1. These are two execution appeals by one Chaube Madho Rao whose objection to execution proceedings has been dismissed by the lower Court.
2. The facts are that a decree-holder, Chaube Gur Narain obtained two decrees for arrears of profit against one. Chaube Binayak Rao, one of 22nd February 1928, which had been taken up in appeal to this Court, and another of 30th May 1926 which was not taken up in appeal. Subsequent to this apparently, the judgment-debtor Binayak became a sanyasi and on 18th August 1928 he made an application to the Collector asking that his son should be entered for all his property, and accordingly mutation was granted in favour of his son, the present appellant Madho Rao. The decree-holder made an application on 20th July 1928 for the execution of the decree, that is, his application was prior to the application of the judgment-debtor for the substitution of the name of his son on 23rd August 1928. The attachment was granted. On 25th July 1929, the appellant Madho Rao made an application objecting to execution on the following grounds : He stated in his objection that he was now the absolute owner of the property in question and without his being made the heir of his father the execution proceedings could not proceed according to law and he claimed that the property had been wrongly attached. That objection has been dismissed by the execution Court on the grounds that as his father was alive it would be necessary for the property to be transferred by way of gift or by conveyance or by a decree of the civil Court.
3. In appeal the learned Counsel has based his argument on Section 50, Civil P.C., which states.
Where a judgment-debtor dies before the decree had been fully satisfied, the holder of the decree may apply to the Court which passed it to execute the same against the legal representative of the deceased.
4. The learned Counsel was not quite certain whether his client would claim in the capacity of legal representative of his father or not but finally decided that he would adopt that position. The learned Counsel sustained his argument by reference to various well-known doctrines of Hindu law to the effect that when a man becomes a sanyasi he becomes dead for purposes of succession and inheritance and the persons entitled succeed to his property. That doctrine however is in regard to devolution of the rights of the person who becomes a sanyasi. The question before us is the converse and deals with the liabilities of this person. Further, the question before us is one of procedures under the Civil Procedure Code. Now Section 50 uses the word ' dies ' apparently in its natural sense and there is nothing in the section or any other portion of the Code which indicates that this word is intended to include civil death. Civil death is in some ways different from natural death and learned Counsel has not been able to show any authority for his proposition that the civil death will come under Section 50, Civil P.C.
5. Further, in regard to this question we may observe that in the present case it is not shown that on any definite date the judgment-debtor Binayak Rao did become a sanyasi. Learned Counsel points to his application of 18th August 1928 made before attachment in which he says that he had become a sanyasi, but no definite date is given and from the mere fact that he made that application it is clear that he had not at that time ceased to take an interest in the affairs of this material world and therefore he cannot at that time be said to have properly become a sanyasi or to have undergone a civil death.
6. We consider therefore that in the present case it is not proved that the judgment-debtor did become a sanyasi, whether before or after attachment, or at all. These, we may mention are some of the difficulties which would arise if this doctrine of civil death were held to come under Section 50, but on the general point of law we consider that Section 50 is not intended to apply to the case of civil death and accordingly we dismiss these appeals with costs.
7. We note that in this case the decree-holder does not admit the fact that the judgment-debtor has become a sanyasi and as observed, it is not proved that he did become a sanyasi.