1. This is a revision against the applicant's conviction under Section 186, Penal Code for having obstructed a commissioner' appointed by a civil Court in his attempt to enter his house in order to attach articles.
2. It was urged that no physical obstruction was caused to the commissioner and that, therefore, no offence under Section 186, Penal Code was made out. The judgment of the trial Court in the summary trial just mentions that the commissioner stated that he was obstructed and that the learned Magistrate believed that the commissioner was obstructed. It does not indicate as to what facts constituted the obstruction. I, therefore, looked up the initial report of the incident which the commissioner submitted to the civil Court. In this report the commissioner mentions that the accused stood at the door challenging the plaintiff to beat him if he tried to enter the house and that when the commissioner told him not to interfere in his preparing the list the accused began to show force and did not allow him to enter the house. It is clear that the commissioner deposed to something of the kind in Court and that the report makes out that there was actual obstruction to the commissioner when he attempted to enter the house.
3. The complaint filed by the Munsif related the facts of the case and then said that he was making the complaint under Section 182, Penal Code for the trial of the accused for the offence. It is argued that on this complaint the accused could not have been tried and convicted of an offence under Section 186, Penal Code because the Court did not lodge the complaint for trial under Section 186, Penal Code as required by Section 195(1)(a), Criminal P.C.I do not agree with the contention. The mis-description of the section of the Penal I Code with reference to the offence made out by 1 the facts alleged does not vitiate the complaint. 1 When a complaint has beta made to the Court I under Section 195, Criminal P.C., the criminal Court j is free to frame any charge on the basis of those I facts. It is the allegations of facts which constitute the complaint. Reference of specific sections relating to the offences made out by these facts is no essential ingredient of complaint.
4. Section 4(1)(h), Criminal P.C., defines the word 'complaint' as follows:
Complaint' means the allegations made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under the Criminal Procedure Code that some person whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but it does not include the report of a police officer.
The definition of the word 'complaint' does not contemplate reference to the specific sections of the enactment making a certain conduct an offence. It follows, therefore, that omission to mention the offence made out by the facts or mentioning a wrong section does not invalidate a complaint and does not take away the jurisdiction of the Court to whom the complaint is made to try a person complained against for any of the offences which can be made out on the basis of the allegations in the complaint.
5. There is ample authority in support of the above view. It was taken in Emperor v. Alli ('03) 25 All. 209; Balusamy Lyyar v. Emperor : AIR1929Mad188 ; Hampana Gowd v. Emperor : AIR1936Mad280 Mt. Naurati v. Emperor 12 A.I.R. 1925 Lah. 631; Emperor v. Bal Mukand ('28) 15 A.I.R. 1928 Lah. 510;Jugeshwar Singh v. Emperor ('36) 23 A.I.R. 1936 Pat. 346 and Provincial Government v. Gomaji ('44) 31 A.I.R. 1944 Nag. 192.
6. The view taken in H.H.B. Gill v. Emperor 34 A.I.R. 1947 F.C. 9, leads to the same conclusion though that case dealt with the question of an accused being tried for an offence other than the offence mentioned in the orders sanctioning the prosecution. Their Lordships of the Federal Court observed at page 116:
It was urged that Gill's trial was vitiated by want at sanction under Section 197, Criminal P.C., in respect of an offence under Section 120B/161, Penal Code. Here too, the contention was that inasmuch as the sanction of the Governor-General under that section was confined to the prosecution' of Gill for having committed daring the years 1941 and 1942 offences punishable under Section 161 and Section 120B read with Section 420, Penal Code,' it was not adequate to cover a charge under Section 120B read with Section 161.... We consider it unnecessary to enter upon a discussion and determination of that question as in our judgment the sanction of the Governor-General in Council dated 3-2-1943, enabled the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate to take cognizance of the offences set out in the sanction and cognizance having properly been taken, the subsequent course of the proceedings would be regulated by the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The mere fact that at the stage of framing charges against the accused the Magistrate came to the conclusion that on the basis of the evidence recorded, charges ought to be framed under Section 161 and Section 120B read with Section 161 instead of under Section 161 and Section 120B read with Section 420, would not render the sanction already granted nugatory and invalidate the Magistrate's action in taking cognizance of the offences set out in the sanction.
7. I am, therefore, of opinion that the criminal Court took cognizance of this case on the complaint of the Munsif and was competent to try the accused for any offence made out against him on the material on record; especially when the offence made out is based on the facts alleged in the complaint lodged by the Munsif. I, therefore, see no illegality in conviction of the applicant and, accordingly, reject this application in revision.