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Achraj Singh Vs. Hardwar Nath and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
Subject Civil
CourtAllahabad
Decided On
Reported inAIR1941All131
AppellantAchraj Singh
RespondentHardwar Nath and ors.
Excerpt:
- .....the high court or chief court, as the case may be, from an appellate order or decree of a district judge passed under sub-section (2) on one or more of the grounds mentioned in section 100, civil p.c., 1908. the period of limitation for appeals under this sub-section shall be ninety days.3. in view of this amendment the decrees or orders passed by a district judge on appeals against decrees or orders of a special judge of the second grade shall be appealable to the high court. thus, by the amendment an aggrieved party is entitled to invoke the appellate jurisdiction of this court for testing the validity or otherwise of an appellate decree or order passed by a district judge. this being so, ordinarily it would not be necessary. for an aggrieved party to invoke the revisional jurisdiction.....
Judgment:

1. The question referred for decision to this Full Bench is as follows:

Whether the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court by Section 115, Civil P.C., can be exercised with reference to appellate orders, passed under Sub-section (2) of Section 45, or revisional orders, passed under Section 46 of the Act, by a District Judge.

2. This question was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Ashraf v. Saith Mal : AIR1938All47 , and it was held in that case that, apart from the provisions contained in ch. 6, U.P. Encumbered Estates Act, this Court had the power to interfere in revision under Section 115, Civil P.C. In view of the somewhat involved provisions of Sections 45 and 46 of the Act the answer to the question referred to above was beset with difficulties of varying intensity and presumably because of those difficulties the Legislature stepped in and passed an Amending Act (Act No. 11 of 1939) by which amendments of far-reaching importance were made in Section 45 of the Act. In accordance with Section 45, as it originally stood, only one right of appeal was given to an aggrieved party against the decisions, decrees, or orders of a special Judge, second grade, or of a special Judge, first grade. By that section the District Judge was authorized to hear appeals against 'any decision, decree or order, of a special Judge of the second grade' and similarly the High Court was empowered to hear appeals against the decisions, decrees or orders of a special Judge of the first grade. But, by the Amending Act referred to above, a new sub-section, viz. (2a), has been introduced in Section 45 and the newly added sub-section runs thus:

An appeal shall lie to the High Court or Chief Court, as the case may be, from an appellate order or decree of a District Judge passed under Sub-section (2) on one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 100, Civil P.C., 1908. The period of limitation for appeals under this sub-section shall be ninety days.

3. In view of this amendment the decrees or orders passed by a District Judge on appeals against decrees or orders of a special Judge of the second grade shall be appealable to the High Court. Thus, by the amendment an aggrieved party is entitled to invoke the appellate jurisdiction of this Court for testing the validity or otherwise of an appellate decree or order passed by a District Judge. This being so, ordinarily it would not be necessary. for an aggrieved party to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of this Court in accordance with the provisions of Section 115, Civil P.C. The question referred to at the inception of this judgment is therefore of no practical importance so far as appellate decrees or orders of District Judges passed after the Amending Act came into force are concerned. The decision of the question one way or the other would therefore only affect the applications in revisions that have already been filed in this Court. In this state of facts, we, as at present advised, do not consider it expedient to depart from the view taken in the Division Bench case noted above. We follow that decision, at any rate, on the principle of stare decisis and accordingly answer the question in the affirmative.


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