1. This is a reference by the Sessions Judge at Moradabad, suggesting that a commitment against the six persons named as opposite parties should be quashed. The powers of the High Court to quash a commitment are those conferred by Section 215, Criminal Procedure Code, and in my opinion there is no ground for quashing the commitment in the present case. It appears that on the 20th of September 1905 one Musammat Mumtaz-un-nissa filed a complaint in the Deputy Magistrate's Court, in which she accused the persons I have mentioned above with offences under Sections 148, 337 and 458, Indian Penal Code. I may here remark, although it may not be very material, that the learned Sessions Judge is wrong in stating in his reference that the complaint was laid under Sections 365 and 366 of the Indian Penal Code. A considerable amount of evidence was taken, but on the 5th of December, without having issued notice to the opposite party, he dismissed the complaint. Without in any way wishing to prejudge the case, I think events have shown that it is possible that the learned Deputy Magistrate was not quite prudent in so dismissing the complaint. The woman's complaint had reference to the taking away of her daughter by the opposite party, and to an alleged attempt to make her transfer her property to her brother, a son of the complainant, also to alleged wrongful confinement of herself and to the forcing of the daughter into a marriage with another person. On the 4th December, i.e., the day before the dismissal of the mother's complaint, Mehdi Hasan filed a further complaint against the same persons under Sections 365 and 366. The acts complained of were no doubt the same as the acts that the girl's mother had Complained of, although the offences suggested by the two complaints were different. The learned Deputy Magistrate summoned witnesses on this second complaint for the 13th and on the 14th notices were issued to the accused. Evidence was also recorded, and on the 15th February 1906 the commitment order which it is now sought to quash was passed. It is contended on behalf of the opposite parties that the Deputy Magistrate had absolutely no jurisdiction to entertain the second complaint, inasmuch as he had already dismissed in the manner I have stated the first complaint made by the girl's mother. I can find nothing in the Criminal Procedure Code which prevents a Magistrate from entertaining a second complaint made against the same person, even though the second complaint may be connected with a previous complaint which has already been dismissed under the provisions of Section 203. No doubt a Magistrate to whom a second complaint was made might take into consideration the fact that a previous complaint had been made and dismissed. This, however, is not the question before me. The question before me is--had the Magistrate jurisdiction to entertain the complaint of the husband after he had dismissed the complaint of the mother? If he had, the present commitment cannot be quashed by me. In my judgment the Magistrate had jurisdiction, and was bound to entertain the second complaint and deal with it according to law. A number of authorities have been cited, amongst others, the case of the Queen-Empress v. Umedan Weekly Notes, 1895, p. 86. In that case a Bench of two judges considered that a Magistrate could take cognizance of a second complaint made by the same complainant. This is a very much stronger case than the present one, where the second complaint was made by a different person alleging different offences though possibly grounded on more or less the same facts. To the same effect is the case of Dwarka Nath Mondul v. Beni Madhab Banerji (1901) I.L.R., 28 Calc., 652 and that of Mir Ahmad Hossein v. Mahomed Askari (1902) I. L R., 29 Calc., 726. On the other side the case of Queen-Empress v. Adam Khan (1899) I.L.R., 22 All., 106 is cited. The facts of this case are quite different from the facts of the present case, and the learned Judge there cited with approval the decision that I have already referred to of Queen-Empress v. Umedan. In my judgment the mere fact that the complaint of the husband was made the day before-the dismissal of the mother's complaint can make no difference whatever. I see no reason therefore to quash the commitment and this is my answer to the reference. Let the record be returned.