Hari Swarup, J.
1. The petitioner claims to be a tenant of the accommodation. He got an allotment order under the provisions of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (Act No. XIII of 1972) on 25-8-1976. In respect of this property proceedings for acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act had commenced by a notification under Section 4 of the Act in 1965. Final notification was issued in 1968 under Section 6 of the Act. The acquisition was for a company. The petitioner by a letter addressed to the Chief Minister of the State dated 29th Sept. 1976 requested that the property be released fromacquisition, and also prayed for the stay of the acquisition proceedings. The award was given by the Collector on 4-8-1977. The present petition has now been filed.
2. The petitioner has challenged the acquisition proceedings and has further alleged that even if the proceedings be there, he cannot be ejected under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act.
3. So far as the question of the validity of acquisition is concerned, we do not think it is open to the petitioner to challenge them at this stage. The notification under Section 6 was issued as far back as in 1968. The petitioner became tenant only in August 1976. The petitioner had full knowledge of these proceedings at the time or immediately after he took the tenancy as is evident from Annexure 9 filed by him. There is no justification for his not coming to this Court earlier if he had any grievance or if he bad any right to challenge the acquisition proceedings. There is no explanation for the laches on the part of the petitioner. The petitioner cannot be now permitted to challenge the land acquisition proceedings even if he be presumed to have any right to challenge them. Further, no basic objection, about the jurisdiction to acquire property has been raised. The objections are only about procedural matters. The affidavit filed in support of the petition is also not by the petitioner but by some other person. The averments are not specific but only vague.
4. The point raised by the learnedcounsel about the petitioner's right to continue in possession even after the award has been made, has no merit. Section 16 of the Act permits the Collector to take possession after the award has been made under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act. It was held by the Supreme Court in B. N. Bhagde v. M. D. Bhagwat (AIR 1975 SC 1767) that possession under Section 16 means 'actual possession' and not 'symbolic possession'. Section 16 thus requires the Collector to eject everyone who may be In occupation of the land. The contention of the learned counsel is that the petitioner being a tenant, cannot be ejected. We find no merit in the contention be-cause if the landlord in possession can be ejected under Section 16, we see no reason why a tenant who derives title from the landlord, cannot be ejected. Section 47 of the Act gives ample jurisdiction to the Collector to enforce the surrender of the land to himself.
5. Learned counsel has urged that because the award has not been given either against or in favour of the petitioner he cannot be evicted. The contention is that possession cannot be taken from the petitioner because his claim was not considered by the Collector while giving the award. The petitioner had never filed any objection or claim before the Land Acquisition Officer for a share in the compensation. He had come into the picture much after notification under Section 9 of the Act had been issued. Ever, if it be that the Collector could suo motu take into consideration the petitioner's claim in the compensation, that case gives him only a right to ask for a reference to the District Judge and not a right to resist the eviction from the property under Section 16 of the Act. It is the making of the award that gives to the Collector jurisdiction to take possession. Merely a claim to apportionment in the compensation awarded cannot oust his jurisdiction to act under Section 16.
6. Learned counsel also urged that because the petitioner had got an allotment order in his favour under the provisions of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972, he can be ejected only by proceedings under Section 21 of that Act. There is also no merit in this contention because once the proceedings for acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act have been completed the rights of the landlord get extinct, and once they are extinct, by reason of Section 111 of the T. P. Act the rights of the tenant also come to an end. No relationship of landlord and tenant exists between the petitioner and the State Government and the question of taking proceedings under Section 21 does not arise.
7. The petition for mandamus has also become infructuous as it has been admitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has already vacated the premises and has delivered possession to the Collector in compliance with the notice served on him.
8. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed.