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Chand Shankar Vs. Bohre Sukh Lal - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCivil
CourtAllahabad
Decided On
Case NumberExn. Second Appeal No. 787 of 1948
Judge
Reported inAIR1951All383
ActsUttar Pradesh (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 - Sections 3 and 14; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC)
AppellantChand Shankar
RespondentBohre Sukh Lal
Appellant AdvocateM.L. Chaturvedi and ;Shyam Bahadur Varma, Advs.
Respondent AdvocateS.B.L. Gaur, Adv.
DispositionAppeal allowed
Excerpt:
.....above, the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah.lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. - 2. the judgment-debtor failed to vacate the house by 31-12-1946, and so the decree-holder put the decree in execution on 11-1-1947. before the decree-holder could succeed in evicting the judgment, debtor the u. --(a) that the tenant has wilfully failed to make payment to the landlord of any arrears of rent within one month of the service upon him of a notice of demand from the landlord; the judgment-debtor then appealed to the lower appellate court but without success. 13. a better..........form the basis of the right to evict and which provide the landlord with a cause of action for the suit. permission of the district magistrate is not such a fact and does not, therefore, constitute a ground on which a suit for the eviction of a tenant may be filed. it is obvious that a tenant does not become liable to eviction merely by reason of the permission of the district magistrate. the permission only removes the bar to the institution of the suit, which exists only when the suit is filed on a ground not mentioned in this section and which does not exist when the suit is filed on a ground mentioned therein. it does not provide a ground for the suit.7. for the reasons indicated above, i hold that the permission of the district magistrate is not a ground mentioned in section 3 of.....
Judgment:

Seth, J.

1. This is an appeal by the judgment-debtor to a decree passed against him on 31-10-1945 which entitles the decree-holder respondent to evict him (the judgment-debtor, appellant) from a house, by putting the decree in execution, if he (the judgment-debtor) fails to vacate it by 31-12 1946. The suit which resulted in the decree, was instituted on 7-10-1944, with the permission of the District Magistrate which was perhaps necessary to maintain the suit because of certain control orders, then in force.

2. The judgment-debtor failed to vacate the house by 31-12-1946, and so the decree-holder put the decree in execution on 11-1-1947. Before the decree-holder could succeed in evicting the judgment, debtor the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (III [3] of 1947) came into force, with retrospective effect from 1-10-1946. Section 14 of the Act provides:

'No decree for the eviction of a tenant from any accommodation passed before the date of commencement of this Act shall, in so far as it relates to the eviction of such tenant, be executed against him as long as this Act remains in force, except on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 3:

Provided that the tenant agrees to pay to the land-land 'reasonable annual rent' or the rent payable by him before the passing of the decree, whichever is higher.' Section 3, referred to in Section 14, reads thus:

'No suit shall, without the permission of the District Magistrate, be filed in any civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation, except on one or more of the following grounds:--

(a) that the tenant has wilfully failed to make payment to the landlord of any arrears of rent within one month of the service upon him of a notice of demand from the landlord;

(b) that the tenant has wilfully caused or permitted to be caused substantial damage to the accommodation;

(c) that the tenant has, without the permission o the landlord, made or permitted to be made any such construction as, in the opinion of the Court, has materially altered the accommodation or is likely substantially to diminish its value;

(d) that the tenant has created a nuisance or has done any act which is inconsistent with the purpose for which he was admitted to the tenancy of the accommodation, or which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the landlord's interest therein;

(e) that the tenant has on or after 1-10-1946, sublet the whole or any portion of the accommodation without the permission of the landlord;

(f) that the tenant has renounced his character as such or denied the title of the landlord and the latter has not waived his right or condoned the conduct of the tenant.

Explanation: For the purposes of section (e) lodging a person in a hotel or a lodging house shall not be deemed to be sub-letting.'

3. Relying on these sections, the judgment-debtor objected to the execution of the decree against him, contending that it could not be executed so long as the Act remained in force. The executing Court overruled this contention and rejected the objection. The judgment-debtor then appealed to the lower appellate Court but without success. He has now come up to this Court in second appeal and has repeated the same objection to the execution of the decree.

4. Section 14 of the Act applies to the decree sought to be executed, for it is, admittedly, a decree for the eviction of a tenant from an accommodation and was passed before the commencement of the Act. It is, therefore, a decree which cannot be executed, while the Act remains in force, except on a ground mentioned in B. 3. Learned counsel for the decree holder-respondent, however, contends that the permission of the District Magistrate is one of the grounds mentioned in Section 3, that the decree is being executed on this ground and that, therefore, the prohibition contained in Section 14 does not apply to the present execution proceedings.

5. Section 3 of the Act relates to suits and has no concern with the execution of decrees. It does not mention the grounds on which a decree for the eviction of a tenant may be executed. It mentions those grounds only on which a suit for eviction is permitted to be filed. As such, Section 14 is capable of only one interpretation, namely, that it means that a decree for the eviction of a tenant shall not be executed except on a ground, which is mentioned in Section 3 as a ground for a suit for the eviction of a tenant. A mere reference to Section 3 will, however, show that the permission of the District Magistrate is not mentioned therein as a ground for a salt for the eviction of a tenant. The section makes a specific mention of grounds and sets them out in six paras lettered as (a) to (f). The permission of the District Magistrate is not included in these. So that even if it be possible to regard the permission of the District Magistrate to be, in its substance and reality, a ground for the eviction of a tenant, it is not possible to regard it to be a ground contemplated by Section 14, for that section refers only to what are mentioned as grounds in Section 3 and not to what may, by a process of reasoning, be determined to be grounds on which a suit is permitted to be filed by Section 3.

6. It is, however, not possible to regard the permission of the District Magistrate referred to in Section 3, even in its essence and reality, to be what is connoted by 'a ground for the eviction of a tenant'. A landlord cannot maintain a suit for the eviction of a tenant without relying on some ground for eviction, such as a determination of the tenancy by efflux of time, by a denial of the landlord's title or by a breach of some condition. A ground on which a suit for the eviction of a tenant may be filed has reference to facts such as these, which form the basis of the right to evict and which provide the landlord with a cause of action for the suit. Permission of the District Magistrate is not such a fact and does not, therefore, constitute a ground on which a suit for the eviction of a tenant may be filed. It is obvious that a tenant does not become liable to eviction merely by reason of the permission of the District Magistrate. The permission only removes the bar to the institution of the suit, which exists only when the suit is filed on a ground not mentioned in this section and which does not exist when the suit is filed on a ground mentioned therein. It does not provide a ground for the suit.

7. For the reasons indicated above, I hold that the permission of the District Magistrate is not a ground mentioned in Section 3 of the Act and is, therefore, not a ground on which an application for the execution of a decree, such as is mentioned in Section 14 of the Act, may be maintained.

8. So far as this case is concerned the decree-holder cannot succeed even if it be assumed that the permission of the District Magistrate is a ground contemplated by Section 14, for it is not even alleged, much less is it proved, that the decree is being executed with the permission of the District Magistrate. The contention on behalf of the decree-holder is that the suit, in which the decree sought to be executed was passed, was instituted with the permission of the District Magistrate and every decree passed in a suit permitted to be filed by Section 3 comes within the exception contained in Section 14, It has already been observed that properly interpreted Section 14 only means this, that a decree for the eviction of a tenant may be executed on all such grounds as are mentioned in Section 3 for filing suits for eviction, without the permission of the District (Magistrate. I do not find it possible to construe Section 14 to mean that every decree passed before the commencement of the Act, in a suit which was instituted with permission of the District Magistrate or on a ground now mentioned in Section 3, comes within the exception contained in Section 14, The condition imposed by the section is not that the suit should have been filed on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 3 but that the decree should be sought to be executed on any one of those grounds. Thus, even if it be assumed that the permission of the District Magistrate is a ground recognised by Section 14, the objection of the judgment-debtor has to be upheld because the decree is not being executed with the permission of the District Magistrate.

9. The Act deals with three classes of cases relating to the eviction of a tenant from an accommodation. Section 3 provides for suits to be instituted after the commencement of the Act, Section 15 provides for suits, pending when the Act came into force; and Section 14 provides for suits, which had already been decided before the commencement of the Act and thus for the execution of the decrees passed in such suits. Section 15 employs language similar to that used in Section 3 and enacts:

'In all suits for eviction of a tenant from any accommodation pending on the date of the commencement of this Act. no decree foe eviction shall be passed except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in section 3.'

10. The language of these two sections being similar, there seems to be no reason why they should not be similarly interpreted. The result of these sections, so interpreted, may be stated thus: (1) No decree shall be passed in a suit instituted before the commencement of the Act with the permission of the District Magistrate merely because it was instituted with the per. mission of the District Magistrate. (2) Ho decree passed before the commencement of the Act, in a suit instituted with the permission of the District Magistrate shall be executed merely because the suit was instituted with the permission of the District Magistrate or merely because the District Magistrate permits it to be executed. (3) But a decree passed in a suit instituted after the commencement of the Act, shall be executable merely because the suit was instituted with the permission of the District Magistrate.

11. The learned counsel for the decree-holder, therefore, contends that the interpretation placed by me on Section 14 of the Act leads to anomalous results, results that could not have been intend-ed by the Legislature, and that there could be no possible reason why the Legislature should have intended that the permission of the District Magistrate granted after the commencement of the Act should be effective while the permission granted by the same officer before the commencement of the Act should be robbed of its efficiency. In other words, the contention of the learned counsel is, that there could be no possible reason for the legislature to make distinction between permissions granted before and after the commencement of the Act.

12. It is not necessary to discover the exact reason for the distinction to repel the contention of the learned counsel. It is enough to suggest some possible reason, for any possible reason is a sufficient answer to the contention that there could be no reason. The condition prevailing at the time when the Act came into force were different from those prevailing some time before the commencement of the Act. It may be presumed safely that in granting permissions District Magistrates might have been materially influenced by the conditions prevailing at the time when the permissions were granted. It is, therefore, likely that the Legislature thought that those permissions should not be acted upon but that they should be revised and that a tenant should not be evicted unless the District Magistrate permits him to be evicted, having regard to the conditions prevailing after the commencement of the Act. I do not say that this was the exact reason that prompted the Legislature to make the distinction. All that I say is that this is a possible reason and, as already observed, nothing more is needed to repel the contention of the learned counsel.

13. A better answer to the contention is that it is not the function of Courts to scan and scrutinise the wisdom and policy of the Legislature. Their task is to administer the law as they find it. So long as a distinction is found to exist according to the recognised rules of interpretation, it has to be recognised and effect has to be given to it. If any anomaly results therefrom the remedy lies with the Legislature.

14. For the reasons indicated above, I hold that the Courts below have erred in rejecting the objection of the judgment-debtor on the ground that the decree was being executed on a ground mentioned in Section 3, U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (III [3] of 1947). I refrain from passing any final orders on the objection petition of the judgment-debtor, which was rejected by the Court below because the learned counsel for the decree holder contends that the judgment debtor has not complied with the requirements of the proviso to Section 14 of the Act and that, therefore, he cannot object to the execution of the decree. This matter has not been considered by the Courts below because it was not necessary for them to do so in the view they took of the meaning of Sections 3 and 14 of the Act. It should be considered now.

15. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed the decree of the lower appellate Court is set aside and the case is remanded to the Court of first, instance through the lower appellate Court with the direction that it should be disposed of in the light of the observations made above. The par ties shall bear their own costs of this appeal. Other costs shall be in the discretion of the Court below.


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