Ryves and Piggott, JJ.
1. This appeal arises out of certain proceedings the nature of which has to a certain extent been misconceived both by the courts below and by the appellant in filing this appeal.
2. We find that two persons, Nathu Mal and Fakir Chand, had applied in the court of the District Judge of Meerut to be declared insolvents. That court made over the proceeding for disposal to the Second Additional Judge of Meerut, who proceeded to adjudicate Fakir Chand and Nathu Mal insolvents and to appoint a receiver on the 23rd of November, 1912. This receiver, on information laid by one of the creditors, seized certain movable property, i.e. some cash and a stock of cloth, as property of the insolvents in order to dispose of the same for the benefit of the creditors. He was undoubtedly acting under the provisions of Section 20 of the Provincial Insolvency Act (Act No. III of 1907), and as a matter of fact in this particular matter he acted under the orders of the District Judge.
3. Mul Chand, who is the appellant before us, claims that the property thus seized by the receiver is his own. He presented, in the court below, what purports to be an objection under Order XXI, Rule 58, of the Code of Civil Procedure. This has no application to the circumstances of the case. Mul Chand's position was that of a person aggrieved by an act of the receiver and his remedy was by an application under Section 22 of Act No. III of 1907. His application was, however, dealt with by the Second Additional Judge of Meerut on the merits, and after taking evidence the learned Additional Judge came to the conclusion that the property seized was in fact that of the insolvents, and he dismissed Mul Chand's application accordingly.
4. The latter has now come before this Court in appeal. He still persists in treating the matter as an execution proceeding under the Code of Civil Procedure, for he has presented this appeal as a matter of right and without any reference to the provisions of Sections 22 and 46 of the Provincial Insolvency Act on the subject of appeals. An examination of these sections, however, suggests two questions. One is whether the court of the Second Additional Judge of Meerut is or is not a 'District Court' within the meaning of the definition in Act No. III of 1907. If it is not, then an appeal from the order complained of lay to the District Judge. We have not thought it necessary to go into this question, for the matter may be disposed of upon another ground. Even if we assume for the sake of argument that the court of the Second Additional Judge was a 'District Court' under the Provincial Insolvency Act, an appeal would only lie from the order complained of by special leave of the District Court or of this Court. We have before us no formal application for leave to appeal. We have heard the appellant on the facts of the case, in order to see whether he could make out any sufficient cause for inducing us to allow him to amend his pleadings and bring the matter before us in regular form by an application for leave to appeal.
5. We are content to find that there is nothing in the circumstances of this case to suggest any reason why special leave should be given. A matter such as this is evidently one which the Legislature intended to leave to the discretion of the District Court. Under such circumstances, leave to appeal should only be granted In special cases, and we find nothing in the record before us to justify us in treating this as a special case.
6. In these circumstances, we dismiss this appeal with costs.