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Sundar Bibi Vs. Bisheshar Nath and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCivil
CourtAllahabad High Court
Decided On
Judge
Reported in(1887)ILR9All93
AppellantSundar Bibi
RespondentBisheshar Nath and ors.
Excerpt:
.....recording judgments. - cantonments act[c.a. no. 41/2006]. section 346 & cantonment fund (servants rules, 1937, rules 13, 14 & 15: [h.l. gokhale, ag. cj, p.v. hardas, naresh h. patil, r.m. borde & r.m. savant, jj] jurisdiction of school tribunal constituted under maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, (3 of 1978) held, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the maharashtra act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. teacher employed in the school run by cantonment..........the court below, these observations would not apply; but i can only say that i cannot conceive that, in such cases, this court would set aside the decree, without stating its reasons fully. i am of opinion that this application must be refused with costs.straight, j.3. the only point put forward as the substantial question of law involved, which would entitle the petitioner to appeal to her majesty in council, is that taken by the first ground of the memorandum of appeal. i am of opinion that, rules having been framed under the civil procedure code in that behalf this court's judgments are not governed by section 574 of the civil procedure code, but by these rules, and therefore i do not think the objection relied on by the petitioner raises any substantial question of law. the.....
Judgment:

John Edge, Kt., C.J.

1. I am of opinion that this application must be reacted. It is an application for leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council, and although four grounds were originally put forward in support of it, the first of them only is now before us. This is thus stated: 'Because the requirements of Section 574 of the Civil Procedure Code have not been complied with.' Now Section 574 provides that 'the judgment of the Appellate Court shall state--(a) the points for determination; (b) the decision thereupon; (c) the reasons for the decision and (d) when the decree appealed against is reversed or varied the relief to which the appellant is entitled.' In the first place, I cannot conceive that was intended that this section should apply to cases where the High Court having heard the judgment of the Court below and argument upon that judgment, cornel to the conclusion that it is right, and agrees with the reasons which gives It can never have been intended that where both the judgment and its reasons are completely satisfactory to the High Court, and such as the Court itself would have given, the Judges should be compelled to write out again 'the points for determination, 'the decision thereupon,' and 'the reasons for the decision.' In this case the Judges have stated their decision, and have also stated their reasons by saying they agree with the reasons given by the Court below. Is it possible to maintain that in these circumstances the Judges of this Court, agreeing with all the substantial reasons contained in the judgment to the lower Court should sit down and again write out these reasons at length? I further that even the rules framed by the Court in March 1885, did not modify the provisions of Section 574, and if that section does apply to a case like the present, the judgment of Sir Comer Petheram and my brother Oldfield did substantially comply with these provisions. Their judgment, which was delivered by the Chief Justice, was in the following terms: 'This appeal must, in my opinion be dismissed with costs, and the judgment of the first Court affirmed; and I do not think it necessary to say more than that we agree with the Judge's reasons.' The Judge's reasons include the groundwork on which they are based; and the Judges of this Court virtually adopt and make their own his statement of the issues, his findings, and his reasons.

2. In the next place this Court, in March 1885--before the date of the judgment in question framed rules under Section 633 of the Code, which provides that the High Court shall take evidence and record judgments or orders in such manner as it by rule from time to time directs.' These words give us the widest discretion as to the mode of taking evidence in cases tried before the Court; and the taking of evidence is the most important step before judgment can be arrived at, because the judgments, both of this Court and of the Privy Council, might be materially affected by the mode in which it is done It has been said that the expression 'record judgments or orders' merely gives us the power of saying that judgments or orders shall be recorded in a particular book or with a particular seal. I entirely dissent from that contention. The intention of the Legislature, as expressed in Section 633, was that the Judges might frame rules as to how their judgments should be given so that they might give them orally or in writing, or adopt any mode which might appear to them best in the interests of justice. I am therefore of opinion that there is nothing in the argument that these rules are ultra vires. Now Rule 9 is as follows: 'The record of judgments or orders shall be, as far as possible, verbatim and it shall state, as far as may be necessary for the purposes of the particular case, the points for determination, the decision thereupon the reasons for the decision and, when the decree appealed against is reversed or varied the relief to which the appellant is entitled.' The important words are as far as may be necessary for the purposes of the particular case.' How can it possibly be contended that in a case where this Court substantially adopts the who e judgment of the Court below, it is necessary to go through the formality of re-stating the points at issue, the decision, upon each point, and the reasons? It has been said that in cases where this Court disagrees with the Court below, these observations would not apply; but I can only say that I cannot conceive that, in such cases, this Court would set aside the decree, without stating its reasons fully. I am of opinion that this application must be refused with costs.

Straight, J.

3. The only point put forward as the substantial question of law involved, which would entitle the petitioner to appeal to Her Majesty in Council, is that taken by the first ground of the memorandum of appeal. I am of opinion that, rules having been framed under the Civil Procedure Code in that behalf this Court's judgments are not governed by Section 574 of the Civil Procedure Code, but by these rules, and therefore I do not think the objection relied on by the petitioner raises any substantial question of law. The application must be refused with costs.

Oldfield, J.

4. I entirely concur in the opinion of the learned Chief Justice.

Brodhurst, J.

5. I concur with the learned Chief Justice that there is no ground for granting the application for leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council, and I would refuse the certificate, and dismiss the petition with costs.

Tyrrell, J.

6. I concur.


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