1. The plaintiff sued for possession of the property to which his deceased father Gaya became entitled as next reversioner on the death of a Hindu widow of the family Mt. Richhpali in 1917. It is admitted by the subordinate Courts that Gaya was next reversioner on the death of Ms. Richhpali but the suit was dismissed on the ground that Gaya was party to a compromise during a litigation in 1861 and was therefore estopped from suing Sukhdeo and others for recovery of the property whose succession opened out on the death of Mt. Richhpali. The litigation in 1863 arose when two other widows of the family Mt. Jaddu and Mt. Reshma had died. Several parties applied for mutation of names whereupon a compromise was effected on 9th January 1863. Gaya and his cousin Jaddu who were then minors under the guardianship of a female were given the property which was in the possession of Mt. Reshma whereas Rambhajan, ancestor of Sukhdeo defendant received the property left by Mt. Jaddu and also a relinquishment from Gaya and Jaddu as to their expectant reversionary rights in the property held by Mt, Richhpali. It is admitted that at the time Rambhajan was the next reversioner to the husband of both the ladies Mt. Reshma and Mt. Jaddu and that Gaya and Jaddu had no right whatsoever to the property of the husband of Mt, Reshma. Under the compromise therefore Gaya obtained the property to which he was not entitled and has enjoyed that property for over 60 years since 1863. Subsequently in 1873 Gaya sued to have the compromise cancelled but that suit was dismissed.
2. The defence here that the present suit is barred by the provisions of res judicata and by reason of the compromise. It does not appear to me that the present suit would have been triable by a Munsif in 1873. The lower appellate Court argued that the value of the property had increased and the value of the present suit could have been only Rs. 1,000 if the suit had been brought in 1873. It appears to me that the Court is under a misapprehension: Rs. 1,000 was valuation of the suit in which the claim was only with respect to one-fourth of the property while the present suit is of four times that value as the property included therein is four times the property included in the suit of 1873. The defence of res Judicata must therefore fail in my opinion.
3. The other defence is strong and fully supported by case law on the subject. The whole point has been summed up in the case of Ananda Mohan Roy v. Gour Mohan Mallick A.I.R. 1921 Cal. 501, after an exhaustive discussion as was usual with the learned Judge who delivered the judgment. The conclusion is summed up in these words at; pp. 511 and 542 (of 48 Cal.) of the report:
We must accordingly take it as settled by the decisions of the Judicial Committee that the interest of a Hindu reversioner is an interest expectant on the death of a qualified owner; it is not a vested interest, it is a spes succession is or a mere chance of succession, it cannot be sold, mortgaged, assigned or relinquished, for in transfer of a spes successions is a nullity and has no effect in law. But though a transfer of his interest by a reversioner is void, he may, by becoming a party to a compromise and by taking the benefit of the compromise, be estopped from claiming as a reversioner.
4. One ruling of the Privy Council Kanhai Lal v. Brij Lal A.I.R. 1918. P.C. 70 and one of this Court Khunni Lal v. Gobind Krishna Narain  33 All. 356, are quoted among others in support of this conclusion. The question here therefore is not one as was in the Privy Council case of Amrit Narain Singh v. Gaya Singh A.I.R. 1917 P.C. 95, as to whether an expectant right of a reversioner may be disposed of by agreement but the question is whether the reversioner under the circumstances of the present case, can sue for Jus right or is debarred from doing so by reason of a family settlement under which he has obtained a certain benefit. As far back as 1919 a Bench of this Court had held in Chahlu v. Parmal  41 All. 611, such an agreement to be binding on the reversioner. It is clear to me that the compromise of 1863 estopped Gaya from claiming his reversionary right on the death of Mt. Richhpali and the plaintiff being the son of Gaya and as he derives his title from Gaya is equally barred.
5. This appeal is dismissed with costs.