1. The parties are Muhammadans, and under the law administered here they can claim pre-emption on all sales of property made between the members of their creed, when the property is of the description to which by their law pre-emption attaches. It is contended that to the property in suit pre-emption does not attach, and passages are cited from the Hedaya and other works (see Baillie's Digest of Muhammadan law, pp. 473, 474, 475) to show that, when a house is sold apart from land, pre-emption does not attach, and it is argued that, inasmuch as the seller had no right in the land, all he could sell was the house.
2. In fact and in law this contention appears erroneous. The seller not. only sold the materials of the house, but such interest as he possessed as an occupier of the soil. The house was sold as a house to be inhabited on the spot with the same right of occupation as the seller had enjoyed.
3. The text on which the appellant relies applies to the sale of the materials of a house or a house capable of and intended to be removed from its site. It is then equally moveable property as goods, boats, or trees, cut or sold to be cut and carried away, but it does not apply to a house sold with the right of occupation of the soil. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.