S.D. Singh, J.
1. The appellant in this appeal is a judgment-debtor against whom a decree was passed oh 3rd Jan. 1949. The last application for execution was moved on 2nd Jan. 1961, and the contention of the appellant was that it was barred by time. The application would be barred by time, if two earlier application moved on 3rd Jan. 1955, and 8th Feb. 1958, were barred by time. But if those applications were within time, even the last application would be within time. What has, therefore, to be seen is whether the aforesaid earlier applications dated 3rd Jan. 1955 and 8th Feb. 1958, were within time.
2. The first application for execution was moved on 21st Dec. 1951. The second application dated 3rd, Jan. 1955, was, therefore, moved more than three years thereafter and the same was the case in respect of the third application, which was filed on 8th Feb. 1958. The Civil Judge has pointed out that Limitation for execution under Article 182 of the Limitation Act was raised from three years to six years under the U. P. Civil Laws (Reforms and Amendments) Act, 24 of 1954, and that, therefore, six years limitation was available to the decree-holder for applying for execution and if that is so, both the applications would obviously be within time.
3. The contention of the appellant was that since the decree was passed in 1949, very much earlier that the enactment of U. P. Act 24 of 1954, the proceedings in execution would continue to be governed by the old law. It is difficult, however, to accept that contention. No authority was cited in support of the proposition that limitation for future applications for execution would be governed by the law in force on the date at the suit or the date of the decree. There is no vested right in a Judgment-debtor that limitation for such an application would continue to be the same for all times to come. If, of course, a particular proceeding gets time-barred by the time the law of limitation is amended, vested rights are created in favour of persons, against whom limitation has already expired, and unless retrospective effect is given to the amending legislation, those vested rights cannot be reopened by extending the period of limitation. Limitation for the second execution application had not expired against the present appellants when the U. P. Act 24 of 1954 received the assent of the President or was published in the Gazette. It would have expired not earlier than 22nd Dec. 1954, while the Act was placed on the Statute Book En November, 1954. When, therefore, the decree-holder got extended period of limitation for applying for execution before limitation for his application had expired, he could take advantage of the amendment in the law of Limitation. No vested right having been created in favour of the appellants, they cannot contend that an application moved more than three years after, the earlier application was to be regarded as barred by time against them.
4. Reference was made to Raghuraj Singh v. Sobhaman, 1951 All WR (HC) 1 : (AIR 1951 All 485) (FB) In which a Full Bench, of this Court considered the effect of an amendment in the law of Limitation. But this decision does not help the appellant. In that case the amendment under consideration was made ininspect of suits under the U. P. Tenancy Act and since the amendment hail been specifically given retrospective effect, it was held that it applied even to suits which may have been filed after the expiry of the limitation, and which would have been, but for the amendment in the law, barred by time, and it was further held that even if the amendment came into effect when an appeal arising out of the suit was pending, the appellate Court could take notice of the amendment in !aw, and give it the necessary effect. That was a case, therefore, in which the amendment was given retrospective effect specifically. We are not concerned in this case with the retrospective effect of the legislation. The U. P. Civil Laws (Reforms and Amendments) Act, 24 of 1954, does not give retrospective effect to this amendment. The decree-holder was entitled to the extended period of limitation because the Act came into force before limitation for his execution application had expired. The application was, therefore, within time.
5. The appeal has no force and is, consequently, dismissed under Order 41, Rule 11, C.P.C.