John Stanley, C.J. and William Burkitt, J.
1. In this appeal the sole question argued before us on behalf of the appellants touches the question of the validity of foreclosure proceedings taken under Section 8 of Regulation XVII of 1806. That section directs that the Judge on receiving a written petition from a mortgagee or holder of a deed of conditional sale for the foreclosure of a mortgage shall cause the mortgagor or his legal representative to be furnished with a copy of the petition and shall at the same time 'notify to him by a parwanah under his seal and official signature' that if he shall not redeem the property mortgaged in the manner provided by the preceding section within one year from the date of the notification, the mortgage will be finally foreclosed and the conditional sale will become conclusive. The appellants contend that the requirements of this section were not complied with, inasmuch as the parwanah which was issued by the Judge to the mortgagors, though it bore the seal of the Court and was in every other respect regular, did not bear on its face the full signature of the Judge but merely his initials. The parwanah bears the initials 'J.W.P.' and it is admitted that these are the initials of Mr. Power, the then presiding Judge. It is said that the initials of a Judge cannot be regarded as his official signature, and reliance has been placed by the appellants on the ruling of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Madhopersad v. Gajudhar (1884.) I.L.R., 11 Calc., 111.
2. By the term 'official signature' as used in the Regulation we understand the signature which a Judge usually adopts in signing parwanahs and other similar orders. Speaking generally, a signature is the writing of a person's name, or mark to represent his name, by himself or his authority, for the purpose and with the intention of authenticating a document as being that of the person whose name or mark is so written. Official documents are in these provinces very frequently signed merely by initials. In this Court judgments and orders are as a rule merely initialled by the Judges. No evidence has been laid before us to prove what was the usual official signature of the District Judges at the date when the parwanah in question was issued.
3. In the case of Madhopersad v. Gajudhar, the parwanah referred to therein did not bear the seal of the Court, but merely the initials of the Judge. In other respects also it did not comply with the provisions of the Regulation; for example, it did not notify from what date the period during which redemption should be made began to run, and it neither was nor purported to be a copy of the petition for foreclosure, the furnishing of which to the mortgagor was essential. In fact there was no attempt made to comply with the requirements of the Regulation. In consequence of these defects the Privy Council held that the requirements of the Regulation had not been complied with. Their Lordships did not hold that if in all other respects the requirements of the Regulation had been complied with the fact that his initials only were signed by the Judge would be a fatal defect.
4. In the case of Kubra Bibi v. Wajid Khan (1893) I.L.R., 16 All., 59 our brother Aikman drew the conclusion from the decision of the Privy Council that their Lordships declined to accept initials as an official signature within the meaning of Section 8 of the Regulation. We do not think that this inference can be reasonably deduced from the language of their Lordships. Our view is that the requirement of the Regulation that the parwanah shall be under the seal and official signature of the Judge, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, ought, on the principle omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta, to be deemed to be satisfied by the affixing of the seal of the Court and the writing of the initials of the Judge, and that it would be unduly restricting the language of the Regulation if we were to hold otherwise.
5. We think therefore that the view taken by the Court below is correct and we dismiss the appeal with costs.