1. This is the defendant's appeal against the appellate decree of Mr. Harish Chandra Asthana, Civil Judge, Lucknow, dated 20th July 1949.
2. The plaintiff alleged, the defendants appellants to be his tenants on a monthly basis at the rent of Rs. 17-8-0 per month. He stated that the tenancy commenced on 9th of each calendar month. On 17th December 1948 the plaintiff gave to the appellants a notice to vacate on 8th January 1949. On 30th November 1948 the plain, tiff had previously applied to the District Magistrate for permission to file a suit for ejectment. This permission was granted on 4th January 1949. Thereafter a suit was instituted for recovery of arrears of rent for 5 months and for ejectment. It was contended in the trial Court that there was no wilful default in the payment of rent and that the permission obtained for filing the suit was not valid. The learned trial Court held that there was no wilful default in the payment of rent, but held that the permission obtained from the District Magistrate was valid. The suit for ejectment and for arrears of rent was accordingly decreed. In appeal the only point pressed was that the permission obtained to file the suit was not valid inasmuch as the permission was granted by Mr. Nigam, who had been authorised only in February 1948 by Mr. Pandit, the then District Magistrate, that at the time of the suit there was another District Magistrate who had not delegated his powers to Mr. Nigam and so the sanction given by Mr. Nigam was invalid. The learned lower Appellate Court did not accept this contention of the appellants and dismissed the appeal.
3. The only point seriously urged before this Court again is that the powers of the District Magistrate under the Rent Control Act were delegated to Mr. Nigam by Mr. Pandit in February 1948 and that at time of the suit the powers had not been delegated by the then District Magistrate and in the circumstances the power was not rightly exercised by Mr. Nigam. This contention has really no substance. Section 3, Rent Control Act directs that if the permission is required it shall be given by the District Magistrate. Sub-section (d) of Section 2 of the Act says that ''District Magistrate' includes an officer authorised by the District Magistrate to perform any of his functions under the Rent Control Act. Under Section 3, therefore,' District Magistrate' means not only the District Magistrate but also the officer authorized by the District Magistrate to perform any of his functions under the Act. The power of delegation has been given to the District Magistrate as a functionary and not to the person by name. This functionary is permanent and there is a permanent succession to this office. Under Section 18, U. P. General Clauses Act it is laid down:
' In any United Provinces Act, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of indicating the relation of a law to the successor of any functionaries or of corporations having perpetual succession, to express its relation to the functionaries or corporations.'
It is, therefore, clear that an order passed by any particular individual in his capacity as District Magistrate shall be deemed to be an order passed by his successors in office when he is succeeded by another person and it is not necessary that a successor should pass a fresh order to keep in effect the previous order of his predecessor. It is up to the successor to change the order of his predecessor if he wants to, but so long as the order is not changed it shall continue to be effective until it is changed by the successor. It is clear, therefore, that it makes no difference that Mr. Nigam was not separately authorised by the successor of Mr. Pandit to exercise the powers under the Act. It is enough that the delegation made by Mr. Pandit, the previous District Magistrate, had not been changed by his successor when the sanction was given by Mr. Nigam.
4. In this view of the matter there is no force in the appeal and it fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.
5. A request was made on behalf of the appellants that in case the appeal is dismissed, a fortnight's time may be given to the appellants to make suitable arrangement to obtain other accommodation. Knowing the great difficulty which the people have to face in obtaining accommodation these days, the request is not unreasonable and it is accordingly directed that the appellants should vacate the premises in their occupation within 15 days from today. The order regarding the stay of delivery of possession is withdrawn except to the extent just indicated above. The applications Nos. 880 and 881 of 1949 are both infructuous in view of the dismissal of the appeal and are accordingly rejected.