1. This is an appeal under Clause 10, Letters Patent, which, with two other appeals (Nos. 15 and 86 of 1943) between the same parties, raise short identical points under U.P. Tenancy Act, 1989. The first Respondent, Pandit Raghuram (here, inafter called 'the Purchaser') at a date which is the material purchased from the second Respondent, Pandit Yogendra Nath first all that one third undivided share in a certain mahal in respect of which the second respondent was at the date of the purchase a co-sharer and, secondly certain arrears of profits in respect of three preceding years-the Fasli years 1844, 1345 and 1346 then due to the second respondent. Finding himself unable otherwise to recover these arrears, the Purchaser brought the three suits out of which these present appeals have arisen in the Revenue Court under Section 280, U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, against the Lambardar to recover them. Three separate suits have been apparently necessary because the arrears of profits related to three separate Khewats. The Court of first instance held that the suits did not lie in a Revenue Court; and this view was upheld on first appeal by the Civil Judge of Meerut. On second appeal to the High Court, however, Sir James Allsop, has taken a different view of Section 230 of the Act and has directed that the proceedings are to be returned to the original Revenue Court for decision, inasmuch as, in his opinion, that Court had jurisdiction to decide the cases. The only question, therefore, before us now is whether these three suits lay under Section 230 U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 to the Revenue Court or to the Civil Court. The point is a very short one. Section 280(1), U.P. Tenancy Act, 1989 says that:
230 (1) : A co-sharer may sue the Lambardar for settlement of accounts and for his share of the profits of a mahal or of any part thereof.
2. The only reason advanced in support of the contention that the Revenue Court cannot entertain the suits is, as we under, stand it, that the arrears of profits in question which are being sued for cannot be said to form part of 'the share' of a 'co-sharer', since, at the moment when they accrued due, the Purchaser was not himself a co-sharer because he did not acquire his share in the mahal, or his title to the arrears of profits, until subsequently. According to this argument the emphasis appears to be laid on the words 'his share' as indicating that the only thing that can be-sued for under Section 230 is what has become due to the plaintiff in his capacity as a 'co-sharer' as distinct from what may have become due to him by purchase from a past co-sharer. We confess that this strikes us as a some what pedantic view of the section particularly when Section 3(1) of the Act is taken into account. That Sub-section, which is the part of the interpretation Section, says that:
(1) All words and expressions used to denote the possessor of any right, title or interest in land, whether the same be proprietary or otherwise shall be deemed to include the predesessors and successors in right, title or interest of such persons.
3. We agree with the learned Single Judge who heard the Second Appeal that an assignee is a successor-in-interest of his assignor; and it appears to us to be clear that the interest of a co-sharer in a mahal extends as much to past profits not received, as to his right to current, and his expectation of future profits. We think, with respect, that it is well put by Yorke J. in Nizakat Ali v. Shaukat Hussain : AIR1943All300 at p. 665..It is obvious, I think that the word co-sharer does denote the possessor of a right, title or interest in land in the shape of a share in the mahal. It seems to cue also reasonable to hold that the transferee of a co-sharer comes within the scope of the words successor in right, title or interest of a co-sharer. In the present case, it is only a question of form in which the deed of transfer has been put. The plaintiff has in effect become the successor of the transferor in respect not only of future profits as also of the current year but also in respect of arrears of profits of the two proceeding years. In respect of all the profits of all the three years in suit I make no doubt that the plaintiff is the successor, within the meaning of Section 3(1), U.P. Tenancy Act, of his transferor and is therefore entitled to maintain a suit under Section 230 for recovery of those profits from the co-sharer....
4. The learned Judge had before him a case substantially on all fours with the case before us. With respect we take the same view. We think the word 'co-sharer' in Nizakat Ali v. Shaukat Hussain : AIR1943All300 . of the Act is, in relation to past accrued profits, quite large enough to include someone who has become entitled to those profits by assignment; and we think that it would be pedantic not to hold that such past profits as much form part of 'his share' of the profits of the mahal as that part of the current or future profits to which he is, or will become, entitled. We notice, too, that it is not for his share of profits alone that a co-sharer may sue under Section 230, but also for a 'settlement of accounts' with the lambardar. We can see no reason why in any settlement of accounts with the lambardar, a share of past profits, to which the person claiming the account is entitled, should be excluded. Yet this would seem to be the result, if Section 230 is held not to extend to such past profits.
5. We are not impressed by the argument that, Section 229, Agra Tenancy Act, 1926 having been omitted from the United Provinces Tenancy Act, 1939, it must be assumed that the expression 'co-sharer' no longer includes the assignee of a co-sharer. We think that this suggestion altogether ignores Section 3(1) of the Act of 1939, If it then be said that Section 3(1) of the Act of 1939 is also to be found in the Act of 1926, we are content to give the same answer as has been given by the learned Single Judge, that the law we have to apply is to be found only in the Act of 1939. This view of the construction of Section 230, U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, follows the current of authority in this Court, as in addition to the case to which we have already referred. The same point has arisen and been similarly decided in at least two other cases : AIR1945All350 . We think, therefore, that these Letters Patent Appeals must be dismissed. As the learned Single Judge has directed that all the costs shall be costs in the cause, we think that we may properly make the costs p these Letters Patent Appeals costs in tie cause as well, This judgment will cover all three appeals.