1. Certain agricultural land was declared surplus in village Kurdi Khera Chahchak alias Kalluwala Jahanpur Uttari in the district of Saharanpur, under the provisions of U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The surplus land was allotted temporarily to one Surja and the third respondent, Basiram. After the proceedings by way of appeals etc. were over the Prescribed Authority proceeded to make permanent allotments. Petitioner was one of the applicants. Tahsildar Saharanpur recommended the case of the petitioner whereupon the Prescribed Authority by his order dated June 30, 1970 allotted a few plots of land to the petitioner and a lease was also executed in his favour, in the meantime the respondents Nos. 3 to 5 filed objections before the Prescribed Authority disputing the allotment in favour of the petitioner, on the ground that he was not a landless labourer but was living with his father who had plenty of land. After hearing the petitioner the Prescribed Authority set aside the allotment in favour of the petitioner holding that the petitioner was not a landless labourer inasmuch as he was living with his father who had sufficient agricultural land and that this fact had been suppressed by the petitioner at the time of allotment. He also found that the Tahsildar had omitted to make a proper report. The Prescribed Authority also observed that the respondents Nos. 3 to 5 were persons to whom the land had been allotted temporarily and they had preference when the question of permanent allotment arose. The petitioner is aggrieved and has approached this court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
2. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner before the Prescribed Authority that the latter had no power to review its earlier order. The Prescribed Authority relying upon Section 37 of the Act held that he had inherent power under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and he could correct any mistake made by him, and, as such, he was competent to review his earlier order of allotment. The learned counsel for the petitioner has pressed the same contentions before me. According to him there is no provision in the Act permitting the Prescribed Authority to review its order of settlement of surplus land. According to him Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and, as such, the Prescribed Authority had no jurisdiction to review its earlier order.
3. There is no doubt that no express power of review has been conferred upon the Prescribed Authority in respect of order passed for the settlement of surplus land under Section 27 of the Act. Section 37 of the Act, however, does seem to confer powers and privileges of a civil court on a Prescribed Authority. This is how Section 37 reads :--
'37. Powers of Officers and Authorities in hearing and disposal of objections and the procedure to be followed:--
Any Officer or authority holding an enquiry or hearing an objection under this Act, shall, in so far as it may be applicable, have all the powers and privileges of a civil court, and follow the procedure laid down in Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for the trial and disposal of suits relating to immovable property.'
It will thus appear that the Prescribed Authority while disposing of an objection against the allotment order could exercise the inherent powers of a civil court under Section 151, C. P. C. However, it is not necessary to go to that extent, because, in my opinion, even if the Prescribed Authority did not possess inherent power of a civil court under Section 151, C. P. C. it certainly could review its order if the same was based upon a mistake and had resulted in injustice to someone else. In Smt. Lachmana v. The Deputy Director of Consolidation (1966 RD 419) (All.) a Division Bench of this Court has held that every court and Tribunal has inherent jurisdiction apart from statutory jurisdiction to correct any error committed by itself. This power is based on legal maxim which is to the effect that no party shall suffer because of the fault of the court or the Tribunal and that there is clear distinction between a statutory review and a review under the inherent powers of the Tribunal to rectify the wrong that has been committed by itself. In the instant case the Prescribed Authority has held that it had made a mistake in allotting the land to the petitioner inasmuch as the petitioner was not a landless labourer; he was residing with his father who had 7 bighas 13 biswas of land and that the allotment order had been obtained by the petitioner by concealing material facts. He also held that the respondents Nos. 3 to 5 had a better claim inasmuch as land had been allotted to them temporarily and according to the amended provisions of Sections 28 and 29 of the Act the land had to be permanently settled in favour of such temporary allottees. Thus in the opinion of the Prescribed Authority while the petitioner was guilty of concealment of material facts and had obtained an order of allotment in his favour fraudulently, injustice has been done to the respondents Nos. 3 to 5 as their claim was ignored. The order passed in favour of the petitioner was manifestly wrong inasmuch as the petitioner was not a landless Labourer. On these findings the Prescribed Authority in my opinion, was perfectly justified in cancelling the allotment order so as to rectify the mistake committed by it.
4. In another case Pancha v. Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil Misc. Writ Petn. No. 1845 of 1971, decided on 17-9-1974 (All.)). I have held that an order of allotment of surplus land is not a judicial order inasmuch as it does not decide any dispute relating to the land. The distribution of surplus land is a bounty by the Government and no one has any right to claim such a bounty and if (in) allotting land to a person the Prescribed Authority feels that it had made a mistake it can certainly review that order, the order being purely administrative one.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a large number of cases such as:-- (1) Sri Niwas Prasad Singh v. S.D.O. Sadar, Mirzapur, 1960 All LJ 557; and (2) Har Bhajan Singh v. Karan Singh, AIR 1966 SC 641.
These are cases of statutory review and not of review under the inherent powers of a court or Tribunal to rectify its own mistake so as to prevent miscarriage of justice. These cases have been noticed and distinguished in the case of Smt. Lachmana, 1966 RD 419 (All.) (supra).
6. That apart, it is also well settled that the writ jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be invoked merely by showing that an order is wrong. It must further be shown that it has resulted in miscarriage of justice (see Pooran Singh v. Additional Commissioner, Agra, 1957 All LJ 193=(AIR 1957 All 276). If the impugned order in the instant case is set aside, it will amount to the restoration of the allotment order in favour of the petitioner which, in my opinion, was clearly wrong. So it will not be a proper exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to resurrect an illegal and unjust order.
7. For all these reasons the petition fails and is dismissed with costs.