paid to the respondents until further orders, or until the disposal of the writ petition ; in either case it is the order of the Court which enabled him to draw the pension which he was otherwise unable to do. If the order prohibiting the payment of pension was ultimately found to be justified, then they cannot be permitted to take advantage of an interim order which ultimately turns out to be wrong. Whether the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure apply or not, as held by their lordships of the Privy Council in Jai Barham v. Kedar Nath Marwari 44 M.L.J. 735 there is an inherent -power in the Court to rectify any mistakes or to restore the status quo ante. The decisions of the Madras High Court have left no doubt that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to writ petitions. Without elaborating this aspect of the matter, it would be sufficient to cite the decision of a Bench of our Court consisting of the former Chief and Srinivasachari, J., in Annam Adinarayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1957 A.L.T. 915. There the provisions of Section 141, Civil Procedure Code, were held to be applicable to writ proceedings. My brother Bimasankaram. J., in an unreported decision (C.M.P. No. 3115 of 1955) dated 29 July 1955 also took the same view. He held that in all cases where the civil jurisdiction of the High Court is invoked under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to Bach proceedings and farther that there la an inherent power in the Court to rectify the consequences occasioned by its own wrong orders or there is power derivable under Section 144, Civil Procedure Code. I have no doubt whatever that under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, as well asunder the inherent powers of the Court, I have power to direct the repayment of the amounts drawn by the respondents. The Court has also power in its inherent jurisdiction as held by another Bench of the Madras High Court in Alagappa Chettiar v. Muthukumara Chettiar I.L.R. 41 Mad. 316 to direct payment of interest on the amounts utilized by the respondents. The amount repayable, therefore, will bear interest at 6 per cent per annum, it being payable on the amounts drawn from the respective dates. The amount together with interest will be paid in two equal instalments of three months each, the first instalment becoming due on 26 November 1959. If the first instalment together with interest is not paid on that date, the applicant will be entitled to execute the decree for the whole amount.