1. I agree entirely with Mr. Haidar that this is a nice question and an important question, but having made up by mind quite clearly and being prepared to give my reasons, I propose to dismiss the appeal so that he can appeal without further delay to the Letters Patent Bench, The question of law is whether a cosharer having claim against another cosharer, in respect of a separate matter altogether, namely for rent, can join that claim to a suit under Section 165 of the Tenancy Act brought for an account. It is a mere question of procedure but sometimes questions of procedure go to the root of a matter, and I can understand that the revenue side may have reasons for refusing to allow two such suits to be joined. A suit for accounts involves totally different considerations, and inasmuch as Assistant Collectors are not trained lawyers, it is quite likely that it is considered important to keep these matters distinct. The revenue procedure is strict and technical and I find on referring to the Fourth Schedule, that the suit on the revenue side are grouped and that a suit under Section 95 or Section 102 for arrears of rent is grouped in group A, whereas a suit under Section 165 is grouped under group B. I find also that in the case of Kalyan Singh v. Raja 3 Unreported Decisions 343, which, I am told, refers to the Board of Revenue-the authority which the learned Judge has relied upon in his judgment-the revenue side have held that rent payable by a cosharer for his tenancy cannot be taken into account under this section. I have not seen the report and I do not know what reasons are given, but I assume that the revenue Courts have good reasons. Mr. Agarwala in his well-known book on this subject upon which he is an authority cites this case without comment, presumably because there was no special reason for criticizing it. I think the High Court ought to follow especially in matters of procedure, as far as it can do so, the policy or line of decisions adopted by the revenue side in cases which strictly belong to the revenue jurisdiction, and I, therefore, hold that the learned District Judge was right in the view which he took. Holding the clear view that I do, and having given my reasons for agreeing with the lower appellate Court I dismiss the appeal summarily so as to enable the appellant, if so advised, to appeal under the Letters Patent without delay.