K.C. Agarwal, J.
1. This is an appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) against the judgment and decree of the II Additional District Judge, Kanpur given in a reference under Section 18 of the Act.
2. The facts which are relevant for the purposes of the present appeal are that a notification under Section 4 of the Act was made by the State of U. P. on 25th June, 1956 notifying an area of 6.93 acres of land of village Nauraiya Khera, Pargana Kanpur. The said notification was followed by a notification under Section 6 of the Act dated 1st December, 1956. The purpose of acquisition mentioned in the notification was the construction of a Textile MachineryParts Factory by Messrs. Laxmi Ratan Engineering Works Ltd., Kanpur.
3. Since in this appeal we are only concerned with the quantum of compensation for the land payable to the appellant we will only mention those facts in the judgment which may be relevant for that purpose. The appellant filed a claim in respect of the entire land notified in the notification under Section 4 and asserted in this connection that the total amount to which he is entitled to is Rs. 2,11,800/-. He further claimed that he was the exclusive owner of 6.93 acres. This claim was based on the assertion that the land being situate in the Factory Area had the potentiality of building site. The Land Acquisition Officer by the award dated 19th October, 1960 found that the land did not have any potentiality of building site.
Accordingly, on the finding that the rate of Rs. 360/- per bigha was reasonable and justified he awarded a sum of Rs. 4,927-20 as the total amount of compensation payable to the appellant for the land. This amount of compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer was in respect of 10 bighas 13 biswas (5.38 acres) of land, as according to the finding arrived at by him the appellant's claim of compensation for the entire land measuring 6.93 acres was not correct. The Land Acquisition Officer had found that the appellant was entitled to compensation for land measuring 10 bighas 13 biswas as over this land alone he was recorded as bhumidhar and sirdar. The remaining 3 bighas of land was recorded as banjar and usar, and vested in the Gram Samaj, whereas 1 biswa of land was recorded as sirdari of Sri Hanumant Singh.
4. Aggrieved against the award of the Land Acquisition Officer, the appellant made a written application to the Collector, requesting that the matter be referred for determination of the amount of compensation to the District Judge. It was thereupon that the reference was made by the District Land Acquisition Officer under Section 18 of the Act to the District Judge for determination of the amount of compensation payable to the appellant. The appellant contended before the court below that the area of land in respect of which he was entitled to compensation was 6.93 acres, and the amount of compensation should be Rs. 1,53,846/- instead of Rs. 4,927-20 as awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer. In this way he claimed an additional sum of Rs, 1,48,918-80.
The claim for this sum was supported by the appellant on the ground that the land was situate in the Factory Area and as it had the potentiality of buildingsite he was entitled to compensation according to its potentiality and not merely on the basis of its agricultural value, as had been awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer, The appellant further claimed in the reference that the total land in respect of which he was entitled, to compensation was 6.93 acres and not 10 bighas 13 biswas.
5. A written statement was filed on behalf of the State of U. P. and the claim of the appellant for the further amount was disputed. It was alleged by the State that the Land Acquisition Officer after considering all the aspects of the matter rightfully awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 350/- per bigha, and as the same was reasonable and justified it could not be increased. It was further alleged that the land did not lie in the Factory Area. In fact it was situate in between the Panki railway station and Ordnance Factory, Kanpur. It was quite far off from the Factory Area and could be of no use unless its user was permitted by the Collector and the Ministry of Defence. On these assertions it was stated that the land was not a valuable site either for mill or factory. With regard to the area, the State of U. P. claimed that the appellant was not entitled to compensation in respect of 6.93 acres and the compensation awarded for 10 bighas 13 biswas was correct.
6. The court below found that the land could not be treated to have potential value as a building site, as to develop as such in the near future, but the same had a well-developed agricultural farm which could have further developed, attracting still better prices., On this finding the court below, treating the land as of agricultural value, enhanced the compensation from Rs. 4,927-20 to Rs. 8,260/-. The court below found that the total area of land belonging to the appellant was only 10 bighas 13 biswas and, therefore, the appellant was entitled to compensation only for this area and not for 6.93 acres of land. The court below had examined the revenue papers filed by the appellant and had found from the same that 3 bighas area of the acquired land for which no compensation was awarded to the appellant was user. Similarly, 1 biswa of land for which no compensation had been allowed was recorded in the name of Hanumant Singh.
7. The appellant has filed the present appeal against the aforesaid judgment and decree of the court below, alleging that the compensation awarded by the court below was inadequate, and that since the land was situate in the Factory Area of the Kanpur Development Board on Kalpi Road close to the Government Arms Factory, having therailway line on the one side and a cement concrete road on its front, the land was valuable site for mill or factory and compensation should have been awarded for its acquisition on that basis.
8. The first question, therefore, that falls for determination is about the potentiality of the land as a building site. In order to decide the question it may be useful to refer to the various notifications made by the State Government declaring the area as Factory Area, It appears that in January 1921 the State Government under Section 42(1) of the United Provinces Town Improvement Act, 1919 sanctioned the improvement scheme framed by the Kanpur Improvement Trust and called the Factory Area Scheme No. 1, which was notified under Section 40 (3) of the Act in the Gazette of the 25th December 1920 and 1st January 1921.
The State Government subsequently, in exercise of the powers under Sub-section (1) of Section 72 of the aforesaid Act, made rules which became effective from 1st Oct. 1924. It was from this date, i.e., 1st October 1924, that Scheme No. 1 which was sanctioned by the State Government in 1921, was enforced. Consequent to the aforesaid notification, the Scheme was enforced in the area mentioned in the same. On 2nd May 1945 the State Government made another notification and a further area on the west of the boundary given in the 1921 notification was included therein. The said notification was made with a view to prevent undesirable habitations and buildings springing up in the area in question. Extension of the areas included in the Scheme by this notification were, (i) North-West area was extended along the Panki-Ganga Ganj Kachcha road up to its junction with Maswanpur kachcha road? (ii) South-West it was extended up to the crossing of the Lower Ganges Canal with East Indian Railway: and then (iii)' on the West up to the level-crossing on the Kalpi Road.
9. There is no dispute between the parties in the present appeal that as a result of this extension in 1945 the acquired land which is the subject-matter of the present appeal, was included under the Scheme, falling within the extreme western limits. As a result of the inclusion of the land in the aforesaid Scheme enforced under the U. P. Town Improvement Act, the land in dispute also became part and parcel of the Factory Area declared under the same. In 1945 the State Legislature passed an Act known as Kanpur Urban Area Development Act. The Act was enacted with a view to make provision for the development and extensionof the urban area of Kanpur. This Act came into force on the 1st September 1945. Consequent to the enforcement of this Act the provisions of the U. P. Town Improvement Act stood repealed so far as they applied to the area to which this Act was made applicable.
10. The question which now falls for our consideration is as to whether the land had any potentiality of Mill Area or Factory Area, so that the appellant could get compensation on that basis and not merely on the agricultural basis. The court below has mainly found on two grounds that the land did not have the potentiality of Factory Area or Mill Area. One of the grounds found by it is that the land was situate in the neighbourhood of the Gun . Factory, and as existence of the Gun Factory of the Government of India, or any such defence structures was likely to be a handicap to the development of the present site as a residential colony it would not be correct to hold that the land had the potentiality of building site.
The other ground given by the learned Judge is that even at the time of the notification made in the year 1956, and at the time when the case was tried by it, a residential colony had not developed in the vicinity of the acquired land. Accordingly, taking the existing condition as regards the land it could not be said that the same had any potentiality of building site. We are not impressed by either of the two grounds, and are not prepared to hold that the land did not have the potentiality of Mill Area or Factory Area, The land appears to lie in a Mill Area obviously because of the reason that the said area has been declared so under the provisions of a statute. About two miles away from the land in dispute the Kanpur Development Board, which had been constituted under the Kanpur Urban Area Development Act, had extensively carried its development activities and had demarcated the plots by making provision for all the amenities needed for industrial development, We have the exemplars in the nature of the sale deeds which were executed in 1954 and 1956 in respect of these lands of the Kanpur Development Board.
A further perusal of the evidence in the case shows that the plot in question was situate on the main Kalpi Road, and the Panki railway station was very near to the same. The fact that certain Ordnance Factories had come into existence in the year 1956 does not in our opinion go to show that the land had no potential value as Mill site, as the military authorities would not have allowed a mill with the necessary buildings attached thereto to be erected in close proximityof the Gun Factory. There is no evidence on record which establishes that the military authorities had imposed any such restriction as could deter persons from taking lands for establishing factories. In the absence of any such evidence it would not be right on our part to presume that as a Gun Factory had been constructed by the Government and as people generally do not establish their factories in the neighbourhood of a Gun Factory, hence it has to be treated that the land did not have any potential value.
The reasoning of the learned Judge further given in this connection that construction of a Gun Factory, or any other structure meant for defence purposes, is made far beyond residential limits of the city in somewhat isolated places, or the existence of this Gun Factory would not give the present site a potential value as a building site, does not at all impress us. It is a matter of common knowledge that some of the Ordnance Factories in Kanpur are situated in the city itself. It would, therefore, be too much to find from the fact of the Gun Factory being in the vicinity that the said area could not have the potentiality of building site.
Moreover, in our view the mere fact that land would never have been made available as Mill site or for building purposes owing to the proximity of the Gun Factory, does not disentitle the persons affected by the establishment of that Factory from claiming compensation on the basis that but for the existence of the Gun Factory the site might have been disposed of as a Mill site. Suppose 'A' possessed a Mill Site, which is in the market as such, then if the contention of the learned counsel for the State is correct, as soon as any military structure is made on adjoining land the value as a Mill Site will no longer be the subject-matter of compensation but the owner 'A' must be content with such other compensation to which he may be entitled owing to the restricted user imposed on the land. We, therefore, do not agree that this could be any ground for holding that the land did not have any potentiality of Mill Site.
11. We also do not find any substance in the finding of the court below that merely on the ground that land was being used as agricultural land till the time of acquisition, its potentiality as non-agricultural land could not be looked into. We may emphasise that there is no real antithesis between agricultural and non-agricultural lands. The same land may be useful for both agricultural and non-agricultural purposes. Merely on the ground that it was used as agricultural land by the owner till the timeof the notification its potentiality as non-agricultural land cannot be overlooked.
12. In valuing land which has been acquired by the State under the Land Acquisition Act the first and the most favourable principle of acquisition is to enquire what is the market value of the property not according to its present disposition but the most lucrative and advantageous way in which it can be disposed of has to be determined with reference to its future utility. Future utility is a thing which people have an eye to in buying land and the market price is affected by it. This future utility must, however, be judged by prudent business calculations and not by mere speculative and impractical imagination. ( (1907) ILR 34 Cal 599).
13. The same principle has been followed by Bombay High Court in In re Dorabji Cursettji Shroff : (1908)10BOMLR675 . In this case it was held that in the neighbourhood of a town where buildings were going to be constructed it would be unfair to assess the value of land on its present income if there was a fair probability of the owner being able, according to its situation, to sell or lease the land for building purposes. It was this very principle which was recognised by the Judicial Committee in Secy, of State Foreign Affairs v. Charlesworth Pilling & Co., 1901 AC 373.
14. It may further be noted in this connection that the area in question had been included in the Factory Area under a Scheme which had been prepared under the provisions of the U. P. Town Improvement Act. It cannot thus be said that the estimation of compensation on the basis of potentiality as a Mill Site would be conjectural. The Scheme by which the said area was included in the Factory Area was framed under an Act of the State Legislature. This Factory Area Scheme was meant for Kannur, which was always considered to be an important town from the industrial point of view in U. P. The land in question was not situate far away either from the Kanpur city or from the limits of the Municipal Board or Corporation in the year 1956. As a matter of fact, soon after the notification in June 1956 the area where the land in question is situate was included within the Corporation limits of Kanpur.
The mere fact that there was dearth of exemplars showing that some transactions of sale, lease or transfer in respect of lands situate in the neighbourhood of the land in question, or in the area which was included in the Factory Area in 1945, does not in any way negative the contention that the area did lie in theMill Area. Mills or factories are not established in two years or three years, and as a matter of fact even a period of 20 years, is sometimes less for the full growth of the entire area covered by such schemes. Hence we find that only because neither factories nor residential colony had come into existence at the time when the notification under Section 4 of the Act was made in the year 1956, in spite of the area having been included in the Factory Area in 1945, can again be no ground for holding that the land did not have the potentiality of Mill Site. As already discussed above, there are some strong circumstances which lead us to the conclusion that the land in dispute had the potentiality of Mill Area, and compensation for the same has to be determined on that basis.
15. The next question that now falls for our determination is the rate at which the appellant is entitled to compensation on the basis of the evidence available on the record. The appellant has produced a number of witnesses in order to prove the valuation of land. The appellant also entered into the witness-box. He has stated that the rate at which the land in question could be sold in the year 1956 was Rs. 5/- per square yard. The names of other witnesses produced are S. N. Tewari, Sheo Shanker Lal, Murtaza Hussain, Kasturi Lal and Bhagwati Prasad. We have carefully read the statements of these witnesses.
Sheo Shanker Lal (P.W. 8) was working in the Planning Section of the Nagar Mahapalika as Amin. He has deposed that he had visited village Nauraiya Khera and had seen the lands in the vicinity of the aforesaid village, including the land involved in the present proceedings. He has stated further that Paper No. 34, which is the map of the Kanpur Development Board Scheme No. 1, concerns planning of the Factory Area. The witness had seen Blocks T and P of Scheme No. 1, and according to him the acquired land lies at a distance of 2 miles 2 furlongs from there. The further statement made by him was that the land sold to the Indian Explosives by the Nagar Mahapalika was situate in the East of the disputed land, and that the land sold by the Nagar Mahapalika to Indian Oil Co. was in the West of the present land.
16. Bhagwati Prasad is the next important witness and has stated that the plots sold by the Nagar Mahapalika were fully developed and that all amenities like roads, sewer, water supply, electric supply, etc. were present. Apart from these two witnesses, the other witnesses have also supported the case of the appellant.
17. The appellant has further filed documentary evidence. Ex. 4 is the sale deed of plot No. 56/4 by Kanpur Development Board in respect of 1,162 square yards. This sale deed was executed on 9th October, 1954 for a sum of Rs. 6,391/-. The rate of land per square yard would be Rs. 5.50. Ex. 5 is another lease deed concerning the land situate in Block P, at a distance of 3 miles from the land involved in the present proceeding. The land was sold on 3rd June, 1958 for Rs. 5,800/-. Ex. III is another lease deed by Kanpur Development Board in respect of 3,105 square yards. This was executed on 20th September, 1957 for Rs. 19,246/-. The land which was the subject-matter of this lease deed was situate at a distance of 2 miles 2 furlongs. The rate of land per square yard would be Rs. 6.3. Ex. 112 is a lease deed by Kanpur Development Board in respect of .1,399 square yards executed on 2nd January, 1958 for Rs. 11,046-75. The rate would come to nearabout Rs. 8/- per square yard (wrongly mentioned by the court below as 5.25 per square yard). The land of this deed was situate in Block T. Apart from these documents the appellant also filed a lease deed executed by the Nagar Mahapalika in respect of plot No. 2 of Block A in favour of Indian Explosives Ltd, on 15th May, 1967 for Rs. 40,39,505/-.
18. It is not in dispute that the lands which were sold or leased out under the documents mentioned above were situate in Blocks P and T of Scheme No. 1 framed by the Kanpur Development Board. It is again admitted that the lands of Block T are at a distance of 2 miles 2 furlongs from the disputed land, whereas the lands of Block P are at a distance of 3 miles. Blocks P and T were developed by the Kanpur Development Board, and as admitted by Bhagwati Prasad (P.W. 11), the plots of these Blocks were fully developed. An attempt was made by the learned counsel for the appellant to argue that it is not clear from the aforesaid exemplars, which were in respect of lands situate in the aforesaid two Blocks, that the lands had been fully developed at the tune when the documents were executed. It was urged in this connection that at the most there was only an undertaking by the Kanpur Development Board to develop these plots.
We, however, do not find any distinction between the position that the plots had been actually developed, or that the Kanpur Development Board had undertaken to develop the same. The statement of Bhagwati Prasad (P.W. 11) to the contrary establishes that the plots dealt with by Exs. 4, 5, 11 and 12 hadall been developed and that these developed plots had all amenities provided by the Nagar Mahapalika itself, like roads, sewers, water supply, electric supply, etc. It has already been noticed by us above that the lands under Blocks T and P of the Factory Area Scheme covered by Exs. 4, 111 and 112 were all situate at a distance of 2 miles and 2 furlongs from the acquired land, nearer to Kanpur city. The other thing which may be noted in this connection is that the lands sold or dealt with by the aforesaid documents were much smaller in area than the area which was the subject-matter of acquisition in the present case, The size of a plot of land will have a very important bearing on the value, as one cannot value a large area of land on the basis of the price fetched by small plots. It is well settled that the price fetched for small plots of land is not a true indication of the proper price of large plots : AIR1959AP52 , Nageswara Rao v. Special Dy. Collector). The fourth criticism against all these exemplars is that some of them were executed after the date of the notification under Section 4 of the Act in the present case.
19. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has, to the contrary, argued that Ex. 4 was a document executed on 9th October, 1954, hence the aforesaid criticism will not apply to this lease, whereas Exs. 5, 111 and 112 were executed immediately after the notification under Section 6 of the Act, and therefore those documents can be considered as evidence for determining valuation of the land. It was further urged in this connection that even if certain percentage of margin is made since the demand of compensation by the appellant is at a rate lower than those at which the lands under the aforesaid documents had been transferred, so even on that basis the appellant should be held entitled for getting the entire amount of Rs. 80,000/- which has been claimed in the present appeal. The learned counsel has relied on AIR 1966 Mys 66 (M. S. Nanjappa v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer) for the above proposition.
In this case it has been laid down that for determination of the market value of the acquired land transactions relating to sales of properties contiguous to the acquired property which took place not only before the date of the preliminary notification, but also sufficiently proximate to the preliminary notification, even if the transactions are sub-sequent transactions, should constitute a guiding factor. Bona fide sale transaction cannot be excluded from consideration merely on the ground that it was entersed into subsequent to the date of the preliminary notification.
20. There is no quarrel with the proposition laid down in the aforesaid case. It may, however, be pointed out that in the Mysore case the sale in question was made within four months from the date of the notification under Section 4, and the court having found that there was no evidence to show that there was any phenomenal or other general increase in the value of the building sites, relied upon the said sale.
21. In : AIR1959Mad462 (Velayudam Chettiar v. Special Tehsildar for Land Acquisition, Madurai), dealing with the aforesaid controversy about reliance on sales after the notification under Section 4, it was emphasised that in determining the market value of the land to be acquired by Government post-notification transactions should not necessarily be ignored altogether. If, however, any considerable interval has elapsed the court should attach little or no value to subsequent sales. In the present case we find that there is considerable difference between the dates on which the documents Exs. 5 and 112 were executed and the date of the notification under Section 4. The date of execution of Ex. 5 is 3rd June, 1958, whereas that of Ex. 112 is 2nd January, 1958. The date of the notification under Section 4 of the Act in the present case was 25th June, 1956. We thus find that these two exemplars have got to be discarded by us on the ground of having been executed much after -the notification under Section 4.
So far as the other documents, name-y, Exs. 4 and 111, are concerned, they can be kept in the category of close proximity from the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act; hence they can be looked into. We further find that although these were executed in respect of lands situate at a distance of 2 miles 2 furlongs from the land in dispute, and that they were in respect of developed Factory Area, besides being in respect of small pieces, but still we do get some support and help from them in arriving at the valuation of the land in dispute. It appears that under the law it is not that for all the grounds mentioned above these documents have to be discarded altogether. The law permits acceptance of these documents, of course subject to allowances, on each of the three or four grounds mentioned above.
22. It is true that the appellant has failed to file any exemplar of the land situate in the vicinity of the land involved in the present acquisition. Paper No. 332-Ga is in respect of the land situate in Panki, but the said document wasexecuted in the year 1967. The difference between the date of the notification under Section 4 of the Act and the date on which the aforesaid document was executed is so large that it would be wholly unsafe to rely on that document for the purposes of determining the correct market value of the land sold in the year 1956. The other transaction of land situate in the vicinity appears to be in favour of the Indian Oil Company, but the appellant has not filed any document which could establish the price and the date on which this transaction took place. In the absence of any document establishing the sale in favour of the Indian Oil Company it is not possible to find anything in favour of the appellant on that basis.
23. As already stated, the evidence furnished by the instances (Ex. 4 and Ex. 111) cannot be ignored altogether, especially when instances of precisely parallel sales are not available.. The question is only one of what allowances should be made for the differences in the conditions. One of the things which has been stressed by us above is about the size of the lands sold or transferred by the exemplars and of the land which is the subject matter of the present acquisition. In dealing with the controversies on this subject courts have allowed percentage to the extent of even fifty per cent in some cases for the purposes of arriving at a finding relating to market value of the acquired land on the basis of the exemplars filed of the lands situate in the neighbourhood of the said land. Some of these cases which may be noticed in this connection and which have accepted the principle of allowing percentage, are :--
: AIR1966All273 .
24. The difference in the location of the plots involved in the acquisition proceedings and those of the lands which were sold under sale deeds Exs. 4 and 111 is also by no means such that the same can be ignored for the purposes of determining the market value. Rather we find that up to the year 1956 when the notification under Section 4 was made in the present case, the Kanpur Development Board had sold lands situate only in that area. This area is admittedly nearer to Kanpur than the one where the land in dispute is situate. The difference in distance, as already found, is 2 miles 2 furlongs. A willing purchaser would thus be prepared to pay more for the land situate in an area which wasnearer to Kanpur than the one in question. This difference in distance also, to our minds, would affect the market value of the land. The third aspect is that exemplars Exs. 4 and 111 were in respect of developed plots, whereas the land in question lay in an area which was not developed at all.
The only two things emphasised in this connection by the learned counsel for the appellant that the land was situate on the Kalpi Road and further that electricity was available, would not, to put mind, keep it at par with the land sold by exemplars Exs. 4 and 111. The fact that electricity was available in that village by itself may not be of any value, seeing it from the point of view of establishing an industry in that area. There is no evidence on record that arrangements had been made by the Kanpur Development Board, or any other authority, making electricity available for industries. We further find that the lands sold under Exs. 4 and 111 had the amenities of sewer, roads, water supply, electricity supply, etc. These amenities are in no way less important that they can be ignored altogether, or that a difference in the market value cannot be found on that basis.
We cannot agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that since the amenities available for the area sold by Exs. 4 and 111 were not at all needed for establishing a factory so they should be ignored for the purposes of determining the market value. As the amenities available for the lands of Exs. 4 and 111 must have been taken into account for the purposes of determining the price for which they were sold, this fact cannot be ignored while determining the value of the land in dispute.
Taking all these factors, coupled with the fact that there were no building activities at the time of the notification under Section 4 of the Act in the instant case, we find that although the land in dispute had the potentiality of building site or mill site, the same could not be sold at a price higher than Rs. 2/- per square yard. As already stated, for coming to this finding about valuation of the land we have taken into consideration the various factors and the circumstances mentioned above. Valuation of immove-able property, as said in some cases, is not an exact science. It is again not an algebraic problem which could be solved by abstract formula. We have taken aid and guidance from the evidence brought on record by the appellant to the extent that we could, and after taking all the relevant considerations into account we find that the land in question could not be sold at a price higherthan at the rate of Rs. 2/- per square yard at the time when the notification under Section 4 of the Act in respect of the acquired land was made in June 1956.
25. As stated above, the appellant has also given oral evidence in support of his case. We have read the oral evidence but we do not find anything much out of the same which could assist us in arriving at the finding about the market value. The appellant, apart from the aforesaid exemplars, had further filed certain letters, Exs. 20 and 21. A lot of controversy was raised in the court below with regard to these letters. We, however, consider it unnecessary to deal with the said controversy in our judgment as according to us the said controversy is wholly immaterial when it has been found by us that the lands under exemplars Exs. 4, 5, 111 and 112 had been transferred by the Kanpur Development Board in the years already noted above.
26. Before we part with the judgment we may refer to the exemplars which have been filed from the side of the respondent in support of the case that the land did not have any potentiality of building site. These exemplars are Exs. A-6, A-7 and A-8. Ex. A-6 is a sale deed dated 25-8-1955 in respect of land situate in Nauraiya Khera. Ex. A-8 is a sale deed executed in respect of grove situate in village Panki. Ex. A-7 is again a sale deed of a plot in village Nauraiya Khera. The court below itself does not appear to have placed any reliance on these documents as the compensation awarded by it is more than what is found on the basis of these exemplars. We also do not accept these exemplars as good evidence for proving the market value of the land in question, as according to us it definitely had the potentiality of building site. These exemplars thus offer no assistance to us in determining the market value of the land.
27. One of the controversies which was raised before the Land Acquisition Officer, as well as in the court below, was as to whether the total acquired area of land belonged to the appellant or not. The court below had found that the appellant was the owner of 10 bighas 13 biswas and that the remaining land i.e., 3 bighas, 1 biswa, did not belong to him. Sri Brij Lal Gupta, learned counsel for the appellant, conceded that the finding given by the court below on the aforesaid point was correct and that he could not establish that the appellant was the owner of the entire land, i.e., 6.93 acres. We thus find that the appellant is entitled to compensation only for land measuring 10 bighas 13 biswas, or5.38 acres. On the finding that the appellant is entitled to compensation at the rate of Rs. 2/- per square yard, i.e. Rs. 9,680/- per acre, the total amount of compensation payable to him for this area would be Rs. 52,078.40.
28. Sri Brrj Lal Gupta further contended that he was entitled to interest under Section 28 of Act on the amount which was awarded by the court below over and above the amount of compensation found by the Land Acquisition Officer. Sri S. N. Upadhya, the learned Standing Counsel, could not dispute this claim of interest We also think that Sri Brij Lal Gupta is correct.
29. We thus find that the total amount of compensation to which the appellant is entitled for the land is Rs. 52,078,40. He has already been awarded a sum of Rs. 8,260/-. After giving adjustment of this amount the total amount which is now payable to the appellant is Rs. 43,818.40. The appellant will further be entitled to interest at the rate of 6% on the sum of Rs. 21,244.60, which was the amount awarded by the court below over and above the amount of compensation declared by the Land Acquisition Officer. This interest will be payable to the appellant from the date of compensation till the date of payment. The appellant is also entitled to interest at the rate of 6% on the amount found payable by us in this appeal.
30. We accordingly allow the appeal and modify the decree of the court below to the extent indicated above, and award a further sum of Rs. 43,818.40. The appellant will further be entitled to interest at the rate of 6% on the amount of Rs. 21,244.60 from the date of possession till the date of its payment. He will also get interest on the amount decreed by us in this appeal at the rate of 6% as indicated above, from the date of possession of the land till the date of its payment. The appellant will also be entitled to his costs on the sum of Rupees 43,818.40 which has been decreed by us.