1. This is an application under Order 45, Rule 2, Civil P.C. for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council from a decree of this Court passed in second appeal on 23rd June 1927. The valuation of the subject-matter of the suit and of the appeal is less than Rs. 10,000, being in fact Rs. 2,800 only. The ground on which the leave to appeal is sought is that it involves
a substantial question of law of general importance and is otherwise fit for appeal, as the plaintiffs have been deprived of a valuable right secured to them by the decree of the appellate Court.
2. It is conceded by the learned Counsel for the appellant that leave to appeal can be given only if the case should fall within Clause (c) Section 109, Civil P.C.
3. It appears that the applicants were the plaintiffs in the Court of first instance. They sued for recovery of certain properties on the allegation that they were joint with one Chikuri who left him surviving a wife and three daughters, all four of whom were the defendants in the suit. The plaintiffs' case was that, on the death of Chikuri, they, as the surviving members of the family, were entitled to the property in suit. The defence was that Chikuri died separate, and the plaintiffs have no right to the property. The Court of first instance dismissed the suit holding that the plaintiffs were separate from Chikuri when the latter died. There was an appeal by the plaintiffs and the learned Additional District Judge, who heard the appeal, held on the evidence that the family was joint and that the plaintiffs were, therefore, entitled to succeed. He accordingly decreed the suit. There was a second appeal which was heard by a Bench of this Court. This Court came to the conclusion that the lower appellate Court had arrived at its conclusion by a misapplication of the law. The following is an extract from the judgment of this Court:
The respondents urge that whether the lower appellate Court was right or wrong, the finding as to jointness was a finding of fact. The question whether it can be disturbed in second appeal depends, therefore, on whether the lower appellate Court, in arriving at that finding had committed any error of law.
4. Thus, after reproducing the purport of Sub-section (1), Section 100, Civil P. C, the Judges proceeded to consider whether the finding arrived at by the lower appellate Court was wrong and whether it was vitiated on account of any substantial error in procedure. Mr. Peare Lal Banerji, the learned Counsel for the appellant, states that, so far as the portion of the judgment quoted above goes, he has no quarrel with it. But he says that, in spite of stating the law correctly, the learned Judges proceeded to misapply it to the circumstances of the case and have virtually taken upon them selves to weigh the evidence and to say that the finding of fact arrived at by the lower appellate Court was wrong. He does not deny that in cases to which Section 103, Civil P: C, applies the High Court could come to a finding of its own. Assuming that this Court misapplied the, law to the particular facts of the case, we fail to see how it is possible for us to certify the case as a fit one for appeal to His Majesty in Council.
5. It has been held repeatedly by their Lordships of the Privy Council that, in order to enable a High Court to certify a case in which the valuation is less than Rs. 10,000, as a fit one for appeal to His Majesty in Council, the case should involve a question of general importance. Ordinarily, none but the parties to a litigation are concerned in the result of a case. It is clear that in every such case where the valuation is less than the prescribed limit, there is no right of appeal to their Lordships of the Privy Council. It is only when a case is of larger importance and the principle, when finally decided by their Lordships of the Privy Council, will be of benefit not only to the people who are directly involved in the litigation but to a considerable body of other people, that leave to appeal should be granted. In the case of Radha Krishna Ayyar v. Swaminatha Ayyar (1), their Lordships of the Privy Council, on the question of the application of Sub-section (c) of Section 109, Civil P.C., said as follows:
That principle is this: that as an initial condition to appeal to His Majesty in Council,. it is essential that the petitioners should satisfy the Court that the subject-matter of the suit is Rs. 10,000, and in addition that in certain cases there should be added some substantial question of law. This does not over the whole grounds of appeal, because nt is plain that there may be certain cases in which it is impossible to define in money value the exact character of the dispute; there are questions as, for example, those relating to religious rights and ceremonies, to caste and family rights or such matters as the reduction of the capital of the companies as well as questions of wide public importance in which the subject-' matter in dispute cannot be reduced into actual terms of money. Sub-section (c) Section 109, Civil P.C. contemplates that such a state of things-exist and Rule 3 of Order 45 regulates the procedure.
6. This quotation from the judgment of the Privy Council enunciates the reason why in certain cases leave to appeal may be granted although the valuation of the subject-matter of the appeal may be less than Rs. 10,000. In the present case there is no dispute as to any question of law at all. It is conceded that in the-judgment under appeal, the law has been properly stated, namely, when a second appeal may be entertained by the High Court. The only point that the appellants want to dispute before their Lord ships of the Privy Council is whether the High Court were right in their application of the law to the peculiar facts of this particular case. This is not in our opinion a matter of the kind described in the above quotation from the judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council.
7. It must be remembered that leave to appeal is a matter of consequence and in the case of Banarsi Prasad v. Kashi Krishna Narain  23 All. 227, their Lordships of the Privy Council made the following pronouncement at p. 232 of the report:
And as it is of great importance not to allow litigants who have succeeded in the High Courts to be harassed by further appeals when there is nothing at stake but amounts of money which the Indian legislature has decided to be too small to give a right of appeal, their Lordships will humbly advise Her Majesty to dismiss this appeal.
8. It will be noticed, therefore, that where no useful purpose, as defined in the case of Radha Krishna Ayyar v. Swaminatha Ayyar A.I.R. 1921 P.C. 25, is likely to be served, and where, in the result of the appeal, the only people interested will be the litigants themselves and where the value of the subject-matter is less than Rs. 10,000 no leave to appeal should be granted: see Mathura v. Jagdeo Singh : AIR1928All61 .
9. The learned Counsel for the applicants has referred us to cases where their Lordships of the Privy Council set aside decrees of the High Court on the ground that the High Court could not interfere with a finding of fact arrived at by the lower appellate Court and that to do so was a contravention of the law. His argument was that leave to appeal in such cases must have been granted on the sole ground that the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction in setting aside improperly a finding of fact. We cannot accede to this argument and Mr. Banerji has not been able to cite a single case in which leave to appeal was granted on the sole ground that the High Court in a particular case misapplied the provisions of Section 100. Civil P.C. On the other hand, in one of the cases quoted by the learned Counsel for the appellant, their Lordships of the Privy Council deprecated the grant of a certificate by a 'High Court' where the Court had refused to interfere with the finding of the lower appellate Court on the ground that it was a finding which could not be interfered with in second appeal, being a finding of fact. Their Lordships remark that no substantial question of law was involved in the appeal. We take this to mean and involve that the mere question, whether a particular finding by a lower appellate Court was a good or bad finding, having regard to the provisions of Section 100, Civil P.C., was in itself no substantial question of law: see Durga Ghowdhrani v. Jawahir Singh Chowdhry  18 Cal. 23.;
10. We, therefore, dismiss the application with costs.