Ryves and Pigoott, JJ.
1. The facts of this case as disclosed in the plaint may be concisely stated thus, so far as is necessary for the purpose of this appeal. The plaintiff alleged that he was the next reversioner of one Ramphal, who was a tenant at fixed rates of a certain holding. He died, leaving him surviving his widow and a widow of a pre-deceised son. These ladies continued in po-session of this holding and were entitled to a Hindu widow's estate therein. They then sold the holding to a mahajan, who in turn sold it to the zamindars. Subsequently the widows died. The plaintiff, three years after the death of the last widow, brought this suit in a Civil Court for possession of the holding and for mesne profits. It is unnecessary to set out the defence beyond stating that it was pleaded that the suit was not cognizable by a Civil Court and that it was burred by limitation, because in order to decide the jurisdiction of the court to hear the suit and ascertain the period of limitation applicable, the allegation of the plaint, and not the nature of the defence set up, are to be considered. The learned Munsif fixed various issues, but tried one only, that of limitation, and holding the suit barred, as having been brought more than six months after the widow's death, dismissed in. On appeal this finding was reversed. The appellate court held that the rule of limitation, applicable was twelve years and he remanded the suit for decision on the other issues.
2. The defendant has appealed from that order of remand. It is quite clear that ii the Civil Courts have jurisdiction then the twelve years' rule is applicable, but it is equally clear that if the plaintiff could have obined his remedy in the Revenue Courts then his suit is admittedly barred.
3. The test seems to be to ascertain what in substance and reality is the relief sought. If that relief could have been obtained on a properly worded plaint presented to a Revenue Court then the jurisdiction of a Civil Court is barred.
4. To apply this test in the present case. What is the real remedy the plaintiff seeks? To obtain possession of a tenancy at fixed rates. Against whom does he seek this relief? The zamindars. On what grounds? That he is the reversionary heir of the last tenant, that on his death he sought to obtain possession, but was obstructed by the zamindars. Under these circumstances a suit under Group C, No. 30 of Schedule IV of the Tenancy Act would seem applicable, and if so, the suit ought to have been brought in the Revenue Court within six months from the date of dispossession.
5. We think it important to maintain for the benefit of tenants who are involved in disputes of any kind with the landlord, the swift and comparatively inexpensive remedy provided by a suit under the Tenancy Act wherever the provision of that Act seem reasonably app icable.
6. The case of Ram Lal v. Chunni Lal (1905) 2 A. L. J. 68 is not quite on all fours with the present case, but it shows that the provisions of Section 79 of the Tenancy Act apply to cases where there has been a constructive as well as an actual or physical ejectment of the plaintiff from his tenancy. The principle underlying that ruling seems to be, that where a person claiming to have succeeded to a tenancy by right of inheritance finds that, on endeavouring to take possession of the same, his right is denied and his possession ousted by the zamindar, he has suffered an ejectment at the hands of the landlord within the meaning of the Section, and his appropriate remedy is by a suit under the Tenancy Act as indicated above. For these reasons we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the lower appellate court and restore the decree of the court of first instance with costs throughout.