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Jhamman Lal Vs. Himanchal Singh - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectProperty
CourtAllahabad High Court
Decided On
Judge
Reported in(1902)ILR24All136
AppellantJhamman Lal
RespondentHimanchal Singh
Excerpt:
act no. xix of 1873 (n.w.p. land revenue act), section 205b - attachment of property of disqualified proprietor--profils accruing after the release of the corpus by the court of wards. - cantonments act[c.a. no. 41/2006]. section 346 & cantonment fund (servants rules, 1937, rules 13, 14 & 15: [h.l. gokhale, ag. cj, p.v. hardas, naresh h. patil, r.m. borde & r.m. savant, jj] jurisdiction of school tribunal constituted under maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, (3 of 1978) held, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the maharashtra act cannot entertain appeals filed under..........was released from superintendence. in the present case it will be observed that the rents and profits accrued after the property had been released from superintendence. examining the section of the act, it appears to us that the only property which is pointed at in the section as being exempted from attachment is property actually under the superintendence of the court of wards, and does not include property such as rents and profits which accrue after the release of the corpus from superintendence. we may observe that the question is far from being free from doubt; but we think that if the legislature intended to apply the section to a case of this kind the words should have been wider, and should have included not merely property or any part of property, but also 'rent and.....
Judgment:

Stanley, C.J. and Burkitt, J.

1. This appeal raises a very nice question upon the true construction and meaning of Section 205B of the N.W.P. Land Revenue Act. The property of the defendant at the time when the plaintiff obtained a decree against him on the 14th July, 1898, was under the superintendence of the Court of Wards. In September, 1899, this property was released by the Court of Wards. Subsequently the rents and profits of this and other shares in the property were collected by the Court of Wards, and in the year 1307 Fasli certain profits were collected which belong or are alleged to belong to the judgment-debtor. These accrued due after the release of his share of the property from superintendence, and it is contended by the decree-holder that he is entitled now to attach such rents and profits. On the part of the defendant it is contended that this case is governed by a decision of this Court in Himanchal Singh v. Jhamman Lal (1900) I.L.R. 22 All. 364 between the same parties. In that case it was decided that the judgment-debtor could not attach rents and profits of property which had been under the superintendence of the Court of Wards at the time the decree was obtained, and which represented rents and profits, that is, the rents and profits which accrued before the property was released from superintendence. In the present case it will be observed that the rents and profits accrued after the property had been released from superintendence. Examining the section of the Act, it appears to us that the only property which is pointed at in the section as being exempted from attachment is property actually under the superintendence of the Court of Wards, and does not include property such as rents and profits which accrue after the release of the corpus from superintendence. We may observe that the question is far from being free from doubt; but we think that if the Legislature intended to apply the section to a case of this kind the words should have been wider, and should have included not merely property or any part of property, but also 'rent and profits' of the property. For these reasons we are of opinion that the Court below is wrong in its decision and that the appeal should be granted.

2. It must be understood that our judgment is not to be taken as entitling the appellant to obtain payment from the Collector without a suit if the Collector contests the matter.


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