Harnam Das Vs. Naubat Ram - Court Judgment
|Court||Allahabad High Court|
|Judge||John Edge, Kt., C.J., ;Straight, ;Oldfield, ;Brodhurst and ;Tyrrell, JJ.|
.....of high court. - cantonments act[c.a. no. 41/2006]. section 346 & cantonment fund (servants rules, 1937, rules 13, 14 & 15: [h.l. gokhale, ag. cj, p.v. hardas, naresh h. patil, r.m. borde & r.m. savant, jj] jurisdiction of school tribunal constituted under maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, (3 of 1978) held, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the maharashtra act cannot entertain appeals filed under section 9 by the employees working in schools which are established and administered by the cantonment board. teacher employed in the school run by cantonment..........the rule in question should not be construed strictly, but it has been suggested that the rule is ultra vires of the court. now this court, in framing the rule in question, appears to have followed the practice of the calcutta high court, and a case arose there--harrak singh v. tulsi ram sahu, 5 b. l. r., 47.,--first before the division bench, and afterwards before the court in appeal, in reference to the number of days within which an appeal would be in time. in that case it was-never suggested that the calcutta high court had no power to make the rule applied there. again, in 1879, fazal muhammad v. phul kuar i. l. r., 2 all., 192, the full bench of this court had to consider what was the period of limitation which should be computed according to this rule, and in that case also it.....
John Edge, Kt., C.J.
1. A preliminary objection to the hearing of this appeal has been taken by Pandit Sundar Lal, and we are of opinion that it must prevail. The objection is, that the appeal has not been riled within the period of ninety days required by the rule of this Court. No reason has been shown why the rule in question should not be construed strictly, but it has been suggested that the rule is ultra vires of the Court. Now this Court, in framing the rule in question, appears to have followed the practice of the Calcutta High Court, and a case arose there--Harrak Singh v. Tulsi Ram Sahu, 5 B. L. R., 47.,--first before the Division Bench, and afterwards before the Court in appeal, in reference to the number of days within which an appeal would be in time. In that case it was-never suggested that the Calcutta High Court had no power to make the rule applied there. Again, in 1879, Fazal Muhammad v. Phul Kuar I. L. R., 2 All., 192, the Full Bench of this Court had to consider what was the period of limitation which should be computed according to this rule, and in that case also it was never suggested that the rule was ultra vires. No such question was raised, and under the circumstances, although the ultimate origin of the rule cannot be traced, we must assume that it had a legal origin, and was not ultra vires of the Court. The appeal must be dismissed with, costs.
Straight, Oldfield, Brodhurst, and Tyrrell, JJ.