S.S. Dhavan, J.
1. This is a plaintiff's second appeal from the decree of the Civil Judge, Gorakhpur reversing that of the 3rd Additional Munsif and dismissing his suit for an injunction to restrain the defendant-respondents from interfering with his right to use a piece of land and for a mandatory injunction to close up a door and a window opening on this land. The houses of the plaintiff appellant Parmatma Prasad and the defendant-respondent Mst. Sampatti are adjacent with a vacant plot of land between them. The plaintiff alleged in his plaint that the strip of land between the two houses belonged to him and he had constructed a latrine on it for his use, that the defendants had recently opened a door and window in the wall of their house facing the vacant plot (and also facing the plaintiff's house); that the defendants had recently demolished a wall of the plaintiff's latrine, and when the plaintiff protested they threatened to assault him. The plaintiff then filed this suit and asked for an injunction to restrain the defendants from interfering with his use of the strip of land and for a mandatory injunction requiring them to close up their door and window in their own wall.
2. The defendants resisted the suit and denied that the strip of land or the latrine belonged to him. They asserted that both belonged to them.
3. The trial court held that the latrine belongs to the plaintiff and that he had been in possession of the strip of land Accordingly, it issued an injunction to restrain the defendants from interfering with his possession of this strip, but refused to issue a mandatory injunction to the defendants to close up the door and window in their wall.
4. The defendants appealed and the plaintiff filed a cross-objection. The Civil Judge, disagreeing with the trial court, found that the plaintiff-respondent had not established any title to the land -- not even a possessory title, and was therefore, not entitled to any injunction with regard to this land. He also held that the defendants too had not established their title to the strip of land, but he was of the view that the plaintiff had to establish his own title before he could succeed in his suit. He allowed the appeal and dismissed the plaintiff's suit and also his cross-objection. The latter has come here in second appeal.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant and the defendant-respondents. Counsel for the appellant contended that the view of the lower appellate court that the plaintiff had not established his title to the strip of land is erroneous. He contended that the Civil Judge had misconstrued a document produced by the plaintiff and this vitiated his assessment of evidence This argument is based on a misunderstanding of the phrase 'misconstruction (or misinterpretation) of a document' It means that that the Court has misconstrued the legal effect or nature of a document. For example,if the document creates a lease but the Court wrongly thinks it is a license, or if it is an agreement of guarantee but the Court holds it to be one of indemnity, this is a misconstruction of the document. But if a document contains allegations or recitals of facts and a party relies on these recitals in proof of his own allegation of facts, and the Court either rejects the recitals as incorrect or misunderstands their effects, this is not a misconstruction of the document but an erroneous view of the facts stated in the document. In the present case the question was whether the strip of land belonged to the plaintiff or defendants. The plaintiff in support of his claim produced a copy of a sale deed of the defendants' house in which the boundary of the plaintiff's house was described as the defendants' house. But the Court held that the description of the plaintiff's boundary in the sale deed as 'the defendants' house' did not mean that the vacant strip of land between the two houses belonged to the plaintiff. Counsel contended that this amounts to a misconstruction of the document. I do not agree. It amounts at the most to a mistaken view of the facts stated in the document. Facts may be known to persons or recited in documents. If alleged in a document, the production of that document is really production of factual evidence contained in it. If the Court makes a wrong assessment of this evidence, it does not amount to a misconstruction of the nature of the document.
6. Counsel for the plaintiff vehemently argued that in view of the defendant's denial of the plaintiff's title, to the latrine the latter is entitled to an injunction to restrain the defendants from interfering with his possession and use of the latrine. I cannot agree. A mere denial by the defendant of a plaintiff's title to land does not entitle the latter to an injunction though it may entitle him to a declaration of his title. For an injunction he must establish that the defendant has not merely denied his title but interfered, or attempted or threatened to interfere, with his possession of use, and therefore there is a reasonable apprehension in his mind that the defendant will again interfere. A party has a right to deny the other party's title and assert his own to the land, in a court of law, but this will not render him liable to an injunction if he has not been guilty of any conduct raising a reasonable apprehension that he is likely to interfere with the other party's rights, and if the court issues an injunction it will be penalising a citizen's exercise of a legal right. In this case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants demolished the wall of the plaintiffs latrine and opened a door and a window in his wall adjoining the vacant strip of land. As regards the first allegation, he has been disbelieved. As regards the second, a person is entitled to open a door or a window in his own wall unless he is under a legal obligation to another person not to do so. Theplaintiff cannot object to his opening the door and the wall on the strip of land, because he failed to establish that this strip belongs to him.
7. The plaintiff's claim for an injunction was therefore rightly dismissed. But he is entitled to a declaration of his title to the latrine. I therefore pass a decree declaring that the latrine belongs to the plaintiff and he has the exclusive right to use it. The plaintiff shall pay additional court-fee, if any, on this relief. Mr. Ambika Prasad undertakes to do so. The decree of the court below is modified to this extent, otherwise the appeal is dismissed.
8. The parties shall bear their owncosts of this appeal.