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Ram Autar and ors. Vs. Ajudhia Singh and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCivil
CourtAllahabad High Court
Decided On
Judge
Reported in(1875)ILR1All231
AppellantRam Autar and ors.
RespondentAjudhia Singh and ors.
Excerpt:
.....board. the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the maharashtra act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. teacher employed in the school run by cantonment board being covered under rule 2 (f) of the cantonment fund servants rules, 1937 can file appeal under rules 13, 14 and 15 to authorities provided therein against any order imposing any penalties etc. [deolali cantonment board v usha devidas dongre, 1993 mah. lj 74; 1993 lab ic 1858 overruled]. -- maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised..........to the contrary could have been expected to succeed. it recites previous applications by ajudhia singh in conjunction with other defendants, and also the judgment of the privy council, and it then proceeds: 'as the other persons do not join me in executing the decree, and in the decree the first court's costs are separately entered in my name, while the costs of the sudder court, amounting to rs. 969-12-0, are entered in my name and in those of the other persons collectively, who do not join in executing the decree, i apply for execution in respect of a 1-11th share, leaving out 10-11ths, the share of the said persons, and pray that it may be realized from the judgment-debtors.' the application of 1874 appears to have been in similar form; and terms more carefully and precisely.....
Judgment:

Robert Stuart, C.J.

1. The application of the 7th September 1871, prayed only for the partial execution of the decree and had not therefore the effect of keeping the decree alive for the other defendants. The same may be said of the application of the 13th August 1874. The application of 1871 itself is before me, and it is difficult to understand how any contention to the contrary could have been expected to succeed. It recites previous applications by Ajudhia Singh in conjunction with other defendants, and also the judgment of the Privy Council, and it then proceeds: 'As the other persons do not join me in executing the decree, and in the decree the first Court's costs are separately entered in my name, while the costs of the Sudder Court, amounting to Rs. 969-12-0, are entered in my name and in those of the other persons collectively, who do not join in executing the decree, I apply for execution in respect of a 1-11th share, leaving out 10-11ths, the share of the said persons, and pray that it may be realized from the judgment-debtors.' The application of 1874 appears to have been in similar form; and terms more carefully and precisely restricted to the applicant's own share could scarcely have been used, and how, in the face of them, the Subordinate Judge could have issued his orders of the 8th and 28th September 1871, is, to say the least of it, not very intelligible.

2. This decree is a joint decree, and no application for its partial execution could keep it alive for the defendants as a body; and Ajudhia Singh's applications of 1871 and f 874, having been confined to his own individual interest in it, in the very clear and unmistakeable terms to which I have adverted, could not be availed of so as to firing the present application within the three years. The order therefore recognizing and proceeding upon it cannot stand. The appeal must ho allowed, and with costs.

Pearson, J.

3. It appears that the execution of the decree was stayed in pursuance of this Court's order, dated 23rd March 1867, in consequence of an appeal lying having been lodged in the Privy Council against the decree of the late Sudder Court, dated 31st March 1864. The appeal was disposed of by the Privy Council's decree, dated 11th February 1870.

4. If it be assumed that the application made by Ajudhia Singh alone on the 7th September 1871, for the execution of a small part of the decree was within time, under Article 167,* Schedule ii, Act IX of 1871, as having been presented within three years from the date of the Privy Council's decree, it must, nevertheless, be held that, inasmuch as it prayed for the partial execution of a joint decree, it was not an application according to law and had not the effect of keeping the decree in force. The same remark applies to Ajudhia Singh' last application of 13th August 1874

5. The present application by Ajudhia Singh and others of the 20th May 1875, is therefore beyond time. I would accordingly decree the appeal with costs, and reversing the lower Court's order disallow the application.

-----------------------------------Foot Note-----------------------------------

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*[Article 7:

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Time when period begins to

Description of application. Period of limitation. run.

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For the execution of a decree Three years.... The date of the decree or

or order of any Civil Court not order, or (where there has been

provided for by No. 169. an appeal) the date of the final

decree or order of the Appellate

Court, or (where there has

been a review of judgment) the

date of the decision passed on

the review, or (where the appli-

cation next hereinafter men-

tioned has been made) the date

of applying to the Court to

enforce, or keep in force, the

decree or order, or (where the

notice next hereinafter made

has been issued) the date of

issuing ii notice under the

Code of Civil Procedure,

section two hundred and

sixteen, or (whore the applica-

tion is to enforce payment of

an instalment which the decree

directs to be paid at a specified

date (the date so specified.)]

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