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Vibhuti NaraIn Singh Vs. Municipal Board, Allahabad - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCivil
CourtAllahabad High Court
Decided On
Case NumberFirst Appeal No. 89 of 1951
Judge
Reported inAIR1958All41
ActsCourt-fees Act, 1870 - Sections 7
AppellantVibhuti NaraIn Singh
RespondentMunicipal Board, Allahabad
Advocates:N.P. Asthana, Adv.
Excerpt:
.....of court fees - section 7(iv)(a) of court fees act, 1870 - suit for declaration of right with permanent-injunction - injunction cannot be granted without declaration of existence of right to property - therefore court-fee chargeable according to section 7(iv)(a). - cantonments act[c.a. no. 41/2006]. section 346 & cantonment fund (servants rules, 1937, rules 13, 14 & 15: [h.l. gokhale, ag. cj, p.v. hardas, naresh h. patil, r.m. borde & r.m. savant, jj] jurisdiction of school tribunal constituted under maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, (3 of 1978) held, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. the school tribunal..........considerably differ on the facts from the case before us.7. in neither of those cases, the second relief sought included a permanent injunction restraining any one from interfering with the exercise of a right which was a subject-matter of the declaration in the first relief. those cases are, therefore, not applicable to the present case. we, therefore, hold that, in this case, the court-fee was payable under section 7(iv)(a) of the court-fees act as applicable in u. p.8. the court-fee had to be determined in accordance with the proviso to that provision of law. we agree with the report of the inspector of stamps that the valuation must be taken to be rs. 10,000/-. because the suit had to be valued for purposes of jurisdiction under section 4 of the suits valuation act read with the.....
Judgment:

V. Bhargava, J.

1. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned Junior Standing Counsel and have gone through the report of the Inspector of Stamps and the opinion sent by the Taxing Officer. It appears that in this case, the Taxing Officer paid more attention to only the first part of the declaration sought as relief (a) in the plaint and did not take into account the significance of the last part of the declaration sought.

2. The declaration, that is sought as relief (a), really consists of three different declarations.

3. The first was that the declaration dated 4th June, 1940, under Section 221 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916, was null and void. The second declaration sought was that the plaintiff was as usual, entitled to allow the stall holders and hawkers on the Jamuna Road and its patri in village Usmanpur Maiku alias Katghar, Allahabad.

4. The third and the last declaration sought was that the plaintiff was, as usual, entitled to realise the tahbazari dues from them without any interference fay the defendant (the Municipal Board Allahabad). There may be a great deal to be said for the view that the relief of the permanent injunction sought as relief (b) does not flow from the first two declarations sought and is not a relief which can be said to be a consequential relief to either of those two declarations.

5. It, however, appears to us that this relief is clearly a consequential relief to the third declaration sought in relief (a). The third declaration in relief (a) was in respect of the existence of the right to realise the tahbazari dues and the permanent injunction sought is to restrain the defendant from interfering with the plaintiff's exercise of that very right. Where a declaration is sought for the existence of a right and a permanent injunction sought restraining some one from interfering with the exercise of that right, the permanent injunction would clearly be a relief consequential to the declaration.

6. The relief of permanent injuncton not to interfere with the exercise of a right cannot be granted in the absence of or independently of the declaration about the existence of that right. This is the view that was taken by this Court in Ram Chhabila v. Sat Narain, 1935 All LJ 1319 (A). The cases in Kalu Ram v. Babu Lal : AIR1932All485 and Sri Krishna Chandraji v. Shyam Behari Lal, (S) : AIR1955All177 , very considerably differ on the facts from the case before us.

7. In neither of those cases, the second relief sought included a permanent injunction restraining any one from interfering with the exercise of a right which was a subject-matter of the declaration in the first relief. Those cases are, therefore, not applicable to the present case. We, therefore, hold that, in this case, the court-fee was payable under Section 7(iv)(a) of the Court-fees Act as applicable in U. P.

8. The court-fee had to be determined in accordance with the proviso to that provision of law. We agree with the report of the Inspector of Stamps that the valuation must be taken to be Rs. 10,000/-. Because the suit had to be valued for purposes of jurisdiction under Section 4 of the Suits Valuation Act read with the rules framed under Section 3 of that Act under which the valuation for purposes of jurisdiction was to be determined by the market price of the non-agricultural immovable property and this valuation was put by the plaintiff himself as Rs. 10,000/-.

9. The court-fee on the plaint is, therefore payable on a valuation of Rs. 10,000/- and the appellant is granted two months' time to pay up the deficiency in the court-fee on the plaint. In view of this decision, the record will also be sent to the Taxing Officer to determine the court-fee payable on the memorandum of appeal.


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