Kalyan Rai Vs. Jagannath and ors. - Court Judgment
|Judge||Stuart and ;Mukherji, JJ.|
|Reported in||AIR1925All130; 78Ind.Cas.1033|
|Respondent||Jagannath and ors.|
evidence act (i of 1872), section 32 (3)--statement by executant of pro-note as to consideration, admissibility of. - cantonments act[c.a. no. 41/2006]. section 346 & cantonment fund (servants rules, 1937, rules 13, 14 & 15: [h.l. gokhale, ag. cj, p.v. hardas, naresh h. patil, r.m. borde & r.m. savant, jj] jurisdiction of school tribunal constituted under maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, (3 of 1978) held, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the maharashtra act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established..........contained in the sale deed executed by them. by this sale-dead the executants left a part of the sale consideration for payment of the very promissory note now in question. they said that only a sum of rs. 700 was due from them on account of the promissory note. the learned judge thought that this statement was admissible under section 32(2) of the evidence act. without specifically deciding whether the statement was admissible under clause (2) or not we are clearly of opinion that the statement is admissible under section 32(3). the evidence therefore that was admitted and the presumption that was raised by the court below was not unjustified. the finding is clearly one of fact only and we do not think we are entitled to go behind it.2. the result is that the appeal fails and is.....
1. The question raised in this second appeal is whether the lower Appellate Court was justified in coming I dismiss this application with costs. to the conclusion that only a part of the consideration of the promissory note, which was the basis of the suit, out of which this appeal arises, passed. The Court of first instance had relied on the presumption of the law that a promissory note is executed for a consideration. The learned District Judge controverted this presumption on the fact that as a matter of fact at least a part of the consideration was not paid on the date the promissory note was executed. He also admitted into evidence a certain statement of the executants of the promissory note. It was contained in the sale deed executed by them. By this sale-dead the executants left a part of the sale consideration for payment of the very promissory note now in question. They said that only a sum of Rs. 700 was due from them on account of the promissory note. The learned Judge thought that this statement was admissible under Section 32(2) of the Evidence Act. Without specifically deciding whether the statement was admissible under Clause (2) or not we are clearly of opinion that the statement is admissible under Section 32(3). The evidence therefore that was admitted and the presumption that was raised by the Court below was not unjustified. The finding is clearly one of fact only and we do not think we are entitled to go behind it.
2. The result is that the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs on the higher scale.