Arthur Strachey, C.J.
1. Mr. O'Conor, who holds Mr. Colvin's brief for the appellant, states that he does not propose to press this appeal except upon the question of sentence. The appellant has been convicted of an offence punishable under Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code, and has received the minimum sentence under that section, namely, seven years' rigorous imprisonment. Unless therefore that Section is inapplicable, I have no power to reduce the sentence. Mr. O'Conor has contended that the Section does not apply, because, according to the evidence for the Crown, and in particular that of the complainant Gajraj, the blow which caused grievous hurt by breaking Gajraj's arm, and which was struck during the commission of the dacoity, was struck, not by the appellant, but by another of the dacoits. He supports this argument by reference to the case in the Madras High Court (Weir 99) cited in Mr. Mayne's note to Section 397, and to the use of the expression 'such offender,' which implies that the liability to enhanced punishment under the Section is limited to the offender who actually causes grievous hurt. There can be no doubt, however, that the appellant was one of the persons committing the dacoity; and the evidence shows, that upon Gajraj seizing the appellant while the dacoits were engaged in plundering the threshing floor, all the dacoits attacked and beat him with lathis, and that the appellant similarly joined the rest in so beating him. It is thus clear that the attack on Gajraj was made by the dacoits, including the appellant, in furtherance of the common intention of all, and therefore each of them was liable under Section 34 of the Code in the same manner as if he were the sole assailant. If without any dacoity the persons concerned had together attacked Gajraj, and in that attack his arm had been broken, but with no evidence as to who struck that particular blow, or even if the evidence showed that one of them other than the accused had struck it, there can be no doubt that all would, by reason of Section 34, have been guilty of causing grievous hurt to him. That principle cannot cease to he applicable because the assault happened to be committed in the course of a dacoity, or because the evidence shows that it was not the appellant's hand which in that dacoity struck the blow causing the grievous hurt. The words 'such offender' in Section 397 therefore include any person taking part in the dacoity who, though he may not have himself struck the blow causing the grievous hurt, is nevertheless liable for the act by reason of Section 34, and I am therefore of opinion that this appellant caused grievous hurt to Gajraj at the time of committing the dacoity; that the case falls within Section 397, and that I have therefore no power to reduce the sentence. I dismiss the appeal.