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Lal Bahadur Singh Vs. Surajpal Singh and anr. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCivil ;Tenancy
CourtAllahabad
Decided On
Reported inAIR1946All486
AppellantLal Bahadur Singh
RespondentSurajpal Singh and anr.
Excerpt:
.....there are various other things that he must prove as well. it is in short a summary remedy and, if successful, it still remains a completely open question whether he can keep that possession as against somebody who comes forward with a better title......court for relief under section 9, specific 'relief act. that brings us to that section.4. if any person is dispossessed without his consent of immoveable property otherwise than in doe course of law, he or any person claiming through him may, by suit, recover possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in such suit. nothing in this section shall bar any person from suing to establish his title to such property and to recover possession thereof....5. now, as i read that section, it furnishes a man who has been dispossessed with a cause of action which is a very different cause of action from the one provided by either section 180 or section 183, u.p. tenancy act. all he has to do under section 9, specific relief act is to come to the court and to say 'i have.....
Judgment:
ORDER

Braund, J.

1. I do not propose to refer this question in revision to a Pull Bench, although it is undoubtedly one of some interest. But it arises in revision and I think it would be better if I dealt with it myself to the best of my ability. The point is a very short one. A suit was brought by a plaintiff against a defendant under Section 9, Specific Relief Act. The plaintiff alleged that he had been in possession of certain plots of land within six months and had been dispossessed of them by the defendant. On these simple allegations, and no more, he claimed possession. The answer given by the defendant, so far as it is material to this revision, was that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the case at all. The ground on which this was asserted was that the suit was taken out of the jurisdiction of the civil Court by Section 242, U.P. Tenancy Act. That section runs in this way:

Subject to the provisions of Section 286 all suits and applications of the nature specified in Schedule 4, shall be heard and determined by a revenue Court, and no Court other than a revenue Court shall, except by way of appeal or revision as provided in this Act, take cognizance of any such suit or application, or of any suit or application based on a cause of action in respect of which relief could be obtained by means of any such suit or application.

Explanation. If the cause of action is one in respect of which relief might be granted by the revenue Court, it is immaterial that the relief asked for from the civil Court may not be identical with that which the revenue Court could have granted.

2. Now, what is said is that the claim of the plaintiff for possession made before the civil Court in this suit is 'based on a cause of action in respect of which relief could' have been obtained by means of such a suit as is specified in Schedule 4, U.P. Tenancy Act. The two relevant types of suit specified in Schedule 4, U.P. Tenancy Act, are those which are described in Sections 180 and 183 of the Act, and we must, therefore, look at these since they are included in Schedule 4, to see if they are suits based on a cause of action which is the same as the cause of action on which the suit, in the civil Court of the present plaintiff is based. Section 180, Tenancy Act, is a section which provides for the ejectment by the Court of any person who takes possession (that is who dispossesses another) 'without the consent of the person entitled to admit him as tenant.' That, therefore, is a section which requires the person who is dispossessed to show, not only that he has been dispossessed, but that he has been dispossessed by a person who has taken possession from him without the consent of whoever it is who would have been entitled to admit the dispossesses as tenant. That is one section.

3. The other section is Section 183. That section affords various remedies to 'any tenant ejected from or prevented from obtaining possession of, his holding or part thereof...' Under this section, therefore, the dispossessed person has to prove first of all that he was a tenant, secondly, that he was a tenant of a holding, thirdly, that he has been dispossessed from that holding or from part of it, and, fourthly, that such dispossessing was not in accordance with the provisions for the time being of the law. And, indeed, there are various other things that he must prove as well. What I have to consider is whether the causes of action in respect of which relief could be obtained under either Section 180 or Section 183 are the same as that cause of action on which a man founds his claim when he comes to the Court for relief under Section 9, Specific 'Relief Act. That brings us to that section.

4. If any person is dispossessed without his consent of immoveable property otherwise than in doe course of law, he or any person claiming through him may, by suit, recover possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in such suit. Nothing in this section shall bar any person from suing to establish his title to such property and to recover possession thereof....

5. Now, as I read that section, it furnishes a man who has been dispossessed with a cause of action which is a very different cause of action from the one provided by either Section 180 or Section 183, U.P. Tenancy Act. All he has to do under Section 9, Specific Relief Act is to come to the Court and to say 'I have been dispossessed and it has been without my own consent....' By virtue of the Limitation Act he has to do so within a very short period of his dispossession. As I see it, Section 9 is in the nature of a summary remedy for a person who has been turned out of de facto possession of property and comes to the Court immediately to be put back into it. It is a cause of action founded entirely on possession and nothing else. No question of title enters into the matter at all. The only qualification for a person claiming relief under this section is that he shall be able to predicate of himself, not that he was any particular type of tenant or was in occupation under any particular title or right, but that, he was merely in possession and was dispossessed. That no question of title arises is made quite clear by the proviso which says that nothing shall stop him from suing to establish his title in another Court. It is in short a summary remedy and, if successful, it still remains a completely open question whether he can keep that possession as against somebody who comes forward with a better title.

6. Comparing, therefore, the cause of action, as I conceive it to be, under Section 9, Specific Relief Act and the causes of action under Sections 180 and 183 respectively of the U.P. Tenancy Act, I have great difficulty in thinking that it can be fairly said that a suit under Section 9, Specific Relief Act is a suit based on a cause of action in respect of which relief could be obtained under either Section 180 or Section 183, Tenancy Act. Test it this way. For the purpose of bringing a suit under either Section 180 or Section 183, Tenancy Act, would it be sufficient for the plaintiff to come to the Court and say merely this : - 'I have been dispossessed within the last six months' - and nothing more? I venture to think that it would not be sufficient. He would have to go a long way further. For the purpose of Section 180 he would have to say that he had been dispossessed by a particular type of person, namely by a person who had omitted to get the consent of him who was entitled to admit him as tenant. For the purpose of Section 183 he would have to say quite a lot of things, namely that he was a tenant, that he had been tenant of a holding and several other things. I cannot think that the summary cause of action provided by Section 9, Specific Relief Act is the same thing as the cause of action, which is really a cause of action based on title, covered by the relevant sections of the U.P. Tenancy Act.

7. For these reasons in my judgment the relief claimed in this suit under the Specific Relief Act was not such as might have been claimed in any suit or application based on a cause of action under the machinery of the U.P. Tenancy Act and accordingly I agree with the view of the Munsif that the suit was cognizable by this. Court. That is the only point that has been argued, and accordingly, I must dismiss this, revision with costs.


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