1. This appeal arises out of a suit for specific performance of a contract of sale. The property belonged to Raja Munshi Madho Lal and after his death passed into the hands of Kunwar Nand Lal, his daughter's son. On 21st February 1929 six of the plaintiffs entered into an agreement with Kunwar Nand Lal to buy the property for a sum of Rs. 1,60,100 but for some reason the transaction fell through. Then on 3rd August 1929 there were three further agreements. Two of the plaintiffs agreed on their own behalf and on behalf of forty other purchasers that they would buy half the property for Rs. 58,000. Three other plaintiffs entered into a similar agreement to buy a quarter of the property for Rs. 40,025. They acted on behalf of 22 vendees. The remaining fourth of the property was to be bought by 28 vendees for a sum of Rs. 40,025, and five of the plaintiffs or their predecessors-in-interest made an agreement with Kunwar Nand Lal to that effect. The deeds of sale were not, however, executed, and eventually on 12th November 1935 the property was sold together with two other villages to one / Bajrangi Lal for a sum of Rs. 1,40,000. This sale deed was executed by the sons of Kunwar Nand Lal who had in the meantime died. The plaintiffs do not, however, found their claim for specific performance on the contracts made in 1929. They allege in their plaint that there was a further agreement in the year 1935 that the whole property, that is, the whole village in suit, should be sold to all the plaintiffs together for a sum of Rs. 1,00,000. After the suit was instituted three of the plaintiffs died and nobody was impleaded to represent their interests. The Civil Judge of Ghazipur, therefore, held that the suit had abated. The remaining plaintiffs appealed, and while the appeal has been pending in this Court a number of the appellants have died. Nobody has been impleaded in their place and the question has, therefore, been raised whether the appeal has not abated as against all the appellants. Learned Counsel for the appellants argued that this question of abatement in appeal was, to all intents and purposes, the same as the question of the abatement, of the suit in the Court below. His argument was that some only of the plaintiffs were parties to the agreements of 1929 and consequently that they alone were entitled to sue. This argument is vitiated by the fact that the suit is not founded on those agreements but on the alleged agreement of 1935 which, according to the plaint, was made by all the plaintiffs together. It seems obvious to us that the specific performance of the contract to sell could not be decreed in the absence of some of the parties to the contract. In that view of the matter the suit was rightly dismissed. In the same way, once the suit for specific performance had been dismissed it is clear to us that it was not open to some only of the plaintiffs to appeal and get this Court to pass a decree of that nature. That being so, the appeal having admittedly abated against some of the appellants must abate against all. We hold that the appeal has abated. We direct that the respondents will get their costs from the surviving appellants.