1. The facts which have given rise to this appeal are these:
Several decrees having been passed against Babu Har Shankar Prasad Singh, one of the respondents to this appeal, the Collector of Ghazipur, in which district a part of Babu Har Shankar Prasad's property was situated, was appointed by the District Judge of Ghazipur under Section 326 of Act No. X of 1877 to take the property under his management for the satisfaction of the decrees and debts due by Har Shankar Prasad. The Collector prepared a statement of the decrees and debts in the manner provided by the Code of Civil Procedure, and among the persons whose debts were entered in such statement were Babus Sita Ram and Harak Chand.
2. They, it is stated, held a promissory note executed by Har Shankar Prasad Singh, but their names were entered as decree-holders, although as a matter of fact they had not obtained a decree at the time. In March 1891 Harak Chand and Hari Chand obtained a decree against Har Shankar Prasad in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Benares. It is alleged that they sold the decree to Sundar Das and Sundar Das assigned it to the present appellants. The decree was transferred for execution to the District Judge of Ghazipur, and execution was taken out in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of that district under the orders of the District Judge. The application which has given rise to this appeal was subsequently presented by the appellants in the Court of the District Judge of Ghazipur on the 30th of January 1895. By it they prayed that their names should be entered in the statement of the debts due by Har Shankar Prasad Singh and that the amount due to them should be put down in that statement as being Rs. 13,339-8-10.
3. This application having been refused by the District Judge, the present appeal has been preferred.
4. One of the respondents to the appeal is the Collector of Ghazipur, the other respondent being Babu Har Shankar Prasad Singh, the judgment-debtor. As against the Collector of Ghazipur Mr. Madho Prasad, who has appeared for the appellants, has not satisfied me that the appellants have any case. The Collector, acting under the provisions of Section 326 of the Code of Civil Procedure, was not acting in any capacity other than that of a manager of the property appointed by the Court. He was nothing better than an officer of the Court for the purpose of managing the property in order to satisfy the decrees which were due by Har Shankar Prasad on the date of the appointment of the Collector as such manager. I fail to see that the appellants have any case against the Collector, and in my judgment the Collector has been improperly made a party to this appeal.
5. On the merits also the appeal must, in my opinion, fail. The application of the appellants may be regarded either as an application to be entered in the statement of debts prepared under Section 322B, or as an application to amend the statement prepared under that section. If it is an application to be entered in the statement it should have been made to the Collector and not to the District Judge. It is only when disputes arise as to the fact or extent of the liability of the judgment-debtor to any of the decrees or claims of which the Collector is informed, that the Civil Court is to determine such disputes, and it is to do so only upon a reference being made by the Collector. The appellants, instead of going to the Collector, applied to the District Judge, and this, in my opinion, they were not entitled to do. Further, they were not entitled to have their names entered in the statement of debts prepared under Section 322B. In that statement only such persons are to be entered as are referred to in Section 322A. The persons so referred to are, first, persons holding decrees for money, and, secondly those having any claim on the property of the judgment-debtor. The appellants evidently did not come within the second class as they had no claim on the property of Har Shankar Prasad, but were merely holders of decrees for money against him. It is not, however, every holder of a decree for money who is entitled to be entered in the statement prepared under Section 322B. Under Clause (a) of Section 322A only two classes of holders of decrees for money are entitled to come in: (1) those whose decrees are capable of execution by sale of the immoveable property of the judgment-debtor, and (2) those in execution of whose decrees proceedings for the sale of such property are pending. There is no question that the appellants do not fall within the category of decree-holders of the second class, as proceedings for the sale of the judgment-debtor's property are not pending in execution of their decree. They do not come within the other class also. By reason of the provisions of the last portion of the first paragraph of Section 325A, no Civil Court can issue any process against the judgment-debtor's property which is under the management of the Collector in execution of a decree for money obtained after the property came under such management. The decree held by the appellants was passed after Har Shankar Prasad's property had been placed under the management of the Collector, and therefore in execution of that decree the said property is not liable to be sold so long as the management continues. It is thus clear that the appellants are not persons who are entitled to be entered in the list of creditors prepared under Section 322B. There can be no doubt that if a claim like the one put forward by the appellants were admitted, the object of the management of the judgment-debtor's property by the Collector would become wholly infructuous.
6. For the above reasons, I am of opinion that the application of the appellants has been properly dismissed. I dismiss this appeal with costs.