Skip to content


Salek Chand Vs. Abdul Razaq - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectLimitation
CourtAllahabad High Court
Decided On
Case NumberSecond Appeal No. 3441 of 1965
Judge
Reported inAIR1974All94
ActsLimitation Act, 1908 - Sections 12 and 20 - Schedule - Article 67
AppellantSalek Chand
RespondentAbdul Razaq
Appellant AdvocateA.B. Saran, Adv.
Respondent AdvocateR.H. Zaidi, Adv.
DispositionAppeal allowed
Excerpt:
..... and 20 and article 67 schedule 1 of limitation act, 1908 - words 'prescribed period' means period prescribed for limitation of suit and not period prescribed for repayment of loan. - cantonments act[c.a. no. 41/2006]. section 346 & cantonment fund (servants rules, 1937, rules 13, 14 & 15: [h.l. gokhale, ag. cj, p.v. hardas, naresh h. patil, r.m. borde & r.m. savant, jj] jurisdiction of school tribunal constituted under maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, (3 of 1978) held, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the maharashtra act cannot entertain appeals filed..........the limitation of the suit and if the period means the prescribed period for the limitation of the suit. schedule 1 has to be read with section 12 of the limitation act and the day from which such period is to be reckoned has to be excluded. there was some difference of opinion on the interpretation of the words 'prescribed period'. the difference has been set at rest by a full bench of this court reported in firm kamta prasad jagannath prasad v. gulzari lal : air1955all41 , wherein after overruling the earlier cases the full bench laid down that the period mentioned in the third column of the first schedule is subject to the provisions of sections 4 to 25 of the limitation act. if the period mentioned in the third column of the first schedule is subject to the provisions of sections 4.....
Judgment:

J.S. Trivedi, J.

1. This Second Civil Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree of Additional Civil Judge, Meerut dismissing the plaintiff's suit on the ground of limitation.

2. Plaintiff-appellant had filed a suit on 19-12-63 for recovery of Rs. 1700/- on the basis of a bond executed on 20th December 1957. The period of limitation was sought to be extended on the basis of payment made on 20th December 1960. The defendant contested the suit on various grounds. The trial Court held that the bond was duly executed by the defendant-respondent and the sum of Rs. 20/- was paid towards interest on 20th December, 1960. The trial Court, however, held that the payment of interest was not within the prescribed period and as such the suit was barred by limitation. The finding of the trial Court was confirmed by the lower appellate Court, hence this Second Civil Appeal.

3. The only question for consideration is whether the payment of interest made on 20th December 1960 extended the period of suit under Section 20 of the Limitation Act (Old). Article 67, Schedule I of the Limitation Act provides a period of three years for a suit, the period is to commence from the date of execution of the bond. Sections 19 and 20 are relevant sections. Section 19 of the Limitation Act prescribes that:--

'Where, before the expiration of the period prescribed for a suit or application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability in respect of such properly or right has been made in writing sign-ed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed, or by some person through whom he derives title or liability, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed.'

Section 20 mentions that:--

'Where payment on account of a debt or of interest on a legacy is made before the expiration of the prescribed period, by the person liable to pay the debt or lagacy or by his duly authorised agent, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the payment was so made.'

4. The question for consideration, therefore, is whether the use of the words 'prescribed period' mean the period prescribed in the first schedule and not the period within which the plaintiff may bring his suit. It is not disputed that a suit if filed on 20th of December, 1960 was within limitation because for computing the period in the first schedule the day from which such period is to be reckoned has to be excluded under Section 12 of the Limitation Act. The use of the expression 'prescribed period' will mean not the period prescribed for the repayment of loan but the period prescribed for the limitation of the suit and if the period means the prescribed period for the limitation of the suit. Schedule 1 has to be read with Section 12 of the Limitation Act and the day from which such period is to be reckoned has to be excluded. There was some difference of opinion on the interpretation of the words 'prescribed period'. The difference has been set at rest by a Full Bench of this Court reported in Firm Kamta Prasad Jagannath Prasad v. Gulzari Lal : AIR1955All41 , wherein after overruling the earlier cases the Full Bench laid down that the period mentioned in the third column of the first schedule is subject to the provisions of Sections 4 to 25 of the Limitation Act. If the period mentioned in the third column of the first schedule is subject to the provisions of Sections 4 to 25 of the Limitation Act, then the day on which the deed was executed had to be excluded in computing the period prescribed under Section 20 of the Limitation Act. Even though there is some difference in the wordings of Sections 19 and 20 of the LimitationAct, but there can be no two opinions that the expiration of the period prescribed for a suit in Section 19 and the use of the words 'prescribed period' in Section 20 have the same meaning.

5. Jainarayan Bapu v. Vithoba, AIR 1923 Nag 143 is a case similar to one in suit. In that case Section 12 was held to have applied for computing the period of limitation. If a suit could be filed till 20th of December, 1960 there is no reason why an acknowledgment or payment of interest made on 20th December, 1960 could not extend the period of limitation and a different interpretation should be put for prescribed period in the case of an acknowledgment or payment of interest than in a case of a suit.

6. Learned counsel for the respondent has contended that the period will not be extended in case the payment is mad* after the period of limitation. There can be no dispute about that proposition of law. The question is whether the payment was made within the period of limitation or not and if Section 12 is applied the payment was made within the period of limitation. The Courts below were, therefore wrong in holding that the payment was made beyond the period of limitation and fell in error in not applying Section 12 of the Limitation Act.

7. The result, therefore, is that this appeal is allowed and the suit of the plaintiff shall stand decreed for Rs. 1700/- with pendente lite and future interest at 3%. Costs of this Court shall be on parties.


Save Judgments// Add Notes // Store Search Result sets // Organizer Client Files //