Stuart and Wallach, JJ.
1. The decision of this revision has been referred to a Bench of two Judges in view of the difference of opinion between the Judges who decided Parbhu Narain Singh, Kashi Naresh v. Harbans Lal (1916) 14 A.L.J. 281 (291). The point is this. Does a revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure lie against the order of a District Judge in an appeal against the decision of a Assistant Collector in a matter under the provisions of Section 167, Local Act II of 1901? We have heard the arguments. The arguments to the effect that no such revision lies can briefly be stated as follows: Under the provisions of Section 167, Local Act II of 1901, 'all suits and applications of the nature specified in the fourth Schedule shall be heard and determined by the Revenue Courts; and except in the way of appeal, as hereinafter provided, no courts other than Courts of Revenue shall take cognizance of any dispute or matter in respect of which any such suit or application might be brought or made. The authority of courts for dealing with the matters provided for by that Act is to be found in the provisions of the Act itself. Revenue Courts only have authority to deal with original matters. Revenue Courts in some instances and Civil Courts in other instances have authority to deal with matters in appeal. The Act confers powers in revision under the provisions of Section 185 on the Board of Revenue alone. What authority, then, we are asked, has the High Court, ' except in the way of appeal as hereinafter provided? ' According to this argument the High Court has necessarily no revisional authority. The arguments on the other side arc to the effect that Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure confers upon the High Court revisional jurisdiction over all Civil Courts subordinate to itself. As a District Judge's Court is subordinate to the High Court, it follows, according to this argument, that the High Court must have powers to revise any orders passed by a District Judge. Great stress is laid in this connection upon the provisions of Section 193, Local Act II of 1901, and we have been asked to note that the provisions of Section 622 of the old Code of Civil Procedure are not excluded under the provisions of Section 193. After considering the point, we are of opinion that the argument against the existence of revisional powers of the High Court in these matters must prevail. The fact that there is no exclusion of Section 622 in Section 193, does not affect the question, for the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to the procedure in suits and other proceedings under the Rent Act so far as they are not inconsistent therewith. Thus the only power that the High Court has to dispose of matters covered by Local Act II of 1901, is given by the Act itself and the power of revision is not a power which is so given to it. In other words we accept the view of Mr. Justice Piggott in Parbhu Narain Singh,. Kashi Naresh v. Harbans Lal (1916) 14 A.L.J. 281: 'I am, as at present advised, of opinion that it would be doing violence to the words of the, last clause of Section 167 of the Tenancy Act for this Court to entertain the present application at all. ' The same view was taken by Tudball, J., in Muhammad Ehtisham Ali v. Lalji Singh (1918) I.L.R. 41 All. 226. We, therefore, find that the High Court has no power to entertain an application for revision against an order passed in appeal by a District Judge against the decision of an Assistant Collector, We accept the preliminary objection and dismiss this revision with costs.