1. It is unfortunate that the opposite party was not represented, but the Court had the advantage of very valuable argument addressed to it by Mr. Bhagwati Shankar. He has placed a printed note before the Court and carefully explained how the words therein cannot be said to offend against the provisions of Section 25, Paper Currency Act (10 of 1923) which replaced previous similar Acts which dated back from 1871 down. What Section 25, Paper Currency Act, prohibits is this:
No person in British India shall draw, accept make or issue any bill of exchange, hundi, promissory note on engagement for the payment of money payable to bearer on demand... of any such person.
2. The document in suit consists of a promissory note and a receipt. In the receipt the promissory note is described as 'indul talab' meaning 'on demand,' In the note itself the words are that the money would be paid mangne par unko ya jisko wok dilwaen unke hukm par (on demand to-him, that is to the lender, or to whomever he may order it to be paid). There are no words here to imply that the money was payable to bearer on demand. In the ruling quoted by the lower Court of Small Causes, Chidambaram Chettiar v. Ayyasawmi  40 Mad. 585, the point of difference is detailed by Krishnan J., at p. 588. In the note which was before their Lordships there was an additional word that the note was payable to bearer. The argument there was that the note was payable to a person or to his order as well. And on this argument the learned Judge observed as follows:
It was further argued that the note in suit did not fall within Section 26 of Act No. 2 of 1910 (corresponding to the present Act of 1923) as it was a note payable, not only to bearer but to a person or his order also. This addition can make no difference as the note is still a note payable to bearer on demand'
3. It is clear that in the Judge's opinion if the words 'payable to bearer' had not existed, a note payable to a person or his order would not have offended against the provisions of the Indian Paper Currency Act. The judgment of Farran, J., in Jetha Parkha v. Ram Chandra Vithoba  16 Bom. 689 is a valuable contribution to the law on the subject. Here the note was payable to owner on demand. The learned Judge pointed out that the provisions in the Indian Paper Currency Act follow the wording of the English Bank Charter Act which was subsequently explained by Stat. 17 and 18, Vict., C. 83, Section 11. The explanation was that promissory notes which shall entitle, or be intended to entitle, the bearer or holder thereof without endorsement to the payment of any sum of money on demand... shall be deemed to be notes within the meaning of the English Bank Charter Act. The Indian Paper Currency Act has not been so explained, but the same interpretation should be given to its words. The real test, therefore, is whether the promissory note in suit is payable to any person who may be in possession thereof. Will the bearer of this note without any endorsement have a right to be paid the money due on the note? According to the Wording of the note, he certainly would not. The demand has to be made by the lender himself, or someone to whom he may order payment. Without endorsement to a particular person the note will not be payable to the bearer thereof. I am, therefore, of opinion that the lower Court was wrong in holding the note to be illegal and void. I set aside the decree of the trial Court and remand the suit to it for a trial on the merits. Costs here and heretofore shall abide the result.