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Hub Lal and anr. Vs. Daya Shankar - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectFamily;Property
CourtAllahabad
Decided On
Judge
Reported in(1915)ILR37All105
AppellantHub Lal and anr.
RespondentDaya Shankar
Excerpt:
registration - family settlement--distribution of family property carried out by means of mutation proceedings--hindu law--joint hindu family--representative capacity of father. - cantonments act[c.a. no. 41/2006]. section 346 & cantonment fund (servants rules, 1937, rules 13, 14 & 15: [h.l. gokhale, ag. cj, p.v. hardas, naresh h. patil, r.m. borde & r.m. savant, jj] jurisdiction of school tribunal constituted under maharashtra employees of private schools (conditions of service) regulations act, (3 of 1978) held, school run by the cantonment board is a primary school and it is not a school recognised by any such board comparable to the divisional board or the state board. the school tribunal constituted under section 8 of the maharashtra act cannot entertain appeals filed under section..........the claim to the extent of the interest to which he would have been entitled had there been no family arrangement. the defendant comes here in second appeal contending that inasmuch as the father of the minor raj narain consented to the arrangement it is binding upon his son, who is a member of the joint hindu family. in our opinion under ordinary circumstances and in the absence of fraud or collusion the managing member of a joint hindu family is entitled to transact the business of the joint hindu family and represent the members of it.4. in the present case no fraud or misconduct of any kind on the part of the father is proved, and it is not shown that the arrangement taken as a whole was not for the benefit of the family. on this point, therefore, we think that the lower.....
Judgment:

Henry Richards, C.J. and Pramada Charan Banerji, J.

1. This appeal arises out of a suit in which the plaintiffs sought a declaration that they were the owners and possessors of certain property and possession.

2. It appears that the parties, who are disputing about the estate of one Bhajan Lal, were all members of the same family. In mutation proceedings a family settlement was come to, in consequence of which the plaintiffs were recorded as owners in respect of the property now in suit. It is alleged by the plaintiffs that this arrangement was come to as the result of fraud. The court of first instance found that there was no fraud when the family settlement was entered into, and accordingly the plaintiffs were not entitled to a decree.

3. The lower appellate court agreed in all the findings of fact of the court of first instance, but, finding that one of the plaintiffs was a minor, it decreed the claim to the extent of the interest to which he would have been entitled had there been no family arrangement. The defendant comes here in second appeal contending that inasmuch as the father of the minor Raj Narain consented to the arrangement it is binding upon his son, who is a member of the joint Hindu family. In our opinion under ordinary circumstances and in the absence of fraud or collusion the managing member of a joint Hindu family is entitled to transact the business of the joint Hindu family and represent the members of it.

4. In the present case no fraud or misconduct of any kind on the part of the father is proved, and it is not shown that the arrangement taken as a whole was not for the benefit of the family. On this point, therefore, we think that the lower appellate court was wrong.

5. The respondent, however, seeks to uphold the decree of the court below on the ground that rights in immovable property were created by the compromise entered into between the parties, and that this could only be done by a document duly registered. We think that under the circumstances of the present case it was not necessary that there should have been any registered writing. The case is very similar to the case of Kokla v. Piari Lal (1918) I.L.R. 35 All. 502. This case was followed in an unreported case to which one of us was a party Since reported (1914) 12 A.L.J. 1316.

6. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the lower appellate court, and restore the decree of the court of first instance with costs.


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