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Chairman, Municipal Board Vs. Bhajan - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
Subject Civil
CourtAllahabad
Decided On
Reported inAIR1937All444
AppellantChairman, Municipal Board
RespondentBhajan
Excerpt:
- .....on the expiry of 3.5 days from 7th august 1930, and therefore any subsequent orders of the building committee on 21st december 1930 would be of no effect. we consider, however, that the question of jurisdiction is one which governs the present suit. the facts are that after the order of the building committee on 21st december 1930 refusing to allow construction on part of the land and allowing construction on the remaining portion of the land the plaintiff made an appeal to the board and on 13th july 1931 the board rejected the appeal of the plaintiff. after that the plaintiff had a right of appeal to the district magistrate under section 318, municipalities act, but the plaintiff did not exercise that tight and he brought this suit in the civil court. it is found by the district.....
Judgment:

1. This is a second appeal by the Municipal Board of Jhansi against an appellate decree of the learned District Judge of Jhansi granting an injunction to the plaintiff respondent. The plaintiff brought a suit setting out that in May 1930 he made an application to the Municipal Board for the construction of a house on his own land, and when he did not get any order for construction for a long time, he started construction of the house after giving notice to the Board, and in the following year in 1931 the Board required that a portion of the house should be demolished and eventually demolished it, and he therefore asked for an injunction. The Board contested the suit on the various grounds : that the plaintiff was not the owner of the land on which the Board had ordered demolition, that the Board had refused permission for building on that particular portion shown by the letters MNOPQR, and that the civil Court had no jurisdiction. The trial Court framed an issue 'Is the suit barred by Section 321, U.P. Municipalities Act?' and that Court held that that section barred the jurisdiction of the civil Court.

2. The plaintiff filed an appeal and the learned District Judge without entering into the merits of that contention held that because the applicant had made an application in May 1930 and on 7th August 1930 sent to the Municipal Board an inquiry in writing asking what had happened to his application and received no reply, therefore under Section 180(3), Municipalities Act, the Board must have been deemed to have sanctioned the application as presented, on the expiry of 3.5 days from 7th August 1930, and therefore any subsequent orders of the Building Committee on 21st December 1930 would be of no effect. We consider, however, that the question of jurisdiction is one which governs the present suit. The facts are that after the order of the Building Committee on 21st December 1930 refusing to allow construction on part of the land and allowing construction on the remaining portion of the land the plaintiff made an appeal to the Board and on 13th July 1931 the Board rejected the appeal of the plaintiff. After that the plaintiff had a right of appeal to the District Magistrate under Section 318, Municipalities Act, but the plaintiff did not exercise that Tight and he brought this suit in the civil Court. It is found by the District Judge that the plaintiff had begun his constructions at least before 25th March 1931, and there is no finding that he had begun his constructions before the resolution of the Building Committee on 21st December 1930. The provision in Section 321(1) of the Act is:

No order or direction referred to in Section 318 shall he questioned in any other manner or by any other authority than is provided therein.

3. One of the sections referred to in Section 318 is Section 186, and also the orders made by a Board under the powers conferred upon it by Section 180(1). These applications are dealt with by the Board or when the powers are delegated to it by a Building Committee under Section 180(1), and it was under that sub-section that rightly or wrongly the Building Committee passed the order of 21st December 1930. Now Section 185 provides that it is an offence for anyone to construct a building in contravention of an order of the Board refusing sanction or any written direction made by the Board under Section 180. Learned Counsel in regard to this says that the order was not a legal order because of the period which had elapsed under the provisions of Section 180(3). That sub-section provides that if the Board neglects or omits for one month after the receipt of a valid notice to build to pass an order in regard to a building application, such person may by written communication call the attention of the Board to the omission or neglect, and if such omission or neglect continues for the further period of 15 days, the Board shall be deemed to have sanctioned the work absolutely. Therefore learned Counsel argues that the resolution of the Building Committee of 21st December 1930 was invalid because under this provision the sanction had already accrued. Section 186 makes provision that 'where the Board considers that such erection.. is an offence under Section 185, it may direct the demolition', etc. Therefore as the Board considered that there was an offence under Section 185 the Board had legal authority under Section 186 to direct demolition. It is to be noticed that 8. 186 makes the Board the authority who is to decide the matter as to whether there is or there is not an offence under Section 185. These decisions of the Board no doubt are subject to the appeal provided in Section 318. But Section 321(1) specifically bars the questioning of such orders by any other authority and this section is a section which prevents the civil Court having any jurisdiction to interfere in these matters.

4. We are of opinion that the trial Court was correct in holding that no suit lay in the present case. Such a view of the law has been taken in the ruling in Sheo Ram v. Sone Lal : AIR1929All912 . We may also refer to the case in S.A., No. 641 of 1934, decided by this Bench on 8th December 1936, where there was a similar question for consideration which was decided in a similar manner. We therefore allow this second appeal and we restore the decree of the trial Court and dismiss the suit of the plaintiff. Parties will bear their own costs throughout.


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