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Master Shivaraj Singh Vs. Bankey Lal and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectProperty;Civil
CourtAllahabad High Court
Decided On
Case NumberSpecial Appeal No. 240 of 1974
Judge
Reported inAIR1977All68
ActsUttar Pradesh (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 - Sections 3, 3(3), 3(4) and 7F; Uttar Pradesh (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction (Amendment) Act, 1954; Uttar Pradesh (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1952
AppellantMaster Shivaraj Singh
RespondentBankey Lal and ors.
Appellant AdvocateRashi Ram and ;Y.P. Goel, Advs.
Respondent AdvocateM.C. Gupta and ;Shanti Bhushan, Advs.
DispositionAppeal allowed
Excerpt:
.....act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards...........filed by respondent no. 1 which was allowed by the commissioner. the matter was taken up to the state government by the appellant by means of a representation and the state government in exercise of its powers under section 7-f of the act set aside the order of the commissioner and granted the permission prayed for by its order dated march 22, 1971. the respondent no. 1 filed a writ petition in this court challenging the aforesaid order of the state government. the writ petition was allowed by a learned single judge of this court on may 10, 1974, on two grounds--(1) that no revision under section 7-f was maintainable, and (2) that the state government had not properly considered the need of the respondent' no. 1, it is this judgment of the learned single judge against which the.....
Judgment:

N.D. Ojha, J.

1. The appellant is the landlord of an accommodation situated at Gandhi Bazzar in the Town Area of Haldaur, in the district of Bijnor. The respondent No. V is the tenant in the accommodation. The appellant made an application under Section 3 of U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)for premission to file a suit for ejectment against the respondent No. 1. The permission prayed for was granted by the Rent Control & Eviction Officer. Against that order a revision was filed by respondent No. 1 which was allowed by the Commissioner. The matter was taken up to the State Government by the appellant by means of a representation and the State Government in exercise of its powers under Section 7-F of the Act set aside the order of the Commissioner and granted the permission prayed for by its order dated March 22, 1971. The respondent No. 1 filed a writ petition in this Court challenging the aforesaid order of the State Government. The writ petition was allowed by a learned Single Judge of this Court on May 10, 1974, on two grounds--(1) that no revision under Section 7-F was maintainable, and (2) that the State Government had not properly considered the need of the respondent' No. 1, It is this judgment of the learned Single Judge against which the present special appeal, has been preferred.

2. Before us the learned counsel for the appellant has challenged the correctness of both the grounds on which the writ petition was allowed. It was urged that the representation made by the appellant to the State Government was maintainable and that the State Government had considered the need of both the parties and it was only after a comparison of their needs that it came to the conclusion that the permission prayed for should be granted. In order to appreciate the, first submission it would be necessary to state, in brief the ground on which the learned single Judge took the view that no revision before the State Government was maintainable. Section 1 of the Act was amended by U. P. Act No. 44 of 1948 whereby Sub-section (2-A) was added which reads as under:--

'(2-A) It shall apply to every Municipality, Notified Area contiguous to a municipal or cantonment area and to areas situate within two miles of such Municipality or Notified Area; provided that the Provincial Government may by notification in the official Gazette declare that it shall cease to apply to any area or shall apply in whole or part to any other area, as may be specified.'

The Act was not applicable to the town Area of Haldaur. Acting under Sub-section (2-A) of Section 1 notification No. 7202/GEO-8-46 date'd December 24, 1948, published in U. P. Gazette dated January1, 1949, Part I, was issued whereby Section 3 of the Act was applied to Haldaur Town Area. The submission which prevailed with the learned Single Judge was that since Section 3 alone has been applied to Haldaur Town Area and not Section 7-F it was not open to the State. Government to set aside the order of the Commissioner. The same submission was reiterated by the learned counsel for respondent No. 1 before us. We are, however, unable to agree with this submission. At the time when the aforesaid notification was issued, relevant portion of Section 3 read as under:--

'3. Restrictions on eviction:-- . ... ... ...No suit shall, without thepermission of the District Magistrate, be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds:-- --

By Section 4 of the Amending Act No. 24 of 1952 the following amendments were made in the section:--

'(a) The original Section 3 was renumbered as Section 3 (1).

(b) The words 'subject to any order passed under Sub-section (3)' were inserted at the beginning of the section.

(c) The following were added as subsections (2) to (4):--

(2) The party aggrieved by the order of the District Magistrate granting or refusing to grant the permission referred to in Sub-section (1) may within 30 days from the date of the, order or the date on which it is communicated to him whichever is later, apply to the Commissioner to revise the order.

(3) The Commissioner shall, as far as may be, hear the application within six weeks from the date of its making and if he is satisfied that the District Magistrate has acted illegally or with material irregularity or has wrongly refused to act, he may confirm or set aside the order of the District Magistrate.

(4) The order of the Commissioner passed under Sub-section (3) shall subject to any order passed by the State Government under Section 7-F be final.'

These Sub-sections (2) to (4) were again substituted by U. P. Act XVII of 1954. The said Act also introduced certain changes in Clauses (a) and (c) of Section 3 (1) and added a new Clause (g) with which we are not concerned. The relevant portion of Sub-section (1) of Section 3 and Sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) ofthe Act as they now stand are as follows :--

'Section 3 (1) Restrictions on eviction.-- Subject to any order passed under Sub-section (3), no suit shall without the permission of the District Magistrate, be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds:--

(2) Where any application has been made to the District Magistrate for permission to sue a tenant for eviction from any accommodation and the District Magistrate grants or refuses to grant the permission, the party aggrieved by his order may within 30 days from the date on which the order is communicated to him, apply to the Commissioner to revise the order.

(3) The Commissioner shall hear the application made under Sub-section (2), as far as may be, within six weeks from the date of making it, and he may, if he is not satisfied as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the order passed by the District Magistrate or as to the regularity of proceedings held before him alter or revise his order, or making such other order as may be just and proper.

(4) The order of the Commissioner under Sub-section (3) shall, subject to any order passed by the State Government under Section 7-F, be final.'

3. It would thus be seen that at the time when the notification applying Section 3 of the Act to Haldaur town area was issued the present Sub-sections (2) to (4) were not there in Section 3. So also the Clause 'subject to any order passed under Sub-section (3)' was not there. It was urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that so far as Haldaur town area is concerned the provisions of Section 3 of the Act as they stood at the time when the notification referred to above was issued alone were applicable and the Commissioner did not have jurisdiction to set aside the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer inasmuch as at that stage no revision to the Commissioner lay. We find ourselves unable to agree with this submission. The notification is still operative and in our opinion Section 3 as it stands after the various amendments will apply to the said town area in virtue of that notification so that Section 3 as it stands today will be applicable to the said town area.

The view which we take finds support from the decision of a Full Bench of this Court in Chandra Bhushan v. Jayatri Devi, 1968 All LJ 243 = (AIR 1969 All 142) (FB). In that case a question arose about refund of court-fees under Section 13 of the Court-fees Act. The said section permits refund of court-fees 'if an appeal or a plaint, which has been rejected by the lower Court on any of the grounds mentioned in the Code of Civil Procedure, is ordered to be received, or if a suit is remanded in appeal on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 351 of the same Code for a second decision by the lower Court.' At the time when the Court-fees Act was framed the Code of Civil Procedure, 1859, was in force, and Section 13 of the Court-fees Act referred to Section 351 of the 1859 Code. Subsequently the, Code of 1859 was repealed and replaced by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1877. Section 562 of the Code of 1877; wag in terms almost identical with Section 351 of the earlier Code.

The Code of 1877 was in turn repealed and replaced by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, and it contained a corresponding provision of Section 562. Then the Code of 1882 was repealed and replaced by the present Code of Civil Procedure. Corresponding to Section 562 of the Code, of 1882 is Order 41, Rule 23 of the present Code. An amendment was made by this Court in Order 41, Rule 23 Subsequently. It was held by the Full Bench that the reference to Section 351 of the Code of 1859 must be read as a reference not only to Order 41, Rule 23 of the Code of 1908 but also with reference to the amendments that may have been made by the High Court in Order 41, Rule 23 so that the benefit of Section 13 may vary from State to State according to the terms of; Order 41, Rule 23 in, each State.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant in the alternative submitted that in case Section 3, as it stands today, is held to be applicable in its entirety to Haldaur town area the State Government was Competent to set aside the order of the Commissioner in view of the provisions of Sub-section (4) of Section 3. In our opinion this submission is well founded. Section 7-F of the Act reads :--

'Section 7-F. Power of State Government.-- The State Government may call for the record of any case granting or refusing to grant permission for the filing of a suit for eviction referred to in Section 3 or requiring any accommodation tobe let or not to be let to any person under Section 7 or directing a person to vacate any accommodation under Section 7-A, and may make such order as appears to it necessary for the ends of justice.'

In our opinion it is not right to say, as has been contended by the learned counsel for respondent No. 1, that Sub-section (4) of Section 3 was enacted just to indicate that the order of the Commissioner under Sub-section (3) shall be final and it would be subject to any order being passed by the State Government under Section 7-F only if the power under Section 7-F could be exercised in a given case. It would be seen that an order even under Section 7 of the Act is liable to be interfered with under Section 7-F even though no provision like Sub-section (4) of Section 3 is to be found in Section 7. Merely on account of the fact that there is no such similar provision in Section 7 as is contained in Section 3 (4) it cannot be said that an order passed under Section 7 will not be final even though no representation has been made to the State government under Section 7-F. If the submission made by the learned counsel :or respondent No. 1 to the effect that it s only because of Section 7-F that the State Government can set aside, an order under Section 3 is accepted Sub-section (4) would become redundant because in that view of the matter even in the absence of Sub-section (4) the State Government would still be competent as in case of an order passed under Section 7 which does not have, any Sub-section as Section 3 (4) to set aside the order of the Commissioner under Section 7-F in respect of those areas where Section 7-F is applicable. It cannot be said that the legislature was doing an exercise in futility in enacting Sub-section (4).

In our opinion the purpose of enacting Sub-section (4) was to ensure that in all those areas where Section 3 as it stood originally alone was applied, remedy of not only a revision under Section 3 to the Commissioner but also a representation to the State Government under Sub-section (4) may be available. It cannot be said that even though a right to file a revision to the Commissioner was given to the landlord or the tenant, as the case may be, against the order of the District Magistrate passed under Section 3 in respect to an accommodation situated in an area to which Section 3 was alone applied, but no right of representation to the State Government was given tothem. In Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher, (1949 (2) All ER 155) at page 164 Denning, L. J. observed:--

'Whenever a statute comes up for consideration it must be remembered that it is not within human powers to foresee the manifold sets of facts which may arise, and, even if it were, it is not possible to provide for them in terms free from all ambiguity. The English language is not an instrument of mathematical precision. Our literature would be much the poorer if it were. This is where the draftsmen of Acts of Parliament have often been unfairly criticised. A Judge, believing himself to be fettered by the supposed rule that he must look to the language and nothing else, laments that the draftsmen have not provided for this or that, or have been guilty of some or other ambiguity. It would certainly save the Judge's trouble if Acts of Parliament were drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity. In the absence of it, when a defect appears a Judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsmen. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament, and he must do this not only from the language of the statute, but also from a consideration of the social conditions which gave rise to it and of the mischief which it was passed to remedy, and then he must supplement the written word so as to give 'force and life' to the intention of the legislature ... ... ... ... ... ... AJudge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases ... ... ... ...'

If the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 is accepted there may be cases in which not only the landlord but even the tenant may suffer. For instance, permission may have been refused by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer but is granted by the Commissioner on a revision filed by the landlord. If it is held that the tenant has no right of representation the very purpose of the Act, which was enacted to restrict the ejectment of tenants to cases of given contingency alone, would be frustrated.

5. There is another way of looking at the problem facing us. On a plain reading of Section 7-F it would appear that the power given to the State Government under the said Section is not dependant upon any representation being made by the aggrieved party. A representation by the aggrieved party is one of therecognised methods to bring to the notice of the higher authority the error committed by a subordinate authority. In our view Section 7-F gives the State Government a power to call for the record of any case in which orders have been passed by the subordinate authorities under any one of the sections referred to in Section 7-F irrespective of the situation or the location of the accommodation in respect of which the order had been passed by the subordinate authorities.

6. In view of the foregoing discussions we are of the opinion that the State Government in the instant case was competent to set aside the order passed by the Commissioner on the representation made by the appellant.

7. In regard to the second ground on which the order of the State Government, was set aside by the learned single Judge, viz., that it had not properly considered the need of respondent No. 1, it was pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant that all the facts which were material had been considered by the State Government. It was urged that the mere fact that the State Government had not specially referred to the plea taken by respondent No. 1, to the effect that he had acquired a goodwill in respect of the shop which he had been carrying on in a portion of the accommodation in dispute was not of much significance on the facts of the instant case. It would be seen that the application for permission under Section 3 had been made by the appellant in respect of the entire accommodation in the tenancy of respondent No. 1. This comprised of not only commercial accommodation but also residential accommodation. It was not the ca.se of respondent No. 1 that he was himself residing in the accommodation in dispute or was carrying on business therein. His case on the other hand was that it was his son Akhilesh Kumar who was residing in the said accommodation and he was carrying on cloth business.

On a consideration of the evidence produced before him the Rent Control and Eviction Officer came to the conclusion that the need of the appellant was genuine. In regard to the need of respondent No. 1 he held that the said respondent owned a very big house and that in view of the ration-card and the voters-list it was apparent that Akhilesh Kumar was also residing with respondent No. 1 in the said house. It was also held that one of the two portions of the shop was lying vacant and in the remaining portion some cloth was kept. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer further found relying on the affidavits of the appellant and his witness Abdul Aziz that Akhilesh Kumar, the son of respondent No. 1, sold cloth as a hawker. On these findings it is apparent that the accommodation in dispute was not being used for residential purposes not only by the respondent No. 1 but also by his son Akhilesh Kumar. It is further clear that Akhilesh Kumar was not selling cloth by sitting in the shop itself but sold it as a hawker. The cloth which was stored in one of the portions of the shop was also of insignificant quantity. The question of the respondent No. 1 acquiring any goodwill in these circumstances hardly arose. Whether a person has acquired goodwill or not is a question of fact. Goodwill has to be proved by evidence. There was neither any pleading about goodwill before the Rent Control & Eviction Officer nor was any evidence given in this respect. The question of considering goodwill, therefore, did not arise in this case. The State Government has also substantially placed reliance on that very material on the basis of which permission was granted by the Rent Control & Eviction Officer. A perusal of the order of the State Government makes it clear that it has considered the needs of both the parties and only after a comparison of their respective needs has come to the conclusion that the permission prayed for by the appellant deserved to be granted to him. The finding recorded by the State Government in these circumstances could not be challenged in a writ petition.

8. In the result the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment of the learned single Judge is set aside and the writ petition is dismissed with costs.


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