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Bhagwan Sri Krishenji Maharaj Virajman Mandir, Khanpur Vs. Chuttan Lal - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectProperty;Civil
CourtAllahabad High Court
Decided On
Case NumberSecond Appeal No. 1729 of 1954
Judge
Reported inAIR1963All54
ActsTransfer of Property Act, 1882 - Sections 106
AppellantBhagwan Sri Krishenji Maharaj Virajman Mandir, Khanpur
RespondentChuttan Lal
Appellant AdvocateS.B.L. Gaur, Adv.
Respondent AdvocateD. Sanyal, Adv.
DispositionAppeal allowed
Excerpt:
civil - property - section 106 of transfer of property act, 1882 - notice terminating tenancy - whether notice is vague - it should be liberally construed - tenant must show the defective language causing him to misunderstand its nature - did not emphasize this point - valid notice. - cantonments act[c.a. no. 41/2006]. section 346 & cantonment fund (servants rules, 1937, rules 13, 14 & 15: [h.l. gokhale, ag. cj, p.v. hardas, naresh h. patil, r.m. borde & r.m. savant, jj] jurisdiction of school tribunal constituted under maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, (3 of 1978) held, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. the..........of bhagwan sri krishenji maharaj virajman mandir khanpur and filed this suit through its manager ganga saran. it was alleged in the plaint that ganga saran was the manager of the deity and had let out to the defendant a plot of land belonging to the plaintiff at a rental of rs. 2/- per month, the tenancy commencing from the 1st of october, 1950. the defendant defaulted in payment of rent and a notice under section 106 of the transfer of property act was served of him,2. the defendant resisted the suit and contended that he had taken the land on lease from a man called raghubir saran and paid rent to him. he denied that ganga saran who is alleged by the plaintiff to have made the agreement was the manager of the deity.3. the trial court disbelieved the defendant and decreed the suit for.....
Judgment:

S.S. Dhavan, J.

1. This is a plaintiff's second appeal against the decision of the learned Additional Civil Judge, Bulandshahr dismissing its suit for the ejectment of the defendant. The plaintiff is the deity of Bhagwan Sri Krishenji Maharaj Virajman Mandir Khanpur and filed this suit through its manager Ganga Saran. It was alleged in the plaint that Ganga Saran was the manager of the deity and had let out to the defendant a plot of land belonging to the plaintiff at a rental of Rs. 2/- per month, the tenancy commencing from the 1st of October, 1950. The defendant defaulted in payment of rent and a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was served of him,

2. The defendant resisted the suit and contended that he had taken the land on lease from a man called Raghubir Saran and paid rent to him. He denied that Ganga Saran who is alleged by the plaintiff to have made the agreement was the manager of the deity.

3. The trial Court disbelieved the defendant and decreed the suit for ejectment. In appeal the learned Judge held that the land had not been leased out to the defendant by Ganga Saran as alleged by the plaintiff but by Raghubir Saran. He also found that the date of the commencement of the tenancy was not the 1st of October 1950, but the Janamashthmi day of August, 1951. He also held that the question whether Ganga Saran or Raghubir Saran had let out the land was immaterial as Raghubir Saran had not claimed any interest adverse to the deity and it was open to the plaintiff to adopt the act of Raghubir Saran. But the learned Judge dismissed the plaintiff's suit on the ground that the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was invalid. Aggrieved by this decision the plaintiff has come to this Court in second appeal.

4. I think the learned Judge was in error. The words of the notice are 'ya agar turn aur koi tareekh shuroo kiraidari ki samajhte ho to uskey lihaz se khali kardo.' ('Or if you think that the tenancy commenced on some other date, you may vacate the land on the corresponding date'). The learned Judge was of the opinion that the words 'uske lihaz se khali kardo' are too vague and indefinite and, therefore, the notice to quit was not valid. I am afraid the learned Judge has placed an interpretation on these words which is quite incorrect. The Transfer of Property Act prescribes no form of notice nor any particular words. If the notice makes it clear to the tenant that his tenancy has been terminated and he is required to vacate the accommodation at the end of the month (or the year) of the tenancy, it is a valid notice. In Ganga Prasad v. Prem Kumar Kohli, AIR 1949 All 173 it was held by this Court that a notice requiring the defendant to vacate the premises 'on 18th May, 1944, or on such date as your then current month of tenancy will end' was valid. This Court has always taken the view that the object of the notice under Section 106 is to give the tenant sufficient time to vacate the premises and such a notice should be liberally construed. The real point in such cases is that the person on whom the notice is served should understand that his tenancy has been terminated and he is required to vacate at the end of the period of the tenancy. If the tenant attacks the notice on the ground of vagueness he must show that its defective language caused him to misunderstand its nature. The words of the notice in the case before me are clear and could have caused no misunderstanding in the defendant's mind. In fact the defendants' counsel did not argue that the defendant misunderstood it. I find no justification for the view of the learned Judge that the notice is indefinite and vague.

5. Learned counsel for the respondent then argued that the plaintiff had no right to file this suit in view of the finding of the appellate Court that the tenancy was created through Raghubir Saran and not its manager Ganga Saran. I am not much impressed by this argument. As correctly observed by the lower Court, Raghubir Saran was not acting on his own behalf and the plaintiff could always ratify the transaction made by him.

6. This appeal is allowed and the plaintiff's suit decreed with costs throughout.

7. Leave to appeal is refused.


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