1. This is an application in revision from an order of a Small Cause Court Judge. It appears that the plaintiff before the Small Cause Court obtained a decree for Rs. 533-13-0 ex parte against the defendant on 12th November 1927. On 12th April 1928, the defendant obtained knowledge of ahe decree. On 22nd April 1928, he applied to set aside the decree, and in recordance with the rules filed a security bond with two sureties. On 27th April 1928, Balgovind applied to withdraw his name as surety. On 30th April 1928, the defendant paid into Court a sum of Rs. 335 which be thought was a sufficient sum to represent the suretyship of Balgovind. On 21st July 1928, the decree-holder objected to the security bond on the ground that the other surety Gopi Tewari being a Hindu and having two sons, his suretyship was worth nothing. It is to be observed that the security given was a hypothecation bond by Gopi Tewari in respect of joint and ancestral property. The Small Cause Court Judge decided this matter very briefly, and he says:
The decree-holder says that his security is not enough, that Gopinath has sons, and as other security has not been filed, the application is dismissed.
2. It is apparent from this order that the security was rejected on the ground that Gopinath, a Hindu father, had two sons and that the property mortgaged was ancestral and joint. The Small Cause Court Judge considered that it was not possible for a Hindu father to pledge his estate for the purpose of being a surety. The appellant raises the question in his first ground of appeal that this statement of law is incorrect.
3. A preliminary question was raised on behalf of the respondent as to whether under Section 25, Small Cause Courts Act, this Court sitting in revision was entitled to interfere in this case on the ground that a proposition of law was incorrect. Reference was made by the learned Counsel for the respondent to Muhammad Nizamuddin Khan v. Hira Lal  A.W.N. 121 in which Mahmud, J. had laid down at p. 122 that he was of opinion that the action of a Court of Small Causes was not questionable in revision unless it had caused at least such substantial injustice affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court as Section 578, Civil P.C., (now Section 115) contemplated. That decision was followed in Mohammad Baqar v. Bahal Singh  13 All. 277 in which it was laid down that Section 25, Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, was not intended to give in effect a right of appeal in all Small Cause Court cases and the revisional powers given by that section are only exerciseable where it appears that some substantial injustice to a party to a litigation has directly resulted from a material misapplication or misapprehension of law, or from a material error in procedure. Following these rulings we find that in the present case there was a very substantial injustice to the appellant, if we hold that the proposition of law on which the lower appellate Court acted was wrong, for the appellant has been deprived of any opportunity of having his case heard on restoration. For these reasons we hold that this is a case in which we should consider whether the proposition of law is correct or incorrect. For the appellant reliance was placed on Maharaja of Benares v. Ram Kumar Misir  26 All. 611. In this case it was held that the sons in a joint Hindu family are liable for the due fulfilment of a hypothecation bond entered into by their father as surety. No authority to the contrary has been shown to us but the learned Counsel for the respondent based his argument on this point of law on the Privy Council case reported at 104 (of 46 All.) Brij Narain v. Mangal Prasad A.I.R. 1924 P.C. 50. That was a case in which the question before their Lordships was whether two prior mortgages constituted a sufficient antecedent debt for a subsequent mortgage executed by a father of a joint Hindu family. Their Lordships held in the affirmative and at p. 104 laid down as the result of the authorities examined in that case five propositions. It must be admitted that the present case of a hypothecation bond as surety does not come under any of the propositions laid down by their Lordships indicating actions which may be taken legally by the father of a joint Hindu family. For the respondent it was argued that proposition 3 would apply to the present class of security. This proposition is as follows:
It he purports to burden the estate by mortgage, then unless that mortgage is to discharge an antecedent debt, it would not bind the estate.
4. There is of course no antecedent debt for a surety bond and accordingly if this proposition was intended by their Lordships to cover a surety bond then such a surety bond would not bind the estate.
5. But we are of opinion that in laying down these five propositions their Lordships of the Privy Council had no intention to apply the propositions to a case like the present which is a case of a hypothecation bond of suretyship. There was no mention at all in the judgment of their Lordships of any such question having been raised before them. We consider that if their Lordships had intended to lay down the proposition that a Hindu father could not bind the estate of the joint family by hypothecating the estate for the purpose of suretyship, that proposition would have been clearly stated in the judgment of their Lordships. We consider that a proposition of such an importance as that in the present case would not have been laid down by their Lordships merely by implication but would have received separate treatment and consideration. Accordingly as we consider that this ruling of their Lordships is not intended to apply to the circumstances of the present case, we consider that we ought to follow the ruling in Maharaja of Benares v. Ram Kumar  26 All. 611. We accordingly hold that the hypothecation bond in the present case tendered to the Small Cause Court Judge was a valid hypothecation bond and that the mere fact that the executant had sons did not make it invalid.
6. There is another aspect of the case which is as follows: When this hypothecation bond was tendered to the Court no objection was taken to it by the respondent on the ground that it was invalid. It was only after the other surety had withdrawn from his suretyship and the appellant had deposited a sum in cash to meet the default of that other surety, that the respondent took objection to this surety bond on this legal point. We consider that if the Small Cause Court Judge held that the bond was invalid on this legal ground, he should have given an opportunity to the appellant to furnish fresh security or deposit a further sum of money to meet the deficiency. Accordingly we direct the Small Cause Court Judge to re-admit this application for the tender of security to his file and to dispose of it in accordance with the directions which we have given on the point of law. It is open to the Small Cause Court Judge to consider the sufficiency of this security on other grounds, and it is open to the appellant, if he has withdrawn the deposit of Rs. 335 to re-deposit it within a period to be determined by the Small Cause Court Judge. Costs so far as incurred in this Court and in the lower appellate Court will be costs in the case.