M.A. Ansari, J.
1. This writ petition seeks mandamus against the State of Andhra Pradesh to stop further actions in pursuance of the letter No. 75/SOA/59 of 5 January 1959. It also challenges the constitutionality of part of the rule contained in G.O. No. 1160, Public/(Services), dated 11 May 1948. To appreciate the several arguments urged in support of the writ petition it is necessary to narrate certain facts leading to the petition. The writ petitioner is an association called Andhra Pradesh Non-Gazetted Officers' Association and was formed in 1950. It has as its members about 64,000 non-gazetted officers of the State and the association has been registered under Societies Registration Act, XXI of 1860, on 20 February 1950. A certificate of such registration has been made part of the enclosures to this writ petition. The aforesaid association though formed In 1950 was recognized only in 1954. The recognition was subject to the rules contained in G.O. Mis. No. 1160 of 11 May 1948, whose relevant part has been extracted in the writ petition and may be usefully quoted:
Recognition la accorded fop the purpose of enabling the employees of Government to communicate their needs and grievances to Government and to Government officers and may be withdrawn by the Government if the employees adopt other methods of ventilating those grievances and needs.
Note: For the purpose of this instruction 'other methods' shall include seditious propaganda, expression of disloyal sentiments, publication in the press, engaging or inviting the assistance of of political and other parties for the representation of grivances and the threat of strike.
It appears that there was a dispute between the Government and the non-gazetted officers, when the secretary of the association Issued a press communique, which was published in the Dally News of 6 January 1959. Therein the secretary of the association is stated to have regretted the Chief Minister's not having met the representatives of the organization and his failing to take the employees into confidence before finalizing the decision on the vital issue. 'The secretary is further reported to have stated that the employees had been asked to meet the Chief Secretary, to whom they had presented a detailed memorandum putting forth the minimum demands. Because of the publication the Government has written the letter, which the writ petition challenges as being violative of the right of free speech of the association. Its relevant part reads as follows:-
[Subject.-Public services-Service associations-Violation of conditions of recognition-Explanation called for.
2. It has been noticed that in a, statement issued to service associations, it has been clearly stated vide Rule 6 in G.O. 1160, Public (Services;, dated 11 May 1948 , that if an association ventilates its grievances' in the press, Government may withdraw the recognition given to such association. As the action of your association in publishing the said statement (copy enclosed; in the press is a direct contravention of the rules, you are hereby called upon to show cause why the recognition granted to your association in G.O. Ms. No. 2-193, dated 25 November 1954, should not be withdrawn. Your reply should reach this department within ten days of the receipt of this letter failing which it will be assumed that you have no explanation to offer and Government will take such action as they may deem proper,'
3. The complaint made in the writ petition is that the part of Rule 6 contained in G.O. No. 1160, Public (Services), prohibiting the State employees from ventilating-their grievances through publication in the press is violative of the fundamental rights contained in Article 19(1)(a) and. is not covered by 01.2 to to the aforesaid article. The same complaint is made about Rule 22 of Government Servants' Conduct Rules that directs the employees to be members of an association, which must satisfy the conditions mentioned therein. The latter challenge cannot obviously be adjudicated in this writ petition, because the right claimed by the association should not be confused with those of its members, the association having a different juristic personality. The counsel for the writ petitioner has, therefore, argued that that part of the Government Order which prevents the publication in the press and prohibits the employees' association from thus ventilating the grievances, violates the freedom of speech contained In Article 19(1)(a) and has become legally void under Article 13(1), The notice calling upon the association to show cause why the recognition should not be withdrawn, he urges, is no longer in exercise of legal powers and is violative of fundamental rights of the writ petitioner. The consequences of being members of an association, whose recognition if withdrawn, are also referred to in the writ petition and are far-reaching; for the several members would then become liable to punishments that range from dismissal from services to other less serious forms of punishment enumerated in the relevant rule.
4. Before dealing with the constitutional issue that has been raised, I would briefly summarize the position taken by the State in the counter. The notice is claimed to have been given in exercise of' powers secured to the Government when recognizing the association and the rule prohibiting the publication in press to be justified on the ground of sustaining discipline among the civil servants that have to assist in discharging the executive functions of the Government. The rule is further claimed to be constitutional being reasonably necessary in order to maintain the security, and covered by Clause 2 of Article 39. It follows that the main issue inviting adjudication in this writ petition is how far the prohibition against the public servants concerning ventilation of their grievances in press Is violative of their fundamental rights of free speech and discussion. That right is not absolute; for Clause 2 of Article 19 preserves to the State the authority of framing rules that are reasonably necessary to achieve the several items enumerated in the clause. It follows that when constitutionality of a prohibition against freedom of speech and discussion is raised, its being reasonable also becomes a Justiciable issue. Therefore, the question arising for decision in this petition is how far the Impugned rule is reasonably necessary to secure one of the several heads enumerated in Clause 2. The learned Counsel of the writ petitioner has argued his client's case with learning and ability. He has drawn my attention to passages in several recognized books on constitutional law, as well as to the pronouncements by the Supreme Court of America and of this country wherein the right of free press has been stated and held to be one of the most cherished and closely guarded privileges under democratic Institutions. I refrain, however, from deciding the controversy because another issue of equal importance has arisen in the case, on which I have the misfortune of not agreeing with some of the decisions of other High Courts. It is clear that the right which can be decided in this writ petition must be fundamental right of the writ petitioner, and it is con ceded on behalf of the State that a society registered under the Act, under which the association has been registered, becomes a legal entity. It follows that the fundamental rights, if any, of the writ petitioner would be distinct and different from those of the members of the association. The question therefore that arises is whether the association has any fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a), Now all the rights under Article 19 are conferred on persons, who are the citizens of India, and it is doubtful whether an association can be legally held to be a citizen as the law governing citizenshipstands today. It is clear that no article in Part II of the Constitution can be invoked for the writ petitioner's being treated as citizen. Article 5 evidently covers natural persons. Articles 6 and 7 go with Article 5 and they would not be of help to the petitioner. Article 8 confers right of citizenship on persona residing outside India and would be equally out of place. Under Article 11 Parliament is authorized to enact law and it is conceded that the writ petitioner is authorized to enact law and it is conceded that the writ petitioner is not covered by the enactment. It follows that what are called corporate persons are not citizens according to Part II of the Constitution and therefore the writ petitioner cannot claim the benefit of Article 19. I, have, however, weighty judicial pronouncements against my conclusions. One is in State of Bombay v. Chamarbaugwala : AIR1956Bom1 ), wherein the learned Judges have given the benefit of the article to a corporation subject to its directors and shareholders being citizens of India. But if the corporate personality be different to those of the directors and shareholders, I fail to understand how the latter's being citizens can be treated as relevant. The counsel for the writ petitioner has drawn my attention to the appellate decision' of the Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala : 1SCR874 , wherein the decision of the trial Court has been referred to without any express disapproval, But because of it, it would not be correct to hold that corporate persons are entitled to the benefit of Article 19(1)(a), Another decision contrary to the view, which I entertain, is in M. K. Mills v. State of Rajasthan , where observations by the Supreme Court in earlier cases have been relied upon in support of the view that corporation is entitled to the benefit of those articles in Part III of the Constitution that are reserved for the citizens. The observations of the Supreme Court are applicable only when such persons can become citizens according to law enacted by the legislature and not that they are citizens as the law stands today. The learned Counsel of the writ petitioner has drawn my attention to Express Newspapers, Ltd. v. Union of India : (1961)ILLJ339SC wherein the petitioners were corporate personalities and yet they were allowed to press their petitions without any objection being raised about their not being entitled to the fundamental rights contained in Article 19. I would, notwithstanding that formidable array of judicial opinion, adhere to the view that unless a person can establish his being entitled to the rights of citizenship as defined by the Constitution and the law enacted thereafter, the person is not entitled to the benefit of Article 19. The position under the American Constitution is different, because under it persons have been given the right. In the circumstances I think it is but proper that the case should be referred to a Division Bench for decision of the constitutional issue raised, by the writ petitioner as well as the doubt which I entertain about the writ petitioner's being entitled to the benefit of Article 19.
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5. [In pursuance of the above order of reference the Division Bench made the following order which was pronounced by Ansari, J.
6. The writ petitioner is the Andhra Pradesh Non-Gazetted Officers' Association and was formed in 1950. One of its several objects is to protect and promote the common interest of all classes of non-gazetted Government officers and is stated to have about 64,000 such/ officers as its members. It had been registered on 20 February 1950 under the Societies Registration Act, XXI of 1860, and was not recognized till 1954. This recognition was made subject to the rules contained in G.O. Mis. No. 1160 of 11 May 1848 and one of the provisions relevant for the purposes of the writ petition is No. 6. It may be usefully quoted here:
Recognition is accorded for the purpose of enabling the employees of Government to communicate their needs and grievances to Government and to Government officers and may be withdrawn by the Government if the employees adopt other methods of ventilating those grievances and needs.
Note : For the purpose of tins instruction 'other methods' shall include seditious propaganda, expression of disloyal sentiments, publication in the press, engaging or inviting the assistance of political and other parties for the representation of grievances and the threat of strike.
The aforesaid rule is closely linked with Rule 22 of the Government Servants' Conduct Rules, 1949, whose relevant extracts are as follows:-
22. (1) No Government servant shall be a member, representative or officer of any association representing, or purporting to represent, Governments or any class of Government servants unless such association satisfies the following conditions, namely:-
(a) * * *(b) * * *(c) the association shall not be in any way connected with any political party or organization, or engage in any political activity;
(d) the association shall not-
(i) issue or maintain any, periodical publication except in accordance with any general or special order of the provincial Government;
(ii) except with the previous sanction of the Provincial Government publish any representation on behalf of its members, whether in the press or otherwise ;
(iii) * * *(iv) * * *(v) * * *(2) No Government servant shall be a member of any service association, the recognition of which has been refused or withdrawn by the Government.
7. The writ petition challenges the constitutionality of both the rules. The complaint made is that the part of Rule 6 in G.O. No. 1160, Public (Services), which prohibits the association from ventilating its grievance through publication in the press is violative of the fundamental rights contained in Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution and is not covered by Clause (2) of the articles. The same complaint Is made against Rule 22 of the Government Servants' Conduct Rules, which directs the employees to be members of only the association that conforms to the conditions mentioned therein. These directions the writ petition alleges to be contrary to Article 19(1)(a) as well as Article 19(1)(a) and therefore to be void.
8. The events which have led to the writ petition may be shortly stated. A dispute had arisen between the Government and the non-gazetted officers. During its pendency the secretary to the association had issued a press communique, which had been published In the Daily News of 6 January 1959, The secretary is stated therein to have regretted the Chief Minister's not having met the representatives of the organization and his failure to take them into confidence before finializing the decision on the vital issue. The secretary is reported to have further stated that the employees had been asked to meet the Chief Secretary to whom they had presented a detailed memorandum concerning the minimum demands. Because of the publication the Government has written the following letter to the association:-
[Subject, Public services Service associations Violation of conditions of recognition Explanation called for.
It has been noticed that in a statement issued to the press by the general secretary of the association (vide copy of a cutting from the Daily News dated 6 January 1950 enclosed) your association has made certain observations on the action of the Chief Minister and the policy of Government.
9. In the rules laid down for granting recognition to service associations, it has been clearly stated (vide Rule 6 in G. 0.1160, Public (Services), dated 11 May 1948) that if an association ventilates its grievances by resorting to publication of grievances in the press-Government may withdraw the recognition given to such association. As the action of your association in publishing the said statement (copy enclosed) in the press IB a direct contravention of the rules, you are hereby called upon to show cause why the recognition granted to your association in G.O. Ms. No. 2493, dated 25 November 1954, should not be withdrawn. Your reply should reach this department within ten days of the receipt of this letter, failing which it will be assumed that you have no explanation to offer and Government will take such action as they may deem proper.'
10. The association has filed the writ petition claiming that the part of the rules quoted in the letter is vlolative of the freedom of speech contained in Article 19(1)(a) and to have become void under Article 13(1). The notice therefore calling' upon the association to show cause why the recognition should not be withdrawn is urged no longer to be in exercise of legal powers and a mandamus ought to be issued to prevent farther actions in pursuance of the letter No. 75/SCA/59 of 5 January 1959. The position taken by the State in the reply is that the letter was in exercise of the legal powers secured to the Government when recognizing the association, and the rule prohibiting the publication in the press to be justified, because it maintains discipline among the civil servants who have to assist the Government in discharge of the executive functions. It follows that the main issue in the writ petition is how far the restraints contained in the rules are violative of the fundamental rights of free speech and discussion. It is conceeded that the right is not absolute, as Clause 2 of Article 19 preserves to the State the power of enacting rules reasonably necessary to achieve the several objects enumerated in the clause. It further follows that the reasonableness of the rules for achieving one or several objects mentioned in the clause had also become Justiciable in the petition. This controversy, however, was not the reason for this writ petition being referred to a Division Bench. It was conceded when the petition was being heard before one of us as a single Judge that the association because of its registration under Act XXI of 1860 has become a legal entity and a question therefore arose whether such a personality can be a citizen in order to claim the several rights under Article 19. There is a divergence of judicial views on whether a corporation can be treated as citizen for the purposes of the article and the writ petition has been referred to a Division Bench for the adjudication of this and the other constitutional issues in the case.
11. It is clear that no provision in the Constitution can be relied upon in support of the juristic personality being treated as citizen. Out of the several articles contained in Part II of the Contitution, which cannot be disregarded when dealing with such rights of a juristic personality, Article 5 covers only natural persons. Articles 6 and 7 deal with citizenship of those who had migrated to and from India before the inauguration of the Constitution. Article 8 confers right of citizenship on persons residing outside India, subject to the conditions laid therein. Article 10 provides for continuance of the citizenship and Article 9 enacts how it is lost. Under Article 11 Parliament is authorized to enact the law regarding the subject. It is conceded that the writ petitioner is not covered by any of the aforesaid articles nor by the enactment under Article 11. It follows that the benefit of Article 19(1)(a) can be claimed by the petitioner only on the case-law that holds juristic persons to be entitled to citizenship, in M. K, Mills v. State of Rajasthan 1953-II L.L.J. 214 it was held that the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution to the citizens were available to corporation and in support of this view reliance was placed on the following observation of Mukherjee, J., in Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of India A.I.R. 1951 S.S.C 41:
The fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution are available not merely to individual citizen but to corporate bodies as well except where tb. 9 language of the provision or the nature of the right compelled the inference that they are not applicable to natural persona and an incorporated company therefore can come up to this Court fore nforcement of its fundamental rights and so may the individual shareholders, to enforce their own.
Kania, C.J., agreed with him and so did Fazl All, J., who also observed as follows :
This company and the shareholders are in law separate entities and if the allegation Is made that any property belonging to the company has been taken poesession of without compensation or the right enjoyed by the company under Article 19(1)(a) has been infringed, it would be for the company to come forward to assert or vindicate its own right and not for any individual shareholder to do so.
12. With respect to the learned Judges of the Rajasthan High Court we do not find in the aforesaid observations of Mukherjee, J., anything to support the proposition that a corporation is a, citizen for purposes of Article 19. Some of the articles in Part HI of the Constitution confer rights on all persons, and corporations being juristic persons would be entitled to their benefits. Such are Articles 14, 27 and 31 and the learned Juges were referring to these rights only. The other fundamental rights contained in Part III are conferred on citizens and these are contained in Articles 15 and 19(1)(a). These would be claimable by corporations only when it is clear as to how the right of citizenship can be conferred on such personality which evidently must be enacted under Article 11. The observation of Fazl All, J., therefore does not help the corporate bodies when they claim the fundamental rights. Indeed their lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala : 1SCR874 have left the question open, for S.R. Das, C.J., at p. 721 observed as follows:
Nor is it necessary for us on this occasion to consider whether a company is a citizen within the meaning of Article 19 and indeed the point has not been argued before us.
Their lordships have earlier left the question open in Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar : 2SCR603 , wherein it was also observed at p. 669 as follows:
It Is urged that the appellant being a company is not a citizen and cannot, therefore, claim any fundamental right under Article 19 which is available only to citizens and therefore the decisions of this Court referred to above have no application. While it is not worthy that the second case mentioned above was concerned with the rights of a company, it is, nevertheless, unnecessary, for the purpose of this appeal, to decide whether a juristic person like a company is a citizen as defined, in Part II of the Constitution and as such entitled to the benefit of Article 19.
We therefore think the question whether juristic persons can be entitled to the benefit of Article 19 is still uncovered by any decisive pronouncement of the Supreme Court, and therefore the Rajasthan case should not be followed, as it holds corporations entitled to the benefit of Article 19, without deciding how such a personality can be a citizen. The counsel for the writ petitioner has next relied on State of Bombay v. Chamarbaugwala : AIR1951Bom1 wherein the learned Judges have given the benefit of the article to a corporation, subject to its directors and shareholders being citizens of India. With respect we beg to differ; for the corporate personality toeing different to those of the directors end shareholders, we do not see how latter's citizenship can be treated as the test for conferring the status on the former. If analogy of birth were to furnish any basis, the place of its incorporation would be more appropriate test. The appellate decision of the Supreme Court in the same case and reported in State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala : 1SCR874 was next relied by the counsel of the writ petitioner. As the decision of the trial Court about corporation having the benefit of citizenship was referred to without any express disapproval, it was urged that corporate personality can claim the benefit. As already mentioned earlier in the Judgement, their lordships of the Supreme Court have not in the case decided the question, for the point was never urged before them. Reliance was also placed on Express Newspapers, Ltd. v. Union of India : (1961)ILLJ339SC , wherein some of the petitioners were corporate personalities, who were allowed to press their petition without any objection being raised about their not being entitled to the fundamental rights contained in Article 19. The case is no authority as to when corporate personalities acquire citizenship and thus become entitled o the benefit of Article 19.
13. Coming to the judicial pronouncement against the writ petitioner in Sri Meenakshi Mills v. State of Madras 1951-II L.L.J. 194 doubts were expressed whether company can be deemed to be a citizen within the meaning of Article 19. In Narasaraopet Electric Corporation v. State of Madras : AIR1951Mad979 it was held that Article 19(1)(f) applies only to citizens and a company incorporated under the Companies Act does not satisfy the requirement of the definition of citizen in Article 5. Also in Jupiter General Insurance Company, Ltd. v. Rajagopalan A.I.R. 1952 Pun. 9 corporation has been held not to be a citizen within Article 19(1)(a), These two cases have been since followed in Cherry Hosiery Mills v. S.K. Ghose : AIR1959Cal397 , where a corporation is held not entitled to the fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(a). We think these decisions are sound in principle; for Part II of the Constitution enumerates who are citizens at the time of the Constitution, how their rights are lost and how all these are natural persona. It is clear that in conferring benefit of Article 19(1)(a) on corporation these provisions cannot be overlooked particularly when by Article 11 Parliament is alone authorized to enact provisions on all other matters relating to citizenship and it is conceded that no enactment yet exists that can be of help to the writ petitioner. With such express reservations to the Parliament we can hardly act on the cases that hold a corporation to be the national of the country where it has been incorporated; and that appeared to us to be the principle on which the several American decisions relied by the counsel of the writ petitioner rest. The writ petition therefore fails on the short ground that the petitioner being a juristic personality and not being a citizen according to the existing enacted law, is not entitled to the benefit of Article 19(1)(a).
14. That apart, we do not think the Government servants are entitled to any such fundamental rights which are being claimed for them in this writ petition. It is now well settled that rules prohibiting Government servants from certain conducts pertain to the conditions of their service and do not violate any of the guarantees contained in Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(c). That appears to us to be an accepted principle of constitutional law even in the United States, whose judicial pronouncements have been much relied upon by the counsel of the writ petitioner. The question in United Public Workers of America v. Harry B, Mitchell 91 Law Ed. 754 was concerning the validity of the Hatch Act, which made it unlawful for employees of the Federal Government to take any active part in political management or in political campaigns and the regulation of civil service commission made such conduct a ground for removal of civil service employees. Upholding the constitutional validity of the Act, Read, J., had observed as follows:
The determination of the extent to which political activities of governmental employees shall be regulated lies primarily with Congress. Courts could interfere only when such regulation passes beyond the general existing' conception of governmental power. That conception develops from practice, history and changing educational, social and economic conditions. The regulation of such activities as Poole carried on has the approval of long practice by the commission, court decisions upon similar problems and a large body of informed public opinion.
Congress and the administrative organs have authority over the discipline and efficiency of the public service. When actions of civil servants, in the judgment of the Congress, menace the integrity and the competence of the service, legislation to forestall such danger and adequate to maintain its usefulness is required. The Hatch Act is the answer of Congress to this need. We cannot see with such a background that these restrictions are unconstitutional.
In McAuliffe v. New Bedford 155 Mass. 216 the policeman had been removed because he was guilty of violating certain police regulation of the city which had provided that no member of the department shall be allowed to solicit money or any aid on any pretence for any political purpose. Mr. Justice Holmes dealing with a writ of mandamus by the policeman had stated as follows:
The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman. There are few employments for hire in which the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional rights of free speech, as well as of idleness by the implied terms of his contract. The servant cannot complain as he takes the employment on the terms, which are offered him. On the same principle, the city may impose any reasonable condition upon holding office within its control. This condition seems to us reasonable, if that be the question open to revision here.
Similar are the following observations of Venkatarama Ayyar, J., in P. Balakotaiah v. Union of India : 1SCR1052 :-
It is next contended that the Impugned orders are in contravention of Article 19(1)(a) and are therefore void. The argument is that action has been taken against the appellants under the rules, because they are communists and trade unionists, and the orders terminating the service under Rule 3 amount, in substance, to the denial to them of the freedom to form associations, which is guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a). We have already observed that that is not the true scope of the charges. But apart from that we do not see how the right of the appellants under Article 19(1)(c) has been infringed. The orders do not prevent them from continuing to be communists or trade unionists.
Moreover there are two decisions directly against the writ petitioner. In Bata Krishna v. Assistant Secretary, Government of Bengal 1957-II L.L.J. 260 it has been held that there is no fundamental right of a person to obtain employment under the Government, and the moment a person enters Government service he becomes bound by the conditions of service. In the case the rule preventing Government servant from publishing criticism of Government and in taking part in politics were challenged as violative of Article 19(1)(a), but the petition was rejected. So also in Kameswar Prasad v. State of Bihar 1959-I L.L.J. 401 the rules prohibiting demonstration and strikes were challenged as contrary to Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(a), but the challenge failed. We therefore think that the writ petition also falls on the grounds that Rule 22 is not violative of the fundamental rights of the members of the association. The counsel for the writ petitioner had cited several American decisions that constitutional guarantees cannot be waived in order to secure privileges. No useful purpose will be served in dealing in detail with these decisions; for they apparently have been found not to exclude restrictions (sic) can be placed is clear from the two American cases referred to earlier in this judgment. And in view of the decisions in this country upholding the restrictions there is also no force in the argument that Rule 22 is violative of Article 19. We therefore dismiss the petition with, costs, which we fix at Rs. 150.