Chamier and Piggott, JJ.
1. The facts of the case are that in the year 1888 one Jhingur Singh made over to the first defendant, in consideration of medical services rendered by him, some plots of land in a village. The defendant entered into possession, planted a garden and built houses on the land, laying out a considerable sum of money thereon. In 1906 Jhingur Singh sold his rights in the village to the plaintiff appellant, who at once set to work to compel the first defendant to pay rent for the land. All his attempts in the Revenue Court failed and he then brought this suit praying for proprietary possession of the land and for mesne profits for three years immediately preceding the suit. The defence was that the plots in question were given by the Zamindar to the defendant in recognition of his medical services, that the defendant had spent a large sum of money on the land and that the plaintiff had no right to dispossess him. The courts below have agreed in dismissing the plaintiff's claim. In second appeal it is contended on behalf of the plaintiff that in the absence of a registered document the defendant is no more than a licensee and that the plaintiff being a transferee of the property is entitled to revoke the licence. Reliance is placed on Section 59 of Easements Act, which runs as follows:
When the grantor of a licence transfers the property affected thereby, the transferee is not as such bound by the licence.
2. The defendant, on the other hand, relies on Section 60 of the Act, which, so far as it applies to the present case, is as follows:
A licence may be revoked by the grantor unless (b), the licensee, acting upon the licence, has executed a work of permanent character and incurred expenses in the execution.
3. The plaintiff admits that on the facts found the case is clearly covered by Section 60 of the Act; but he maintains that Section 59 lays down an independent rule which entitles a transferee of property to revoke a licence, even if the licensee acting upon the licence has executed a work of a permanent character and incurred expenses in the execution, that is to say, even if the licence could not have been revoked by the original grantor. It seems to us that the words, 'as such' in Section 59 are extremely significant and would not have appeared in the section if the intention had been to lay down an independent rule that a transferee of property might revoke a licence which could not have been revoked by the transferor. The section was probably inserted in order to meet the possibility of a plea by the licensee of property that no one but the grantor of the licence is entitled to revoke it and that if the grantor does not revoke it his transferee cannot do so. In our opinion Section 59 means that, when the grantor of a licence transfers the property, the transferee is no more bound by the licence than the transferor was, and we think it impossible to construe this section as meaning that the transferee has a better right than the transferor. For these reasons we are of opinion that Section 59 of the Easements Act does not entitle the plaintiff to revoke the licence granted to the defendant, even if he is only a licensee. We need only add that the plaintiff's claim, against the defendant as a trespasser, is clearly not maintainable. The suit was rightly dismissed. We dismiss this appeal with costs.