1. This second appeal arises out of a suit in which the Shias of Jaunpur sought a declaration that they had a right to take out whenever they liked a religious procession with tabal, tasha, etc. and to pass through every thoroughfare in Jaunpur City as well as Qazi-ki-gali in mohalla Ajmeri and Abirgar Tola reciting nauha and doing matam on the afflictions of Imam Husain and calling imprecations (lanat) on Omar-bin-saad, Hur-mula, Shanon, Yazid, Shis, Shimer and Khuli. The learned Munsif gave them a declaration in these terms subject to any order or directions issued by the Magistrate or the police for preventing breaches of the public peace or obstructions of thoroughfares or for other matters mentioned in Section 144, Criminal P.C. or under other statutory provisions or for regulation of traffic. The decision of the learned Munsif was upheld in first appeal. It is urged in second appeal that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a declaration saying that they had a right to call down curses or imprecations on certain persons who are revered by Muslims or certain sects of Muslims. It is also urged that the learned Munsif in his judgment gave expression to opinions about other persons who are held in reverence by the Sunnis. We may say at once that we think that it was quite unnecessary for the learned Munsif to go into questions of history and pronounce his opinion upon any persons who are revered by any section of Muslims. The question before him was quite simple and his remarks were entirely irrelevant. In our judgment he would have been much wiser to refrain from expressing opinions of this kind which were unnecessary for the decision of the suit. We ourselves make it clear that we express no opinion one way or the other about the historical facts or the religious disputes between the parties.
2. On the other point it seems clear to us that no civil Court should exercise its power to give a declaration to the effect that any person or persons is or are entitled to bring down curses upon others in public streets and highways. We express no opinion whether any particular form of recitation is or is not offensive to the feelings of the Sunnis, but we think it was quite wrong to include in the declaration a statement that the plaintiffs have a right to call down imprecations on the persons mentioned in the plaint. It seems to us that the law on the matter of these rights to take out processions is now so clear that suits of this nature are a mere waste of time. It is obvious that the Shia community has a right to take out a procession accompanied by recitations or any other ceremonials provided they do not offend the equal rights of others to make use of the public streets without being subjected to an abuse or any form of offence. It is equally clear that the law has placed a power in the hands of Magistrates or the police to license processions and interfere with them if they are likely to cause a breach of the public peace or in other ways to interfere with the welfare of the community as a whole. Declarations in suits of this nature can do no more than state the law which is now perfectly clear. In the present case we think it sufficient to modify the declaration by excising from it the words 'and callings of Lans (imprecations) on the seven persons named in that list.' As we have already said, we express no opinion upon the nature of any particular recitation. This disposes of the question before us. The appeal is allowed in part. We are satisfied that the whole trouble has been caused by the plaintiffs in attempting to secure a declaration which on the face of it should never have been allowed. We therefore direct that the plaintiffs-respondents will pay the costs of the defendants-appellants in all Courts.